The End Of Culture
For years now, I’ve collected ideas for fixing cultural drift, and tried to judge which seem more promising. Thankfully, my efforts seem to finally be converging. Let’s set aside the terrible or infeasible options of restarting cultural evolution either by collapsing society so far that we revive the simple harsh world of centuries ago, or by fragmenting our world into many sufficiently insular units. Aside from these, I now see our most promising fixes as modest variations on the same general approach: replace accidental variation and selection of culture with deliberate steering.
This general approach requires us to accomplish three big things, none of which are easy. Our specific options vary mainly in the order we do these, and in how much each helps the others. These three things to accomplish are: 1) learn more about how to manage culture, 2) create governance systems better able to achieve the goals we give them, and 3) change the values that we use to direct our governance systems toward more valuing adaption, either directly or indirectly.
First, we must learn much more about how to deliberately track and steer cultural change. One promising approach here is to work harder to learn how to monitor and manage corporate cultures. (Perhaps via combo prediction markets.) Success there might be quite profitable, as cultural decay is the main way firms now lose value, and might also enable and inspire efforts to manage cultures on larger scales.
If management of culture turns out to be surprisingly easy, then maybe existing governance would be up to this task. But more likely, we will need governance systems more competent than those we now use on large scales. So that when we assign to them the task of making culture more adaptive, they actually achieve that result. And so this is the second big thing we must accomplish. Possibilities for more competent forms of government include futarchy, and for-profit governance.
Widespread adoption of for-profit-governance on larger scales could plausibly result from mass elimination of our many current limits on the scope of capitalism in our lives. As cultural drift over the last few centuries has resulted mainly from capitalism changing its areas too fast for other areas not run by capitalism to keep up, drift seems solved by letting capitalism run everything.
Luckily we do now let capitalism run most all of our AI world, so cultural drift might be fixed soon after AIs replace humans wholesale in the economy. Though AI capitalism might become much more limited if we either love or hate AIs too much.
Alas, most people today hate the idea of unleashing capitalism to run everything for ordinary humans, including their fertility and governance. Therefore, the third big thing we must accomplish, and the hardest, is to change common values to more favor adaption, either directly or indirectly. Unleashing capitalism indirectly promotes adaption, and we might instead come to more directly value adaptation, and task competent governance institutions with achieving it. For example, we might make markets estimating the future adaptive success of particular small groups, and give those who govern such groups strong incentives to make such estimates rise. Reward if rise, fire if fall.
Alas, it seems quite hard to get most people to value the adaptive success of their groups. But for groups that are large enough, it might work nearly as well to get them to value earlier dates for concrete achievements that would plausibly be delayed by civilization collapse. Such as when do a million people live in space, or when do we achieve immortality for ordinary humans.
Thus “all” we need to do to fix cultural drift is to 1) learn to manage cultures, 2) adopt more competent governance systems, and 3) change our values, directly or indirectly, to more value adaption. Easy-peasy.


Regarding 'letting capitalism run everything.' Have you read reviews of or discussed with anyone the book by Bowles', Understanding Capitalism? It's a textbook, so I assume you would not have actually read it, since you are an academic economist and the book is an introduction to political economy -- just asking an opinion of its view; Since Bowles and colleagues advocate *not* letting capitalism run everything.
I don't understand why it suggests we need to value adaption more or even what that means in this context. I get the idea that adaptation means something like ability to respond to evolutionary pressures but once you no longer have cultural evolution I don't understand what that even means.
I mean imagine we can manage culture in a really productive and efficient way but that only works because there is a single global culture, ie, the practice could be exploited if we ever had to again compete against a different culture. Does that mean that is an anti-adaptive practice because it would be disfavored in a system of cultural adaptation?
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More generally, I think this is what I don't understand about this whole view. I agree that in some sense there are dangers associated with losing the prior competetive environment but you seem to think we can derive that some specific property we need more of -- adaptation.
Is this trivial and you just mean something like good or efficient or what?