Hanging out with moral philosophers last week at Oxford reminded me of the old complaint that economists neglect morality. Actually, I think the real problem is the reverse! Let me explain. Many people advise us on what to do. Some discuss personal actions, while others suggest how groups could better coordinate. And, crucially, some advise us on what we
So econ informs on how to get what we want, and morality informs on what we should do. Econ is regarding the supply and demand of goods and services. Morality is concerned with good and bad. Ok, the first distinction is economics defining economics. The second is morality defining morality. What about each domains definition of the other domain?
• What is the morality based definition of economics?• What is the economics definition of morality?
Regarding the first point; how can the moralist hope to handle economics sans economic theory?On the second point; Economics deals with quantities such as supply, demand, price and efficiency. The economics definition of morality concerns how the moralist hopes to manipulate these variables, and for what affect. So take a supply and demand cross and ask; what does the moralist want to do here? It must be something to do with moving away from equilibrium. Otherwise why bother?
Phil's critique is interesting but, I think wrong. Desire utilitarianism is specifically limited to the domain of malleable desires - those that can be manipulated through social pressure. That means the buddhism option is right out. Moreover, satanism is probably out too given that people have prosocial traits like reciprocity, guilt, and sympathy.
A better critique is that desire utilitarianism is nothing but nash bargaining problem between large numbers of people. The nature of the social contract and our social norms are themselves the product of a bargaining problem. Thus it suffers from all the problems that happen in bargaining situations in which there is a powerful actor with a large threat advantage. It is justice as mutual advantage in a new dress, not preference utilitarianism or anything unique. See also my criticism based on the case of the 900 racists
I suspect we define morality differently. To me, morality defines distinction between good and bad. Of course, this distinction is not universally judged - it may be judged differently by each individual. In that sense, I tend toward a position of egoistic utilitarianism.
However, I also tend toward a position that scales. If we behave in a way that would cause us all misery should we behave that way, then we are shooting (not a collective foot) all our feet. In other words, we need to be mindful to disentangle ourselves from prisoner's dilemmas which pool into tragedies of the commons.
When there is no such conflict, acting to achieve our ends is perfectly moral. I suspect both that (a) this is true most of the time -- for most of our actions, and (b) that these are not the interesting decisions in life...
Your comments seem reasonable. A cursory study of recent history surely suggests Republicans like to wrap their greed in blankets of religiosity. Yes I agree.
Rebecca, yes there is a possible position on morality which says morality is exactly getting everyone what they want, in which case there would indeed be no conflict between morality and getting everyone what they want. But you seem to accept that most people's concept of morality seems different from this, and thus can conflict with wants.
I said in the post that people want to appear more moral than they want to be, and I don't see that this theory is undermined by your observation that people publicly condemn immorality.
I completely agree that it's a rationalisation, but the point is that they feel pressure to be seen to be acting morally, which - however you analyse it - involves (perhaps reluctant, in some cases) recognition that there are more important things than their own wants. Those recognised other things might involve morality, or they might involve a selfish desire to avoid being seen as a certain type of person. But even the latter indirectly involves moral concerns: in this case, it is the desire not to be seen as a selfish person who always prioritises their own wants. And our condemnation of selfish people who prioritise their own wants, if such condemnation is reflective and intelligent, is primarily moral. (If it is unreflective, there may be an evolutionary explation for it.)
It may be that most people's conceptions of morality are more substantial than what liberalism lays out, but my point is that even the liberal conception of morality is a conception of morality, and it captures quite well the desire you attributed to humans for a policy that considers our wants overall. Therefore, humans do want a moral policy. I think that to claim that what humans want is a policy that prioritises our wants in a way that does not conform to *any* plausible conception of morality is going to be implausible. For example, the claim that all (or most) humans want a policy that prioritises their own wants at the expense of everyone else's wants is, I believe, implausible. Some humans may want this, and perhaps many of us occasionally daydream about how nice such a policy would sometimes be, but (I hope that) few mentally healthy individuals seriously want it.
Rebecca, when people say "they don't care" or when they cite "constraints", we can usually clearly see the other considerations that weighed against morality. For example, yes money is limited, but we can see other discretionary items in their budget and infer that they preferred those items to local meat. People like to talk as if they had no choice to excuse their choices, but we know better.
I agree there is social pressure to be moral and that one liberal ideal limits morality to dealing efficiently with conflicting wants, but most people's concepts of morality go well beyond this.
I wonder whether this is really true: 'But in fact we care only moderately about what we "should" do'. In my experience, when asked to justify their actions, many people will attempt to argue that they do act morally - and, if pointed out that they do not act in the most moral way, will claim that they are unable to do so because of certain constraints (e.g. the people who say, 'I know that buying meat that is produced cruelly isn't ideal, but it's cheaper and my money is limited'). Or, more rarely, they will disengage and agree that they don't act morally, but that they don't care. I haven't ever come across someone who concedes that they do not always act morally, but justifies this by claiming that they care less about morality than about other considerations. Perhaps this comes down to an impoverished conceptual scheme, or to social pressure to be seen to be moral. But there is social pressure to be seen to be moral for at least one good reason: being moral, at least in part, involves being considerate of others. For that reason, the claim that '[w]hat we humans want is policy that considers our wants overall, without giving excess weight to morality' is misleading. On one view of morality - namely liberalism - a policy that considers our wants overall just is a policy that gives primary weight to morality, provided that this policy recognises that people's various wants often conflict, and that measures are sometimes necessary to prevent the wants of one person or group causing significant harm to another person or group. Having said that, I think you're partly right: in liberal societies, people don't see why they shouldn't satisfy their wants providing that doing so doesn't harm anyone else. That this is true can be seen from the fact that legislation against acts that don't cause significant harm to others - such as homosexuality between consenting adults - is generally frowned upon in most Western societies.
A disclaimer: I have only skim-read the other comments, apologies if I'm rehashing something that's already been said!
Robin, I expect to, but do NOT intend to, continue to choose to do things I shouldn't do and that I don't have good reasons for doing. What this this say about me, in comparison to someone who intends to continue acting in this way?
The fact that value is not an end in itself distinguishes values from wants/desires. It's a heuristic to help us make better decisions (e.g. stick with social norms)?
So a value is a rule of thumb that helps make decisions so that we get what we want in the long run (=means)?
Is it that a value is a separate term in our total utility function? Like "don't deceive people" = "i believe deception is wrong" = "when making decisions choose an action in which degree of deception is as low as possible. Any deviation from this will cause you huge penalty". So you just take a function (e.g. a sum) over the separate values and preferences/wants and voila there's your total utility. In this sense I still stick with the claim that in some contexts is useful to consider values and wants equivalent.
Richard, it is not clear to me if what we should do is the same as what we have the most reason to do. But it is clear that we often knowingly choose acts other than what we believe is the act we have the most reason to do, and other than the act we think we should do. Call us "irrational" if you will, but we expect to and intend to continue this behavior.
I'm not sure how I can be any more direct or clear about this: we all knowingly make choices contrary to what we "should" choose. Yes sometimes this is due to mistakes, but it mainly reflects the fact that we do not want only to be moral.
I disagree. I believe that enlightened self-interest is a sufficient basis for morality. In this view, when we make choices contrary to what we "should" choose, it is always due to mistakes (lack of enlightenment). A fully enlightened being (if such a being could exist) would never knowingly make choices contrary to what "should" be chosen.
Sometimes we feel a conflict between what we want and what we know we should do. You seem to believe that this conflict must be due to competing values (wanting to do the moral thing versus wanting to do the immoral thing). I believe that the conflict is due to bugs in our algorithms for making decisions (lack of enlightenment).
What would it mean to want to be moral (to do the moral thing) purely for the sake of morality itself, rather than for the sake of something else? What could this possibly mean to a scientific materialistic atheist? What is this abstract, independent, pure morality? Where does it come from? How can we know it? I think we must conclude that morality is a means, not an end in itself.
Robin, you keep putting "should" in inverted commas. Philosophers are interested in what we should do, not what we "should" do. So I'm trying to work out whether we are just talking past each other. Shifting to a neutral, unambiguous vocabulary might help. Hence my question: are the "amoral" decisions you're talking about ones that the agent can endorse on reflection, or judge as what they have most reason (all things considered) to do?
If so, they're assuming normative principles. If not, the agent is irrational by their own lights. Either way, you can't avoid the fact that decision-making -- and the practical reasoning that underlies it -- is essentially normative.
So econ informs on how to get what we want, and morality informs on what we should do. Econ is regarding the supply and demand of goods and services. Morality is concerned with good and bad. Ok, the first distinction is economics defining economics. The second is morality defining morality. What about each domains definition of the other domain?
• What is the morality based definition of economics?• What is the economics definition of morality?
Regarding the first point; how can the moralist hope to handle economics sans economic theory?On the second point; Economics deals with quantities such as supply, demand, price and efficiency. The economics definition of morality concerns how the moralist hopes to manipulate these variables, and for what affect. So take a supply and demand cross and ask; what does the moralist want to do here? It must be something to do with moving away from equilibrium. Otherwise why bother?
Phil's critique is interesting but, I think wrong. Desire utilitarianism is specifically limited to the domain of malleable desires - those that can be manipulated through social pressure. That means the buddhism option is right out. Moreover, satanism is probably out too given that people have prosocial traits like reciprocity, guilt, and sympathy.
A better critique is that desire utilitarianism is nothing but nash bargaining problem between large numbers of people. The nature of the social contract and our social norms are themselves the product of a bargaining problem. Thus it suffers from all the problems that happen in bargaining situations in which there is a powerful actor with a large threat advantage. It is justice as mutual advantage in a new dress, not preference utilitarianism or anything unique. See also my criticism based on the case of the 900 racists
I suspect we define morality differently. To me, morality defines distinction between good and bad. Of course, this distinction is not universally judged - it may be judged differently by each individual. In that sense, I tend toward a position of egoistic utilitarianism.
However, I also tend toward a position that scales. If we behave in a way that would cause us all misery should we behave that way, then we are shooting (not a collective foot) all our feet. In other words, we need to be mindful to disentangle ourselves from prisoner's dilemmas which pool into tragedies of the commons.
When there is no such conflict, acting to achieve our ends is perfectly moral. I suspect both that (a) this is true most of the time -- for most of our actions, and (b) that these are not the interesting decisions in life...
Your comments seem reasonable. A cursory study of recent history surely suggests Republicans like to wrap their greed in blankets of religiosity. Yes I agree.
Rebecca, yes there is a possible position on morality which says morality is exactly getting everyone what they want, in which case there would indeed be no conflict between morality and getting everyone what they want. But you seem to accept that most people's concept of morality seems different from this, and thus can conflict with wants.
I said in the post that people want to appear more moral than they want to be, and I don't see that this theory is undermined by your observation that people publicly condemn immorality.
I completely agree that it's a rationalisation, but the point is that they feel pressure to be seen to be acting morally, which - however you analyse it - involves (perhaps reluctant, in some cases) recognition that there are more important things than their own wants. Those recognised other things might involve morality, or they might involve a selfish desire to avoid being seen as a certain type of person. But even the latter indirectly involves moral concerns: in this case, it is the desire not to be seen as a selfish person who always prioritises their own wants. And our condemnation of selfish people who prioritise their own wants, if such condemnation is reflective and intelligent, is primarily moral. (If it is unreflective, there may be an evolutionary explation for it.)
It may be that most people's conceptions of morality are more substantial than what liberalism lays out, but my point is that even the liberal conception of morality is a conception of morality, and it captures quite well the desire you attributed to humans for a policy that considers our wants overall. Therefore, humans do want a moral policy. I think that to claim that what humans want is a policy that prioritises our wants in a way that does not conform to *any* plausible conception of morality is going to be implausible. For example, the claim that all (or most) humans want a policy that prioritises their own wants at the expense of everyone else's wants is, I believe, implausible. Some humans may want this, and perhaps many of us occasionally daydream about how nice such a policy would sometimes be, but (I hope that) few mentally healthy individuals seriously want it.
Rebecca, when people say "they don't care" or when they cite "constraints", we can usually clearly see the other considerations that weighed against morality. For example, yes money is limited, but we can see other discretionary items in their budget and infer that they preferred those items to local meat. People like to talk as if they had no choice to excuse their choices, but we know better.
I agree there is social pressure to be moral and that one liberal ideal limits morality to dealing efficiently with conflicting wants, but most people's concepts of morality go well beyond this.
I wonder whether this is really true: 'But in fact we care only moderately about what we "should" do'. In my experience, when asked to justify their actions, many people will attempt to argue that they do act morally - and, if pointed out that they do not act in the most moral way, will claim that they are unable to do so because of certain constraints (e.g. the people who say, 'I know that buying meat that is produced cruelly isn't ideal, but it's cheaper and my money is limited'). Or, more rarely, they will disengage and agree that they don't act morally, but that they don't care. I haven't ever come across someone who concedes that they do not always act morally, but justifies this by claiming that they care less about morality than about other considerations. Perhaps this comes down to an impoverished conceptual scheme, or to social pressure to be seen to be moral. But there is social pressure to be seen to be moral for at least one good reason: being moral, at least in part, involves being considerate of others. For that reason, the claim that '[w]hat we humans want is policy that considers our wants overall, without giving excess weight to morality' is misleading. On one view of morality - namely liberalism - a policy that considers our wants overall just is a policy that gives primary weight to morality, provided that this policy recognises that people's various wants often conflict, and that measures are sometimes necessary to prevent the wants of one person or group causing significant harm to another person or group. Having said that, I think you're partly right: in liberal societies, people don't see why they shouldn't satisfy their wants providing that doing so doesn't harm anyone else. That this is true can be seen from the fact that legislation against acts that don't cause significant harm to others - such as homosexuality between consenting adults - is generally frowned upon in most Western societies.
A disclaimer: I have only skim-read the other comments, apologies if I'm rehashing something that's already been said!
Unknown, not expecting to do what you intend must feel very frustrating.
Are you saying you don't? You never expect to break some resolution due to weakness of will or simple forgetfulness or whatever?
Dr, yes folks should do what they should, but don't want to.
Unknown, not expecting to do what you intend must feel very frustrating.
Robin, I expect to, but do NOT intend to, continue to choose to do things I shouldn't do and that I don't have good reasons for doing. What this this say about me, in comparison to someone who intends to continue acting in this way?
The fact that value is not an end in itself distinguishes values from wants/desires. It's a heuristic to help us make better decisions (e.g. stick with social norms)?
So a value is a rule of thumb that helps make decisions so that we get what we want in the long run (=means)?
Is it that a value is a separate term in our total utility function? Like "don't deceive people" = "i believe deception is wrong" = "when making decisions choose an action in which degree of deception is as low as possible. Any deviation from this will cause you huge penalty". So you just take a function (e.g. a sum) over the separate values and preferences/wants and voila there's your total utility. In this sense I still stick with the claim that in some contexts is useful to consider values and wants equivalent.
Richard, it is not clear to me if what we should do is the same as what we have the most reason to do. But it is clear that we often knowingly choose acts other than what we believe is the act we have the most reason to do, and other than the act we think we should do. Call us "irrational" if you will, but we expect to and intend to continue this behavior.
Robin,
I'm not sure how I can be any more direct or clear about this: we all knowingly make choices contrary to what we "should" choose. Yes sometimes this is due to mistakes, but it mainly reflects the fact that we do not want only to be moral.
I disagree. I believe that enlightened self-interest is a sufficient basis for morality. In this view, when we make choices contrary to what we "should" choose, it is always due to mistakes (lack of enlightenment). A fully enlightened being (if such a being could exist) would never knowingly make choices contrary to what "should" be chosen.
Sometimes we feel a conflict between what we want and what we know we should do. You seem to believe that this conflict must be due to competing values (wanting to do the moral thing versus wanting to do the immoral thing). I believe that the conflict is due to bugs in our algorithms for making decisions (lack of enlightenment).
What would it mean to want to be moral (to do the moral thing) purely for the sake of morality itself, rather than for the sake of something else? What could this possibly mean to a scientific materialistic atheist? What is this abstract, independent, pure morality? Where does it come from? How can we know it? I think we must conclude that morality is a means, not an end in itself.
Robin, you keep putting "should" in inverted commas. Philosophers are interested in what we should do, not what we "should" do. So I'm trying to work out whether we are just talking past each other. Shifting to a neutral, unambiguous vocabulary might help. Hence my question: are the "amoral" decisions you're talking about ones that the agent can endorse on reflection, or judge as what they have most reason (all things considered) to do?
If so, they're assuming normative principles. If not, the agent is irrational by their own lights. Either way, you can't avoid the fact that decision-making -- and the practical reasoning that underlies it -- is essentially normative.