Sex is near and love is far, logical analysis is near while “aha” creativity is far, and conventional art is near while unconventional art is far. These results seem to confirm my suggestion that near mode emphasizes practical action, while far mode emphasizes social image. Sex is more what we really want, while love is more how we present ourselves to get such things. Analysis tends to be more practical, while “creativity” and unconventionality is more done to show off. More
This argument seems more like a personal opinion rather than a factual one. Were is your evidence? And even if you do, is it distinct from your own bias?
I agree that that statement is poorly supported, and seems quite presumptuous. Based on a significant amount of experience I find the sensation of really being in love (even if unrequited) both more desirable and rewarding than sex, along with a number of other non-exceptional activities. It's possible I'm unusual in this though.
Saying "sex is more what we really want" isn't talking about near-far at all. It is a separate claim, that seemed to me to help support my speculation about near-far differing functions.
Okay, possibly just a problem with clarity of definitions then. But "I’ve always talked primarily about what puts us into one mode or the other" sounds very different from the phrase I cited above, where you don't use near/far terminology, you plainly say "Sex is more what we really want", not "Sex puts us into a mode of thinking where we consider more what we really want rather than how we look to others". The former (under trivial interpretation) is about wanting sex as opposed to other things, while the latter is about clarity in thinking about wanting possibly something else, with "sex" acting as cognitive cue. Which of these do you actually say?
In all of my discussions of near-far I've always talked primarily about what puts us into one mode or the other, and what is more accessible in that mode. That is pretty much all there is to something being near or far.
I agree with the near/far distinction, very interesting findings cited, but I disagree with Robin’s interpretation of it. Rather than just being ‘the public relations department of the mind’, I think the far mode is something far more important, I think it’s an entirely new form of intelligence.
My Conjecture:
Near Mode=Rationalistic Intelligence (Decision theory, Goal optimization, Bayesian)
Far Mode = Creative intelligence (Information theory, Agent coordination/integration, Analogical)
Humans don’t operate on decision theory (near mode), rather they operate on the basis of categorization and analogy formation (far mode). This could be a feature rather than a bug.
The ‘Signaling’ concept (which I agree is fundamental to far mode thought) could be more important than supposed. ‘Signaling’ can also include ‘Self-Signaling’; but I don’t see a clear difference between ‘self-signaling’ and knowledge representation.
Look at this paper (link below), it proposes to explain consciousness as a communication system, the idea is that the mind consists of multiple agents, and consciousness is a ‘cross-talk’ communication system which coordinates their decision making. (That is, 'self-signaling'). Let me suggest that this exactly equivalent to far mode thought:
Before the mind can engage in decision making, it must first represent the things it’s making decisions about (form models or representations of them). The crucial point is that Bayesian decision theory is itself a model… it presupposes a model of causality… a representation of a time-line of plans . So knowledge representation is primary, the actual process of decision making is secondary.
Back up to the previous paragraph on consciousness as self-signaling/cross-talk – between different internal sub-agents. I see no clear difference between this and knowledge representation. My suggestion is that ‘far mode’ thinking is in the fact the entire basis of intelligence!
The articles cited support my interpretation. If I am right, knowledge representation (categorization) is entirely equivalent to ‘self-signaling’ (far mode thought). Note that the linguistic task cited was a categorization task. I’m suggesting that the very categorization process itself is not something separate from far-mode thought.
Conceptual issue, not about evidence. I object to the following part of summary:
Sex is more what we really want, while love is more how we present ourselves to get such.
I would rather summarize the evidence as saying that sex primes into near mode, causes to think more of what we really want, while love primes into far mode, causing us to think of how we present outselves. Love/sex themselves are not on the near/far spectrum, as neither is about what is being signaled or what is being preferred, but rather are adaptations implementing near/far thought.
"Sex is more what we really want, while love is more how we present ourselves to get such."
This pretty much shot your credibility. Yes, the rest of the post is interesting. No, it doesn't even pretend to back up this statement. This feels like one of the more pronounced of a long line of bold, "unconventional" statements with no basis in fact or relation to the data actually discussed.
I don't think it's valid to analyze emotions using the near/far distinction. The distinction is for plans and behavior, hypothetical actions and signals about those actions. When the distinction is present, in far mode, the pressure is to signal hypothetical actions, while in near mode, the pressure is to choose different actions. For emotions, the distinction doesn't make sense, as emotions are actually present, they are not hypothetical. Now, the emotions may be an adaptation that pushes forward the signal about some other hypothetical action, but it's an important distinction.
So, for the topic of this article, I'd say both sex and love are near, while the extent of taking care about the loved ones is far, with love being the near counterpart.
This argument seems more like a personal opinion rather than a factual one. Were is your evidence? And even if you do, is it distinct from your own bias?
Seems to me just a basic Ev. Psych. explanation, no presumption there.
Yes,I think non-anonymous academic bloggers lie about TGGP's influence.Shouldn't you be linking to TGGP? Shouldn't Professor Gelman?
I don't link to him, but I claim psychopaternalist reasons for my links, not that I'm linking to what's most interesting or influential.
If analysis was practical it would have more evolved hardware to support it.
I forgot to add, I agree about the prompting effect. One does make me think more near term and other farther.
I agree that that statement is poorly supported, and seems quite presumptuous. Based on a significant amount of experience I find the sensation of really being in love (even if unrequited) both more desirable and rewarding than sex, along with a number of other non-exceptional activities. It's possible I'm unusual in this though.
Thanks, that makes sense now.
Saying "sex is more what we really want" isn't talking about near-far at all. It is a separate claim, that seemed to me to help support my speculation about near-far differing functions.
Okay, possibly just a problem with clarity of definitions then. But "I’ve always talked primarily about what puts us into one mode or the other" sounds very different from the phrase I cited above, where you don't use near/far terminology, you plainly say "Sex is more what we really want", not "Sex puts us into a mode of thinking where we consider more what we really want rather than how we look to others". The former (under trivial interpretation) is about wanting sex as opposed to other things, while the latter is about clarity in thinking about wanting possibly something else, with "sex" acting as cognitive cue. Which of these do you actually say?
In all of my discussions of near-far I've always talked primarily about what puts us into one mode or the other, and what is more accessible in that mode. That is pretty much all there is to something being near or far.
I agree with the near/far distinction, very interesting findings cited, but I disagree with Robin’s interpretation of it. Rather than just being ‘the public relations department of the mind’, I think the far mode is something far more important, I think it’s an entirely new form of intelligence.
My Conjecture:
Near Mode=Rationalistic Intelligence (Decision theory, Goal optimization, Bayesian)
Far Mode = Creative intelligence (Information theory, Agent coordination/integration, Analogical)
Humans don’t operate on decision theory (near mode), rather they operate on the basis of categorization and analogy formation (far mode). This could be a feature rather than a bug.
The ‘Signaling’ concept (which I agree is fundamental to far mode thought) could be more important than supposed. ‘Signaling’ can also include ‘Self-Signaling’; but I don’t see a clear difference between ‘self-signaling’ and knowledge representation.
Look at this paper (link below), it proposes to explain consciousness as a communication system, the idea is that the mind consists of multiple agents, and consciousness is a ‘cross-talk’ communication system which coordinates their decision making. (That is, 'self-signaling'). Let me suggest that this exactly equivalent to far mode thought:
http://www.rifters.com/craw...
Before the mind can engage in decision making, it must first represent the things it’s making decisions about (form models or representations of them). The crucial point is that Bayesian decision theory is itself a model… it presupposes a model of causality… a representation of a time-line of plans . So knowledge representation is primary, the actual process of decision making is secondary.
Back up to the previous paragraph on consciousness as self-signaling/cross-talk – between different internal sub-agents. I see no clear difference between this and knowledge representation. My suggestion is that ‘far mode’ thinking is in the fact the entire basis of intelligence!
The articles cited support my interpretation. If I am right, knowledge representation (categorization) is entirely equivalent to ‘self-signaling’ (far mode thought). Note that the linguistic task cited was a categorization task. I’m suggesting that the very categorization process itself is not something separate from far-mode thought.
Conceptual issue, not about evidence. I object to the following part of summary:
Sex is more what we really want, while love is more how we present ourselves to get such.
I would rather summarize the evidence as saying that sex primes into near mode, causes to think more of what we really want, while love primes into far mode, causing us to think of how we present outselves. Love/sex themselves are not on the near/far spectrum, as neither is about what is being signaled or what is being preferred, but rather are adaptations implementing near/far thought.
"Sex is more what we really want, while love is more how we present ourselves to get such."
This pretty much shot your credibility. Yes, the rest of the post is interesting. No, it doesn't even pretend to back up this statement. This feels like one of the more pronounced of a long line of bold, "unconventional" statements with no basis in fact or relation to the data actually discussed.
And the evidence presented in the post seems completely irrelevant to you?
I don't think it's valid to analyze emotions using the near/far distinction. The distinction is for plans and behavior, hypothetical actions and signals about those actions. When the distinction is present, in far mode, the pressure is to signal hypothetical actions, while in near mode, the pressure is to choose different actions. For emotions, the distinction doesn't make sense, as emotions are actually present, they are not hypothetical. Now, the emotions may be an adaptation that pushes forward the signal about some other hypothetical action, but it's an important distinction.
So, for the topic of this article, I'd say both sex and love are near, while the extent of taking care about the loved ones is far, with love being the near counterpart.
That is an interesting observation.