On Jan 19, 2000, I posted an email to the Extropians mailing list, giving the first public mention of the futarchy idea. (I also have a detailed PPT on the idea dated June 22, 2000, and the first pdf paper
I think it'd be interesting to have a dual-mode prediction market that had 'open bets' and 'hidden bets'. The open bets would show who was betting and how much. The hidden bets would show only after the resolution of the prediction, except to the sponsors. The sponsors would pay money to have a hidden bet of their choice hosted. The info-providers would earn reputation points on successful predictions (open or hidden) which they could wager on hidden bets to increase the share of the payout they would receive. Current available payout per point of reputation wagered on the hidden bets would be visible to the info-providers.Something like this could enable, for instance, straightforward investment into the system by an info-buyer who simply purchased info on whether a particular stock was going to go up by x% in a month. They'd thus be out-sourcing to a crowd of stock advisors. A way of connecting up a group of people with collective knowledge (like Wall Street Bets users) but insufficient individual knowledge / resources to strongly capitalize on them independently. I haven't thought through the longer term implications, but in the short term it seems like a plausible win/win for the info-buyer (capital supplier & risk accepter) and info-suppliers.
What do you mean by "running these decentralized systems"? By virtue of being decentralized, the idea is that once deployed, these frameworks don't depend on any firm running them (no hosting, no influence on operations whatsoever).
I would say personally that the biggest issue is that of liquidity, but the good thing is that since these platforms are modular, anyone can build an application on top of them (for example, an application with a limited amount of information markets leveraging a market scoring rule market maker). I think such implementations are quite within reach now.
What other issues do you think are being neglected?
In some situations yes you care only for more info than others. But in a great many other situations you want more info even if others also get that info.
Often what matters is not the absolute quality of your information, but rather whether it's better than the info that someone else has. The value of private info can be huge, but it's hard to find people willing to pay for better predictions if everyone else also gets to know the prediction.
I am well aware. But most firms running these decentralized systems are still claiming to follow all laws to the letter. And they neglect all the other issues re successful info market projects.
Regulations are an issue for centralized providers that can be easily taken down by their local authorities. There are interesting decentralized alternatives with open frameworks and usable today for non-conditional market. Conditional markets should come soon after. I am confident that these solutions will allow for the emergence of global open prediction markets that can serve as robust decision support systems in the next decade.
Free riding on paying for info is indeed an issue. But if just a few parties benefit near equally, they may be able to make a deal. Or if one party gains enough, they may pay, even if other parties also gain a lot.
So presumably you also need there to be a unique individual/group which benefits far more than others from the info. I mean otherwise why pay for the info when you can just pretend to be an info seller/trader and get the same info but let someone else pay. Or am I missing something.
The CEO thing sounds great but it is probably particularly likely to run into regulatory reform tape don’t you think?
I think it'd be interesting to have a dual-mode prediction market that had 'open bets' and 'hidden bets'. The open bets would show who was betting and how much. The hidden bets would show only after the resolution of the prediction, except to the sponsors. The sponsors would pay money to have a hidden bet of their choice hosted. The info-providers would earn reputation points on successful predictions (open or hidden) which they could wager on hidden bets to increase the share of the payout they would receive. Current available payout per point of reputation wagered on the hidden bets would be visible to the info-providers.Something like this could enable, for instance, straightforward investment into the system by an info-buyer who simply purchased info on whether a particular stock was going to go up by x% in a month. They'd thus be out-sourcing to a crowd of stock advisors. A way of connecting up a group of people with collective knowledge (like Wall Street Bets users) but insufficient individual knowledge / resources to strongly capitalize on them independently. I haven't thought through the longer term implications, but in the short term it seems like a plausible win/win for the info-buyer (capital supplier & risk accepter) and info-suppliers.
Pr. Hanson,
What do you mean by "running these decentralized systems"? By virtue of being decentralized, the idea is that once deployed, these frameworks don't depend on any firm running them (no hosting, no influence on operations whatsoever).
I would say personally that the biggest issue is that of liquidity, but the good thing is that since these platforms are modular, anyone can build an application on top of them (for example, an application with a limited amount of information markets leveraging a market scoring rule market maker). I think such implementations are quite within reach now.
What other issues do you think are being neglected?
Regards
In some situations yes you care only for more info than others. But in a great many other situations you want more info even if others also get that info.
Often what matters is not the absolute quality of your information, but rather whether it's better than the info that someone else has. The value of private info can be huge, but it's hard to find people willing to pay for better predictions if everyone else also gets to know the prediction.
I am well aware. But most firms running these decentralized systems are still claiming to follow all laws to the letter. And they neglect all the other issues re successful info market projects.
Regulations are an issue for centralized providers that can be easily taken down by their local authorities. There are interesting decentralized alternatives with open frameworks and usable today for non-conditional market. Conditional markets should come soon after. I am confident that these solutions will allow for the emergence of global open prediction markets that can serve as robust decision support systems in the next decade.
Free riding on paying for info is indeed an issue. But if just a few parties benefit near equally, they may be able to make a deal. Or if one party gains enough, they may pay, even if other parties also gain a lot.
Yes regulations are an issue.
So presumably you also need there to be a unique individual/group which benefits far more than others from the info. I mean otherwise why pay for the info when you can just pretend to be an info seller/trader and get the same info but let someone else pay. Or am I missing something.
The CEO thing sounds great but it is probably particularly likely to run into regulatory reform tape don’t you think?