One standard finding about near vs. far thinking is that in far mode we tend to focus more on our goals, while in near near mode we tend to focus more on practical constraints that limit which goals we can achieve. However, there is one kind of practical consideration that can get us to think more in far mode; an “obstacle” we are inclined to overcome:
Ok, I thought you might have covered this in previous posts. However the appearance of smooth transitions surely doesn't prove that near/far thinking isn't modal in the strict sense of the term - it could be that the seeming seamlessness is a result of hidden complexity, and deep down there really are functional transitions going on that are (just) below the level of conscious awareness.Isn't this getting to the heart of why our behavior so often differs from our explanations of it? That is, we are so abstracted from our mental mechanisms, even relatively high-level ones, that we are constantly chasing explanations for our behavior that makes sense of what these brain modules are presenting to our consciousness, where 'presenting' means 'needs to know', rather than 'this is really what I'm up to'.
The same subject came up in Jim Hamilton's continuing work on regime shifting in energy markets. When the price of gas goes above a recent peak, consumers change their buying habits. The same phenomena comes up in the Prescott growth model.
We operate short term, when buying gas, we just check the queue, if its too long we skip the purchase. Then one day we have no choice, get stuck in a long gas line and that become the obstacle. Henceforth, we look at price, using money to manage gas over longer periods, we go into another regime, so they call it regime shifting.
Robin, on the specific definition of near versus far thinking, why do you believe these alternatives constitute alternative modes of thinking, as opposed to simply a shift in time focus, with requisite shift in priorities? Consider this defn:"An option allowing a change in the method of operation of a device."Compared to for example, the distinction between episodic and semantic memory systems, there is not specifically a change in mode when switching between these mechanisms, since the brain has specific areas for each function, whereas 'mode' implies a singular piece of wetware that switches, in the algorithmic sense, as needed.
What exactly is the bi-modal mechanism in the case of near/far thinking?
Ok, I thought you might have covered this in previous posts. However the appearance of smooth transitions surely doesn't prove that near/far thinking isn't modal in the strict sense of the term - it could be that the seeming seamlessness is a result of hidden complexity, and deep down there really are functional transitions going on that are (just) below the level of conscious awareness.Isn't this getting to the heart of why our behavior so often differs from our explanations of it? That is, we are so abstracted from our mental mechanisms, even relatively high-level ones, that we are constantly chasing explanations for our behavior that makes sense of what these brain modules are presenting to our consciousness, where 'presenting' means 'needs to know', rather than 'this is really what I'm up to'.
Drewfus, as I've said before, brains seem to shift smoothly from more to less far vs. near thinking; it isn't a sharp two mode system.
The same subject came up in Jim Hamilton's continuing work on regime shifting in energy markets. When the price of gas goes above a recent peak, consumers change their buying habits. The same phenomena comes up in the Prescott growth model.
We operate short term, when buying gas, we just check the queue, if its too long we skip the purchase. Then one day we have no choice, get stuck in a long gas line and that become the obstacle. Henceforth, we look at price, using money to manage gas over longer periods, we go into another regime, so they call it regime shifting.
Robin, on the specific definition of near versus far thinking, why do you believe these alternatives constitute alternative modes of thinking, as opposed to simply a shift in time focus, with requisite shift in priorities? Consider this defn:"An option allowing a change in the method of operation of a device."Compared to for example, the distinction between episodic and semantic memory systems, there is not specifically a change in mode when switching between these mechanisms, since the brain has specific areas for each function, whereas 'mode' implies a singular piece of wetware that switches, in the algorithmic sense, as needed.
What exactly is the bi-modal mechanism in the case of near/far thinking?