Bryan points us to this survey on thirty key philosophy questions. The survey offers four indicators to estimate philosophical truth: Most popular opinion of anyone who responded to the survey. Most popular of responding profs at “99 leading departments of philosophy.”
In this case the reason we would evolve to project moral preferences is pretty obvious, but it's harder to see why we would evolve to project objects that don't exist or affect us.
I notice philosophers of biology are much more likely to be anti-realists.
Do you know of any good justifications for moral realism yourself?
Whoops, I see the name comes from E.T. Jaynes. In that case, it can't be the coincidence that Jaynes chose the name, given that Hume is usually described that way.
What Eliezer calls the "mind projection fallacy" was identified in the 18th century by David Hume, a philosopher. It can't be a coincidence that Eliezer chose the name "mind projection fallacy," given that Hume is usually described as a projectivist about quite a lot of stuff: http://en.wikipedia.org/wik...
A lot of philosophers are sympathetic to projectivist views on quite a lot of topics, but the fact that not all philosophers are inclined to take a Humean stance on morality and aesthetics doesn't show that they've never heard of the idea--just that they (perhaps wrongly) reject it.
Agreeing that a fallacy exists isn't the same thing as agreeing about which arguments commit it. You could imagine a skeptic about material objects claiming that you commit a fallacy of projection when you claim that there really are objects out there in the external world (as opposed to just sensory impressions that exist in your mind). Most of us would think that this is wrong--we usually think that we really are right to believe that there really are computers out there, and not just sensory impressions of computers that exist only in our minds.
So it's one thing to think it's possible to make an error along these lines, another thing to think that the error is actually made when we believe in moral and aesthetic facts. While I actually do think it's being made in these cases, I don't think that people who disagree have no idea what they're talking about, or are unaware of the possibility of a projectivist position on these topics.
It is distressing to see the degree of moral realists among professional philosophers. Their belief in objective aesthetics, or any objective value for that matter, is comical.
Buck Farmer: Hume's fact/value dichotomy destroys the possibility of observing 'value', or deriving it from facts. Of course, revelation can impart wisdom regarding some 'objective value' (I am a noncognitivist in that regard, as 'objective value' seems meaningless. Valuable to whom? For what end?) but only theists and spiritualists would buy that nonsense.
Do moral realists believe that objective moral truths could similarly be revealed to those who abide by different moral systems?
Yes. A murderer, for example, is objectively more dangerous to those around him than a non-murderer. Granted, this is not invariant, but then neither is it invariant that a rattlesnake is dangerous (a particular rattlesnake might be a mutant which has ineffective poison). For this reason, is it critically important to correctly label people as murderers and non-murderers. It is not mere arbitrary aesthetics that brings people to be alarmed by murder and desirous of identifying and dealing with murderers. It is rational fear of the murderer. For this reason it is also important to distinguish murder from justified killing - for example, killing in self-defense. A person who has killed in self-defense is typically not to be feared, is in fact to be sought out, since that person will likely be a good ally in the face of evil.
Similarly, it is important to distinguish theft non-theft. Again, it is not merely a matter of aesthetics, of personal taste. A thief really is a danger to those around him, because he is liable to take their stuff. If there is a thief in the vicinity, protect your valuables. If there isn't, then you can afford to relax more.
A human criminal - someone in the habit of committing evil acts - is truly a danger to those around him, more of a danger than a poisonous rattlesnake. The danger is no more a matter of aesthetics than is the danger from a rattlesnake a matter of aesthetics.
After reading a number of definitions for moral realism, I'm still unclear about how a moral realist might distinguish an objective moral truth from a moral rule that was contrived to suit a particular time, place, and culture.
If someone claims that the glass of water in front of me contains 600 ml of water when I believe it contains 500 ml of water, I don't assume that our disagreement is rooted in our differences in personal values, preferences, and agendas, as I might if we had a moral disagreement. Using a graduated cylinder, I could perform a cogent demonstration that could cause someone to see the error in their previous statement. Do moral realists believe that objective moral truths could similarly be revealed to those who abide by different moral systems?
Thanks. This directly addresses my question. You can type the terms from the quiz into their search box, and be taken to an argument exactly concerning that issue.
Best paper on Aesthetics is this one on Neuroaesthetics:
Science and Art
Of course I take the unusual view that morality is merely a special case of aesthetics. So I think objective aesthetics implies objective morality, where 'objective' is taken to mean 'can be assigned true, false labels'.
A possible justification for following objective aesthetics/morality is that there exist 'universal priors' (universal categories?) and our mind cannot function optimally without using these correct categories, and thus you cannot do things contrary to objective morality without degrading your own cognitive functions. I assume 'probabilities' themselves are just 'reference classes' (sub-categories) in disguise. A clever trick that, however it's being done.
Excellent. My 'bottom line' philosophical views are confirmed by the experts. :D
The survey shows a majority for platonism (there do exist universals beyond space and time), and a resounding majority for moral realism (though I assumed this only refers to the weak version- that you can attach 'true' and 'false' labels to moral claims).
To Hopefully Anonymous: What? There is disagreement over aesthetic and moral claims? I don't think philosophers know about this. If they did, how could any of them be realists? After all, it is just obvious that disagreement over X entails that there is no fact of the matter about X. I can't believe they didn't notice this "variation" before! What idiots! As you suggest, they must suffer from some kind of totalizing psychological disorder which causes them to ignore the "real world." It is about time someone as obviously well-read in philosophy as yourself came in and told everyone what's what.
I would really like to see the raw (anonymized) data. I want to, for example, see how the beliefs of one-boxers differ from two-boxers on the remainder of the questions. That would give me some information I'd feel comfortable updating on.
Robert, see Wikipedia article on Object of the Mind for possible examples.
In this case the reason we would evolve to project moral preferences is pretty obvious, but it's harder to see why we would evolve to project objects that don't exist or affect us.
I notice philosophers of biology are much more likely to be anti-realists.
Do you know of any good justifications for moral realism yourself?
Whoops, I see the name comes from E.T. Jaynes. In that case, it can't be the coincidence that Jaynes chose the name, given that Hume is usually described that way.
What Eliezer calls the "mind projection fallacy" was identified in the 18th century by David Hume, a philosopher. It can't be a coincidence that Eliezer chose the name "mind projection fallacy," given that Hume is usually described as a projectivist about quite a lot of stuff: http://en.wikipedia.org/wik...
A lot of philosophers are sympathetic to projectivist views on quite a lot of topics, but the fact that not all philosophers are inclined to take a Humean stance on morality and aesthetics doesn't show that they've never heard of the idea--just that they (perhaps wrongly) reject it.
Agreeing that a fallacy exists isn't the same thing as agreeing about which arguments commit it. You could imagine a skeptic about material objects claiming that you commit a fallacy of projection when you claim that there really are objects out there in the external world (as opposed to just sensory impressions that exist in your mind). Most of us would think that this is wrong--we usually think that we really are right to believe that there really are computers out there, and not just sensory impressions of computers that exist only in our minds.
So it's one thing to think it's possible to make an error along these lines, another thing to think that the error is actually made when we believe in moral and aesthetic facts. While I actually do think it's being made in these cases, I don't think that people who disagree have no idea what they're talking about, or are unaware of the possibility of a projectivist position on these topics.
It is distressing to see the degree of moral realists among professional philosophers. Their belief in objective aesthetics, or any objective value for that matter, is comical.
Buck Farmer: Hume's fact/value dichotomy destroys the possibility of observing 'value', or deriving it from facts. Of course, revelation can impart wisdom regarding some 'objective value' (I am a noncognitivist in that regard, as 'objective value' seems meaningless. Valuable to whom? For what end?) but only theists and spiritualists would buy that nonsense.
Do moral realists believe that objective moral truths could similarly be revealed to those who abide by different moral systems?
Yes. A murderer, for example, is objectively more dangerous to those around him than a non-murderer. Granted, this is not invariant, but then neither is it invariant that a rattlesnake is dangerous (a particular rattlesnake might be a mutant which has ineffective poison). For this reason, is it critically important to correctly label people as murderers and non-murderers. It is not mere arbitrary aesthetics that brings people to be alarmed by murder and desirous of identifying and dealing with murderers. It is rational fear of the murderer. For this reason it is also important to distinguish murder from justified killing - for example, killing in self-defense. A person who has killed in self-defense is typically not to be feared, is in fact to be sought out, since that person will likely be a good ally in the face of evil.
Similarly, it is important to distinguish theft non-theft. Again, it is not merely a matter of aesthetics, of personal taste. A thief really is a danger to those around him, because he is liable to take their stuff. If there is a thief in the vicinity, protect your valuables. If there isn't, then you can afford to relax more.
A human criminal - someone in the habit of committing evil acts - is truly a danger to those around him, more of a danger than a poisonous rattlesnake. The danger is no more a matter of aesthetics than is the danger from a rattlesnake a matter of aesthetics.
After reading a number of definitions for moral realism, I'm still unclear about how a moral realist might distinguish an objective moral truth from a moral rule that was contrived to suit a particular time, place, and culture.
If someone claims that the glass of water in front of me contains 600 ml of water when I believe it contains 500 ml of water, I don't assume that our disagreement is rooted in our differences in personal values, preferences, and agendas, as I might if we had a moral disagreement. Using a graduated cylinder, I could perform a cogent demonstration that could cause someone to see the error in their previous statement. Do moral realists believe that objective moral truths could similarly be revealed to those who abide by different moral systems?
Are philosophers really so unaware of the mind projection fallacy? None of the justifications for moral realism make the least sense to me.
http://lesswrong.com/lw/oi/...
The aesthetics one is staggering.
Thanks. This directly addresses my question. You can type the terms from the quiz into their search box, and be taken to an argument exactly concerning that issue.
Sorry HA, I was engaging in hyperbole. There are a few, and I would even put Robin in that same class (on odd days).
Best paper on Aesthetics is this one on Neuroaesthetics:
Science and Art
Of course I take the unusual view that morality is merely a special case of aesthetics. So I think objective aesthetics implies objective morality, where 'objective' is taken to mean 'can be assigned true, false labels'.
A possible justification for following objective aesthetics/morality is that there exist 'universal priors' (universal categories?) and our mind cannot function optimally without using these correct categories, and thus you cannot do things contrary to objective morality without degrading your own cognitive functions. I assume 'probabilities' themselves are just 'reference classes' (sub-categories) in disguise. A clever trick that, however it's being done.
"After all, it is just obvious that disagreement over X entails that there is no fact of the matter about X."
Er, when X is aesthetics ...
Excellent. My 'bottom line' philosophical views are confirmed by the experts. :D
The survey shows a majority for platonism (there do exist universals beyond space and time), and a resounding majority for moral realism (though I assumed this only refers to the weak version- that you can attach 'true' and 'false' labels to moral claims).
To Hopefully Anonymous: What? There is disagreement over aesthetic and moral claims? I don't think philosophers know about this. If they did, how could any of them be realists? After all, it is just obvious that disagreement over X entails that there is no fact of the matter about X. I can't believe they didn't notice this "variation" before! What idiots! As you suggest, they must suffer from some kind of totalizing psychological disorder which causes them to ignore the "real world." It is about time someone as obviously well-read in philosophy as yourself came in and told everyone what's what.
"I often feel like I might be just the only agnostic in a world of conceptual true believers / atheists."
Sorry to undermine your solipsistic frame, but I don't think I'm a conceptual true believer/atheist, and I'm hardly low profile in your space.
I would really like to see the raw (anonymized) data. I want to, for example, see how the beliefs of one-boxers differ from two-boxers on the remainder of the questions. That would give me some information I'd feel comfortable updating on.