When we try to justify our actions, we prefer to do so by citing a common general good that results from our actions. But of course we often have other stronger motives for our actions, motives that we are less eager to highlight.
Really? Marginal utility is a clue to inframarginal utility? I would have thought the relationship between the marginal and inframarginal would be an object of some empirical study, but impressionistically, they seem independent, even negative. Some of the most valuable goods inframarginally are extremely cheap at the margin: air is free.
One function of democracy only needs the people to believe the system works to be effective. It's often overlooked in our day but the fact that modern democracies do not have Game of Thrones/Roman style successions of leaders is in large part because the people see only people who won elections (or have ridiculous popular support) as legitimate for more than a very short period.
While clever infra-marginal analysis might reveal surprising, it seems to me that in the absence of that one should presume that it would reveal similar priorities to those shown by the more visible clues seen at the margin.
Great post, but as I wrote here (http://priorprobability.com..., what's wrong with hypocrisy per se? Like everything else, is there not an "optimal level" of hypocrisy?
Bad example: it's one thing to read about something, it's another to get hit in the face by it. Of course that doesn't mean that everyone who travels gains useful knowledge or even sets out to do that (there are a lot of people who just use that as an excuse to get travel money).
"I'm more confident that a prediction-market society isn't one I'd care to live in: I don't think making profit by hoarding information brings out the best in man."
Speaking of values and the effects on individuals of prediction markets:
I've gambled since I was ~12 years old if you count fantasy football; fantasy sports, poker, pro sports, investing. There are three aspects of gambling that I love:
1) Endless debate triggers me. Debate w/ out hard incentives to mean what you say is like baseball w/ out an umpire. Betting is a conflict resolver. Had your say? Fine, state your terms. That satisfies me enormously.
2) Gambling hones rationality. It puts a little voice in the back of your head that says, "if you don't know more than the other guy shut your mouth!". It shifts your attention from big fashionable problems to low-hanging fruit. The fundamental rule of all gambling is to find a space you know best, and add your 2 cents.
3) It nudges thinking from a "persuasive" mode, which comes naturally, to a truth-seeking one.
Anyway, that's the background I come from; undoubtedly it influences by optimism about prediction markets.
I'm sure folks with many negative gambling experiences see prediction markets differently.
I sure don't say that we use voting to gain info; we use voting to ensure a nontrivial-to-game incentive structure for politicians. And your suggestions #7 and #8 both appear more susceptible to gaming than one-person-one-vote.
since it seems obvious that prediction markets help aggregate information I have to ask if you're arguing in good faith
I don't see myself as qualified to have an opinion on whether prediction markets would help aggregate information. I only point to the drawbacks in information cost that Robin ignores--as you do implicitly. (I discuss this in a recent thread.)
I'm more confident that a prediction-market society isn't one I'd care to live in: I don't think making profit by hoarding information brings out the best in man. So the ultimate differences go deep, and they don't relate that much to information aggregation--they do relate to forager versus farmer values (one of Robin's themes).
Of course I agree that we justify things morally that we want for other reasons, and information aggregation, being regarded as a social good, is used for justificatory purposes. But Robin's examples fail to make the case, each easily explainable otherwise. I think this is because "information aggregation" just isn't a primeval human value. It isn't usually one of the main justifications. (In fact, Robin has been somewhat original in locating information aggregation as a fundamental issue in politics.)
Insofar as information aggregation can serve as justification, there's reason to suspect advocates of prediction markets, since they are expressly aimed at it. I think Robin focuses on the wrong kind of signaling to see this. His examples imply that we justify by information aggregation arrangements (like meetings) that serve our other wants (like hierarchy). But advocacy of prediction markets, in my view, serves a different kind of signaling function: the advocacy itself serves as a signal. What does it signal? Confidence in being right. Only if you're confident that you're more right than others would you want to bet in a prediction market. (And those who are against them are in the position of refusing institutions compelling them to put their money where their mouth is.) Confidence in being right is indeed a primeval good (itself signaling actually being right), well-suited for being a signaling target.
Thanks for your direct feedback: such is very helpful.
Yes, travel is a good example of something that is often justified in info terms, but where that doesn't withstand further scrutiny. I'll add it to the list.
It is "nearly a hit", but among the misses it is much nearer than average.
It's off the economics topic, but on for use of language:
George Carlin joked that when planes almost hit each other we call it a "near miss" when in fact it's a "near hit".
Really? Marginal utility is a clue to inframarginal utility? I would have thought the relationship between the marginal and inframarginal would be an object of some empirical study, but impressionistically, they seem independent, even negative. Some of the most valuable goods inframarginally are extremely cheap at the margin: air is free.
One function of democracy only needs the people to believe the system works to be effective. It's often overlooked in our day but the fact that modern democracies do not have Game of Thrones/Roman style successions of leaders is in large part because the people see only people who won elections (or have ridiculous popular support) as legitimate for more than a very short period.
Bribing "jurors." Or better, combinations among jurors advancing their interests.
While clever infra-marginal analysis might reveal surprising, it seems to me that in the absence of that one should presume that it would reveal similar priorities to those shown by the more visible clues seen at the margin.
I don't see what games you could have in mind.
I point out the hypocrisy here, but don't actually criticize it much. Do you worry I've exceeded the optimal amount of pointing out of hypocrisy?
Yes, that is another good example. I'll add it.
We say we read or watch the news to be informed, but it's more a kind of entertainment in most cases.
Great post, but as I wrote here (http://priorprobability.com..., what's wrong with hypocrisy per se? Like everything else, is there not an "optimal level" of hypocrisy?
Bad example: it's one thing to read about something, it's another to get hit in the face by it. Of course that doesn't mean that everyone who travels gains useful knowledge or even sets out to do that (there are a lot of people who just use that as an excuse to get travel money).
"I'm more confident that a prediction-market society isn't one I'd care to live in: I don't think making profit by hoarding information brings out the best in man."
Speaking of values and the effects on individuals of prediction markets:
I've gambled since I was ~12 years old if you count fantasy football; fantasy sports, poker, pro sports, investing. There are three aspects of gambling that I love:
1) Endless debate triggers me. Debate w/ out hard incentives to mean what you say is like baseball w/ out an umpire. Betting is a conflict resolver. Had your say? Fine, state your terms. That satisfies me enormously.
2) Gambling hones rationality. It puts a little voice in the back of your head that says, "if you don't know more than the other guy shut your mouth!". It shifts your attention from big fashionable problems to low-hanging fruit. The fundamental rule of all gambling is to find a space you know best, and add your 2 cents.
3) It nudges thinking from a "persuasive" mode, which comes naturally, to a truth-seeking one.
Anyway, that's the background I come from; undoubtedly it influences by optimism about prediction markets.
I'm sure folks with many negative gambling experiences see prediction markets differently.
I sure don't say that we use voting to gain info; we use voting to ensure a nontrivial-to-game incentive structure for politicians. And your suggestions #7 and #8 both appear more susceptible to gaming than one-person-one-vote.
since it seems obvious that prediction markets help aggregate information I have to ask if you're arguing in good faith
I don't see myself as qualified to have an opinion on whether prediction markets would help aggregate information. I only point to the drawbacks in information cost that Robin ignores--as you do implicitly. (I discuss this in a recent thread.)
I'm more confident that a prediction-market society isn't one I'd care to live in: I don't think making profit by hoarding information brings out the best in man. So the ultimate differences go deep, and they don't relate that much to information aggregation--they do relate to forager versus farmer values (one of Robin's themes).
Of course I agree that we justify things morally that we want for other reasons, and information aggregation, being regarded as a social good, is used for justificatory purposes. But Robin's examples fail to make the case, each easily explainable otherwise. I think this is because "information aggregation" just isn't a primeval human value. It isn't usually one of the main justifications. (In fact, Robin has been somewhat original in locating information aggregation as a fundamental issue in politics.)
Insofar as information aggregation can serve as justification, there's reason to suspect advocates of prediction markets, since they are expressly aimed at it. I think Robin focuses on the wrong kind of signaling to see this. His examples imply that we justify by information aggregation arrangements (like meetings) that serve our other wants (like hierarchy). But advocacy of prediction markets, in my view, serves a different kind of signaling function: the advocacy itself serves as a signal. What does it signal? Confidence in being right. Only if you're confident that you're more right than others would you want to bet in a prediction market. (And those who are against them are in the position of refusing institutions compelling them to put their money where their mouth is.) Confidence in being right is indeed a primeval good (itself signaling actually being right), well-suited for being a signaling target.
Thanks for your direct feedback: such is very helpful.
Yes, travel is a good example of something that is often justified in info terms, but where that doesn't withstand further scrutiny. I'll add it to the list.