In standard decision theory, an agent makes a choice in each of a large number of possible choice situations. If these choices satisfy some plausible rationality axioms, they can be represented by utility and belief functions over a set of possible states of the world. As the agent learns info, their beliefs update according to Bayes rule, but their utilities do not change. There are noisy versions of this, where agents make limited mistakes re this standard, and standard game theory is built on top of all this.)
Personally I found my values changing a lot after I had kids. But I don’t feel like a different person, nor do I feel that either my pre-kid or post-kid self was more correct per se.
I feel more like my “true values” are unknowable, and my intuition over time gives me different clues as to what my true values are. Rational action is great but it does have the limit that I only know an approximation to my own values. Philosophy can help draw these out but it’s always incomplete.
I know generational theories are not considered serious in intellectual circles, but I find them very useful in explaining how values change over time.
In your framework, I would fit them into the "context-dependent" slot, except the context is not a simple scalar, like wealth or age. The context is the relationship between a person's generation and the previous and next generations.
However you classify them, over time, the numbers in the previous generations will fall off, and the numbers in next generations will increase. So if you're trying to develop a plausible coherent framework to explain your motives, you'll have to change your framework to accomodate this reality.
A lot of your "preferences" may just be falsified preferences (ala Kuran) to fit in with your surroundings, and when the numbers of the olds and youngs start shifting, your falsified preferences set will abruptly change in the form of cascades. You may not even realize that they were falsified preferences to begin with, since prior to that point, the social drivers were so firm and obvious that you may never even have realized it that they were malleable.
People outside your generation can have an outsize impact as tie-breakers for deep value conflicts of your generation because they're not your direct rivals (people tend to resist value advocated by competitors). They can serve as "arbitrators" in the social competition of your generation, even if they're not directly involved. For example, consider if your generation has a deep value divide that you can't resolve. If this division happens when you're young, often there's a Cold Truce imposed by the elders (your spats are excluded from Serious Discourse). On the other hand, if this division happens when you're older, then eventually the youths will decide the matter, whether you like it or not.
This generational changeover is dynamic because (at least in our culture) kids are the people who are most empowered to rebel. Whether or not their decision makes sense, they'll do different stuff than the people immediately before then (even if its the same different stuff as the people 2 or 3 generations ago). So the context keeps changing and refreshing.
This doesn't mean that the youths are the only drivers of change. Each generation drives changes throughout their lifetime. They age into roles the previous generations once had, but they play those roles differently than them, and so the context keeps shifting. And all the preferences you thought you had that you don't really have a deep personal stake will have to keep shifting to keep up according to the prevailing Preference Falsifications regimes (aka Keeping up with the Times).
So the straight forward answer comes from this bit here
"Sometimes such humans discover that the actions toward which they are inclined just cannot be made very consistent in this way. Doing so requires more self-control than they can muster. At which point they in effect accept that they cannot be even approximately rational, however attractive they might seem. However, this appears to be a relatively rare problem among those who try to be rational; they can usually seem to get usefully closer to this ideal. "
A better model would be when the self-control is too much they redefine their implicit utility function so that the unattainable choice is no longer optimal and continue on attempting towards rationality. This new implicit utility function gives rise to new values. Most of the time this process is completely unconscious and the person has not awareness of it. Yet, sometimes the redefinition is so stark that the value shift cannot be ignored.
In this case the person can either see through what has happened and go back to the sucky-place or they can rationalize away this contradiction. Ability to rationalize away some contradiction is related to intelligence so it will appear to very intelligent that some people aren't even trying. They are. Few people are Zen enough to go around saying what I do in this situation is weak stupid but that's natural because I'm weak and stupid precisely to this degree.
Indeed, I suspect wants and likes come from two different sources at least in part to facilitate this very self-deception. Wants are consistent with your current implicit utility function. You backcast that inorder to mask changes to the implicit utiltiy function. Since likes are totally different it would require actively seeking out evidence of what you did and did not like at the time in order to falsify the backward projection. Memories of themselves are likely to be of little help since they also are actualized through a backcasting process.
We have easier access to current likes because their useful for the concurrent updating of shallow values, but distant likes are hidden to allow the appearance of a temporally unified rational self.
Two issues. First, one's values almost certainly aren't consistent and one can't possibly know they are consistent. Consistency is undecidable. So among other things one's values will change as they come into conflict and the conflicts are avoided and/or resolved. The outcomes of conflicts aren't predictable or for that matter stable.
Second, imitation of others doesn't necessarily or even typically indicate an attempt to signal status, even if we are imitating someone because they have achieved high status. Imitating someone who's a master furniture maker is likely to help one become a better furniture maker. Imitating someone who has made a lot of money is likely to help one make more money.
Your discussion is quite relevant, as are all the comments. It all seems to boil down to who determines what "values" are and can one set of values be imposed upon another.
I find it quite rational to say not impose my sexual preferences on another. Attempting to define a "value" upon others because they prefer same or opposite sex through rhetoric may be considered impositional rhetoric. Somehow someone uses physical force to impose his sexuality upon another. This is almost always considered to be a violation of values. Something we may criminally punish.
Now my question is, is rhetorical imposition telling others to engage in one's preferred sexual activity less of as violation? If so, why? Only because we think rhetorical assault is less harmful than physical assault?
And yet the personal feelings of violation can over cause as much psychological harm through rhetorical assault as physical assault.
This becomes the real question to me...and I am open to answers to how the very idea of "values" can be maintained beyond the shared values of whomever may share them. Or how anyone''s values can be extended beyond those that may share.
But if there are no values whatsoever, then we are opening ourselves to extreme violence upon one another. But then likewise, attempting to enforce any particular values upon others can lead to the same.
Your addendum will not gain popularity, it's not cool to look like you're trying to be cool! But to say that as a society we value what has status... that's just passing the buck. What causes high status? It's meted out by different societies, some family sized, some bigger. I can imagine someone complementing me to give myself a little boost to do something I might lack the discipline to just power through. (I guess visualizing rewards is smarter than discipline for conserving 'spoons'.) How does any culture decide what actions are worthy?
You might get some use from anthropology reading. It's harder than most soft sciences. I suspect as we shed some of our society's values, those associated with tribal society may emerge to fill the gap. Big Man is more appropriate to a society becoming more feminine and web of connections than King or CEO. And even if society doesn't shift in that direction, I think it's helpful to see what some other 'stable' social structures look like.
Is there a theoretical reason for equating changing/unchanging deep values with identity?
Do those two alternatives (single identity with constant deep values vs. multiple identities with differing values) really exhaust the space of possibilities? Trying to assume the multiple identity idea, I am still quite partial to my past and future pseudo-selves. So it isn’t quite like we are all just different persons.
If I assume the unchanging deep values=identity variant, must I conclude that my deep values would have been the same if my parents had abandoned me in the wilderness and I had grown up as a feral child? Are victims of brain injury different persons before and after their injury? There is something to be said for I am my memories and mind, but also the idea that I am my body. Are we the containers, or the contents, or some combination?
What are the axioms of rationality that force us onto this dilemma? Any way to attacking those?
This seems like exactly the problem that Agnes Callard addresses in Aspiration (though from a different academic tradition than you're proposing here) - I think you guys talked about it on an early episode of your podcast, I'd love to know what you find is missing in that formulation?
(Also as another commenter mentioned Transformative Experience (L. A. Paul) grapples with this from the Decision Theoretic side)
Well, values change in different ways. *Sometimes* people rationally update their values based on which pursuits make them truly happy in hindsight. *Sometimes* people just emulate successful people or change to fit in with their peer group. *Sometimes* people's values change with their circumstances, e.g. if they temporarily become homeless they will afterwards become more concerned about homelessness issues, or if they become rich they will afterwards become more concerned about taxes on the rich. You can't generalize and say values always change in this way, or in that way.
Ideally, people should rationally update their beliefs and values to maximize consistency between values (and maximize happiness-in-hindsight as you mentioned). If a person holds value V1 which tells them to take action A1, and also holds value V2 which tells them *not* to take action A1, then they hold inconsistent values. They could resolve the inconsistency by discarding or de-emphasizing V1 or V2. They could also resolve it by forming a deeper value V3 that generalizes V1 and V2 in a simple way, and shows that V1 and V2 are limited special cases of V3. Then they can take action A1 or not take it, depending on what V3 says.
I never understood the purpose behind the "different persons" usage when explaining a single persons actions across time. The person who presses the gas and steers the car is clearly the same person who realizes he's going the wrong direction and changes where they're going. The fact that the values of this single person changed and caused him to alter his decision does not make him a "new" person. I heard Jordan Peterson use this too, as if people are re-created whole cloth as different entities because they change over time.
Is there a reason, what is reason for this? As opposed to the recognition that people are rational beings, with free will, that can re-act to new information and choose a different course of action?
Your proposed process of shallow versus deep value changes over time seems impossible to model. Does that mean that mathematical economics is an oxymoron?
Personally I found my values changing a lot after I had kids. But I don’t feel like a different person, nor do I feel that either my pre-kid or post-kid self was more correct per se.
I feel more like my “true values” are unknowable, and my intuition over time gives me different clues as to what my true values are. Rational action is great but it does have the limit that I only know an approximation to my own values. Philosophy can help draw these out but it’s always incomplete.
I know generational theories are not considered serious in intellectual circles, but I find them very useful in explaining how values change over time.
In your framework, I would fit them into the "context-dependent" slot, except the context is not a simple scalar, like wealth or age. The context is the relationship between a person's generation and the previous and next generations.
However you classify them, over time, the numbers in the previous generations will fall off, and the numbers in next generations will increase. So if you're trying to develop a plausible coherent framework to explain your motives, you'll have to change your framework to accomodate this reality.
A lot of your "preferences" may just be falsified preferences (ala Kuran) to fit in with your surroundings, and when the numbers of the olds and youngs start shifting, your falsified preferences set will abruptly change in the form of cascades. You may not even realize that they were falsified preferences to begin with, since prior to that point, the social drivers were so firm and obvious that you may never even have realized it that they were malleable.
People outside your generation can have an outsize impact as tie-breakers for deep value conflicts of your generation because they're not your direct rivals (people tend to resist value advocated by competitors). They can serve as "arbitrators" in the social competition of your generation, even if they're not directly involved. For example, consider if your generation has a deep value divide that you can't resolve. If this division happens when you're young, often there's a Cold Truce imposed by the elders (your spats are excluded from Serious Discourse). On the other hand, if this division happens when you're older, then eventually the youths will decide the matter, whether you like it or not.
This generational changeover is dynamic because (at least in our culture) kids are the people who are most empowered to rebel. Whether or not their decision makes sense, they'll do different stuff than the people immediately before then (even if its the same different stuff as the people 2 or 3 generations ago). So the context keeps changing and refreshing.
This doesn't mean that the youths are the only drivers of change. Each generation drives changes throughout their lifetime. They age into roles the previous generations once had, but they play those roles differently than them, and so the context keeps shifting. And all the preferences you thought you had that you don't really have a deep personal stake will have to keep shifting to keep up according to the prevailing Preference Falsifications regimes (aka Keeping up with the Times).
So the straight forward answer comes from this bit here
"Sometimes such humans discover that the actions toward which they are inclined just cannot be made very consistent in this way. Doing so requires more self-control than they can muster. At which point they in effect accept that they cannot be even approximately rational, however attractive they might seem. However, this appears to be a relatively rare problem among those who try to be rational; they can usually seem to get usefully closer to this ideal. "
A better model would be when the self-control is too much they redefine their implicit utility function so that the unattainable choice is no longer optimal and continue on attempting towards rationality. This new implicit utility function gives rise to new values. Most of the time this process is completely unconscious and the person has not awareness of it. Yet, sometimes the redefinition is so stark that the value shift cannot be ignored.
In this case the person can either see through what has happened and go back to the sucky-place or they can rationalize away this contradiction. Ability to rationalize away some contradiction is related to intelligence so it will appear to very intelligent that some people aren't even trying. They are. Few people are Zen enough to go around saying what I do in this situation is weak stupid but that's natural because I'm weak and stupid precisely to this degree.
Indeed, I suspect wants and likes come from two different sources at least in part to facilitate this very self-deception. Wants are consistent with your current implicit utility function. You backcast that inorder to mask changes to the implicit utiltiy function. Since likes are totally different it would require actively seeking out evidence of what you did and did not like at the time in order to falsify the backward projection. Memories of themselves are likely to be of little help since they also are actualized through a backcasting process.
We have easier access to current likes because their useful for the concurrent updating of shallow values, but distant likes are hidden to allow the appearance of a temporally unified rational self.
Two issues. First, one's values almost certainly aren't consistent and one can't possibly know they are consistent. Consistency is undecidable. So among other things one's values will change as they come into conflict and the conflicts are avoided and/or resolved. The outcomes of conflicts aren't predictable or for that matter stable.
Second, imitation of others doesn't necessarily or even typically indicate an attempt to signal status, even if we are imitating someone because they have achieved high status. Imitating someone who's a master furniture maker is likely to help one become a better furniture maker. Imitating someone who has made a lot of money is likely to help one make more money.
Your discussion is quite relevant, as are all the comments. It all seems to boil down to who determines what "values" are and can one set of values be imposed upon another.
I find it quite rational to say not impose my sexual preferences on another. Attempting to define a "value" upon others because they prefer same or opposite sex through rhetoric may be considered impositional rhetoric. Somehow someone uses physical force to impose his sexuality upon another. This is almost always considered to be a violation of values. Something we may criminally punish.
Now my question is, is rhetorical imposition telling others to engage in one's preferred sexual activity less of as violation? If so, why? Only because we think rhetorical assault is less harmful than physical assault?
And yet the personal feelings of violation can over cause as much psychological harm through rhetorical assault as physical assault.
This becomes the real question to me...and I am open to answers to how the very idea of "values" can be maintained beyond the shared values of whomever may share them. Or how anyone''s values can be extended beyond those that may share.
But if there are no values whatsoever, then we are opening ourselves to extreme violence upon one another. But then likewise, attempting to enforce any particular values upon others can lead to the same.
Your addendum will not gain popularity, it's not cool to look like you're trying to be cool! But to say that as a society we value what has status... that's just passing the buck. What causes high status? It's meted out by different societies, some family sized, some bigger. I can imagine someone complementing me to give myself a little boost to do something I might lack the discipline to just power through. (I guess visualizing rewards is smarter than discipline for conserving 'spoons'.) How does any culture decide what actions are worthy?
You might get some use from anthropology reading. It's harder than most soft sciences. I suspect as we shed some of our society's values, those associated with tribal society may emerge to fill the gap. Big Man is more appropriate to a society becoming more feminine and web of connections than King or CEO. And even if society doesn't shift in that direction, I think it's helpful to see what some other 'stable' social structures look like.
Is there a theoretical reason for equating changing/unchanging deep values with identity?
Do those two alternatives (single identity with constant deep values vs. multiple identities with differing values) really exhaust the space of possibilities? Trying to assume the multiple identity idea, I am still quite partial to my past and future pseudo-selves. So it isn’t quite like we are all just different persons.
If I assume the unchanging deep values=identity variant, must I conclude that my deep values would have been the same if my parents had abandoned me in the wilderness and I had grown up as a feral child? Are victims of brain injury different persons before and after their injury? There is something to be said for I am my memories and mind, but also the idea that I am my body. Are we the containers, or the contents, or some combination?
What are the axioms of rationality that force us onto this dilemma? Any way to attacking those?
This seems like exactly the problem that Agnes Callard addresses in Aspiration (though from a different academic tradition than you're proposing here) - I think you guys talked about it on an early episode of your podcast, I'd love to know what you find is missing in that formulation?
(Also as another commenter mentioned Transformative Experience (L. A. Paul) grapples with this from the Decision Theoretic side)
Well, values change in different ways. *Sometimes* people rationally update their values based on which pursuits make them truly happy in hindsight. *Sometimes* people just emulate successful people or change to fit in with their peer group. *Sometimes* people's values change with their circumstances, e.g. if they temporarily become homeless they will afterwards become more concerned about homelessness issues, or if they become rich they will afterwards become more concerned about taxes on the rich. You can't generalize and say values always change in this way, or in that way.
Ideally, people should rationally update their beliefs and values to maximize consistency between values (and maximize happiness-in-hindsight as you mentioned). If a person holds value V1 which tells them to take action A1, and also holds value V2 which tells them *not* to take action A1, then they hold inconsistent values. They could resolve the inconsistency by discarding or de-emphasizing V1 or V2. They could also resolve it by forming a deeper value V3 that generalizes V1 and V2 in a simple way, and shows that V1 and V2 are limited special cases of V3. Then they can take action A1 or not take it, depending on what V3 says.
I never understood the purpose behind the "different persons" usage when explaining a single persons actions across time. The person who presses the gas and steers the car is clearly the same person who realizes he's going the wrong direction and changes where they're going. The fact that the values of this single person changed and caused him to alter his decision does not make him a "new" person. I heard Jordan Peterson use this too, as if people are re-created whole cloth as different entities because they change over time.
Is there a reason, what is reason for this? As opposed to the recognition that people are rational beings, with free will, that can re-act to new information and choose a different course of action?
Your proposed process of shallow versus deep value changes over time seems impossible to model. Does that mean that mathematical economics is an oxymoron?
Best book on this is “Transformative Experience” by decision theorist L. A. Paul
Is there a subject missing in the title? Otherwise I don't understand the title.