At Freakonomics, Arthur Brooks on why conservatives seem happier: In my last post I showed the large happiness differences between religious Americans and secularists, and argued that this is a big part of the reason conservatives are so much happier than liberals. But I also noted that religion and other lifestyle distinctions still only explain about half the gap. …
Conservatives are happy because they are skeptical that mankind can be perfected, and therefore don't seek utopia. In fact, religious conservatives place ultimate happiness beyond the bounds of human life. Which is to say they find fulfillment through duty. It is through duty that one sacrifices.
It seems to me that the liberal seeks an ever asymptotic approach to ultimate truth, which they know at some point might come to a clearer understanding. And it is that hope to know the ultimate truth that will cause them to overturn any established order, and so they question any duty not on the same path. The assumption of course is that the truth will liberate one from suffering. A dangerous assumption.
One who seeks an ultimate truth in the world must inevitably re-order the world to accomodate that truth, and defines suffering as the distance from the possibility of perfection. They cannot accept that those without possession of the truth and the means to approach it are not self-deluded.
But how can anyone who lived without knowing what we know possibly have been happy? I think there is a conceit that life of the mind delivers happiness divorced from the act of discovery. I think people misjudge the size of the soul and of the mind and presume that one can satisfy one or the other by living completely in them. But the mind and the soul are hungry and become jaded and self-serving. Happiness is found in balance. Balance requires discipline. To live entirely in the mind, or the soul, or the body are conceits.
I concur with Kyle. Correlation is not necessarily causation.
More so, if we assume causation, is this still putting the cart before the horse? Are people conservative because they are happy, or liberal because they are unhappy? Would deliberately changing political views have no impact were it the symptom and not the disease?
This article provides interesting ammunition for future research, but I see no valid and well-supported conclusions.
Conservatives much more happy than liberals? That's certainly not my experience. But then, I've never lived in the USA.
I suggest that Arthur Brooks survey people living under a liberal government and see what results the data gives, before making extrapolations about religion and optimism.
I should think that anyone, whether conservative or liberal, will be happiest living in the society that most reflects and supports their own values.
Z. M., I didn't say you wanted not to be in agony. I said you had reasons not to be in that state. Having reasons for something is not the same as wanting this thing. For example, you would still have a reason now not to be in agony tomorrow if--perhaps because you are severely depressed--there was nothing you now wanted.
I urge you to read, if you have the time, the first chapter, and particularly the fourth section, of Derek Parfit's Climbing the Mountain.
Pablo, of course I don't want to be in agony. I also want to know the truth (although not nearly as badly as I want to avoid agony). If the latter desire doesn't count as having a self-justifying reason, why should the former?
The idea I (and others, I think) are trying to get at is that ultimate ends don't come from reason alone. They can be hardwired into your nervous system (like the end of avoiding pain) or you can acquire them through experience, but somewhere along the chain of goals and subgoals, you have to reach a point where you don't have a reason for something. No goal has the status of a tautology--as far as I can tell, anyway.
Shall we connect this discussion to the previous post on placebos? A certain belief or state of mind can improve one's subjective impressions of the world while offering no objective improvement. Happiness and suffering seem to be subjective states, while well-being is an objective state.
I'm trying to decide if Voltaire's comment is perfect or ironic given his pseudonym.
Z. M., yes, I do think there are noninstrumental, justificatory reasons for some things. And so do you. You believe, as I do, that you have reasons not to experience a horrible state of agony.
At least in America, conservatives tend to be the ones whose lives are well-accepted and integrated into society. If someone is marginalized by society, it's hard for them to remain a conservative. Yet, leaving conservatism doesn't immediately fix the society that marginalizes them, so they're still left unhappy.The Inductivist agrees here.
a. Robin's data for conservatives being happier relies exclusively on self-report. Within evangelical Christianity, there is a widespread custom known as "witnessing," which means that Christians are expected to act happy and seem perfect in order to "witness" to the pagan masses as to how happy Christianity makes one. This custom is also widespread among other socially conservative movements that are not in alignment with truth, such as Amway. So they may not actually be happier - they may merely be lying. (There is also the problem of lying to oneself about one's happiness - I know you guys hate David Benatar, but he devotes an entire chapter to this in Better Never to have Been.)
b. "X group is happier" is a much different observation than "adopting X characteristic will make Y group happier." The data on lottery winners and spinal injury accident victims seem to argue against the idea that changes can make people happier - though of course adopting a new political outlook is an internal change, whereas spinal injury/lottery winning are external changes. I think this is a weaker objection than (a).
Z. M., I meant to ask Robin whether he believed there are non-instrumental, justificatory reasons for believing the truth. As you recognize in your latest comment, these reasons need not lead to an infinite regress. Only instrumental reasons do.
Show me the money! The correlation between income and political affiliation is an obvious missing link here. Are people happy because they are conservative or conservative because they are happy? Causation is an important element in understanding this phenomenon and I would argue that political affiliation is largely determined by their standard of living.
In America's 1-dimensional politics we call democrats liberals and republicans conservatives but this dichotomy is such an oversimplification of the human belief system that it offers very little insight as to why one person chooses one party or the other.
Ultimately, political affiliation is a mere after-thought to one's lifestyle and belief system. Naturally people who are currently content with their lives are going to identify with the party that is currently responsible. Whereas people who identify themselves as unhappy are going to have reasons for being unhappy. I would argue that most people who define themselves as democrats in this country have seen an exponential decrease in their standards of living.
But be careful when generalizing about belief structures. I'm sure this study would reflect completely opposite data if conducted with the populous (aristocracy and proletariat alike) if conducted after the French Revolution for example.
I'm confused, Pablo. Could you try rephrasing why the question of a regress doesn't arise with justificatory reasons?
Are we defining our terms in different ways? By explanatory reasons, I understand reasons that explain the causal processes of how something came to be: here evopsych, physics, and the like would be relevant. By justificatory reasons, I understand reasons the justify a particular value or course of action within some given goal structure or system of morals.
When we ask "Why do you want X?" the justificatory answer can be "X is an end in itself" or "X is a means for acquiring Y." If the latter, we can ask "Why do you want Y?", and the answer can be "Y is an end in itself" or "Y is a means for acquiring Z." If the latter ...
Conservatives are happy because they are skeptical that mankind can be perfected, and therefore don't seek utopia. In fact, religious conservatives place ultimate happiness beyond the bounds of human life. Which is to say they find fulfillment through duty. It is through duty that one sacrifices.
It seems to me that the liberal seeks an ever asymptotic approach to ultimate truth, which they know at some point might come to a clearer understanding. And it is that hope to know the ultimate truth that will cause them to overturn any established order, and so they question any duty not on the same path. The assumption of course is that the truth will liberate one from suffering. A dangerous assumption.
One who seeks an ultimate truth in the world must inevitably re-order the world to accomodate that truth, and defines suffering as the distance from the possibility of perfection. They cannot accept that those without possession of the truth and the means to approach it are not self-deluded.
But how can anyone who lived without knowing what we know possibly have been happy? I think there is a conceit that life of the mind delivers happiness divorced from the act of discovery. I think people misjudge the size of the soul and of the mind and presume that one can satisfy one or the other by living completely in them. But the mind and the soul are hungry and become jaded and self-serving. Happiness is found in balance. Balance requires discipline. To live entirely in the mind, or the soul, or the body are conceits.
I concur with Kyle. Correlation is not necessarily causation.
More so, if we assume causation, is this still putting the cart before the horse? Are people conservative because they are happy, or liberal because they are unhappy? Would deliberately changing political views have no impact were it the symptom and not the disease?
This article provides interesting ammunition for future research, but I see no valid and well-supported conclusions.
Conservatives much more happy than liberals? That's certainly not my experience. But then, I've never lived in the USA.
I suggest that Arthur Brooks survey people living under a liberal government and see what results the data gives, before making extrapolations about religion and optimism.
I should think that anyone, whether conservative or liberal, will be happiest living in the society that most reflects and supports their own values.
I've no time for Parfit right now, so--though I'm afraid it isn't terribly Bayesian of me--we'll have to agree to disagree for the moment.
Z. M., I didn't say you wanted not to be in agony. I said you had reasons not to be in that state. Having reasons for something is not the same as wanting this thing. For example, you would still have a reason now not to be in agony tomorrow if--perhaps because you are severely depressed--there was nothing you now wanted.
I urge you to read, if you have the time, the first chapter, and particularly the fourth section, of Derek Parfit's Climbing the Mountain.
Pablo, of course I don't want to be in agony. I also want to know the truth (although not nearly as badly as I want to avoid agony). If the latter desire doesn't count as having a self-justifying reason, why should the former?
The idea I (and others, I think) are trying to get at is that ultimate ends don't come from reason alone. They can be hardwired into your nervous system (like the end of avoiding pain) or you can acquire them through experience, but somewhere along the chain of goals and subgoals, you have to reach a point where you don't have a reason for something. No goal has the status of a tautology--as far as I can tell, anyway.
Shall we connect this discussion to the previous post on placebos? A certain belief or state of mind can improve one's subjective impressions of the world while offering no objective improvement. Happiness and suffering seem to be subjective states, while well-being is an objective state.
I'm trying to decide if Voltaire's comment is perfect or ironic given his pseudonym.
Z. M., yes, I do think there are noninstrumental, justificatory reasons for some things. And so do you. You believe, as I do, that you have reasons not to experience a horrible state of agony.
frelkins, I don't understand what your point is.
At least in America, conservatives tend to be the ones whose lives are well-accepted and integrated into society. If someone is marginalized by society, it's hard for them to remain a conservative. Yet, leaving conservatism doesn't immediately fix the society that marginalizes them, so they're still left unhappy.The Inductivist agrees here.
a. Robin's data for conservatives being happier relies exclusively on self-report. Within evangelical Christianity, there is a widespread custom known as "witnessing," which means that Christians are expected to act happy and seem perfect in order to "witness" to the pagan masses as to how happy Christianity makes one. This custom is also widespread among other socially conservative movements that are not in alignment with truth, such as Amway. So they may not actually be happier - they may merely be lying. (There is also the problem of lying to oneself about one's happiness - I know you guys hate David Benatar, but he devotes an entire chapter to this in Better Never to have Been.)
b. "X group is happier" is a much different observation than "adopting X characteristic will make Y group happier." The data on lottery winners and spinal injury accident victims seem to argue against the idea that changes can make people happier - though of course adopting a new political outlook is an internal change, whereas spinal injury/lottery winning are external changes. I think this is a weaker objection than (a).
@Pablo S
Robin carefully says he "wants" to know the truth. Doesn't this make his position clear?
Pablo, do you think there are any noninstrumental, justificatory reasons for anything? I don't.
Z. M., I meant to ask Robin whether he believed there are non-instrumental, justificatory reasons for believing the truth. As you recognize in your latest comment, these reasons need not lead to an infinite regress. Only instrumental reasons do.
Professor Hanson was just channeling Jesus Christ, who taught "you shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free."
Show me the money! The correlation between income and political affiliation is an obvious missing link here. Are people happy because they are conservative or conservative because they are happy? Causation is an important element in understanding this phenomenon and I would argue that political affiliation is largely determined by their standard of living.
In America's 1-dimensional politics we call democrats liberals and republicans conservatives but this dichotomy is such an oversimplification of the human belief system that it offers very little insight as to why one person chooses one party or the other.
Ultimately, political affiliation is a mere after-thought to one's lifestyle and belief system. Naturally people who are currently content with their lives are going to identify with the party that is currently responsible. Whereas people who identify themselves as unhappy are going to have reasons for being unhappy. I would argue that most people who define themselves as democrats in this country have seen an exponential decrease in their standards of living.
But be careful when generalizing about belief structures. I'm sure this study would reflect completely opposite data if conducted with the populous (aristocracy and proletariat alike) if conducted after the French Revolution for example.
I'm confused, Pablo. Could you try rephrasing why the question of a regress doesn't arise with justificatory reasons?
Are we defining our terms in different ways? By explanatory reasons, I understand reasons that explain the causal processes of how something came to be: here evopsych, physics, and the like would be relevant. By justificatory reasons, I understand reasons the justify a particular value or course of action within some given goal structure or system of morals.
When we ask "Why do you want X?" the justificatory answer can be "X is an end in itself" or "X is a means for acquiring Y." If the latter, we can ask "Why do you want Y?", and the answer can be "Y is an end in itself" or "Y is a means for acquiring Z." If the latter ...