Humans aren't entirely selfish for a raft of reasons: kin selection, reciprocity, reputation management, and signalling trustworthiness. They are also sometimes manipulated into unselfishness by others, or by parasites (that promote pro-social behaviour to help spread to other hosts). Much the same also applies to corps - despite the "shareholder value" rule.
Robin: I think Tyler's comment on his blog wasn't intended as a response, but simply to give background context to your reference to "mood affiliation" in your post. I don't think he was suggesting your present post should be viewed through the lens of hypocrisy.
I'm surprised no one has yet called out Tyler's repetition of the old socialist trope claiming that management has a fiduciary duty "to maximize shareholder profits".
Management has a duty, as an agent of the owners, to do *whatever the owners want them to do*. Usually that includes a keen attention to profit, but it rarely, if ever, is the only thing.
Certainly as a shareholder, profit is one of the things *I* want from management, but it is by no means the only thing.
Thank you Professor, I agree. Any thoughts on the notion of types of selfishness and some properties thereof? It could help us create better regulations...
Complaints that are targeted toward evaluating particular proposed regulations do make more sense to me. Of course that doesn't mean any one proposed regulation is a good idea.
If so much is going to rest on the concept of selfishness, then it requires more inquiry. For example, are there multiple kind of "selfishness"? Are all kinds ( if multiple kinds do exist) equally beneficial/harmful to society? Can it be measured? Is it additive - i.e. if x number of people come together to form an organization, is the "selfishness" of the organization the mean or the sum or some other functions of selfishness?
In general, I do agree with Prof. Hanson's framing - it is much more consistent and crisp than Prof. Cowen's. One follow-up question though: Society over multiple millennia have created other equally selfishness institutions that change the "selfish" calculus of individuals. By that token, shouldn't we support regulation and moral opprobrium for corporations and their leaders as a mechanism to change their calculus in an individual's favor? And then, doesn't complaining about corporations becomes a rational individual response?
I’m really baffled by Cowen’s argument. Anyone who thinks corporations are their friends is a fool. Their nature is to try to exploit us, and once you understand that they’re okay.
But the only reason anyone would make this mistake is because we are all being constantly bombarded with corporate advertising trying desperately to make us believe that corporations are our friends, so they can exploit that misunderstanding. And I do mean bombarded.
Cowen seems to be saying something like: pay no attention to the constant intrusions into your private thoughts by these psychopathic manipulative exploiters who would turn you into dog food in an instant if the law wouldn’t punish them for it. They’re constantly trying to convince you, your children, and everyone else you care about that they’re friendly even though believing that makes you vulnerable to their terrible predations. Once you accept that they want to kill you and destroy everything that matters to you they’re actually great!
Cowen's cryptic comment looks a lot like the third paragraph in your post, which discusses his approach to the book. Maybe he interpreted that paragraph as a complaint, and is making the point that in your anti-hypocrisy crusade, you are doing the very thing that you complain about him doing in his book?
Robin, you say "We aren’t at all fooled into thinking of big business as equal lovers or drinking buddies."
But in the previous paragraph, you describe humans (my paraphrase) as unconsciously calculating the exact degree of required reciprocity even in friendship, and as no less essentially selfish than big business.
So I'm left wondering: What is the difference which the above quote seems to acknowledge?
Yes, we probably receive more trustworthy behavior from firms than friends. It does seem a puzzle that we give friends a pass while excoriating businesses for the slightest violations.
Perhaps we would speak similarly of acquaintances if possible with the same impunity. This hypothesis suggests we will criticize celebrities much more than associates for similar transgressions and also that powerful individuals will be more inclined to call others out. Does your research for <it>Elephant</it> bear on this?
You've read the book and I haven't. Would it be fair to summarize the book as arguing that corporations are more reliable & trustworthy than they are commonly given credit for being? Tyler could make that argument while also claiming (as you quote) that is a noble lie that they attain the level of friends or relatives without any inconsistency. The issue would then be that he's implicitly treating "our other relation partners" as more reliable & trustworthy than you believe them to be, and the evidence to settle that matter would not be in the book.
Humans aren't entirely selfish for a raft of reasons: kin selection, reciprocity, reputation management, and signalling trustworthiness. They are also sometimes manipulated into unselfishness by others, or by parasites (that promote pro-social behaviour to help spread to other hosts). Much the same also applies to corps - despite the "shareholder value" rule.
Robin: I think Tyler's comment on his blog wasn't intended as a response, but simply to give background context to your reference to "mood affiliation" in your post. I don't think he was suggesting your present post should be viewed through the lens of hypocrisy.
I'm surprised no one has yet called out Tyler's repetition of the old socialist trope claiming that management has a fiduciary duty "to maximize shareholder profits".
Management has a duty, as an agent of the owners, to do *whatever the owners want them to do*. Usually that includes a keen attention to profit, but it rarely, if ever, is the only thing.
Certainly as a shareholder, profit is one of the things *I* want from management, but it is by no means the only thing.
I don't see types of selfishness as useful for regulation of firms.
Thank you Professor, I agree. Any thoughts on the notion of types of selfishness and some properties thereof? It could help us create better regulations...
Complaints that are targeted toward evaluating particular proposed regulations do make more sense to me. Of course that doesn't mean any one proposed regulation is a good idea.
If so much is going to rest on the concept of selfishness, then it requires more inquiry. For example, are there multiple kind of "selfishness"? Are all kinds ( if multiple kinds do exist) equally beneficial/harmful to society? Can it be measured? Is it additive - i.e. if x number of people come together to form an organization, is the "selfishness" of the organization the mean or the sum or some other functions of selfishness?
In general, I do agree with Prof. Hanson's framing - it is much more consistent and crisp than Prof. Cowen's. One follow-up question though: Society over multiple millennia have created other equally selfishness institutions that change the "selfish" calculus of individuals. By that token, shouldn't we support regulation and moral opprobrium for corporations and their leaders as a mechanism to change their calculus in an individual's favor? And then, doesn't complaining about corporations becomes a rational individual response?
I’m really baffled by Cowen’s argument. Anyone who thinks corporations are their friends is a fool. Their nature is to try to exploit us, and once you understand that they’re okay.
But the only reason anyone would make this mistake is because we are all being constantly bombarded with corporate advertising trying desperately to make us believe that corporations are our friends, so they can exploit that misunderstanding. And I do mean bombarded.
Cowen seems to be saying something like: pay no attention to the constant intrusions into your private thoughts by these psychopathic manipulative exploiters who would turn you into dog food in an instant if the law wouldn’t punish them for it. They’re constantly trying to convince you, your children, and everyone else you care about that they’re friendly even though believing that makes you vulnerable to their terrible predations. Once you accept that they want to kill you and destroy everything that matters to you they’re actually great!
Do I have that just about right?
Cowen's cryptic comment looks a lot like the third paragraph in your post, which discusses his approach to the book. Maybe he interpreted that paragraph as a complaint, and is making the point that in your anti-hypocrisy crusade, you are doing the very thing that you complain about him doing in his book?
I just added to the post.
Thanks. This response is a bit cryptic to me but it prompted me to reread the quote-containing paragraph and I think I now get the drift.
The book argues that firms are reliable & trustworthy in an absolute sense, not just relative to our low expectations.
There are many differences in relations, both possible and real differences, other than whether one is fooled by it.
Robin, you say "We aren’t at all fooled into thinking of big business as equal lovers or drinking buddies."
But in the previous paragraph, you describe humans (my paraphrase) as unconsciously calculating the exact degree of required reciprocity even in friendship, and as no less essentially selfish than big business.
So I'm left wondering: What is the difference which the above quote seems to acknowledge?
Yes, we probably receive more trustworthy behavior from firms than friends. It does seem a puzzle that we give friends a pass while excoriating businesses for the slightest violations.
Perhaps we would speak similarly of acquaintances if possible with the same impunity. This hypothesis suggests we will criticize celebrities much more than associates for similar transgressions and also that powerful individuals will be more inclined to call others out. Does your research for <it>Elephant</it> bear on this?
You've read the book and I haven't. Would it be fair to summarize the book as arguing that corporations are more reliable & trustworthy than they are commonly given credit for being? Tyler could make that argument while also claiming (as you quote) that is a noble lie that they attain the level of friends or relatives without any inconsistency. The issue would then be that he's implicitly treating "our other relation partners" as more reliable & trustworthy than you believe them to be, and the evidence to settle that matter would not be in the book.