At SciFoo Camp last weekend, famed quantum gravitist Lee Smolin mentioned that he’d noticed a correlation between these beliefs: Many worlds for quantum mechanics, Anthropic arguments in physics, and
Bohm's ontology is far cleaner than the MWI ontology. The trouble with MWI is that is cannot explain why we observe the reality we actually do (how does our subjective experience emerge from the wavefunction?).
It comes down to a matter of levels of abstraction. If you think reality only operates on a single level (reductionism) then you'll go for MWI. If on the other hand, you think reality is best divided into different levels of abstraction, you'll be sympathetic toward Bohm.
An analogy might be the relation between deduction and induction; if deduction is just a special case of induction, does that mean we can dispense with the notion of deduction? By analogy, if the particle is somehow just a part of the pilot wave, can we dispense with the notion of the particle? I lean towards a 'no' answer in both cases.
This is a bit like asking why the elite intelligentsia of 1900 believed in Fabian socialism, eugenics, and the objective existence of atoms (which was an issue at the time). The common theme would be that these ideas look like the best available answer to some important question. But the details are a mass of historical contingency.
I learned about Bohm at about the same time as MWI, about 20 years ago. I find MWI more compelling for two reasons. First, MWI has fewer bits - Occam's razor rules in its favor (as I view it). Second, if Bohm is correct about the objective reality in itself, then I think Bohm's pilot wave would be capable of sustaining subjective experience without the help of the particle. That is, even if there is a pilot wave and a particle as Bohm says, we could just as well occupy some other part of the pilot wave.
I just want put in a plug for the Bohm intepretation of QM as a strong alternative to MWI. I didn't know anything technical about it, about when I researched it I was amazed to discover that it lined up so perfectly to my 3-level ontological model of reality. This has really caused me to start doubting MWI.
In Bohm, reality has a three level structure - the wave function is split in two - there's the basic wave function at the top level, a new quantum potential at the mid-level, and the particle on the bottom level. All three levels are equally real. Although in Bohm there is no wave function collapse and all branches are equally real, there is only one actual concrete particle history (one world).
Again, I must emphasize, this is a perfect match to my own recursive 3-level ontological model, which has really startled me.
Thus, aside from a few who I would consider cranks, physicists believe in anthropic arguments only insofar as they believe in a multiverse.
That is exactly correct, but you miss the critical point of this willful ignorance, (no, you even join ranks with them), that this is also the reason that physicists are the cranks, since the weak interpretation is not what is observed... duh.
I don't know about your first question, but I would have guessed the answer is "no."
I don't think the "perceived flaw" of string theory is higher dimensions. In fact, that's an enormous asset, if for instance you think anthropics is the only way to explain the cosmological constant.
I would guess the loop folks would say the flaw in string theory is that it has to take for granted a "background" Minkowski metric, whereas one hopes a fundamental theory incorporating GR would not have to make any prior assumptions about the background geometry. But I'm not very initiated into either school.
Perhaps this is why people writing above say what they do about "anthropics." It should be made clear that the only flavor of "anthropic reasoning" that a significant number of physicists entertain is the idea that our universe is one among many with a variety of different properties, and we observe what properties we do in part because they, unlike others, are suitable to the evolution of observers like us.
Thus, aside from a few who I would consider cranks, physicists believe in anthropic arguments only insofar as they believe in a multiverse.
Regarding AI, I suspect a physicists belief in this is independent his/her position on (1) and (2)... so "correlation" might not be a good word. Maybe I am missing something, but to me the question is merely is it in principle possible to emulate a human mind using a device that is not merely a copy of the human brain. Physicists, regardless of positions (1) and (2), tend not to believe in a "soul" -- and I think for most the question would boil down to whether thoughts ultimately reflect only the processing of information, in which case one accepts the possibility to build a computer to do the same (though the necessary resources could be enormous, and civilization may end before we figure it all out). Perhaps physicists readily accept the proposition because they are unaware of what is supposed to be the subtlety (that's sort of how I feel).
I'm sorry, I'm a perennial newbie at QM. But is there any particular reason why loop quantum gravity would necessarily be in opposition to with MWI? I thought string theory's perceived flaw was appealing to higher dimensions in this universe.
I was comparing MW with Marxism, not talking about anthropism or libertarianism. The category of "big explanation" is a crude, vague, hand-waving thing, of limited explanatory value here. You might call Schroedinger's equation itself a "big explanation" since it applies to so much. This is what I was critiquing, using as an example MW versus Marxism. What KVN's argument in effect does is damn MW by association with Marxism, and a highly questionable, forced association at that, which is the height of lazy reasoning. I'm aware of Bohm. Bohm adds new elements since it's a hidden-variable theory. It's not necessarily wrong, but it's not taking the Schroedinger's equation as seriously as MW, since Schroedinger's equation does not say anything about the hidden variables, any more than it says anything about the wave-function collapse.
The third belief in the cluster (conscious-AI) is pretty clear-cut rational, but the other two are highly controversial (as shown by my lower probability assessments). So some explanation other than rationality is needed.
So do numerous alternative explanations. I think Yudkowsky successfully rebutted all explanations involving the notion of a 'wave-function collapse' in his series on this blog, but readers should be aware that numerous other alternative explanations still remain. The Bohm interpretation, for example, has no wave-function collapse (according to this interpretation reality is stratified into different levels - both wave-function and particle levels equally ontologically real - this is a similar idea to my own '3-level causality' theory.)
See for example, the good wikipedia article summarizing the ontology of some of the more popular alternatives (go to comparison table at end):
Ontology of QM Interpretations
>Marxism does not take market economics seriously but rather is itself a bad, alternative, crackpot theory.
I agree, but Marxists are not likely to see it that way. And in fact, its opposite number, Libertarianism, could also be regarded as just as crackpot. Even moderate versions are certainly not regarded as 'rational' by main-stream economists.
Few take anthropics seriously. It is usually used as a sort of 'God of the gaps' - once causal explanations of something are available, you can dispense with anthropics, for instance anthropic arguments are used to explain the cosmological constant only because there is currently no causal explanation, once one is available, I bet that anthropics will be dropped like a hot-potato.
I want to suggest that the believers in this belief cluster are not nearly as 'rational' as they think. They just fancy themselves as 'cool smarties'.
For the anthropic case, you probably need to be looking at some kind of multiverse. Few object to using anthropic reasoning to explain the fact that we live on a planet where life can survive. It's more troublesome if we want to explain why we live in a universe where life can survive, unless you have some reason to believe there are other universes. So the MWI-anthropic connection makes sense.
I'm surprised about the connection with AI though, surprised enough that I would want to see evidence that it's true. From what I gather from way afar, most physicists neither accept the MWI nor any multiverse. Do most physicists then believe that conscious AI is impossible? That would be a surprise to me. Conscious AI is a common part of popular futurist culture, and I'm not aware of grumpiness from the physics community that such AIs are scientifically inaccurate (unlike things like FTL travel, where there are frequent low-key complaints).
It seems to me that there is a common thread: a patternist theory of consciousness.
In my case, I take MWI seriously for reasons of mathematical elegance. Once I accept that my consciousness is continually branching with the rest of the universe, it appears disingenuous to identify it with anything apart from the patterns of causality in my brain; this patternism then gives (2) and (3) as relatively easy corollaries.
Is CI less frivolously "impressive-sounding" and more practical against real-world problems than many-worlds? Is the idea that consciousness/intelligence are purely physical processes, that could be simulated like any other, somehow more "large-scale theistic-type hand waving" than its opposite? Regardless of the merits and criticisms of anthropic reasoning, do you seriously judge those who favor it over your preferred cosmology as emotionally-insecure head-in-the-clouds types trying to sound smart?
Believers in these three things obviously prefer large-scale theistic type hand waving, rather than practical dealing with small problems. They are the type of person who has a lot of emotional investment in how smart they are, and is therefore driven to impressive sounding theories of everything, which tend not to help with actual problems in the real world. See also: the Singularity, most public Economists, etc etc.
Yes. I just finished it. I allowed myself to wax poetic on the extropian list, here is what I wrote:
I have some of my own reflections on autistic cognitive style:
Autism is a form of abnormal development of the brain, where the mostbasic neurological substrate of cognition, such as the corticalmantle, cortical columns, and the subcortical support structures,develop normally, yet there is an impairment in the long-rangeconnections (white matter tracts) between cortical modules. Thisdiffers from garden-variety retardation where the substrate ofcognition is itself dysfunctional. Furthermore, the impairment oflong-range white matter tracts is not random. Random damage to whitematter is seen in multiple sclerosis and microvascular disease whichproduce a totally different cognitive outcome (although infrequentlyone may observe some savant-like traits). The tracts most affected inautism tend to be the highly specialized networks important for socialand linguistic tasks, while general-purpose cognitive circuitry isspared.
The special purpose circuitry is very important for fast achievementof social competence, which is obviously extremely important forsurvival in the prehistoric jungle that shaped our genes. Yet, suchspeed comes at a cost: The social circuitry imposes a pre-determinedstructure on cognition, directing attention to stimuli and phenomenamost important for survival in the jungle. This structure carries withitself evolutionary assumptions about social tactics, finelycalibrated to life in small tribes. It teaches about dominance andsubmission games, coalition-building and exclusion of strangers, theuses of violence and deception in both offensive and defensiveapplications. It teaches to devote cognitive resources to tracking thealphas, rather than count petals in various flowers. It weaves lies,violence and the ability to self-deceive into the very fabric of themind, making them into unseen yet all pervading facts of life.
The mildly autistic mind is to some extent deprived of suchpre-ordained structure. It is free to use its raw intelligence withoutcompulsive focus on tribal structure. It tends to excel and then focuson tasks that do not require extensive long-range corticalconnections, such as mathematics, or physical modeling of theenvironment. It is forced to come up with its own ways of imposingstructure on sensory input which is much slower than pre-configuredideas - but it is free not to be shackled by tricks calibrated for thehunter-gatherer lifestyle. The autistic person is in a way weak,innocent, inept at bullying, lying and social manipulation, yet hismind is like a primal force, unbound by outdated assumptions. He ismentally undivided, applying his general cognitive engine to a greaterscope of tasks than usual among the dominant social animals. His stylereflects his neural structure - a Hawkins' hierarchical temporalmemory, fluidly building ever more complex hierarchy of world modelsfrom simpler units, without the shortcuts afforded by the specializedneural hardware seen in standard humans - slower but less likely tomake systematic mistakes in understanding. He is the persistenttruth-finder, at times appalled by what he finds out. He is theinnocent, fluid force of truth.
Bohm's ontology is far cleaner than the MWI ontology. The trouble with MWI is that is cannot explain why we observe the reality we actually do (how does our subjective experience emerge from the wavefunction?).
It comes down to a matter of levels of abstraction. If you think reality only operates on a single level (reductionism) then you'll go for MWI. If on the other hand, you think reality is best divided into different levels of abstraction, you'll be sympathetic toward Bohm.
An analogy might be the relation between deduction and induction; if deduction is just a special case of induction, does that mean we can dispense with the notion of deduction? By analogy, if the particle is somehow just a part of the pilot wave, can we dispense with the notion of the particle? I lean towards a 'no' answer in both cases.
This is a bit like asking why the elite intelligentsia of 1900 believed in Fabian socialism, eugenics, and the objective existence of atoms (which was an issue at the time). The common theme would be that these ideas look like the best available answer to some important question. But the details are a mass of historical contingency.
I learned about Bohm at about the same time as MWI, about 20 years ago. I find MWI more compelling for two reasons. First, MWI has fewer bits - Occam's razor rules in its favor (as I view it). Second, if Bohm is correct about the objective reality in itself, then I think Bohm's pilot wave would be capable of sustaining subjective experience without the help of the particle. That is, even if there is a pilot wave and a particle as Bohm says, we could just as well occupy some other part of the pilot wave.
I just want put in a plug for the Bohm intepretation of QM as a strong alternative to MWI. I didn't know anything technical about it, about when I researched it I was amazed to discover that it lined up so perfectly to my 3-level ontological model of reality. This has really caused me to start doubting MWI.
In Bohm, reality has a three level structure - the wave function is split in two - there's the basic wave function at the top level, a new quantum potential at the mid-level, and the particle on the bottom level. All three levels are equally real. Although in Bohm there is no wave function collapse and all branches are equally real, there is only one actual concrete particle history (one world).
Again, I must emphasize, this is a perfect match to my own recursive 3-level ontological model, which has really startled me.
Thus, aside from a few who I would consider cranks, physicists believe in anthropic arguments only insofar as they believe in a multiverse.
That is exactly correct, but you miss the critical point of this willful ignorance, (no, you even join ranks with them), that this is also the reason that physicists are the cranks, since the weak interpretation is not what is observed... duh.
http://dorigo.wordpress.com...
I don't know about your first question, but I would have guessed the answer is "no."
I don't think the "perceived flaw" of string theory is higher dimensions. In fact, that's an enormous asset, if for instance you think anthropics is the only way to explain the cosmological constant.
I would guess the loop folks would say the flaw in string theory is that it has to take for granted a "background" Minkowski metric, whereas one hopes a fundamental theory incorporating GR would not have to make any prior assumptions about the background geometry. But I'm not very initiated into either school.
Perhaps this is why people writing above say what they do about "anthropics." It should be made clear that the only flavor of "anthropic reasoning" that a significant number of physicists entertain is the idea that our universe is one among many with a variety of different properties, and we observe what properties we do in part because they, unlike others, are suitable to the evolution of observers like us.
Thus, aside from a few who I would consider cranks, physicists believe in anthropic arguments only insofar as they believe in a multiverse.
Regarding AI, I suspect a physicists belief in this is independent his/her position on (1) and (2)... so "correlation" might not be a good word. Maybe I am missing something, but to me the question is merely is it in principle possible to emulate a human mind using a device that is not merely a copy of the human brain. Physicists, regardless of positions (1) and (2), tend not to believe in a "soul" -- and I think for most the question would boil down to whether thoughts ultimately reflect only the processing of information, in which case one accepts the possibility to build a computer to do the same (though the necessary resources could be enormous, and civilization may end before we figure it all out). Perhaps physicists readily accept the proposition because they are unaware of what is supposed to be the subtlety (that's sort of how I feel).
I'm sorry, I'm a perennial newbie at QM. But is there any particular reason why loop quantum gravity would necessarily be in opposition to with MWI? I thought string theory's perceived flaw was appealing to higher dimensions in this universe.
I was comparing MW with Marxism, not talking about anthropism or libertarianism. The category of "big explanation" is a crude, vague, hand-waving thing, of limited explanatory value here. You might call Schroedinger's equation itself a "big explanation" since it applies to so much. This is what I was critiquing, using as an example MW versus Marxism. What KVN's argument in effect does is damn MW by association with Marxism, and a highly questionable, forced association at that, which is the height of lazy reasoning. I'm aware of Bohm. Bohm adds new elements since it's a hidden-variable theory. It's not necessarily wrong, but it's not taking the Schroedinger's equation as seriously as MW, since Schroedinger's equation does not say anything about the hidden variables, any more than it says anything about the wave-function collapse.
The third belief in the cluster (conscious-AI) is pretty clear-cut rational, but the other two are highly controversial (as shown by my lower probability assessments). So some explanation other than rationality is needed.
>Many worlds takes Schroedinger’s equation seriously.
So do numerous alternative explanations. I think Yudkowsky successfully rebutted all explanations involving the notion of a 'wave-function collapse' in his series on this blog, but readers should be aware that numerous other alternative explanations still remain. The Bohm interpretation, for example, has no wave-function collapse (according to this interpretation reality is stratified into different levels - both wave-function and particle levels equally ontologically real - this is a similar idea to my own '3-level causality' theory.)
See for example, the good wikipedia article summarizing the ontology of some of the more popular alternatives (go to comparison table at end):
Ontology of QM Interpretations
>Marxism does not take market economics seriously but rather is itself a bad, alternative, crackpot theory.
I agree, but Marxists are not likely to see it that way. And in fact, its opposite number, Libertarianism, could also be regarded as just as crackpot. Even moderate versions are certainly not regarded as 'rational' by main-stream economists.
Few take anthropics seriously. It is usually used as a sort of 'God of the gaps' - once causal explanations of something are available, you can dispense with anthropics, for instance anthropic arguments are used to explain the cosmological constant only because there is currently no causal explanation, once one is available, I bet that anthropics will be dropped like a hot-potato.
I want to suggest that the believers in this belief cluster are not nearly as 'rational' as they think. They just fancy themselves as 'cool smarties'.
For the anthropic case, you probably need to be looking at some kind of multiverse. Few object to using anthropic reasoning to explain the fact that we live on a planet where life can survive. It's more troublesome if we want to explain why we live in a universe where life can survive, unless you have some reason to believe there are other universes. So the MWI-anthropic connection makes sense.
I'm surprised about the connection with AI though, surprised enough that I would want to see evidence that it's true. From what I gather from way afar, most physicists neither accept the MWI nor any multiverse. Do most physicists then believe that conscious AI is impossible? That would be a surprise to me. Conscious AI is a common part of popular futurist culture, and I'm not aware of grumpiness from the physics community that such AIs are scientifically inaccurate (unlike things like FTL travel, where there are frequent low-key complaints).
It seems to me that there is a common thread: a patternist theory of consciousness.
In my case, I take MWI seriously for reasons of mathematical elegance. Once I accept that my consciousness is continually branching with the rest of the universe, it appears disingenuous to identify it with anything apart from the patterns of causality in my brain; this patternism then gives (2) and (3) as relatively easy corollaries.
Is CI less frivolously "impressive-sounding" and more practical against real-world problems than many-worlds? Is the idea that consciousness/intelligence are purely physical processes, that could be simulated like any other, somehow more "large-scale theistic-type hand waving" than its opposite? Regardless of the merits and criticisms of anthropic reasoning, do you seriously judge those who favor it over your preferred cosmology as emotionally-insecure head-in-the-clouds types trying to sound smart?
as opposed to those people who make themselves feel smart by making up grand generalizations that makes others look less smart.
Believers in these three things obviously prefer large-scale theistic type hand waving, rather than practical dealing with small problems. They are the type of person who has a lot of emotional investment in how smart they are, and is therefore driven to impressive sounding theories of everything, which tend not to help with actual problems in the real world. See also: the Singularity, most public Economists, etc etc.
Yes. I just finished it. I allowed myself to wax poetic on the extropian list, here is what I wrote:
I have some of my own reflections on autistic cognitive style:
Autism is a form of abnormal development of the brain, where the mostbasic neurological substrate of cognition, such as the corticalmantle, cortical columns, and the subcortical support structures,develop normally, yet there is an impairment in the long-rangeconnections (white matter tracts) between cortical modules. Thisdiffers from garden-variety retardation where the substrate ofcognition is itself dysfunctional. Furthermore, the impairment oflong-range white matter tracts is not random. Random damage to whitematter is seen in multiple sclerosis and microvascular disease whichproduce a totally different cognitive outcome (although infrequentlyone may observe some savant-like traits). The tracts most affected inautism tend to be the highly specialized networks important for socialand linguistic tasks, while general-purpose cognitive circuitry isspared.
The special purpose circuitry is very important for fast achievementof social competence, which is obviously extremely important forsurvival in the prehistoric jungle that shaped our genes. Yet, suchspeed comes at a cost: The social circuitry imposes a pre-determinedstructure on cognition, directing attention to stimuli and phenomenamost important for survival in the jungle. This structure carries withitself evolutionary assumptions about social tactics, finelycalibrated to life in small tribes. It teaches about dominance andsubmission games, coalition-building and exclusion of strangers, theuses of violence and deception in both offensive and defensiveapplications. It teaches to devote cognitive resources to tracking thealphas, rather than count petals in various flowers. It weaves lies,violence and the ability to self-deceive into the very fabric of themind, making them into unseen yet all pervading facts of life.
The mildly autistic mind is to some extent deprived of suchpre-ordained structure. It is free to use its raw intelligence withoutcompulsive focus on tribal structure. It tends to excel and then focuson tasks that do not require extensive long-range corticalconnections, such as mathematics, or physical modeling of theenvironment. It is forced to come up with its own ways of imposingstructure on sensory input which is much slower than pre-configuredideas - but it is free not to be shackled by tricks calibrated for thehunter-gatherer lifestyle. The autistic person is in a way weak,innocent, inept at bullying, lying and social manipulation, yet hismind is like a primal force, unbound by outdated assumptions. He ismentally undivided, applying his general cognitive engine to a greaterscope of tasks than usual among the dominant social animals. His stylereflects his neural structure - a Hawkins' hierarchical temporalmemory, fluidly building ever more complex hierarchy of world modelsfrom simpler units, without the shortcuts afforded by the specializedneural hardware seen in standard humans - slower but less likely tomake systematic mistakes in understanding. He is the persistenttruth-finder, at times appalled by what he finds out. He is theinnocent, fluid force of truth.