Why do most people want their teachers, doctors, detectives, soldiers, park rangers, etc. to be state employees, or heavily regulated “professionals,” instead of vigorously competing business-folk? Yes, many specific market failure rationales are offered, but it seems to me that humans also feel a psychological need to keep their sacred social institutions looking similar to the families, bands, and fiefdoms of their distant ancestors. We want something like key people swearing an oath of loyalty to us and our dearest norms; otherwise it just doesn’t feel right.
In what way- can you give more details?
Weren't private detectives mentioned as having existing historically? Maybe somebody who actually knows the details should check that up.
What about government-subsidised defence lawyers with bounties per client they get let off?
The army currently has a practical monopoly on force, and yet they haven't seized power.
In addition, a system could easily exist with both a public army and private forces- as long as the balance of power wasn't too far in favor of the private forces, a mix of a reluctance to embark on a risky civil war, the consequences of failure and democratic indoctrination would restrain private forces from a coup.
Government detective or not, there is a risk of false accusations. If you put a reward for doing something, there is always the risk of people "cheating" to get more rewards (in this case, false accusations to increase conviction rates). It's not the system's fault. I think Robin's system has merit given the right time to test it and the right system to support it.
- Jacqueline Roberts
There's already a similar experiment - American private jail system. It was the worst thing ever to happen to justice in any developed country ever, and if you cannot even admit that much, you really should stay away from the subject.
Stuart, we could experiment by slowly add more crimes that are enforced by bounties instead of police.
That sounds like a very good idea.
I'm somewhat surprised that so many people fear false accusations with bounty hunting more than with government employee detectives and prosecutors, who if they could would also like to falsely accuse folks in order to increase their closure and conviction rates, and who can better collude to achieve this end.
They already tried this type of thing in ancient Greece, and from the odious effects of the policy the word 'sycophant' still retains its unsavory connotation.
And in whose interest does everybody act in this capacity?
Regarding bail bondsmen, I thought this NPR story should make us more cautious.
according to the county treasurer in Lubbock, bondsmen usually only pay 5 percent of the bond when a client runs.Consider that math for a minute. The bondsmen charge clients at least 10 percent. But if the client runs, they only have to pay the county 5 percent. Meaning if they make no effort whatsoever, they still profit...It is possible to skip the commercial bail bonding business entirely by just paying cash. Show up for court and you get your cash back. But it turns out that this is not as easy as it sounds. It takes hours longer to post a cash bail. And many people, like Sandy Ramirez, don't even know that it's an option... She says neither the district attorney's office, the judge nor the court clerk told her she could leave cash with the court as a deposit and get it back when the case was over. ...judges aren't setting bail at what you can afford to pay. They're setting bail 10 times higher than what many people can afford to pay a bail bondsman. If a judge thinks $1,000 is a good amount to bring you back to court, then bail is set at $10,000.
See my above comment. I nearly was framed by the current system..
I would be more worried about being framed in this scenario than I am now.
We can make the loser pay the winner's court costs.
In your proposed system one would only need to make it more expensive to prosecute oneself than the bounty would pay out to avoid getting charged. The poor would get charged more often than the rich, because they could afford to put up less of a fight.
You might suggest a counter bounty for defence attorneys, but that would provide the perverse incentive for them to take on only the easiest to defend and leave everyone else blowing in the wind.