Re civ decline, my basic story is that a key contribution to the fall of civilizations is plausibly that as a civ gets big, rich, and peaceful, its local cultural evolution process parameters get worse, at least at the culture level.
I am going to say something that is inherently sexist, but there is probably at least a kernel of truth in it. Women tend to be worriers - but evolution heavily selected on the ability of women to successfully raise their children - and worrying about risk to their children was - and is adaptive. But without young children to focus their worries, young women can and do focus their worries on other issues where such worries are less adaptive. With the drop in child rearing, particularly child rearing while relatively young, societies around the world are being greatly impacted by worrying women.
I could have added the also simple minded generalization that young single men tend to be too risk seeking. To the best of my understanding, the two over generalizations are about equally valid.
John Michener (in comments) raised the question of displaced worry: Is the vigilance regarding harm to loved ones—which was adaptive for ancestral women occupied by childcare—now being redirected by contemporary women toward social activism?
This is worth discussing because evolutionary mismatch is important. The mismatch Michener identified is: Ancestral women typically started having children at age 19 (with 22 being peak fertility) and continued into their late 30s, birthing an average of five children over a 20-year span. This involved natural birth spacing due to caloric restriction and high physical activity. In contrast, contemporary urban women may have only one to three children, mostly in their 30s.
So, I did a quick literature search. Childless women in their 20s are indeed more involved in social activism than same-aged women with children. Does this support the displaced worry thesis? Scholars note that this displacement can be a straightforward consequence of the time and energy demands of parenting, but it may also be related to education and financial resources. Young women who have postponed childbearing often possess resources and personality traits that differ from those of women rearing children in their 20s; these include higher education, financial autonomy, and greater political interest.
Ok, continuing on with 'displaced worry.'
Young women's social activism is often centered on safety, equity, and harm reduction—including long-term harm reduction such as environmentalism. This emphasis on creating a social environment where children can thrive characterizes some of the most famous activist movements in the West. Historic examples include social movements against child labor during the Industrial Revolution, the Temperance movement (1840s–1920s), and contemporary movements such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). Women have also been heavily involved in social justice movements where men were the primary leaders, such as the abolition of slavery and the Civil Rights Movement (1960s).
The women in these movements overwhelmingly had children (as did 90% of women until recently). Thus, social activism is not necessarily a "displaced worry" resulting from childlessness.
Michener argues: "Young women can and do focus their worries on other issues (other than childrearing) where such worries are less adaptive."
But which issues are "less adaptive"? Does Michener mean vigilance regarding climate threats, micro-aggressions, linguistic purity, or complex geopolitical conflicts? Does he mean social movements against male domination and other feminist topics, or perhaps complaints about men being obsessed with sex on dating apps? I agree these aren't adaptive in the classic sense of reproductive fitness, but in what way are they harmful or detrimental to cultural fitness?
Many of these topics seem to be positive for cultural fitness, as they can directly or indirectly reduce economic inequality and reduce inequality among males. Inequality among males is a negative factor for social stability—one that was famously tamed (of course not eliminated) by Christianity's monogamy requirement. Women’s involvement in social justice actions are thus increasing the fitness of human cultures, moving cultures in the direction of the relatively flat social hierarchies of the ancestral environment.
According to the Wikipedia article on Cousin Marriage, earlier Church restrictions on cousin marriage were considerably relaxed (not strengthened) at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. "For example, the marriage of Louis XIV of France and Maria Theresa of Spain [in 1660] was a first-cousin marriage on both sides. It began to fall out of favor in the 19th century as women became socially mobile." Earlier church restrictions had made it almost impossible for royalty and nobility to find marriage partners.
A personal note. Doing genealogy, I found a first cousin marriage in my family 3 generations up in the early 19th century. It was completely allowed (neither encouraged or discouraged) among Jews, then and now. But I was confused because on their NY marriage licenses, two cousins (one a witness, if I recall correctly) appeared to misstate their mothers' maiden names. I concluded that the cousin who was to be married was afraid that first-cousin marriage was illegal in NY and the other was covering for her. In fact, it was not illegal in NY state and is not illegal now. I know of no ill consequences arising from this union. And despite my initial puzzlement, when I contacted that branch of the family, they knew all about the incident in detail and confirmed my conclusion .
I would answer “both.” Providential like you say in avoiding a universal empire, and in that the church was able to gain and maintain some independence from the state. This was critical. But that freedom enabled the church to implement reforms (like Cluny) to double down on doctrines like individual judgement / salvation, equality of souls before God, and importance of interior religiosity over external rituals. This was Christianity changing culture over millennia. And unlocking this worldview was a critical enabler for capitalism / Enlightenment / liberalism.
When your model fails to account for something, it looks like random chance, or luck. That's a problem with the model.
The success of Christianity is not luck, it's people using their reason. Church leaders determined rationally that doing X would increase the power of the church, so they did X. Your notion of cultural selection has a blind spot where it comes to people using their reason to improve their own circumstances and power, which is really a major part of how culture changes, much more significant than random cultural variation followed by Darwinian selection.
The point of your post is that Christianity did change significantly while it maintained and expanded its power across different demographics and circumstances. It's not possible to do that without continually adapting.
Were "most" changes power-increasing? There's no way to count discrete changes to say yes or no on that. Some of them would be irrelevant changes to theological fine points. *Enough* of the changes were power-increasing, and the reason this was so, is because of church leaders doing the smart thing to increase their power.
I think to get that “lucky” the major key—the master key—was a highly fragmented system. The Church, for better or for worse, played a major role in shaping a decentralized Europe. This resulted in more autonomy and specialization and ultimately more tolerance and greater individual freedom. Not, to be sure, the kind of liberty we libertarians write about, but its foundation.
Michael Magoon writes about this in his book series, From Poverty to Progress, and on his Substack which goes by that same title.
With religion and technology I am reminded of the Chinese parable of the man who lost his horse. What looks like a blessing may in time turn out to be a curse. Or vice versa. Who's to say? Those in the thick of it (i.e., all of us) have no way of knowing how it will turn out.
The industrial revolution has been great for human flourishing, but if in 30 years an AI apocalypse brings about the end of humankind – it was a foolish bargain.
I'd imagine the internet has led to an increase in religious hostility. Just because the internet is global in nature (so people from different religions interact with/see each other more than they otherwise would. perhaps partly due to algorithms amplifying controversial content as well
I am going to say something that is inherently sexist, but there is probably at least a kernel of truth in it. Women tend to be worriers - but evolution heavily selected on the ability of women to successfully raise their children - and worrying about risk to their children was - and is adaptive. But without young children to focus their worries, young women can and do focus their worries on other issues where such worries are less adaptive. With the drop in child rearing, particularly child rearing while relatively young, societies around the world are being greatly impacted by worrying women.
Regarding whether this is sexist. It does seem related to the 'blame women' trope. Here's a hilarious example by a talented YouTuber.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk1Ylpq6Tjw
I could have added the also simple minded generalization that young single men tend to be too risk seeking. To the best of my understanding, the two over generalizations are about equally valid.
Agree.
John Michener (in comments) raised the question of displaced worry: Is the vigilance regarding harm to loved ones—which was adaptive for ancestral women occupied by childcare—now being redirected by contemporary women toward social activism?
This is worth discussing because evolutionary mismatch is important. The mismatch Michener identified is: Ancestral women typically started having children at age 19 (with 22 being peak fertility) and continued into their late 30s, birthing an average of five children over a 20-year span. This involved natural birth spacing due to caloric restriction and high physical activity. In contrast, contemporary urban women may have only one to three children, mostly in their 30s.
So, I did a quick literature search. Childless women in their 20s are indeed more involved in social activism than same-aged women with children. Does this support the displaced worry thesis? Scholars note that this displacement can be a straightforward consequence of the time and energy demands of parenting, but it may also be related to education and financial resources. Young women who have postponed childbearing often possess resources and personality traits that differ from those of women rearing children in their 20s; these include higher education, financial autonomy, and greater political interest.
Ok, continuing on with 'displaced worry.'
Young women's social activism is often centered on safety, equity, and harm reduction—including long-term harm reduction such as environmentalism. This emphasis on creating a social environment where children can thrive characterizes some of the most famous activist movements in the West. Historic examples include social movements against child labor during the Industrial Revolution, the Temperance movement (1840s–1920s), and contemporary movements such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). Women have also been heavily involved in social justice movements where men were the primary leaders, such as the abolition of slavery and the Civil Rights Movement (1960s).
The women in these movements overwhelmingly had children (as did 90% of women until recently). Thus, social activism is not necessarily a "displaced worry" resulting from childlessness.
Michener argues: "Young women can and do focus their worries on other issues (other than childrearing) where such worries are less adaptive."
But which issues are "less adaptive"? Does Michener mean vigilance regarding climate threats, micro-aggressions, linguistic purity, or complex geopolitical conflicts? Does he mean social movements against male domination and other feminist topics, or perhaps complaints about men being obsessed with sex on dating apps? I agree these aren't adaptive in the classic sense of reproductive fitness, but in what way are they harmful or detrimental to cultural fitness?
Many of these topics seem to be positive for cultural fitness, as they can directly or indirectly reduce economic inequality and reduce inequality among males. Inequality among males is a negative factor for social stability—one that was famously tamed (of course not eliminated) by Christianity's monogamy requirement. Women’s involvement in social justice actions are thus increasing the fitness of human cultures, moving cultures in the direction of the relatively flat social hierarchies of the ancestral environment.
According to the Wikipedia article on Cousin Marriage, earlier Church restrictions on cousin marriage were considerably relaxed (not strengthened) at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. "For example, the marriage of Louis XIV of France and Maria Theresa of Spain [in 1660] was a first-cousin marriage on both sides. It began to fall out of favor in the 19th century as women became socially mobile." Earlier church restrictions had made it almost impossible for royalty and nobility to find marriage partners.
A personal note. Doing genealogy, I found a first cousin marriage in my family 3 generations up in the early 19th century. It was completely allowed (neither encouraged or discouraged) among Jews, then and now. But I was confused because on their NY marriage licenses, two cousins (one a witness, if I recall correctly) appeared to misstate their mothers' maiden names. I concluded that the cousin who was to be married was afraid that first-cousin marriage was illegal in NY and the other was covering for her. In fact, it was not illegal in NY state and is not illegal now. I know of no ill consequences arising from this union. And despite my initial puzzlement, when I contacted that branch of the family, they knew all about the incident in detail and confirmed my conclusion .
I would answer “both.” Providential like you say in avoiding a universal empire, and in that the church was able to gain and maintain some independence from the state. This was critical. But that freedom enabled the church to implement reforms (like Cluny) to double down on doctrines like individual judgement / salvation, equality of souls before God, and importance of interior religiosity over external rituals. This was Christianity changing culture over millennia. And unlocking this worldview was a critical enabler for capitalism / Enlightenment / liberalism.
When something critical in history is the result of pure luck it gives hope that the Great Filter is behind us.
There's (maybe) life, the Cambrian explosion, (maybe) language, and whatever led to our current tech civ (maybe this).
Robin handing out a free dissertation topic
When your model fails to account for something, it looks like random chance, or luck. That's a problem with the model.
The success of Christianity is not luck, it's people using their reason. Church leaders determined rationally that doing X would increase the power of the church, so they did X. Your notion of cultural selection has a blind spot where it comes to people using their reason to improve their own circumstances and power, which is really a major part of how culture changes, much more significant than random cultural variation followed by Darwinian selection.
Most Christianity changes did not much increase its power.
The point of your post is that Christianity did change significantly while it maintained and expanded its power across different demographics and circumstances. It's not possible to do that without continually adapting.
Were "most" changes power-increasing? There's no way to count discrete changes to say yes or no on that. Some of them would be irrelevant changes to theological fine points. *Enough* of the changes were power-increasing, and the reason this was so, is because of church leaders doing the smart thing to increase their power.
I think to get that “lucky” the major key—the master key—was a highly fragmented system. The Church, for better or for worse, played a major role in shaping a decentralized Europe. This resulted in more autonomy and specialization and ultimately more tolerance and greater individual freedom. Not, to be sure, the kind of liberty we libertarians write about, but its foundation.
Michael Magoon writes about this in his book series, From Poverty to Progress, and on his Substack which goes by that same title.
With religion and technology I am reminded of the Chinese parable of the man who lost his horse. What looks like a blessing may in time turn out to be a curse. Or vice versa. Who's to say? Those in the thick of it (i.e., all of us) have no way of knowing how it will turn out.
The industrial revolution has been great for human flourishing, but if in 30 years an AI apocalypse brings about the end of humankind – it was a foolish bargain.
I'd imagine the internet has led to an increase in religious hostility. Just because the internet is global in nature (so people from different religions interact with/see each other more than they otherwise would. perhaps partly due to algorithms amplifying controversial content as well