Orgs coordinate activity. And if coordination is hard, we should expect orgs to only barely accomplish this task. That is, we should expect org decisions to be dominated by coalition politics. Orgs that face competitive pressures, like firms, would slowly get more efficient, and
> The cardinal rule here is to give before you get. ... Figure out how you could be valuable and then sponsorship flows.
Here's a problem I've found with that: Whenever I attempt to give before I get, the conclusion that the potential sponsor inevitably comes to is that they can continue extracting value from me without paying back in themselves. When I explain that I cannot sustain the level of value I'm providing without some value being provided in return, they generally don't see that as their problem.
Below the ~75th ability (or some proxy for the interaction of parent's income and IQ) percentile, 'patronage' takes the more extreme form of some degree of abjection.
Perhaps, but could you cite something from the other literatures actually seeks to rigorously quantify its effect and distinguish it from mentoring? If not, then I think it Hewlett's study does constitute a significant contribution ...
This doesn't seem cynical at all to me. Really, both this OB post and the quoted passage seem hopelessly idealistic. OTOH, I basically consider anything conceptualized in terms of economics, that is, in terms of the pursuit of values/interests by conscious or human agents, to be hopelessly idealistic. Practically all real optimization seems to me to consist of local hill-climbing, not agency.
"Orgs that face competitive pressures, like firms, would slowly get more efficient, and thus larger, as we slowly found and spread org innovations to better channel coalition politics efforts in productive directions."
That's not always true since humans have finite lifespans and human nature is static (new generations repeat the mistakes of previous generations), a simple example is the fact that coalition politics haven't been eliminated. Businesses are still not able to reliably select for a person's merit and they probably never will be.
Sponsorship, as described by Sylvia Ann Hewlett, looks the same as patronage, a form of relationship between superiors (persons with power) and selected subordinates (their protégés) as described by everyone else. It is well characterized and understood in sociology, and in art, political, and economic history. Apparently this universal phenomenon in political and economic relations was hitherto unknown to economists. Or perhaps it is another example of the freakonomics movement, by which I mean the tendency amongst economists to take a phenomenon already well understood and described in detail by other disciplines (often psychology and sociology) and give it a slightly different label, whilst presenting it as a major new economic insight.
Since the intellectual and epistemological development ofsociety is so tied with the developments and relationships of certain groups,the fact that the mentorship relation is based in power doesn't sufficiently undermineits intellectual role. Since there's no separate realm of ideas, I believe whenan intellectual mentor says you should research something or go in a certaindirection, this will also teach what you should be researching and what isvaluable from an intellectual standpoint.
It is certainly true that competitive altruism runs deep in academia. One good advice I've got is to always start an email offering something. An important Professor will likely receive dozens of marginally equally interesting emails, and deliberately or not, he will tend to pay more attention to those who are offering something to start with.
I think it's only brown-nosing when someone low-status does it.
> The cardinal rule here is to give before you get. ... Figure out how you could be valuable and then sponsorship flows.
Here's a problem I've found with that: Whenever I attempt to give before I get, the conclusion that the potential sponsor inevitably comes to is that they can continue extracting value from me without paying back in themselves. When I explain that I cannot sustain the level of value I'm providing without some value being provided in return, they generally don't see that as their problem.
How do you prevent this?
In my experience, proteges often physically resemble younger versions of their patrons.
Below the ~75th ability (or some proxy for the interaction of parent's income and IQ) percentile, 'patronage' takes the more extreme form of some degree of abjection.
Isn't the market local hill climbing?
LOL
Perhaps, but could you cite something from the other literatures actually seeks to rigorously quantify its effect and distinguish it from mentoring? If not, then I think it Hewlett's study does constitute a significant contribution ...
Couldn't the ORG just buy their Ally, via M&A. Do we buy Mentors in the same way or they buy us. They pay us, but its a win-win.
This doesn't seem cynical at all to me. Really, both this OB post and the quoted passage seem hopelessly idealistic. OTOH, I basically consider anything conceptualized in terms of economics, that is, in terms of the pursuit of values/interests by conscious or human agents, to be hopelessly idealistic. Practically all real optimization seems to me to consist of local hill-climbing, not agency.
"Orgs that face competitive pressures, like firms, would slowly get more efficient, and thus larger, as we slowly found and spread org innovations to better channel coalition politics efforts in productive directions."
That's not always true since humans have finite lifespans and human nature is static (new generations repeat the mistakes of previous generations), a simple example is the fact that coalition politics haven't been eliminated. Businesses are still not able to reliably select for a person's merit and they probably never will be.
Aren't the Koch brothers his sponsors?
I agree that give the situation you describe Hewlett should have called it "patronage."
Sponsorship, as described by Sylvia Ann Hewlett, looks the same as patronage, a form of relationship between superiors (persons with power) and selected subordinates (their protégés) as described by everyone else. It is well characterized and understood in sociology, and in art, political, and economic history. Apparently this universal phenomenon in political and economic relations was hitherto unknown to economists. Or perhaps it is another example of the freakonomics movement, by which I mean the tendency amongst economists to take a phenomenon already well understood and described in detail by other disciplines (often psychology and sociology) and give it a slightly different label, whilst presenting it as a major new economic insight.
Perhaps Robin will disclose whether he had a sponsor.
"Seeking out a sponsor with power..."
What some would call "brown-nosing".
Since the intellectual and epistemological development ofsociety is so tied with the developments and relationships of certain groups,the fact that the mentorship relation is based in power doesn't sufficiently undermineits intellectual role. Since there's no separate realm of ideas, I believe whenan intellectual mentor says you should research something or go in a certaindirection, this will also teach what you should be researching and what isvaluable from an intellectual standpoint.
It is certainly true that competitive altruism runs deep in academia. One good advice I've got is to always start an email offering something. An important Professor will likely receive dozens of marginally equally interesting emails, and deliberately or not, he will tend to pay more attention to those who are offering something to start with.