Avoiding Truth
In this essay I describe two strategies for avoiding truth in forming political opinions.
The great mass of people form their political beliefs with little regard for facts or logic. However, the elites also have a strategy for avoiding truth. Elites form their political beliefs dogmatically, using their cleverness to organize facts to fit preconceived prejudices. The masses’ strategy for avoiding truth is to make a low investment in understanding; the elites’ strategy is to make a large investment in selectively choosing which facts and arguments to emphasize or ignore.
I am particularly interested in the high-investment strategy, also known as confirmation bias. Is it true that for the most part we organize data to fit our priors? If so, why? How can we tell when we are confronting data honestly or with confirmation bias?
Adrian, it is not obvious that that all our institutions reduce confirmation bias; some of them may increase it. It is important to carefully evaluate our institutions on this issue, and seek improvements.
Arnold: I think that it is very hard for us to avoid confirmation bias. As a society then, we create a number of institutions to counteract or nullify it: 1st Amendment, the adversarial legal system with trial by jury, double-blind testing, the econ publication process of ideas->conversations with colleagues->brown bag seminars->working papers, and conference and other seminars->peer review->publication), political debates, etc. Perhaps one could argue that societies that progress do so by creating such rules and institutions.
An additional thought. You seem to be arguing that elites follow what Philip Tetlock has characterized as hedgehog strategies. But are there not elites who pursue fox strategies. I suspect that Tetlock would argue that we are born foxes or hedgehogs; as long as there are foxes to tip the balance, we may be OK.