Noah Smith complains about people like me: There’s a fad in the economics world that annoys me. The fad is to describe every human action as “signaling.” This has to stop, people. … It’s become fashionable in the economics world to label any and every human social interaction as a form of signaling. The most enthusiastic promoter of this way of thinking is GMU economist Robin Hanson. Fashion isn’t self-expression — it’s signaling. Leisure isn’t about fun — it’s about signaling. And so on.
I'd say most speech is signalling. Small talk isn't about the explicit information transfer. It's about showing you care enough to spend five minutes just to show that you care.
There is a massive presumption of truth in speech; barring a highly improbable claim, a perceived ulterior motive, or particularly low credibility, people tend to assume that anything they hear is true. Speech that depends on that presumption (which is most speech) is not signalling. However, it is quite possible for speech to be signalling. However, for speech to be signalling, there usually has to be some other agent whose actions are being relied upon. For instance, claiming that your product is low fat can viewed as signalling in the sense that a product that isn't low fact has a greater chance of resulting in penalties from regulatory agencies.
Why isn't all communication signalling? Why isn't all behavior signalling? I am thinking Robin Trivers and self deception. We are just better off if everyone is unaware that we are one big complex signal. Aren't all prices just signals?
Don't let Noah frame the debate he is too earnest. He would rather be liked than correct like when we attacked you for comparing rape and cuckolding. You are being aware and honest and that signal is not welcome in public discourse.
Thanks for the reply - I should have probably also included #8 That sender and receiver should have competing interests; but I'm going to guess that you would imagine scenarios in human signalling where the interests of sender and receiver don't compete in any significant way.
I have to think about your reasons for leaving the others out. In the evolutionary biology case costly signalling was proposed to explain how do individuals with competing interests exchange information given that there is an incentive to cheat/lie and ruin the communication system? How does such a system maintain equilibrium? That's why the signals must be costly, to make the short run benefits of cheating not worth it - which protects the system as a whole.
So if you're going to leave #7 out, for instance, then I lose my understanding of why we evolved a COSTLY signalling system at all. Because it's that cost structure described in #7 that makes the costliness necessary.
On #5, there can still be a signaling message even when the audience already knows the message. Many messages are sent to a large audience, where some of that audience already knows. On #6, many listeners choose wide listening strategies, which let in info that hurts them sometimes. If they know that a particular info would hurt them they might try to not listen to that, but it can be hard to target your listening that specifically. On #7, with large groups of senders and receivers each one need not internalize the consequences of hurting the communication system. So individuals might well send signaling messages that hurt the system.
Nice clarification... I really like that you included 1) - as I think this is an important feature of human signalling that distinguishes it from signalling in other animal domains.
Semantic values of utterances tend to get less important as signalling behaviours become more prevalent. This is why - say - in a scientific context you should want to do your best to avoid signalling behaviours so that the focus can remain on the semantic values of the theories under consideration.
I do think you should include other features of signalling that hail from the standard signalling story.
5) There needs to be an asymmetry of information between parties.6) Transference of that information is mutually beneficial.7) Cheating by the sender of information should have a short run benefit for the individual sender, and short run cost for the receiver - but a long run cost for both the sender and receiver as the system of communication breaks down.
Also - in the domain of human signalling I'd add another feature that I think is important. Because talk is cheap - we actually go to great lengths to increase the costs of speaking. We punish people, for instance, who say the wrong things on twitter etc.
By increasing the costs in this way - we actually enable certain forms of speech to become costly enough to serve as honest signals.
One problem with your definition is that it is all contemporaneous, whereas in practice you've gone beyond this with regard to the object of signaling.
This is relevant to the Noah debate. Brian Caplan regards the signals education provides to employers as contemporaneously useful to them. (And in this he might actually weaken his case.) Noah's Japanese example (where college is a moratorium) does seem to refute Caplan's explanation.
The main reason I find to think college education has a large signaling component is its inefficiencies. There isn't much concern about the effective transmission of knowledge. But what is being signaled? It probably has to do with personal associations, such as with the "intellectually powerful" professariat (per Robin) more than useful personal traits (per Brian).
Noah: "People say college signals quality X. But there are better ways to show off X, for example Y and Z. So it doesn't make sense that people would choose college to display X."
He could be correct, but I doubt it. Another possibility is that a college degree signals additional qualities, which are not correlated with Y and Z. Then a college degree could be the best way to show off all these qualities together.
Noah rejects the idea that college could be the best way to signal either intelligence or conscientiousness. He doesn't consider that it could be the best way to signal both together.
Or more likely, college shows off both, combined with additional qualities we also value but don't like to discuss too openly.
I think Noah forgets to factor in the opportunity cost -- not just the cost. When you wax your mustache, you are giving up some particular forms of employment ... But then not for all. In the labs I work in, no one would bat an eye ... It becomes a more nuanced problem.
> More generally I call a message “signaling” if it has these features:
You're listing features of signaling, but you're making it sound like they define signaling, which they do not. Signaling is when you pay a cost to show something because the benefit given that it's true makes it worth it, and the benefit given that it is false would not be worth it.
Talking isn't signaling because it's cheap and easy to lie. There is a cost to lying, but since the cost is only paid if you lie, it's not signalling.
Things that are easily and quickly verifiable cannot be signaled since it would never be worthwhile to pay the cost. Although you have to be careful with that one. If someone simply can verify something, you may need to signal it before they actually do. It's generally possible to get around this with cheaper methods though, so I'm not sure how much this happens.
Senders must want people to believe it's as high as possible, or they wouldn't benefit from the cost of signaling.
I'd say most speech is signalling. Small talk isn't about the explicit information transfer. It's about showing you care enough to spend five minutes just to show that you care.
There is a massive presumption of truth in speech; barring a highly improbable claim, a perceived ulterior motive, or particularly low credibility, people tend to assume that anything they hear is true. Speech that depends on that presumption (which is most speech) is not signalling. However, it is quite possible for speech to be signalling. However, for speech to be signalling, there usually has to be some other agent whose actions are being relied upon. For instance, claiming that your product is low fat can viewed as signalling in the sense that a product that isn't low fact has a greater chance of resulting in penalties from regulatory agencies.
Why isn't all communication signalling? Why isn't all behavior signalling? I am thinking Robin Trivers and self deception. We are just better off if everyone is unaware that we are one big complex signal. Aren't all prices just signals?
Don't let Noah frame the debate he is too earnest. He would rather be liked than correct like when we attacked you for comparing rape and cuckolding. You are being aware and honest and that signal is not welcome in public discourse.
Thanks for the reply - I should have probably also included #8 That sender and receiver should have competing interests; but I'm going to guess that you would imagine scenarios in human signalling where the interests of sender and receiver don't compete in any significant way.
I have to think about your reasons for leaving the others out. In the evolutionary biology case costly signalling was proposed to explain how do individuals with competing interests exchange information given that there is an incentive to cheat/lie and ruin the communication system? How does such a system maintain equilibrium? That's why the signals must be costly, to make the short run benefits of cheating not worth it - which protects the system as a whole.
So if you're going to leave #7 out, for instance, then I lose my understanding of why we evolved a COSTLY signalling system at all. Because it's that cost structure described in #7 that makes the costliness necessary.
On #5, there can still be a signaling message even when the audience already knows the message. Many messages are sent to a large audience, where some of that audience already knows. On #6, many listeners choose wide listening strategies, which let in info that hurts them sometimes. If they know that a particular info would hurt them they might try to not listen to that, but it can be hard to target your listening that specifically. On #7, with large groups of senders and receivers each one need not internalize the consequences of hurting the communication system. So individuals might well send signaling messages that hurt the system.
Nice clarification... I really like that you included 1) - as I think this is an important feature of human signalling that distinguishes it from signalling in other animal domains.
Semantic values of utterances tend to get less important as signalling behaviours become more prevalent. This is why - say - in a scientific context you should want to do your best to avoid signalling behaviours so that the focus can remain on the semantic values of the theories under consideration.
I do think you should include other features of signalling that hail from the standard signalling story.
5) There needs to be an asymmetry of information between parties.6) Transference of that information is mutually beneficial.7) Cheating by the sender of information should have a short run benefit for the individual sender, and short run cost for the receiver - but a long run cost for both the sender and receiver as the system of communication breaks down.
Also - in the domain of human signalling I'd add another feature that I think is important. Because talk is cheap - we actually go to great lengths to increase the costs of speaking. We punish people, for instance, who say the wrong things on twitter etc.
By increasing the costs in this way - we actually enable certain forms of speech to become costly enough to serve as honest signals.
No.
Signaling does not have to expensive if you do have the quality being signaled, it only has to be expensive if you do not have the quality.
One problem with your definition is that it is all contemporaneous, whereas in practice you've gone beyond this with regard to the object of signaling.
This is relevant to the Noah debate. Brian Caplan regards the signals education provides to employers as contemporaneously useful to them. (And in this he might actually weaken his case.) Noah's Japanese example (where college is a moratorium) does seem to refute Caplan's explanation.
The main reason I find to think college education has a large signaling component is its inefficiencies. There isn't much concern about the effective transmission of knowledge. But what is being signaled? It probably has to do with personal associations, such as with the "intellectually powerful" professariat (per Robin) more than useful personal traits (per Brian).
Noah: "People say college signals quality X. But there are better ways to show off X, for example Y and Z. So it doesn't make sense that people would choose college to display X."
He could be correct, but I doubt it. Another possibility is that a college degree signals additional qualities, which are not correlated with Y and Z. Then a college degree could be the best way to show off all these qualities together.
Noah rejects the idea that college could be the best way to signal either intelligence or conscientiousness. He doesn't consider that it could be the best way to signal both together.
Or more likely, college shows off both, combined with additional qualities we also value but don't like to discuss too openly.
I think Noah forgets to factor in the opportunity cost -- not just the cost. When you wax your mustache, you are giving up some particular forms of employment ... But then not for all. In the labs I work in, no one would bat an eye ... It becomes a more nuanced problem.
So signaling is any costly gesture whose expense can be taken by another as a measure of commitment.
> More generally I call a message “signaling” if it has these features:
You're listing features of signaling, but you're making it sound like they define signaling, which they do not. Signaling is when you pay a cost to show something because the benefit given that it's true makes it worth it, and the benefit given that it is false would not be worth it.
Talking isn't signaling because it's cheap and easy to lie. There is a cost to lying, but since the cost is only paid if you lie, it's not signalling.
Things that are easily and quickly verifiable cannot be signaled since it would never be worthwhile to pay the cost. Although you have to be careful with that one. If someone simply can verify something, you may need to signal it before they actually do. It's generally possible to get around this with cheaper methods though, so I'm not sure how much this happens.
Senders must want people to believe it's as high as possible, or they wouldn't benefit from the cost of signaling.