Many complain that economists "over-simplify." We do simplify of course; we are picky about what data "counts", and we prefer models with a few stark assumptions. And other social analysts do offer more detailed social stories, relying on messier data like personal impressions. But economists wonder: does their added detail get them closer to the truth?
My point was not that conclusions don't have (at times) subconscious reasoning underlying them. Rather, my point was that what Caplan calls "intuition" and, in my experience, what many philosophers call "intuition", is irreducible, not simply a conclusion without knowledge of how it was arrived at.
I'm at fault here, because what you're calling intuition is also an accepted definition of the word. Indeed, I suspect I've simply misread you by assuming one definition when you intended another.
The major problem with this restrictionist philosophical method is that you end up being a Procrustes. Focusing on one part of the data at the exclusion of other parts means that you end up with a half truth. The cost/benefit is this, the more object knowledge you have the less subject knowledge, the more analysis the less syntheses, the more quality the less quantity.
For example, you can reduce music down to its objective elements. You can say that this song has this frequency and then this one and then the next. But by doing this you kill the existential aspect of the song. The subjective element is what makes music, music.
Soren Kiekegaard talked about how the more objective a fact is the less existential personal relevance the fact has and vise versa. The fact that 2+2=4 is highly objective but it has little meaning to me on an existential level on the other extreme my eternal salvation has a lot of existential importance to me but it is unprovable. A philosopher to sacrificing the intuitive (existential data) comes at too high of a cost. A philosopher is a lover of wisdom, as such a philosopher needs not to look for a wisdom to serve him/her but a wisdom to serve. The truths found by a restrictionist philosophical method are below man and are not worthy to serve.
Scott, how can you be so confident that our subsconcious minds have no reasoning behind the conclusions they offer us? This seems to reject everything we know about cognitive science.
Caplan's reliance on intuition is, I think, essential, but I'm not sure he reduces it to simply being presented with a thought without its reasoning. Rather I and perhaps he thinks of intuition as irreducible. You intuit and there's the data (with some probability of truth). It's not that the reasoning isn't clear--it's that the reasoning isn't there.
Now, perhaps we should rely on a broader base of intuitions. But what evidence is there that such a pool will be more accurate than my singular intuition? Are you relying on some sort of meta-intuition to make that claim?
I have also been irked by Caplan's reliance on intuition. He does say introspection is one area he agrees with the Austrians on. At his webpage Mario Rizzo says he wants to shift economics away from mathematics and toward philosophy, so I wonder if he thinks X-phi is a good thing in bring the disciplines closer together or bad in that it chips away at what is good in philosophy.
Before on this blog I have discussed whether a machine could calculate the answer to ethical problems. Could a machine generate intuitions in response to philosophical queries? One definition of intuition given is a conclusion from the subconscious without evident reasoning. The working of most machines is usually known at least to the designer, so perhaps by definition couldn't have intuitions. I don't think they could answer the sort of epistemological questions posed in the pdf (whether someone "really knows" or "just believes"). It seems like an issue of language. Before I have excluded normative statements from the class of statements which have truth value, but I think these sorts of things could be included as well. They do not seem to alter our expected experience at all, so it doesn't really matter what the answer to the question is.
Senthil, bioethics is full of claims that different moral rules apply to health and medicine, versus say food or warmth. It is simpler to try to give each person what they want, than to try specifically to give them more health relative to other things.
What do you mean when you say 'health-care-specific intutions'?
Would philosophers have simpler theories or lesser theories too? How do you imagine some philosophical theory would be if they realize that intution data is less reliable? Like, do you have any instance in mind on how some theory, any theory, is viewed currently and how would it be simpler like an economic theory?
Robin,
My point was not that conclusions don't have (at times) subconscious reasoning underlying them. Rather, my point was that what Caplan calls "intuition" and, in my experience, what many philosophers call "intuition", is irreducible, not simply a conclusion without knowledge of how it was arrived at.
I'm at fault here, because what you're calling intuition is also an accepted definition of the word. Indeed, I suspect I've simply misread you by assuming one definition when you intended another.
Cure, almost any act has both costs and benefits.
Robin, Doesn’t what you suggest come at some cost even if it's a matter of degree? I know my world view comes with the cost of having certainty.
Cure, no one is suggesting eliminating intuition as evidence.
The major problem with this restrictionist philosophical method is that you end up being a Procrustes. Focusing on one part of the data at the exclusion of other parts means that you end up with a half truth. The cost/benefit is this, the more object knowledge you have the less subject knowledge, the more analysis the less syntheses, the more quality the less quantity.
For example, you can reduce music down to its objective elements. You can say that this song has this frequency and then this one and then the next. But by doing this you kill the existential aspect of the song. The subjective element is what makes music, music.
Soren Kiekegaard talked about how the more objective a fact is the less existential personal relevance the fact has and vise versa. The fact that 2+2=4 is highly objective but it has little meaning to me on an existential level on the other extreme my eternal salvation has a lot of existential importance to me but it is unprovable. A philosopher to sacrificing the intuitive (existential data) comes at too high of a cost. A philosopher is a lover of wisdom, as such a philosopher needs not to look for a wisdom to serve him/her but a wisdom to serve. The truths found by a restrictionist philosophical method are below man and are not worthy to serve.
Scott, how can you be so confident that our subsconcious minds have no reasoning behind the conclusions they offer us? This seems to reject everything we know about cognitive science.
Caplan's reliance on intuition is, I think, essential, but I'm not sure he reduces it to simply being presented with a thought without its reasoning. Rather I and perhaps he thinks of intuition as irreducible. You intuit and there's the data (with some probability of truth). It's not that the reasoning isn't clear--it's that the reasoning isn't there.
Now, perhaps we should rely on a broader base of intuitions. But what evidence is there that such a pool will be more accurate than my singular intuition? Are you relying on some sort of meta-intuition to make that claim?
I have also been irked by Caplan's reliance on intuition. He does say introspection is one area he agrees with the Austrians on. At his webpage Mario Rizzo says he wants to shift economics away from mathematics and toward philosophy, so I wonder if he thinks X-phi is a good thing in bring the disciplines closer together or bad in that it chips away at what is good in philosophy.
Before on this blog I have discussed whether a machine could calculate the answer to ethical problems. Could a machine generate intuitions in response to philosophical queries? One definition of intuition given is a conclusion from the subconscious without evident reasoning. The working of most machines is usually known at least to the designer, so perhaps by definition couldn't have intuitions. I don't think they could answer the sort of epistemological questions posed in the pdf (whether someone "really knows" or "just believes"). It seems like an issue of language. Before I have excluded normative statements from the class of statements which have truth value, but I think these sorts of things could be included as well. They do not seem to alter our expected experience at all, so it doesn't really matter what the answer to the question is.
Senthil, bioethics is full of claims that different moral rules apply to health and medicine, versus say food or warmth. It is simpler to try to give each person what they want, than to try specifically to give them more health relative to other things.
What do you mean when you say 'health-care-specific intutions'?
Would philosophers have simpler theories or lesser theories too? How do you imagine some philosophical theory would be if they realize that intution data is less reliable? Like, do you have any instance in mind on how some theory, any theory, is viewed currently and how would it be simpler like an economic theory?
Thanks for the plug Robin! I have added your interesting site to our blog roll.