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Peter Gerdes's avatar

To explain things like opposition to prediction markets notice that the kind of estimation mechanisms people tend to be so opposed to aren't those *they* just lack control over but those that don't give control to anyone with normal sensibilities.

People are perfectly happy to agree that we should ask an expert to weigh in when deciding if it is ethical to engage in some kind of medical trial, apply some kind of embryonic sex selection mechanism or offer poor people money for organs or sex. They will agree to this in principle even without any control over what that expert will say or who they will be despite the risk the expert will be allied against them and have direct policy influence. Yet we seem to be most hesitant about experiments, prediction markets and the like not when they directly control outcomes but when they bear on socially charged (but more decision remote) facts like innate gender differences, myths of national pride and etc..

An possible explanation of these attitudes is that pure value signals are too easy to costlessly fake so we use factual claims to communicate group membership, e.g., claims about innate differences not values of gender equality to evaluate your worth as a feminist ally.

When the estimation mechanism is a bunch of people we can count on them to understand these factual signals and aver from forcing us into a consensus which signals animosity toward some group we value. If controversial data comes up economist experts can be counted on to convey it relatively diplomatically but the results of experiments or prediction markets can force us into positions where the clear fact we are bound to accept is of the form that would signal disloyalty to an ally group.

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Peter Gerdes's avatar

On reflection I think there might be two different phenomena at play.

There is definitely the "I want to talk about how evil republicans/democrats are so let me toss up some facts that make them look bad and me good," e.g., did you know about the emoluments clause. I didn't realize the first time I read your post you were talking about this kind of situation because I don't think this kind of use of facts has much impact on the actual choices people make (except maybe occasionally being backed into rhetorical corners). When the tables are turned and the same fact pattern fits their guy people just come up with a reason it's not comparable.

However, uncontrollable estimation mechanisms really don't create any problems for fact-soldiers like this. Indeed, since we quote facts in this way largely by selecting a few facts from a large repository the *more* prediction mechanisms with a whiff of legitimacy the better as I can just cite the one I want. If your theory was correct it should equally well predict that people should oppose things like organized queries of economists views on school vouchers, minimum wage etc.. but everyone seems fine with this idea even without specific questions in mind.

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