Quick, what is the best gift you ever got from a woman? From your parents? From a left-handed person? From a teacher? These aren’t easy questions to answer. But they seem easier than these questions: What is the
My essay integrating System 1 & 2 with construal-level theory is posted. "The deeper solution to the mystery of moralism—Morality and free will are hazardous to your mental health." (http://tinyurl.com/9exlxlk)
Hard for me to read this. Imagine three circles. A smaller inner circle surrounded by two larger circles respectively.The inner most circle encapsulates our likes. The second circle encapsulates our dislikes. The third encapsulates all that which lies outside of our experience. We neither like them nor dislike them.
Each person has a distinct set of circles.
In this context we have a graphic example of one "innate" set of near-far relationships, and a "metaphorical" set of near-far relationships.Granted, in this plausibly "far" example, we are limited for the sake of comprehension to only straight-line examples from the center of the inner circle directly into the outer circles.
With the innate set, one is merely required to straight-line-pull some outwardly and across their likes through their dislikes into their indifference (the future).
With the metaphorical set some will have centers spaced quite widely apartSpecifically those whose "likes" lie on the "far" side of one's "likes".
The only way averaging can work to the protagonist's advantage is with those whose "biases" are closest to each other.
The Affect Heuristic shows that we are actually quite willing to average in the very near and that thsi might be evolutionarily a fairly ancient heuristic
Consistent with the Presenter's Paradox is the observation that it is very hard to get juries to convict in complex financial prosecutions, where the case tends to consist of laborious presentation of small bits of evidence. Especially given that the standard "beyond a reasonable doubt" applies, and the jury often appears to equate the absence of a "smoking gun" with "reasonable doubt". When all that may be going on is they were just averaging. Or sleeping. Don't know where commercial litigation fits in to near / far dichotomy
My take (I'm preparing a posting on my blog) is that near and far mode involve different inter-relations between System 1 and System 2. I don't think they can be reduced to them. It's true that System 1 is less analytic, but it's also true that it's less abstract than System 2.
The neurophysiological underpinning of far mode is that it involves processing higher in the nervous system: that is, subjected to deeper analysis. That fits badly with System 1. (Right- and left-hemisphere is another dichotomy that sort of sounds related but turns out not to have any simple relationship.)
In short, the relationship between System 1 and 2 and far mode and near mode begs for clarification, but the relationship isn't a straightforward correspondence. There's no compelling reason why Robin needs to rush to clarify the relationship--when the psychologists doing the research haven't clarified it and I, after all, want to beat him to it.
Seconding Arthut's comment/query and adding a few details (from memory, sorry) from Thinking Fast and Slow-
1) Kahneman's "System 1" (our quick, intuitive, unconscious mode) finds it easy to identify a line segment of average/typical length from among a "pick-up-sticks" batch of line segments displayed onscreen, but difficult to quantify the sticks' total length
2) When presented with side-by-side choices of A) a tableware set in good condition, B) a set consisting of A plus extra matching plates some good and some broken, subjects report willingness to spend slightly more for B; but when disjoint sets of subjects are asked how much they would spend for A or B *singly*, B is on average valued *less* than A. (Analogous tests have been run on Ebay, with similar results).
3) TFaS cites a number of interesting ways to encourage engagement of "System 2" (our heavyweight, analytical, conscious, less easily fooled mode). These include a) making text tough to read (e.g. small, light gray shading), b) gripping a pencil lengthwise with the lips (which engages the same frown muscles that tend to be engaged when the going gets tough generally; conversely, gripping a pencil *crosswise* with the *teeth* engages the *smile* muscles, which tends to *reduce* System 2's engagement)
In my world abstraction is high I. You can have abstractions which are high O but these are abstractions of abstractions. An example of this is economics.which is high O.
The problem for presenters and evaluators is one of having to draw conclusions. However, this behaviour seems only to presents itself in hierarchical structures?
Gifts can be many things. Not just objects. They can beexperiences.
The greatest gifts given to me were the behaviors of others,good or bad, that helped me build my intuition. As speech is a behavior many ofthe gifts were presented to me in narratives. Others where the attributes oftruth that lay in-expressed within me andneeded to be brought to the surface to be realized. This could be accomplished bybenevolent dictators, loving friends and family.
So when somebody gives you an object as a gift there is alsothe experience you have that's a gift.
I've read or heard that in Japan the practice of gift givingis one in which you give a person a gift that they can give to their partner.Sounds like a good practice to me.
The real gift is in giving.
We add near, average far depends on the context of the abstraction.
I wonder how this squares with basic fallacies about donating to multiple charities. As far as I can tell, a person who donates to help feed starving children isn't seen as quite as generous as a person who helps starving children AND helps clothe naked mole rats, even if total amount donated is the same for each person. But the averaging principle should make us see the latter as doing less good.
I just added to this post.
My essay integrating System 1 & 2 with construal-level theory is posted. "The deeper solution to the mystery of moralism—Morality and free will are hazardous to your mental health." (http://tinyurl.com/9exlxlk)
Hard for me to read this. Imagine three circles. A smaller inner circle surrounded by two larger circles respectively.The inner most circle encapsulates our likes. The second circle encapsulates our dislikes. The third encapsulates all that which lies outside of our experience. We neither like them nor dislike them.
Each person has a distinct set of circles.
In this context we have a graphic example of one "innate" set of near-far relationships, and a "metaphorical" set of near-far relationships.Granted, in this plausibly "far" example, we are limited for the sake of comprehension to only straight-line examples from the center of the inner circle directly into the outer circles.
With the innate set, one is merely required to straight-line-pull some outwardly and across their likes through their dislikes into their indifference (the future).
With the metaphorical set some will have centers spaced quite widely apartSpecifically those whose "likes" lie on the "far" side of one's "likes".
The only way averaging can work to the protagonist's advantage is with those whose "biases" are closest to each other.
respectfully
The Affect Heuristic shows that we are actually quite willing to average in the very near and that thsi might be evolutionarily a fairly ancient heuristic
http://www.plosone.org/arti...
Consistent with the Presenter's Paradox is the observation that it is very hard to get juries to convict in complex financial prosecutions, where the case tends to consist of laborious presentation of small bits of evidence. Especially given that the standard "beyond a reasonable doubt" applies, and the jury often appears to equate the absence of a "smoking gun" with "reasonable doubt". When all that may be going on is they were just averaging. Or sleeping. Don't know where commercial litigation fits in to near / far dichotomy
It's true that System 1 is less analytic, but it's also true that it's less abstract than System 2.
Should be more abstract
My take (I'm preparing a posting on my blog) is that near and far mode involve different inter-relations between System 1 and System 2. I don't think they can be reduced to them. It's true that System 1 is less analytic, but it's also true that it's less abstract than System 2.
The neurophysiological underpinning of far mode is that it involves processing higher in the nervous system: that is, subjected to deeper analysis. That fits badly with System 1. (Right- and left-hemisphere is another dichotomy that sort of sounds related but turns out not to have any simple relationship.)
In short, the relationship between System 1 and 2 and far mode and near mode begs for clarification, but the relationship isn't a straightforward correspondence. There's no compelling reason why Robin needs to rush to clarify the relationship--when the psychologists doing the research haven't clarified it and I, after all, want to beat him to it.
Seconding Arthut's comment/query and adding a few details (from memory, sorry) from Thinking Fast and Slow-
1) Kahneman's "System 1" (our quick, intuitive, unconscious mode) finds it easy to identify a line segment of average/typical length from among a "pick-up-sticks" batch of line segments displayed onscreen, but difficult to quantify the sticks' total length
2) When presented with side-by-side choices of A) a tableware set in good condition, B) a set consisting of A plus extra matching plates some good and some broken, subjects report willingness to spend slightly more for B; but when disjoint sets of subjects are asked how much they would spend for A or B *singly*, B is on average valued *less* than A. (Analogous tests have been run on Ebay, with similar results).
3) TFaS cites a number of interesting ways to encourage engagement of "System 2" (our heavyweight, analytical, conscious, less easily fooled mode). These include a) making text tough to read (e.g. small, light gray shading), b) gripping a pencil lengthwise with the lips (which engages the same frown muscles that tend to be engaged when the going gets tough generally; conversely, gripping a pencil *crosswise* with the *teeth* engages the *smile* muscles, which tends to *reduce* System 2's engagement)
Could sequencing in this case be considered hierarchical?
inward and outward.
This suggests that the geekish desire to tell the whole story, including the weakening parts, is a disaster for getting ideas across.
What do l and O mean?
In my world abstraction is high I. You can have abstractions which are high O but these are abstractions of abstractions. An example of this is economics.which is high O.
I contend that abstraction is far, sequencing is near: http://tinyurl.com/7faf9nz
The problem for presenters and evaluators is one of having to draw conclusions. However, this behaviour seems only to presents itself in hierarchical structures?
Gifts can be many things. Not just objects. They can beexperiences.
The greatest gifts given to me were the behaviors of others,good or bad, that helped me build my intuition. As speech is a behavior many ofthe gifts were presented to me in narratives. Others where the attributes oftruth that lay in-expressed within me andneeded to be brought to the surface to be realized. This could be accomplished bybenevolent dictators, loving friends and family.
So when somebody gives you an object as a gift there is alsothe experience you have that's a gift.
I've read or heard that in Japan the practice of gift givingis one in which you give a person a gift that they can give to their partner.Sounds like a good practice to me.
The real gift is in giving.
We add near, average far depends on the context of the abstraction.
I wonder how this squares with basic fallacies about donating to multiple charities. As far as I can tell, a person who donates to help feed starving children isn't seen as quite as generous as a person who helps starving children AND helps clothe naked mole rats, even if total amount donated is the same for each person. But the averaging principle should make us see the latter as doing less good.