In the human world before civilization, there were moral norms, but not law. In that world, people were taught how they should ideally enforce moral rules. If B harms A in violation of local moral norms, and if A confronting B gives an inadequate response, then A should tell near associates about it, and this group should talk and coordinate, deciding who to believe and what to do about it.
At the end you say "Thus those low in status and value might reasonably embrace fewer norms." I agree this is a reasonable choice. However, those who embrace fewer norms against harming others are more likely to violate those norms. This could partly explain why those low in status and value are more likely to harm others. It also leads to the prediction that when the rule of law is strong and norms are enforced regardless of status, then low status people are less likely to commit harms. Less likely than in the weak rule of law situation.
All of this makes sense, but the problem with this kind of meta-ethical analysis is it never acknowledges the actual ethical problem of the universe: That everything reduces to power, the most powerful thing wins by definition(Whatever that means, however tautological it sounds), and it doesn't ever question this. Should we be playing this power game, even if not playing it is a losing game? What is the end game of playing vs. not playing this kind of game? What I think the end game is , is beings who are essentially psychopathic, unable to process what ethical facts there are (humanity is already the larval stage of this, it's a deeply psychopathic, autistic, ethically idiotic species, as a function of power acquisition), distill more and more psychopathy and power. Anti-psychopathy is incompatible ultimately with power acquisition.
The second to last sentence seems like the wrong comparison: “The benefit of a norm helping to coordinate behavior might be less than the costs of resentment when others fail to support A’s complaints based on the norm.” I’m having trouble articulating the correct comparison. But clearly one would not make a rational decision on the basis of whether the benefit of the norm exceeds the cost of resentment. Perhaps one could compare the cost of the norm to the cost of resentment, or the benefit of the norm (including avoided resentment) against the benefit of not holding the norm.
Robin's post here is frankly just terrible. From the descriptive, "it is often in onlookers' selfish interest to back up the abusers," he leaps without warrant to the normative, "the abused are bad and we shouldn't associate with them." By what theory of ethics could you justify such a leap? Half the point of ethics is that sometimes pursuing selfish benefit is unethical.
Now consider Robin's own frequently stated resentment of academic norms that worked against him - norms that he has little hope of changing. I used to like and conditionally agree with these doomed complaints of his, but maybe I shouldn't. He's telling us we shouldn't.
If this is the kind of rhetoric going forward, the blog should be renamed "endorsing bias." In this case, the bias is against the victim, perpetuating the falsehood that the victim was not harmed unfairly (against norms). To overcome bias means to fight against it even when bias would serve your interests. Is that not what the blog is about anymore?
Isn’t this just a particular case of “Associate with the powerful, disdain the weak, bully the bullied”? Of course, power has to be understood as including whose side third parties are likely to take. At the end of the day, no sign of weakness will be forgiven.
Agreed. I once told my superior at work that our new hire was just not up for the task. And when nothing was ever done I began to resent this person that I had to work with
Re. "Note also that if A’s early teachers had expected them to be low status, they might have reasonably taught them fewer moral norms." - This would lead to low-status people having less resentment in general. My impression is that this isn't the case, but I don't know. Nor do I know how to measure resentment.
In practice A will tend to collect allies with the same, or similar, resentments: Others also wronged by B, or wronged in a similar way. Thus a coalition is formed, and A might increase their social standing within that coalition by being its leader. (A=Thomas Jefferson for example). You focused on the negative social aspects of harboring a resentment ("Thus in this world, resentment is a bad sign about a potential associate") but with the right audience it can be a positive. The enemy of my enemy is my (potential) friend.
Add to this the fact that there is often a wide gulf between what is communicated publicly, what is communicated privately, and what ones actual beliefs/motivations are – and it becomes a very subtle dance indeed. I'm convinced that the majority of our emotions and social brain functions are designed to navigate situations like this, as well as reciprocal altruism.
I wonder how you would interpret cancel culture through your lens. There it seems that the more aggrieved and justifiably resentful one is, the higher their standing within the community of "activists" involved in these cancellation campaigns. *I* resent their resentment, but a lot of other people seemingly do not.
How would you explain data that showed resentful people in the past correlate positively to powerful people in the future? (I don't have that data, but I can imagine it being true)
More evidence that Robin is our Nietzsche.
Off topic, but scenarios are more parseable if you call the characters human names like Alice and Bob instead of A and B.
Seems right but I'm not sure it requires that much complexity. Isn't it enough to say:
Resentment signals that you lack the power to respond to slights.
The rest just describes ways you might lack that power.
B is always getting away with it - B is kind of a B, no?
At the end you say "Thus those low in status and value might reasonably embrace fewer norms." I agree this is a reasonable choice. However, those who embrace fewer norms against harming others are more likely to violate those norms. This could partly explain why those low in status and value are more likely to harm others. It also leads to the prediction that when the rule of law is strong and norms are enforced regardless of status, then low status people are less likely to commit harms. Less likely than in the weak rule of law situation.
All of this makes sense, but the problem with this kind of meta-ethical analysis is it never acknowledges the actual ethical problem of the universe: That everything reduces to power, the most powerful thing wins by definition(Whatever that means, however tautological it sounds), and it doesn't ever question this. Should we be playing this power game, even if not playing it is a losing game? What is the end game of playing vs. not playing this kind of game? What I think the end game is , is beings who are essentially psychopathic, unable to process what ethical facts there are (humanity is already the larval stage of this, it's a deeply psychopathic, autistic, ethically idiotic species, as a function of power acquisition), distill more and more psychopathy and power. Anti-psychopathy is incompatible ultimately with power acquisition.
Wonderfully explained. Why can't school text books be like this?
Perhaps the correct lesson is to not be resentful.
Why is being resentful useful?
The second to last sentence seems like the wrong comparison: “The benefit of a norm helping to coordinate behavior might be less than the costs of resentment when others fail to support A’s complaints based on the norm.” I’m having trouble articulating the correct comparison. But clearly one would not make a rational decision on the basis of whether the benefit of the norm exceeds the cost of resentment. Perhaps one could compare the cost of the norm to the cost of resentment, or the benefit of the norm (including avoided resentment) against the benefit of not holding the norm.
But then why did resentment evolve in the first place? This account of resentment is probably incomplete.
Robin's post here is frankly just terrible. From the descriptive, "it is often in onlookers' selfish interest to back up the abusers," he leaps without warrant to the normative, "the abused are bad and we shouldn't associate with them." By what theory of ethics could you justify such a leap? Half the point of ethics is that sometimes pursuing selfish benefit is unethical.
Now consider Robin's own frequently stated resentment of academic norms that worked against him - norms that he has little hope of changing. I used to like and conditionally agree with these doomed complaints of his, but maybe I shouldn't. He's telling us we shouldn't.
If this is the kind of rhetoric going forward, the blog should be renamed "endorsing bias." In this case, the bias is against the victim, perpetuating the falsehood that the victim was not harmed unfairly (against norms). To overcome bias means to fight against it even when bias would serve your interests. Is that not what the blog is about anymore?
Isn’t this just a particular case of “Associate with the powerful, disdain the weak, bully the bullied”? Of course, power has to be understood as including whose side third parties are likely to take. At the end of the day, no sign of weakness will be forgiven.
Agreed. I once told my superior at work that our new hire was just not up for the task. And when nothing was ever done I began to resent this person that I had to work with
Re. "Note also that if A’s early teachers had expected them to be low status, they might have reasonably taught them fewer moral norms." - This would lead to low-status people having less resentment in general. My impression is that this isn't the case, but I don't know. Nor do I know how to measure resentment.
In practice A will tend to collect allies with the same, or similar, resentments: Others also wronged by B, or wronged in a similar way. Thus a coalition is formed, and A might increase their social standing within that coalition by being its leader. (A=Thomas Jefferson for example). You focused on the negative social aspects of harboring a resentment ("Thus in this world, resentment is a bad sign about a potential associate") but with the right audience it can be a positive. The enemy of my enemy is my (potential) friend.
Add to this the fact that there is often a wide gulf between what is communicated publicly, what is communicated privately, and what ones actual beliefs/motivations are – and it becomes a very subtle dance indeed. I'm convinced that the majority of our emotions and social brain functions are designed to navigate situations like this, as well as reciprocal altruism.
I wonder how you would interpret cancel culture through your lens. There it seems that the more aggrieved and justifiably resentful one is, the higher their standing within the community of "activists" involved in these cancellation campaigns. *I* resent their resentment, but a lot of other people seemingly do not.
How would you explain data that showed resentful people in the past correlate positively to powerful people in the future? (I don't have that data, but I can imagine it being true)