Early in ’08 I posted on how our genes influence our political beliefs. New data suggests gene influence is even stronger than it seemed then. Here is the fraction of opinion variance explained by genetics on various 1986 topics, for men and for women (all are 5% significant):
Because there are millions of common SNPs, CNVs, and other genetic variants in humans, it is possible to attribute 99% of any attribute to genetic variation, unless you have a sample size in the millions (possibly fewer, possibly much more). So it's crucial to know how the study controlled for multiple hypothesis testing (meaning, if the first gene variant you try fails to account for the data, you can move on to the second, and the third, and the millionth.)
It is important to distinguish between "heritable" and "genetic".
First off, epigenetic factors - these are both environmentally influenced AND heritable, and their influence on cognition is a hot topic right now, particularly the role of DNA methylation.
Also, there is a huge "heritability gap" - even though we know many traits, like propensity for diabetes, are extremely heritable, we have been unable to link these traits to _specific_ genes or features in the genome. This is a big puzzle right now, and it may be that our perspective on what it means for something to be "genetic" is way off base.
Please, please use the term "heritable" when that's what's observed, because calling it "genetic" is quite premature.
The fools believe they are sages and believe everything sagacious -including your advice - is foolish. They believe that their failure to follow (what they wrongly believe to be) foolish advice is consistent with their sagacity. The fools and the sages have their categories reversed.
If this is insufficient explanation, I will drop it here and possibly take up the matter at a later time with a more acceptable thought experiment.
Constant, if they fools do not know they are fools, then they can't tell they are fools from whether or not they are inclined to follow advice, so you can't assume the fools don't follow your advice.
The simplified model is there to make the point clear. In the real world the fools do not know they are fools, and therefore, to make the model a better microcosm of the real case, we must likewise assume that the fools do not know they are fools.
If the world were this simple, it would easy for everyone to tell if they are a sage or fool: you are a sage if you feel inclined to be persuaded by my argument. Given this key info, fools would know to ignore their initial opinions and defer to sages, at which point all would agree.
A big problem with this study is that it conflates "genetic" with "in utero environment".
Monozygous twins share not only the same genome, they also share the same in utero environment where 99.9999%+ of their growth and development occurred (from a single cell to 10^8+ cells).
This is a gigantic problem with twin studies that is mostly ignored.
I think these types of studies can warn us about which of our beliefs we should inspect particularly carefully, but at the end of the day the best we can do is to apply our reasoning abilities as carefully as possible. There is no sense in saying "well I'm genetically pre-programmed to believe that 2+2=4 so the fact that it seems intuitively logical is no reason to believe that it's true".
Also, some of these correlations might not imply causation. 400 years ago (and perhaps to this day) there was probably a strong correlation between skin colour and belief in the experimental method, but that's not because Enlightenment thinkers were genetically pre-programmed to believe in the experimental method.
"You can think you just like or don’t like school prayer, but you can’t reasonably think that feeling is informative about what policy is best for the country, or morally right."
You *can* think that - if your aim is to manipulate others into adopting the same views. If you don't really think it is the best thing for them, others are likely to detect your insincerity - and then resist your attempt to manipulate them. So: it is best to believe sincerely in the worth of your political opinions - if you want to spread them around so that they come to matter.
isn’t certainty that our opponents are knaves or fools one well known bias that we all might try to overcome?
On that. Suppose that the population is divided into fools and sages. Suppose, furthermore, that Robin offers sage advice when he counsels adopting the average view. The sages follow Robin's advice and adjust their views to reflect the average of all views. The fools do not follow Robin's advice, and fail to adjust their views. With each iteration, the average approaches more and more closely to the views of the fools, until, finally, everybody comes to adopt the worldview of the fools.
To put this story in a different way. Either you are are a sage or a fool. If you are a fool, you are cooked, you are done. You may as well not listen to the sages, since you can't ultimately escape from your foolishness. You may as well wallow in it. And in any case, you're not even listening, so there's no point giving you advice.
If you are a sage, then you should not listen to the fools, since they are fools. You should not average your views with the views of fools, since that would increase your foolishness.
So no matter who you are, either you may as well treat the other side as fools, or else you should treat the other side as fools.
Finally, if you want to contribute to the advancement of knowledge, the last thing you want to do is adopt the average view. The average view is not on any frontier of knowledge, so if you adopt the average view, then you will never contribute. If, on the other hand, you go out on a limb, then even if you are on average more wrong, if, say, you are more wrong than everybody nine times out of ten and more right than everybody only one time out of ten, then that one time you do contribute to advance, and the other nine times you hardly do any harm, since others will recognize your foolishness. Look at Isaac Newton. He was was not right about everything (e.g. he was interested in alchemy). Maybe he was more wrong than right. It doesn't matter. We have separated the good from the bad and preserved the good ideas of Isaac Newton.
Then what is the MOST reliable way avaliable to gain accurate political beliefs, or at least compensate for genetic biases?
Are there any good books about the relationship between genes and politics?
Because the study was a twin study, my comment above is irrelevant.
Please provide a reference. The link you provide merely leads to a nag screen, with no information as to the authors, journal, or year of publication.
Because there are millions of common SNPs, CNVs, and other genetic variants in humans, it is possible to attribute 99% of any attribute to genetic variation, unless you have a sample size in the millions (possibly fewer, possibly much more). So it's crucial to know how the study controlled for multiple hypothesis testing (meaning, if the first gene variant you try fails to account for the data, you can move on to the second, and the third, and the millionth.)
It is important to distinguish between "heritable" and "genetic".
First off, epigenetic factors - these are both environmentally influenced AND heritable, and their influence on cognition is a hot topic right now, particularly the role of DNA methylation.
Also, there is a huge "heritability gap" - even though we know many traits, like propensity for diabetes, are extremely heritable, we have been unable to link these traits to _specific_ genes or features in the genome. This is a big puzzle right now, and it may be that our perspective on what it means for something to be "genetic" is way off base.
Please, please use the term "heritable" when that's what's observed, because calling it "genetic" is quite premature.
The fools believe they are sages and believe everything sagacious -including your advice - is foolish. They believe that their failure to follow (what they wrongly believe to be) foolish advice is consistent with their sagacity. The fools and the sages have their categories reversed.
If this is insufficient explanation, I will drop it here and possibly take up the matter at a later time with a more acceptable thought experiment.
Constant, if they fools do not know they are fools, then they can't tell they are fools from whether or not they are inclined to follow advice, so you can't assume the fools don't follow your advice.
(Actually I think that you (Robin) must be kidding, but it's hard to read sly humor in text - hence my straight response.)
The simplified model is there to make the point clear. In the real world the fools do not know they are fools, and therefore, to make the model a better microcosm of the real case, we must likewise assume that the fools do not know they are fools.
If the world were this simple, it would easy for everyone to tell if they are a sage or fool: you are a sage if you feel inclined to be persuaded by my argument. Given this key info, fools would know to ignore their initial opinions and defer to sages, at which point all would agree.
A big problem with this study is that it conflates "genetic" with "in utero environment".
Monozygous twins share not only the same genome, they also share the same in utero environment where 99.9999%+ of their growth and development occurred (from a single cell to 10^8+ cells).
This is a gigantic problem with twin studies that is mostly ignored.
I think these types of studies can warn us about which of our beliefs we should inspect particularly carefully, but at the end of the day the best we can do is to apply our reasoning abilities as carefully as possible. There is no sense in saying "well I'm genetically pre-programmed to believe that 2+2=4 so the fact that it seems intuitively logical is no reason to believe that it's true".
Also, some of these correlations might not imply causation. 400 years ago (and perhaps to this day) there was probably a strong correlation between skin colour and belief in the experimental method, but that's not because Enlightenment thinkers were genetically pre-programmed to believe in the experimental method.
For those without access I believe the title is Not By Twins Alone and the pdf is here.
"You can think you just like or don’t like school prayer, but you can’t reasonably think that feeling is informative about what policy is best for the country, or morally right."
You *can* think that - if your aim is to manipulate others into adopting the same views. If you don't really think it is the best thing for them, others are likely to detect your insincerity - and then resist your attempt to manipulate them. So: it is best to believe sincerely in the worth of your political opinions - if you want to spread them around so that they come to matter.
isn’t certainty that our opponents are knaves or fools one well known bias that we all might try to overcome?
On that. Suppose that the population is divided into fools and sages. Suppose, furthermore, that Robin offers sage advice when he counsels adopting the average view. The sages follow Robin's advice and adjust their views to reflect the average of all views. The fools do not follow Robin's advice, and fail to adjust their views. With each iteration, the average approaches more and more closely to the views of the fools, until, finally, everybody comes to adopt the worldview of the fools.
To put this story in a different way. Either you are are a sage or a fool. If you are a fool, you are cooked, you are done. You may as well not listen to the sages, since you can't ultimately escape from your foolishness. You may as well wallow in it. And in any case, you're not even listening, so there's no point giving you advice.
If you are a sage, then you should not listen to the fools, since they are fools. You should not average your views with the views of fools, since that would increase your foolishness.
So no matter who you are, either you may as well treat the other side as fools, or else you should treat the other side as fools.
Finally, if you want to contribute to the advancement of knowledge, the last thing you want to do is adopt the average view. The average view is not on any frontier of knowledge, so if you adopt the average view, then you will never contribute. If, on the other hand, you go out on a limb, then even if you are on average more wrong, if, say, you are more wrong than everybody nine times out of ten and more right than everybody only one time out of ten, then that one time you do contribute to advance, and the other nine times you hardly do any harm, since others will recognize your foolishness. Look at Isaac Newton. He was was not right about everything (e.g. he was interested in alchemy). Maybe he was more wrong than right. It doesn't matter. We have separated the good from the bad and preserved the good ideas of Isaac Newton.