My current take is that it's less likely to work than caloric restriction, caloric restriction has taken hits in the 2 recent primate studies so that's not very likely in the first place, but intermittent fasting has the major advantage of being much easier since you don't need to change the food you eat and you also aren't running the risk of malnourishing yourself if you don't eat *exactly* right. (Example: I mentioned in a previous thread an old family friend who is still in the hospital, at least partially because he was starving himself by incompetently doing caloric restriction.)
Interesting that the farmer ,like the warrior ( the missing man in the F/F dichotomy who kicks both of them around) is deified but what would Paul Harvey say about the forger?
@f26939f398e5b2e21ea353b06370c426:disqus re Yudowskian meaethics
" Good consequences are inherently good because being viewed as such by subjects is all we can mean by "good." "
If it takes a subject to dub or deem something good, then that this is NOT inherently good, in the sense that something inherently weighs 10 kilos. You rendition just contradicts the meaning of "inherent".
"Our moral intuitions are all the same--that is, our moral conclusions converge.."
It is not clear that or how or why they would. It is also not clear that the output of an inutitiional blackbox would count as really good (euthypohro problemc) or whether it is meant to...or..
"The problem is better expressed by saying you disagree with him than that you don't understand him. "
No. The problem is that his writings aren't coherent enough to form a theory that can be agreed with ot disagreed with. I'm not most people
"-the vast majority of people simply don't understand moral theories they disagree with"
So I've noticed.
"Yudkowsky is as clear as he can be given such an excess of verbiage and incompetence at the art of omission."
You mean he is clear but long-winded? But your short summary wasn't clear either. See above.
@77122d260f450be1c517966fe193e3e3:disqus Are there non-human animals that find flower attractive other than those which use them as a food source?
And anyway, given what I know about insect nervous system and behaviors (such as repeatedly bumping into lights), I doubt that they have any concept of ''beauty'. Insects seem to be very simple stimulus-response machines, not much more complex than Braitenberg veichles http://en.wikipedia.org/wik...
As for Stuxnet, we now see that AI is interacting with national security in a way that it wasn't in 2009. Well, at least not so blatantly. I remember comments on the Accelerating Future blog about how AGI systems would infiltrate computer systems in a highly autonomous way and have real-world destructive effects. Now that's real.
I don't see how Stuxnet can possibly fit any reasonable definition of AI. It's just a piece of computer malware. Maybe it's more complex than the usual ones, but it doesn't seem in any way 'intelligent'.
You say you know what they are, then immediately run into the same interpretational problems as everyone else. Are good consequences inherently good, or only viewed as such by subjects? Does each subject have their own notion of the good or do they converge?
The answers are straightforward--not that I'd want to wade through Yudkowskian verbosity to prove it. :) Good consequences are inherently good because being viewed as such by subjects is all we can mean by "good." Our moral intuitions are all the same--that is, our moral conclusions converge. This per Yudkowsky.
The problem is better expressed by saying you disagree with him than that you don't understand him. (Not that I'm questioning your sincerity--the vast majority of people simply don't understand moral theories they disagree with. [But it isn't essentially the "opponent's" fault that they don't understand. — see my "The unity of comprehension and belief explains moralism and faith" http://tinyurl.com/cxjqxo9 ]) Different philosophical systems take different concepts as primitive. ( http://tinyurl.com/bx2ujj2 )The game is to attack their coherence or plausibility, not to refuse to understand them.
Yudkowsky is as clear as he can be given such an excess of verbiage and incompetence at the art of omission. (See my "Construal-level theory, the endowment effect, and the art of omission" — http://tinyurl.com/9sw54v8 ) His problem isn't lack of comprehensibility but implausibility and, more importantly, readily discovered incoherence. Methodologically, his problem is a refusal (or inability) to construct any arguments or to deal with opponent arguments.
I do have some sympathy with greeting Yudkowsky's ramblings by characterizing them as incomprehensible. After all, it's the LW way! But it's a bad way -- they way of the cheap shot, or more charitably, ethical philistinism. ( http://tinyurl.com/6kamrjs )
@srdiamond , re Yudkowskian metaethics.You say you know what they are, then immediately run into the same interpretational problems as everyone else. Are good consequences inherently good, or only viewed as such by subjects? Does each subject have their own notion of the good or do they converge? etc etc.
> Yudkowsky's meta-ethics i...what??? AFIACT, know one knows what it is including Yudkowsky.I know what they are; that he laboriously develops over some 23(?) lengthy posts a well-established view without apparently knowing that it is or offering any novel arguments for it doesn't make the position obscure. He believes that to know what's moral, we can only consult our intuitions (which he seems to think--at the object level--are utilitarian). He doesn't address the basic arguments against intuitionism: 1) different persons' intuitions vary and 2) people might subject their moral intuitions to rational critique.On another topic in response to a different poster--It may well be--it seems to me--that our moral sense ultimately reduces to aesthetics (as does our sense of truth). This is ultimately a psychological question rather than a meta-ethical one: it doesn't address the truth value of moral claims. But what seems implausible is that our sense of beauty is hardwired--as opposed to "prewired" and modifiable by experience, if unfolding in accordance with its prewired nature. What may be universal is the way the aesthetic sense develops in response to experience rather than the way it manifests.
You're right someone as smart as that couldn't mean what I think they mean. I'll think about reading it.
But on flowers: it may not have been important to evolve the ability to distinguish flowers which were associated with particular foods. Easier and more flexible just to like flower shapes in general. For that matter a) not all flowers are beautiful b) even those that are I don't find especially beautiful.
Deutsch is one of the smartest guys on the planet. He wouldn't be making the argument unless he could back it up.
Deutsch does consider numerous alternative explanations and dispatches them.
The argument that for instance 'flowers are correlated with fruit' (food) is a weak counter-argument. Most flowers were NOT correlated with fruit or food for humans, yet we still find them attractive, further we find the same specific part of the flowers attractive as do insects. This is simply inexplicable if the sense of beauty was all species-specific.
'Flowers are beautiful' as a justification for a necessary universal aesthetics seems very weak. There are lot of other reasons humans might find flowers beautiful (they were correlated with access to food in the ancestral environment for example). Or it could just be a spandrel.
See here for details:http://intelligence.org/201...
My median estimate is 2060, but my distribution is wide:http://intelligence.org/201...
My current take is that it's less likely to work than caloric restriction, caloric restriction has taken hits in the 2 recent primate studies so that's not very likely in the first place, but intermittent fasting has the major advantage of being much easier since you don't need to change the food you eat and you also aren't running the risk of malnourishing yourself if you don't eat *exactly* right. (Example: I mentioned in a previous thread an old family friend who is still in the hospital, at least partially because he was starving himself by incompetently doing caloric restriction.)
What do you think of Intermittent Fasting as a way to improve health or live longer?
And the forager too.
Interesting that the farmer ,like the warrior ( the missing man in the F/F dichotomy who kicks both of them around) is deified but what would Paul Harvey say about the forger?
@f26939f398e5b2e21ea353b06370c426:disqus re Yudowskian meaethics
" Good consequences are inherently good because being viewed as such by subjects is all we can mean by "good." "
If it takes a subject to dub or deem something good, then that this is NOT inherently good, in the sense that something inherently weighs 10 kilos. You rendition just contradicts the meaning of "inherent".
"Our moral intuitions are all the same--that is, our moral conclusions converge.."
It is not clear that or how or why they would. It is also not clear that the output of an inutitiional blackbox would count as really good (euthypohro problemc) or whether it is meant to...or..
"The problem is better expressed by saying you disagree with him than that you don't understand him. "
No. The problem is that his writings aren't coherent enough to form a theory that can be agreed with ot disagreed with. I'm not most people
"-the vast majority of people simply don't understand moral theories they disagree with"
So I've noticed.
"Yudkowsky is as clear as he can be given such an excess of verbiage and incompetence at the art of omission."
You mean he is clear but long-winded? But your short summary wasn't clear either. See above.
@77122d260f450be1c517966fe193e3e3:disqus Are there non-human animals that find flower attractive other than those which use them as a food source?
And anyway, given what I know about insect nervous system and behaviors (such as repeatedly bumping into lights), I doubt that they have any concept of ''beauty'. Insects seem to be very simple stimulus-response machines, not much more complex than Braitenberg veichles http://en.wikipedia.org/wik...
As for Stuxnet, we now see that AI is interacting with national security in a way that it wasn't in 2009. Well, at least not so blatantly. I remember comments on the Accelerating Future blog about how AGI systems would infiltrate computer systems in a highly autonomous way and have real-world destructive effects. Now that's real.
I don't see how Stuxnet can possibly fit any reasonable definition of AI. It's just a piece of computer malware. Maybe it's more complex than the usual ones, but it doesn't seem in any way 'intelligent'.
You say you know what they are, then immediately run into the same interpretational problems as everyone else. Are good consequences inherently good, or only viewed as such by subjects? Does each subject have their own notion of the good or do they converge?
The answers are straightforward--not that I'd want to wade through Yudkowskian verbosity to prove it. :) Good consequences are inherently good because being viewed as such by subjects is all we can mean by "good." Our moral intuitions are all the same--that is, our moral conclusions converge. This per Yudkowsky.
The problem is better expressed by saying you disagree with him than that you don't understand him. (Not that I'm questioning your sincerity--the vast majority of people simply don't understand moral theories they disagree with. [But it isn't essentially the "opponent's" fault that they don't understand. — see my "The unity of comprehension and belief explains moralism and faith" http://tinyurl.com/cxjqxo9 ]) Different philosophical systems take different concepts as primitive. ( http://tinyurl.com/bx2ujj2 )The game is to attack their coherence or plausibility, not to refuse to understand them.
Yudkowsky is as clear as he can be given such an excess of verbiage and incompetence at the art of omission. (See my "Construal-level theory, the endowment effect, and the art of omission" — http://tinyurl.com/9sw54v8 ) His problem isn't lack of comprehensibility but implausibility and, more importantly, readily discovered incoherence. Methodologically, his problem is a refusal (or inability) to construct any arguments or to deal with opponent arguments.
I do have some sympathy with greeting Yudkowsky's ramblings by characterizing them as incomprehensible. After all, it's the LW way! But it's a bad way -- they way of the cheap shot, or more charitably, ethical philistinism. ( http://tinyurl.com/6kamrjs )
@srdiamond , re Yudkowskian metaethics.You say you know what they are, then immediately run into the same interpretational problems as everyone else. Are good consequences inherently good, or only viewed as such by subjects? Does each subject have their own notion of the good or do they converge? etc etc.
> Yudkowsky's meta-ethics i...what??? AFIACT, know one knows what it is including Yudkowsky.I know what they are; that he laboriously develops over some 23(?) lengthy posts a well-established view without apparently knowing that it is or offering any novel arguments for it doesn't make the position obscure. He believes that to know what's moral, we can only consult our intuitions (which he seems to think--at the object level--are utilitarian). He doesn't address the basic arguments against intuitionism: 1) different persons' intuitions vary and 2) people might subject their moral intuitions to rational critique.On another topic in response to a different poster--It may well be--it seems to me--that our moral sense ultimately reduces to aesthetics (as does our sense of truth). This is ultimately a psychological question rather than a meta-ethical one: it doesn't address the truth value of moral claims. But what seems implausible is that our sense of beauty is hardwired--as opposed to "prewired" and modifiable by experience, if unfolding in accordance with its prewired nature. What may be universal is the way the aesthetic sense develops in response to experience rather than the way it manifests.
You're right someone as smart as that couldn't mean what I think they mean. I'll think about reading it.
But on flowers: it may not have been important to evolve the ability to distinguish flowers which were associated with particular foods. Easier and more flexible just to like flower shapes in general. For that matter a) not all flowers are beautiful b) even those that are I don't find especially beautiful.
> Yudkowsky's meta-ethics is
...what??? AFIACT, know one knows what it is including Yudkowsky.
Hi Robert,
Deutsch is one of the smartest guys on the planet. He wouldn't be making the argument unless he could back it up.
Deutsch does consider numerous alternative explanations and dispatches them.
The argument that for instance 'flowers are correlated with fruit' (food) is a weak counter-argument. Most flowers were NOT correlated with fruit or food for humans, yet we still find them attractive, further we find the same specific part of the flowers attractive as do insects. This is simply inexplicable if the sense of beauty was all species-specific.
I encourage you to read the book.
'Flowers are beautiful' as a justification for a necessary universal aesthetics seems very weak. There are lot of other reasons humans might find flowers beautiful (they were correlated with access to food in the ancestral environment for example). Or it could just be a spandrel.