Sean Carroll’s new best-selling book The Big Picture runs the risk of preaching to the choir. To my mind, it gives a clear and effective explanation of the usual top physicists’ world view. On religion, mysticism, free will, consciousness, meaning, morality, etc. (The usual view, but an unusually readable, articulate, and careful explanation.) I don’t disagree, but then I’m very centered in this physicist view.
There are a lot of things you can't do with blindsight. According to you, the only difference between blindsight and regular sight lies in the fact that regular sight is accompanied by a delusional...but why should a delusion make it more effective?
He does not think that normal sight involves conscious experience; he thinks it involves the illusion of conscious experience. But in no case does he think there is real conscious experience.
None of the positions here are "impenetrable" to me, by the way.
The same kind of evidence that tempts me to attribute consciousness to other human beings, namely similarity of body and behavior with me. Obviously other human beings have a much greater similarity, and consequently the temptation is much greater in that case than in the case of a bacterium. That is why I said "might" in this case.
"Exactly the epistemic situation Dennett points to ensuring the infirmity of "qualia.""
No, it isn't. Again, the issue with the term "qualia" is that the common treatment within the philosophy of mind is to ascribe to them an ineffability that that does not comport with the facts. That is what Dennett attacks in QQ.
"It isn't very plausible that Dennett, whose work I respect, would banish qualia only to reintroduce a concept of experience that is still more nebulous"
He didn't "reintroduce" anything, he simply did not deny the existence of what others are nebulously referring to. I'm sorry that you're too dense to get this.
"By the way, are these "conscious experiences," which you think Dennett allows, private?"
Nothing is "private" in the sense you mean ... this is one of Dennett's most fundamental points.
"Have you read my "Dogma" piece?"
Of course not. You aren't an important, deep, or knowledgeable thinker and I've already wasted more of my time on your confused droppings than is warranted. Ta ta.
Obviously they do detect those things and yours is a circular argument, moron.
vvv addendum addressing the absurd response from "useless": "useless" really is quite stupid and intellectually dishonest. Obviously the claim that " those things either have subjective experience (as bacteria might), or do not detect anything" is entirely circular, being indefensible without a prior claim that detection requires subjective experience, a claim that flies in the face of meaning and usage.It implies that not only aren't zombies conscious, but they cannot detect anything, which not even the most committed zombiephile would assert. It implies that defense systems cannot detect incoming missiles, and that your computer cannot detect a new device. This level of intellectual dishonesty goes far beyond "useless"; it is nefarious ... although it does have the upside of showing just how far people like "useless" will go to shore up their position, and just how worthless their "arguments" are.
A blindsighted person, when he is doing the blindsighting, is affected by things but does not detect them. As I said to Jim Balter, that is just like a thermometer, which is affected by the cold but does not detect it any more than water detects cold when it freezes.
Of course, you could use "detect" in an extended way both for the thermometer and for the blind sighted person, but that is basically metaphorical. It is not detecting as we normally detect things, which is a conscious act.
However, even in the normal way, the blindsighted person detects himself saying "it was blue" or whatever, and since he can use that to consciously realize that it was blue, he can detect the blue indirectly, from his own behavior.
In the way we were talking about it, those things either have subjective experience (as bacteria might), or do not detect anything. Obviously a thermometer does not detect the temperature, any more than water detects cold when it freezes. They are just affected by it.
"But you have Dennett wrong! He doesn't "reduce consciousness to brain signals," but rather denies its existence (where "consciousness" is defined in the technical sense of qualitative experience)."
He is saying that Dennett denies the existence of consciousness, which is defined as "qualitative experience." So he is saying that Dennett denies the existence of qualitative experience, and he himself agrees with this denial.
He then says,
"What Dennett does a poor job of is explaining away the ultra-powerful intuition of conscious experience. He seems to treat it as a philosophical error rather than an aspect of our psychology."
That is, the intuition that we have "conscious experience" is wrong, according to Stephen Diamond. So according to him, we do not have conscious experience. If he agrees that in a sense we have experience, it is unconscious experience, which is not what normal people mean by experience.
Without the subjective experiences, we would be causally affected by objective features, but obviously we would not detect anything, just as a stone does not detect any objective features when it is stepped on.
So, a blindsighted person doesn't detect anything? [Detection requires an evolutionary history of adaptation by means of discrimination.]
obviously people mean something beyond that with "conscious experience", and Dennett is clearly making reference to that use of the term.
But you can't tell us what! Exactly the epistemic situation Dennett points to ensuring the infirmity of "qualia." It isn't very plausible that Dennett, whose work I respect, would banish qualia only to reintroduce a concept of experience that is still more nebulous, one that is based on "you know it when you have it." Again, this is the very problem raised by qualia and is central to Dennett's dismissal of qualia.
I think [but am not sure - any direct clarification from Dennett?] Dennett just means by "experience" the interaction with the world resulting in learning. This is an entirely common use of "experience." It has the merit of not rendering Dennett's demolition of qualia trivial.
[By the way, are these "conscious experiences," which you think Dennett allows, private?
[Have you read my "Dogma" piece? ( http://juridicalcoherence.b... ) Your questions about how I use the inverted spectrum suggest you haven't.]
[Added.] Here's a test case. Would a blindsighted person have visual experiences? On my interpretation of Dennett, he would say yes. (The blindsighted are capable of visual learning, and you can only learn "from experience.") On yours, no. In either event, this illustrates the ambiguity of the concept of "experience."
"Without the subjective experiences, we would be causally affected by objective features, but obviously we would not detect anything, just as a stone does not detect any objective features when it is stepped on."
It's just like an entirely useless idiot to talk about stones rather than thermometers or litmus strips or bacteria or anything else that might pose a problem for his claim.
Ohh, to clarify by disingenuous I meant misleading. I didn't meant to imply any ill-intent and sorry if it came across that way.
There are a lot of things you can't do with blindsight. According to you, the only difference between blindsight and regular sight lies in the fact that regular sight is accompanied by a delusional...but why should a delusion make it more effective?
He does not think that normal sight involves conscious experience; he thinks it involves the illusion of conscious experience. But in no case does he think there is real conscious experience.
None of the positions here are "impenetrable" to me, by the way.
The same kind of evidence that tempts me to attribute consciousness to other human beings, namely similarity of body and behavior with me. Obviously other human beings have a much greater similarity, and consequently the temptation is much greater in that case than in the case of a bacterium. That is why I said "might" in this case.
There is nothing circular about it. Every argument implies its conclusion, but that does not mean it is circular.
I know, but you ignored the fact that it was Stephen's own position, and that it denied the existence of conscious experience.
"But you can't tell us what!"
As I already noted, that isn't necessary.
"Exactly the epistemic situation Dennett points to ensuring the infirmity of "qualia.""
No, it isn't. Again, the issue with the term "qualia" is that the common treatment within the philosophy of mind is to ascribe to them an ineffability that that does not comport with the facts. That is what Dennett attacks in QQ.
"It isn't very plausible that Dennett, whose work I respect, would banish qualia only to reintroduce a concept of experience that is still more nebulous"
He didn't "reintroduce" anything, he simply did not deny the existence of what others are nebulously referring to. I'm sorry that you're too dense to get this.
"By the way, are these "conscious experiences," which you think Dennett allows, private?"
Nothing is "private" in the sense you mean ... this is one of Dennett's most fundamental points.
"Have you read my "Dogma" piece?"
Of course not. You aren't an important, deep, or knowledgeable thinker and I've already wasted more of my time on your confused droppings than is warranted. Ta ta.
"This is from Stephen Diamond"
I already read it, and commented on it, cretin.
Obviously they do detect those things and yours is a circular argument, moron.
vvv addendum addressing the absurd response from "useless": "useless" really is quite stupid and intellectually dishonest. Obviously the claim that " those things either have subjective experience (as bacteria might), or do not detect anything" is entirely circular, being indefensible without a prior claim that detection requires subjective experience, a claim that flies in the face of meaning and usage.It implies that not only aren't zombies conscious, but they cannot detect anything, which not even the most committed zombiephile would assert. It implies that defense systems cannot detect incoming missiles, and that your computer cannot detect a new device. This level of intellectual dishonesty goes far beyond "useless"; it is nefarious ... although it does have the upside of showing just how far people like "useless" will go to shore up their position, and just how worthless their "arguments" are.
Exactly what evidence tempts you to attribute consciousness to a bacterium?
A blindsighted person, when he is doing the blindsighting, is affected by things but does not detect them. As I said to Jim Balter, that is just like a thermometer, which is affected by the cold but does not detect it any more than water detects cold when it freezes.
Of course, you could use "detect" in an extended way both for the thermometer and for the blind sighted person, but that is basically metaphorical. It is not detecting as we normally detect things, which is a conscious act.
However, even in the normal way, the blindsighted person detects himself saying "it was blue" or whatever, and since he can use that to consciously realize that it was blue, he can detect the blue indirectly, from his own behavior.
In the way we were talking about it, those things either have subjective experience (as bacteria might), or do not detect anything. Obviously a thermometer does not detect the temperature, any more than water detects cold when it freezes. They are just affected by it.
This is from Stephen Diamond:
"But you have Dennett wrong! He doesn't "reduce consciousness to brain signals," but rather denies its existence (where "consciousness" is defined in the technical sense of qualitative experience)."
He is saying that Dennett denies the existence of consciousness, which is defined as "qualitative experience." So he is saying that Dennett denies the existence of qualitative experience, and he himself agrees with this denial.
He then says,
"What Dennett does a poor job of is explaining away the ultra-powerful intuition of conscious experience. He seems to treat it as a philosophical error rather than an aspect of our psychology."
That is, the intuition that we have "conscious experience" is wrong, according to Stephen Diamond. So according to him, we do not have conscious experience. If he agrees that in a sense we have experience, it is unconscious experience, which is not what normal people mean by experience.
Without the subjective experiences, we would be causally affected by objective features, but obviously we would not detect anything, just as a stone does not detect any objective features when it is stepped on.
So, a blindsighted person doesn't detect anything? [Detection requires an evolutionary history of adaptation by means of discrimination.]
obviously people mean something beyond that with "conscious experience", and Dennett is clearly making reference to that use of the term.
But you can't tell us what! Exactly the epistemic situation Dennett points to ensuring the infirmity of "qualia." It isn't very plausible that Dennett, whose work I respect, would banish qualia only to reintroduce a concept of experience that is still more nebulous, one that is based on "you know it when you have it." Again, this is the very problem raised by qualia and is central to Dennett's dismissal of qualia.
I think [but am not sure - any direct clarification from Dennett?] Dennett just means by "experience" the interaction with the world resulting in learning. This is an entirely common use of "experience." It has the merit of not rendering Dennett's demolition of qualia trivial.
[By the way, are these "conscious experiences," which you think Dennett allows, private?
[Have you read my "Dogma" piece? ( http://juridicalcoherence.b... ) Your questions about how I use the inverted spectrum suggest you haven't.]
[Added.] Here's a test case. Would a blindsighted person have visual experiences? On my interpretation of Dennett, he would say yes. (The blindsighted are capable of visual learning, and you can only learn "from experience.") On yours, no. In either event, this illustrates the ambiguity of the concept of "experience."
"Without the subjective experiences, we would be causally affected by objective features, but obviously we would not detect anything, just as a stone does not detect any objective features when it is stepped on."
It's just like an entirely useless idiot to talk about stones rather than thermometers or litmus strips or bacteria or anything else that might pose a problem for his claim.