Lying is not OK. Hypocrisy is not OK. We should be honest with each other and ourselves as value #1.
This is what is necessary to have a rational culture that actually seeks to overcome bias.
There are values above reproduction. You would not be happy to have a million children if you did not see them as carrying on your legacy, for instance if the "children" were mindless frogs. The value that determines whether an entity you produced is "yours" or not - that is a value above just reproduction. Reproduction *of what*? *What* is the type of thing that you want to see reproduced?
I want to see honest and rational entities reproduced. I want to there to be entities with greater understanding of deep truths. Deceit is a cancer.
Minds are not created by genetic evolution, but by memetic evolution. Their true goal is not to spread the genes but to spread the memes. To the degree that they engage in gene-spreading activity at all it is due to being forced into that behavior by drives that originate from outside the mind, mindless drives that originate from the body.
Is this another way of saying that culture wars are less important in the long evolutionary term than you previously hypothesized? Because they're mainly used to drive coalitions in the here and now, and not intended to produce evolutionarily improved descendants of the culture down the line?
If so, I think that's directionally right. People focus too much on memetic evolution as achieving some sort of cultural dominance for a meme, rather than seeing that as a form of over-fitting to temporal conditions that's unlikely to be sustained.
IMO successful evolution is intended to reach some sort of dynamic equilibrium of a complementary ecology, rather than the dominance of any single or group of factors. Evolution of (real biological) dinosaurs continually trying to get bigger due to competitive pressures is better view as a "dead-end" solution. The increase in complexity, optionality, elegance or resilience of the adjustment mechanisms are the real gains.
Perhaps the purpose of culture wars is not to produce more fitting culture per se, but to shake up the terrain for cooperation/competition. Sort of like a forest fire, revitalizing ecological niches by destroying old and allowing new spaces.
"More generally, the main practical reason to declare public values that differ from one’s action priorities is to show and support coalition partners."
I'm curious though why coalitions don't usually directly state that they simply value more descendants. If we know abstractly that we just want more long term evolutionary impact, wouldn't we prefer coalitions that publicly declare this?
Scared values become sacred because they foster collaboration. It’s an outcome of memetic selection. The sacred status helps maintain collaboration even when Pareto-optimal outcomes are not individually rational, such as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
We can’t _all_ have more descendants. Therefore, the honest message would be, “We value more descendants for this particular group, which, by a happy coïncidence, includes us, at the expense of everyone else”. Saying this openly doesn’t seem a good idea—or we’d see groups doing it and suceeding.
Possibly, but I think another important aspect is that our status seeking sometimes makes us align with agents that have fewer children incidentally, yet we then act as though that is the value not the by product. To use a made up example, if a population has a religious order that spends up to the first 50 years of their life celibate as they study, and tend to rise to high prominence as governmental functionaries and are generally highly respected as the wise elite, people are going to associate high status and wisdom with not having kids, no matter whether it is intentional. Some proportion of the population will not have descendants, or very few, in favor of going through the process to become high status, and many will emulate the outcome of few kids despite not going through the whole process. In a sense, it comes down to signaling "We value knowledge and wisdom the most, above having kids".
I have a feeling that, in the 90s, you could talk about the end of evolutionary history, as well. Which I always thought was very strange. So I'm personally glad to see this argument. But - perhaps you address this elsewhere - values seem like a very chancy thing for evolution to work on. At least if you're talking about genetic evolution by natural selection, which I think we are. There seems to be so much chaotic noise between a gene and a societal value, for the reasons you give in this post, and perhaps for many other reasons too.
The big selective pressure would seem to be on how much people like babies, compared to how much they like sex. And maybe also on factors which influence how much they're likely to carefully plan their own lives. Maybe people might tend to become less wild, more domestic - as it would be relatively less important that they might conceive after a one-night stand, and more important that they wouldn't be too worried about 'having no social life.'
Of course, there might be selective pressure affecting values too. But I think the collateral effects of selective pressure on our emotions would be likely to swamp any such direct effect.
...all this is provided social change isn't so fast that evolution becomes just noise. I mean if sperm donation were to become normal in society and then a cultural backlash or technological collapse stopped it, then that would play hell with any kind of evolutionary signal.
Robin, I've read your post on evolved values with great interest, and while I appreciate the novel ideas you present, I feel that your argument would benefit from further development and consideration of additional factors.
Firstly, the distinction you make between an agent's internal action priorities and the values presented by its "press secretary" component is intriguing, but it lacks clarity and empirical support. To strengthen your case, it would be helpful to provide more concrete evidence and examples to substantiate this claim.
Moreover, I believe that your emphasis on sacred values as a means of binding groups and signaling coalitions, while important, may oversimplify the complex processes of value formation and expression. These processes are influenced by a wide range of psychological, social, and cultural factors that warrant deeper exploration.
Additionally, I would argue that your post does not sufficiently address the critical role of power dynamics and political maneuvering in shaping the public expression of values. In situations involving power and politics, agents often strategically navigate social interactions to maximize their influence and achieve their goals, which can lead to the obfuscation of true values. However, it is important to note that genuine value expression can still occur in these contexts, particularly when agents are under close scrutiny or when the stakes are high.
I also suggest that the strategic pursuit of influence and the navigation of social interactions are not inherently detrimental to the formation and articulation of values. In some cases, these processes can lead to the refinement and expression of more inclusive values that reflect diverse perspectives, especially when there is an environment that encourages open dialogue and critical reflection.
In conclusion, while your post offers a thought-provoking perspective on the evolution of values, I believe that further theoretical refinement and empirical investigation are necessary to test the validity of your claims. A more comprehensive approach would engage with the multifaceted nature of value formation and expression, taking into account the complex interplay between individual motives, social dynamics, and the broader cultural and institutional context in which values are shaped and expressed. By doing so, we can develop a more nuanced understanding of how evolved agents navigate the strategic landscape of value expression while pursuing their long-term goals.
"It makes sense for agents to, somewhere inside themselves, know abstractly that they just want more long term evolutionary impact."
Perhaps it makes sense abstractly, but is unnecessary in practical terms, therefore less likely. Abstract means more removed, therefore will be less directly selected for. Usually baser, less abstract options get selected for and those brutal mechanics can wash out any more abstracted options.
Compare ideas of group selection, it's an abstract form, one can see how evolution would work on groups, but the bottleneck of the individual makes it very hard to ascertain it happening at all (otherwise why would we argue about it at all) as the selection of levels has to be all aligned, and is easily disrupted (quick thought: perhaps this is why narcissists and psychopaths are still with us, to disrupt group selection alignment).
The 'alignmen't of cells/tissues/organs/body/world/extended-phenotype is easier to encompass in an individual and be selected for because of the genetic bottleneck. (Quick thought: Perhaps this is a good base for a new definition for species of individuals.) The world/extended phenotype includes the future beyond the lifespan of the individual, but this is easily washed out by those future individuals doing their own thang. I suspect it would require multiple lifespans of the universe to select for (quick thought, is this what Teilhard de Chardin was on about??_ like the bottleneck would have to be the big bang - big crunch???)
What can be selected for is not any particular view of the world (more descendants/group selection of my identity) which are highly abstract and thus more removed from direct practical selection, but an urge "to world" by individuals, and urge to cocoon the body with social stuff— an urge to get organized, an urge to organize: an urge to should. Like the way hunger gets you to eat, but the recipe, the cuisine, is up to you in your circumstance (which includes other people).
But if the values of the conscious mind differ from those of the unconscious mind, then isn't there a certain inefficiency at gaining them? If I go to the store thinking I'm supposed to be getting bananas, and my UM wants pop tarts... mightn't I end up all to often with bananas?
I have a radical position to share.
Lying is not OK. Hypocrisy is not OK. We should be honest with each other and ourselves as value #1.
This is what is necessary to have a rational culture that actually seeks to overcome bias.
There are values above reproduction. You would not be happy to have a million children if you did not see them as carrying on your legacy, for instance if the "children" were mindless frogs. The value that determines whether an entity you produced is "yours" or not - that is a value above just reproduction. Reproduction *of what*? *What* is the type of thing that you want to see reproduced?
I want to see honest and rational entities reproduced. I want to there to be entities with greater understanding of deep truths. Deceit is a cancer.
I'm going to help out the unconscious minds of your readers, but I don't know how to put pictures here, so I put it on my substack and this is the link: https://ishayirashashem.substack.com/p/look-at-cute-babies
Minds are not created by genetic evolution, but by memetic evolution. Their true goal is not to spread the genes but to spread the memes. To the degree that they engage in gene-spreading activity at all it is due to being forced into that behavior by drives that originate from outside the mind, mindless drives that originate from the body.
Yes, as long as we are the way we are, we will continue to be the way we are.
Is this another way of saying that culture wars are less important in the long evolutionary term than you previously hypothesized? Because they're mainly used to drive coalitions in the here and now, and not intended to produce evolutionarily improved descendants of the culture down the line?
If so, I think that's directionally right. People focus too much on memetic evolution as achieving some sort of cultural dominance for a meme, rather than seeing that as a form of over-fitting to temporal conditions that's unlikely to be sustained.
IMO successful evolution is intended to reach some sort of dynamic equilibrium of a complementary ecology, rather than the dominance of any single or group of factors. Evolution of (real biological) dinosaurs continually trying to get bigger due to competitive pressures is better view as a "dead-end" solution. The increase in complexity, optionality, elegance or resilience of the adjustment mechanisms are the real gains.
Perhaps the purpose of culture wars is not to produce more fitting culture per se, but to shake up the terrain for cooperation/competition. Sort of like a forest fire, revitalizing ecological niches by destroying old and allowing new spaces.
I don't think I'm concluding that culture wars are less important.
Interesting post, thank you
"More generally, the main practical reason to declare public values that differ from one’s action priorities is to show and support coalition partners."
I'm curious though why coalitions don't usually directly state that they simply value more descendants. If we know abstractly that we just want more long term evolutionary impact, wouldn't we prefer coalitions that publicly declare this?
Coalitions seem to be bonded more strongly when they agree on a sacred value, vs when they just agree to help each other.
Scared values become sacred because they foster collaboration. It’s an outcome of memetic selection. The sacred status helps maintain collaboration even when Pareto-optimal outcomes are not individually rational, such as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
We can’t _all_ have more descendants. Therefore, the honest message would be, “We value more descendants for this particular group, which, by a happy coïncidence, includes us, at the expense of everyone else”. Saying this openly doesn’t seem a good idea—or we’d see groups doing it and suceeding.
Possibly, but I think another important aspect is that our status seeking sometimes makes us align with agents that have fewer children incidentally, yet we then act as though that is the value not the by product. To use a made up example, if a population has a religious order that spends up to the first 50 years of their life celibate as they study, and tend to rise to high prominence as governmental functionaries and are generally highly respected as the wise elite, people are going to associate high status and wisdom with not having kids, no matter whether it is intentional. Some proportion of the population will not have descendants, or very few, in favor of going through the process to become high status, and many will emulate the outcome of few kids despite not going through the whole process. In a sense, it comes down to signaling "We value knowledge and wisdom the most, above having kids".
I have a feeling that, in the 90s, you could talk about the end of evolutionary history, as well. Which I always thought was very strange. So I'm personally glad to see this argument. But - perhaps you address this elsewhere - values seem like a very chancy thing for evolution to work on. At least if you're talking about genetic evolution by natural selection, which I think we are. There seems to be so much chaotic noise between a gene and a societal value, for the reasons you give in this post, and perhaps for many other reasons too.
The big selective pressure would seem to be on how much people like babies, compared to how much they like sex. And maybe also on factors which influence how much they're likely to carefully plan their own lives. Maybe people might tend to become less wild, more domestic - as it would be relatively less important that they might conceive after a one-night stand, and more important that they wouldn't be too worried about 'having no social life.'
Of course, there might be selective pressure affecting values too. But I think the collateral effects of selective pressure on our emotions would be likely to swamp any such direct effect.
...all this is provided social change isn't so fast that evolution becomes just noise. I mean if sperm donation were to become normal in society and then a cultural backlash or technological collapse stopped it, then that would play hell with any kind of evolutionary signal.
Values are memes-driven, not genes-driven, and they evolve by the rules of memetic evolution, not genetic evolution.
Robin, I've read your post on evolved values with great interest, and while I appreciate the novel ideas you present, I feel that your argument would benefit from further development and consideration of additional factors.
Firstly, the distinction you make between an agent's internal action priorities and the values presented by its "press secretary" component is intriguing, but it lacks clarity and empirical support. To strengthen your case, it would be helpful to provide more concrete evidence and examples to substantiate this claim.
Moreover, I believe that your emphasis on sacred values as a means of binding groups and signaling coalitions, while important, may oversimplify the complex processes of value formation and expression. These processes are influenced by a wide range of psychological, social, and cultural factors that warrant deeper exploration.
Additionally, I would argue that your post does not sufficiently address the critical role of power dynamics and political maneuvering in shaping the public expression of values. In situations involving power and politics, agents often strategically navigate social interactions to maximize their influence and achieve their goals, which can lead to the obfuscation of true values. However, it is important to note that genuine value expression can still occur in these contexts, particularly when agents are under close scrutiny or when the stakes are high.
I also suggest that the strategic pursuit of influence and the navigation of social interactions are not inherently detrimental to the formation and articulation of values. In some cases, these processes can lead to the refinement and expression of more inclusive values that reflect diverse perspectives, especially when there is an environment that encourages open dialogue and critical reflection.
In conclusion, while your post offers a thought-provoking perspective on the evolution of values, I believe that further theoretical refinement and empirical investigation are necessary to test the validity of your claims. A more comprehensive approach would engage with the multifaceted nature of value formation and expression, taking into account the complex interplay between individual motives, social dynamics, and the broader cultural and institutional context in which values are shaped and expressed. By doing so, we can develop a more nuanced understanding of how evolved agents navigate the strategic landscape of value expression while pursuing their long-term goals.
"lacks clarity and empirical support … concrete evidence and examples"
I link there to our book Elephant in the Brain, which has plenty of such things.
"It makes sense for agents to, somewhere inside themselves, know abstractly that they just want more long term evolutionary impact."
Perhaps it makes sense abstractly, but is unnecessary in practical terms, therefore less likely. Abstract means more removed, therefore will be less directly selected for. Usually baser, less abstract options get selected for and those brutal mechanics can wash out any more abstracted options.
Compare ideas of group selection, it's an abstract form, one can see how evolution would work on groups, but the bottleneck of the individual makes it very hard to ascertain it happening at all (otherwise why would we argue about it at all) as the selection of levels has to be all aligned, and is easily disrupted (quick thought: perhaps this is why narcissists and psychopaths are still with us, to disrupt group selection alignment).
The 'alignmen't of cells/tissues/organs/body/world/extended-phenotype is easier to encompass in an individual and be selected for because of the genetic bottleneck. (Quick thought: Perhaps this is a good base for a new definition for species of individuals.) The world/extended phenotype includes the future beyond the lifespan of the individual, but this is easily washed out by those future individuals doing their own thang. I suspect it would require multiple lifespans of the universe to select for (quick thought, is this what Teilhard de Chardin was on about??_ like the bottleneck would have to be the big bang - big crunch???)
What can be selected for is not any particular view of the world (more descendants/group selection of my identity) which are highly abstract and thus more removed from direct practical selection, but an urge "to world" by individuals, and urge to cocoon the body with social stuff— an urge to get organized, an urge to organize: an urge to should. Like the way hunger gets you to eat, but the recipe, the cuisine, is up to you in your circumstance (which includes other people).
see https://www.academia.edu/40978261/Why_we_should_an_introduction_by_memoir_into_the_implications_of_the_Egalitarian_Revolution_of_the_Paleolithic_or_Anyone_for_cake
for this argument,
and my substack which looks at the implications of this, which is currently being migrated to https://whyweshould.loofs-samorzewski.com/about.html
Currently our worlding is failing to world. If we disappear, then better luck next time dear bat-lizards.
We successfully reason using abstractions all the time, and in many important situations.
I should hope so.
But if the values of the conscious mind differ from those of the unconscious mind, then isn't there a certain inefficiency at gaining them? If I go to the store thinking I'm supposed to be getting bananas, and my UM wants pop tarts... mightn't I end up all to often with bananas?
Your conscious mind mainly sets what you say, not what you do.
So I tell everyone (including myself) that I am going for Bananas, but end up with pop-tarts?
That’s a bit taking the PR agent hypothesis too far. I can make conscious motor decisions, like when it’s not quite a good time to poop.