Discussion about this post

User's avatar
Phil Getts's avatar

Re. "meta-institutions, i.e., the institutions that shape who listens to and believes whom on what about abstract topics like the consequences of institution choices":

Just today, I gave a presentation in the Carnegie Mellon public library on print publishing versus fan-fiction, and one graph was what the distribution of views among authors should be if number of readers is proportional to talent. We know talent at complex tasks influenced by many genes is distributed normally, by the Central Limit Theorem. (Although a graph of /measured/ talent probably won't look normal, because the measuring stick is unlikely to map linearly onto the genetics. There is a troubling circularity in this, but I don't think it will change the results.) So we can construct that graph. It shows that the top 3.5% of authors, ranked by talent, get about 17% of book sales or reads or whatever.

The next graph showed the actual distribution of views among authors on a fan-fiction website. The top 3.5% of authors received half of all views. I also have graphs of the distribution of sales among authors for print publishers, and self-published authors on Amazon. They are all the same power-law distributions, which concentrate nearly all readers among a shockingly small number of authors. Because this is a power law distribution, it's dominated by the extreme outliers, and gets more biased as the number of people increases; so the concentration of wealth among just a few winners is more extreme for print publishing as a whole than for any single fan-fiction community.

We find the same power-law distribution if we look at citation counts to scientific papers, and also if we look at the populations of cities. All these things appear to have a distribution determined by "preferential attachment", which means, Them that has, gets more. The winners appear to be determined not by talent, but by the random variations in success or publicity in the early stages of people's careers.

This means that the vast majority of great writers, scientists, or whatever, are complete unknowns, and the winners won mostly by chance. It is mathematically outrageous to claim that the distribution of success in any field I have looked at is proportional to talent. (Skill, possibly, at least in professional sports, professional studio and orchestra musicians, or Olympic curling, where some people devote vastly more time to developing that skill than others, and where it is easy to evaluate performance.)

And that's /before/ we consider that the number of positions in these meta-institutions has not obviously increased rapidly, while the number of people seeking these positions increased by a factor of about 2^8 between 1880 and 1980. (I'm using the doubling time from de Solla Price's book "Little Science, Big Science, and beyond".)

Is it not strange that we have hundreds of times as many scientists as we did in Einstein's day, but fewer Einsteins?

Suppose that at some point, the winners realize they are lottery winners. How can they stay on top of the heap? If the criteria for winning changes, there is always the risk that it will /work/, and reward people with skill--in which case very few of the winners will remain winners.

The best thing that the winners can do to ensure that they remain winners is to ensure that promotion is never based on merit. Best for it to change randomly and illogically. And best to coordinate on this.

The way to coordinate people who can't communicate is to look for Schelling points, obvious good-enough policies or places that people can recognize as good when people start converging there. But if you are an evil person trying to coordinate with other evil people, you need an anti-Schelling point: a point which is so bad that no honest person would choose it.

The first anti-Schelling point I know of was the Nicene Creed, which enabled the corrupt people within the Orthodox Church to kick out the nerdy Arians who insisted on theology making sense. You had to sacrifice your reason to accept the Nicene position on the nature of the Trinity, which I think was the whole point. (Besides which, Jesus opposed the Nicene position more often and more-clearly than he supported it.) Modern anti-Schelling points include replacing prizes with grants, outlawing performance incentives in grants, eliminating standardized tests, and (in the humanities) Marxism.

So I think that our meta-institutions are now controlled by people who are strongly motivated to make sure that our methods of whom to believe and to promote, never work.

Kurtis Hingl's avatar

What, you don’t think the like button and the substack algorithm is the best possible meta institution there could be?

20 more comments...

No posts

Ready for more?