My last post discussed how to influence the distant future, using a framework focused on a random uncaring universe. This is, for example, the usual framework of most who see themselves as future-oriented “effective altruists”. They see most people and institutions as not caring much about the distant future, and they themselves as unusual exceptions in three ways: 1) their unusual concern for the distant future, 2) their unusual degree of general utilitarian altruistic concern, and 3) their attention to careful reasoning on effectiveness.
"if you consider spending on yourself now versus on your kid one generation later, you discount future returns at roughly a factor of two per generation". That is Alan Rogers theory. The problem is that it assumes senescence. Why spend on your kids, rather than your future self? Senescence. Senescence fairly simply and obviously explains most discounting. You typically don't transfer much wealth to your future self because you will be old then. Giving to your sexual offspring rather that your asexual offspring a generation might make a bit of difference if you hapen to be a species who is into parental care - but the main story about discounting is senescence, not kin selection - and senescence applies to sexual and asexual creatures aike.
Re: "one simple theory is that even though cultural evolution happens much faster than genetic evolution, genes still remain in firm control of cultural evolution".
That's often referred to as Wilson's idea that genes keep culture on a leash. However, looking at the possibility of runaway cultural evolution, surely that looks like archaic nonsense. DNA looks as though it is destined for the dustbin of history. There is no leash.
How slowly do they grow, relative to what is possible from a long-term-oriented investment? And what fraction of interest is reinvested, as opposed to spent? Most institutions that claim to have a non-fiduciary mission (e.g. charities, not corporations) spend most of what they have in a given year, and rarely accumulate giant portfolios. Yet universities are a notable exception.
The answer to your question is, yes, universities pick a strategy of not spending all their money right away, despite strong pressures to do so, to exert influence over a long period of time. I think this motivation would be pretty familiar to the trustees that make these decisions.
Haha - yes it does come across as "self-consciously/pretentiously profound". It's close to a meditation on mortality / life philosophy, but I love seeing the same idea being discovered from multiple directions.
He says that the revealed preference/ purpose of any particular war, or contest etc. ("Finite Game") is to end that contest with a preferred outcome, which gives a "title", which conveys knowledge about the fact that you won the contest to people in the future.
Culture and Religion, in contrast, are "Infinite Games", played for the purpose of continuing play. You can "win" a war or a certification exam, but has anyone ever "won" Buddhism or Hip-Hop?
I guess you're going to propose a market-based approach for how cultures can learn more quickly how to make better long-term plans, which somehow uses near-term results as a proxy for long-term results so that the learning feedback cycle can happen fast enough.
Robin, FYI: there are a few instances where you say "distract future" rather than "distant future", and your points are numbered "1, 2, 2" rather than "1, 2, 3" in the opening paragraph.
Such endowments don't grow very fast. Universities are long lived not because of their endowments but because of stickiness in their status rankings. Rocks are long lived too, but not because of anything they do. The question is; do universities pick any strategies because they result in long term benefits?
What about university endowments? A few prestigious universities seems to do a good job of exploiting the fact that interest rates exceed growth rates and thus project their influence into the future.
"if you consider spending on yourself now versus on your kid one generation later, you discount future returns at roughly a factor of two per generation". That is Alan Rogers theory. The problem is that it assumes senescence. Why spend on your kids, rather than your future self? Senescence. Senescence fairly simply and obviously explains most discounting. You typically don't transfer much wealth to your future self because you will be old then. Giving to your sexual offspring rather that your asexual offspring a generation might make a bit of difference if you hapen to be a species who is into parental care - but the main story about discounting is senescence, not kin selection - and senescence applies to sexual and asexual creatures aike.
Re: "one simple theory is that even though cultural evolution happens much faster than genetic evolution, genes still remain in firm control of cultural evolution".
That's often referred to as Wilson's idea that genes keep culture on a leash. However, looking at the possibility of runaway cultural evolution, surely that looks like archaic nonsense. DNA looks as though it is destined for the dustbin of history. There is no leash.
How slowly do they grow, relative to what is possible from a long-term-oriented investment? And what fraction of interest is reinvested, as opposed to spent? Most institutions that claim to have a non-fiduciary mission (e.g. charities, not corporations) spend most of what they have in a given year, and rarely accumulate giant portfolios. Yet universities are a notable exception.
The answer to your question is, yes, universities pick a strategy of not spending all their money right away, despite strong pressures to do so, to exert influence over a long period of time. I think this motivation would be pretty familiar to the trustees that make these decisions.
I don't mind pretentious, if they have insights to offer.
Haha - yes it does come across as "self-consciously/pretentiously profound". It's close to a meditation on mortality / life philosophy, but I love seeing the same idea being discovered from multiple directions.
I bought it and started to read it, but thought it was terrible and stopped.
He says that the revealed preference/ purpose of any particular war, or contest etc. ("Finite Game") is to end that contest with a preferred outcome, which gives a "title", which conveys knowledge about the fact that you won the contest to people in the future.
Culture and Religion, in contrast, are "Infinite Games", played for the purpose of continuing play. You can "win" a war or a certification exam, but has anyone ever "won" Buddhism or Hip-Hop?
Robin,
This idea had been developed in fascinating directions in "Finite and Infinite Games" by James P. Carse.
Specifically sections 25-31 (mini-chapters).
Have you run across this book before?
I guess you're going to propose a market-based approach for how cultures can learn more quickly how to make better long-term plans, which somehow uses near-term results as a proxy for long-term results so that the learning feedback cycle can happen fast enough.
Oops; fixed.
Robin, FYI: there are a few instances where you say "distract future" rather than "distant future", and your points are numbered "1, 2, 2" rather than "1, 2, 3" in the opening paragraph.
Such endowments don't grow very fast. Universities are long lived not because of their endowments but because of stickiness in their status rankings. Rocks are long lived too, but not because of anything they do. The question is; do universities pick any strategies because they result in long term benefits?
What about university endowments? A few prestigious universities seems to do a good job of exploiting the fact that interest rates exceed growth rates and thus project their influence into the future.