Key Gadget: Pro-Equilibria Norms

Fill a plane with chimps, and most might be dead before it lands. A plane of humans, in contrast, usually lands without injury. How do we do that?

A general answer is that humans have remarkable abilities to coordinate to achieve peaceful equilibria, wherein we each have relatively specific and peaceful expectations re others’ behavior, and yet we each also achieve many of our usual ends.

We economists typically assume game theory, wherein players coordinate via “equilibria”, which are commonly-known sets of mutual expectations and actions. But economists don’t talk much about how we actually achieve such equilibria. However, sociologists like Erving Goffman and Harvey Sacks have been working hard on this for at least a half century. Here is what I’ve figured out from reading such folk lately (including a book draft by Sam Berstler).

Humans have evolved a powerful cultural gadget in the form of this meta-norm: in each situation, expect and promote an as-specific-as-possible prosocial equilibrium.

This meta-norm suggests many more specific norms. For example, if someone starts to talk to a co-located group of people who engage him or her, then in the absence of contrary clues they all immediately assume they have common knowledge that each:

• A) clearly understands what they each say and do

• B) has full confidence in each thing they say

• C) intends the specific outcomes induced by their actions

• D) believes what others tell them

• E) pays full attention to this interaction

• F) wants and tries to help and respect them all

• G) tries to take more specific implication-rich “lines” re selves roles, & situations

• H) acts by, evaluates by, believes in, doesn’t discredit, & supports these lines

• I) if many interpretations are possible, picks usual, simplest, or unthreatening.

• J) when norms violated, tries to repair the situation to minimize future breaks

• K) does all this intuitively, smoothly, not awkwardly; explicit talk is more awkward

• L) takes actions as needed to make it easier for all to follow these norms

• M) values this interaction and following all these norms, all else equal

In other kinds of interactions, we support as many of these norms as can be relevant. For example, we attend enough to channels by which others might try to initiate interactions with us, so we could accept their bids if we felt so inclined. When walking in a crowd, we telegraph our intended direction and speed of travel.

Not all aspects of situations are seen as relevant to particular lines. In fact, we can sometimes say things contrary to our faces via “covert” channels visible to all. Such as whispers, innuendo, pauses, jokes, etc. Covert channels help when norms require that we notice how lines differ from other reality.

Breaking such norms can be done at a cost, when other goals matter more. The cost may be minimal if others see you tried to break norms minimally.

Following these norms, especially G, tends to induce moves to more specific equilibria wherein players can infer more about the actions of others, and thus better coordinate. Often our line is that we never moved, but were always there.

Successfully following these norms together is a ritual that bonds people together.

For example, saying “please do X” takes the line that they may decline the request if not so inclined, even if they in fact can’t decline. When people stand in a queue, their shared line is that their time is equally valuable. The line of a nod in response to something said is agreement with it.

It is usually easier to follow these norms via “method acting”, and “really” believing our lines, at least to a big degree. Which is why supporting lines can feel “fake”, and a lie, if evidence could be offered to discredit those lines.

Note that an implication of this key cultural gadget is that we are prone to embrace common lines presented by authorities, such as teachers, doctors, police, etc., and to ignore personal contrary evidence. Such lines could thus long sit quite far from what personal evidence suggests, and even further from best collective evidence. Even if our personal evidence is that people who go to docs more don’t get better faster than those who go less, we might still embrace the doc line that they make you healthier.

Yes, people are sometimes inclined to take on lines of social rebels, who defy authorities. But they seem nearly as inclined toward such contrarian lines when personal and collective evidence supports authorities.