Yesterday I criticized proposals by George Dvorsky and Anders Sandberg to give rights to ems by saying that random rights are bad. That is, rights limit options, which is usually bad, so those who argue for specific rights should offer specific reasons why the rights they propose are exceptional cases where limiting options helps strategically. I illustrated this principle with the example of a diner’s bill of rights.
I agree that a specific list of em rights is inappropriate at this juncture when we have no idea what rights the ems would want or need.
We can, however, move up a level of abstraction and perhaps agree that ems may be deserving of certain rights. What rights? Animal cruelty laws would be a good starting point. California Penal Code sec. 597(a), for example, generally prohibits causing an animal "needless suffering." I bet we could agree that ems should have the same right when they are capable of suffering. If they suffer from being shut off then, at least prima facie, they would have a right not to be shut off unless there was some compelling justification for doing so.
That makes more sense. I'm not a utilitarian, but if I were I'd be a summation utilitarian. If X is good, it seems logical that 2X is twice as good. And summation utilitarianism avoids any divide by zero problems. Summation utilitarianism also better matches what we'd expect an evolutionary algorithm to produce.
I could have sworn someone was arguing on another thread here that liberals are utilitarian while conservatives are deontologists
But conditional on their being utilitarians, liberals are averaging utilitarians and libertarians are summation utilitiarians. (Perhaps I'm generalizing from too small a number.) Summation utilitarianism blocs with Christian deontology in favoring pronatalism; averaging utilitarianism is neutral on birth.
Bryan Caplan is the only anarchist among the GMU lunch crew. He is also a practicing pro-natalist. I could have sworn someone was arguing on another thread here that liberals are utilitarian while conservatives are deontologists (Hanson is more utilitarian than Caplan). I would say a minority of W.E.I.R.D people advocate utilitarianism, and conservatives are more similar to the modal human. Caplan also believes in "common sense", privileging his own priors for no good reason. This is also unfortunately common. His "common sense" view that ems wouldn't be conscious leads him to disagree with Hanson on that front.
I believe Sailer identifies as a Catholic, though not a particularly religious one and has advocated the use of birth control in some circumstances. He seems to regard the Protestantizing of American Catholics as a good thing.
Explicit anti-natalists are a small minority. The one I first heard of is Chip Smith, the "Hoover Hog", who is basically a libertarian (though more focused on things like free speech than economic policy). Francois Tremblay, who has made up a kind of anti-natalist award, is a former an-cap who now identifies as an anarcho-socialist with disdain for his former fellow-travelers.
"Nope, it's not just about me: more people fighting over the same amount of resources affects everyone (negatively for most people)"
Uh. They earn those resources by adding more value to other people's lives through their own voluntary activity than those resources are worth, unless they are rent-seekers.
Comments like these make it pretty obvious that your primary problem is a simple lack of economic literacy.
I doubt there are many antinatalist democrats (or antinatalist people in general), just a lot of people who do not believe in "go forth and multiply" because they want to preserve the Earth for their older selfs and their moderately numbered descendants.
"Em enthusiasm may signal pronatalist conservatism. Another way Robin engages in very subtle signaling."
Robin has only two children, if he's talking the talk, like you say he is, he doesn't seem to be walking the walk, then again, that's not exactly unheard of in people who signal conservative ideals... I think he's mostly a closeted anarcho-capitalist.
"I trust you to make that choice for your own life more reliably than any other person, and I don't trust you one bit to make the same choice for other individuals without their consent, which is of course the whole aim of your position."
Nope, it's not just about me: more people fighting over the same amount of resources affects everyone (negatively for most people), so it becomes a public issue and most people would vote my way (if not immediately they will after watching the population grow and the quality of life decrease for a while), barring some major ideological shift.
In short reproduction would be sidelined to an emergency procedure to be used in case an EM server blows up. This single infringement of freedom (which EMs would mind far less than we would since immortal beings do not need children to replace them and carry on their legacy in the future) would prevent the Malthusian hellhole of Robin's scenarios and the general lack of freedoms that comes with it.
The topic of "antinatalism" has entered the discussion, and although it seems at first a red herring, at a subtler level there may be something like this involved in this discussion—only because of a statistical relationship Steve Sailer reported. According to Sailer, liberalism vs. conservativism or being a Democrat versus a Republican correlates .8 with fertility. (I think this applies to district predominance rather than individuals.) Conservative Republicans are more fertile. Sailer implies that a fundamental divide on natalism and antinatalism distinguishes these coalitions.
Although the natalism controversy (if it can be called that) isn't directly relevant here, it may be relevant to the signaling involved. Em enthusiasm may signal pronatalist conservatism. Another way Robin engages in very subtle signaling.
[Added 8:15] IMASBA
I doubt there are many antinatalist democrats (or antinatalist people in general),
Then rather than antinatalist read "less natalist" or perhaps nonnatalist (birth neither good or bad in itself). You imply that rightist natalism comes from religion, "Go forth and multiply." (That's in the Bible, isn't it? :)) I couldn't discover Sailer's take, which I'd find interesting because I don't think he's religious.
Every intellectually serious libertarian is an anarchist. Anarcho-capitalists experience status anxiety in politics because they practice "antinatalism." But their attraction to summative utilitarianism suggests that they may have an interest in signaling their basic conservative inclinations in practical politics. Status anxiety causes increased signaling behavior. They are, after all, part of the Right.
As to walking the walk, I have two words for you: homo hypocritus. But then, let whoever has no mote in his eye throw the first stone (re hypocrisy).
I trust you to make that choice for your own life more reliably than any other person, and I don't trust you one bit to make the same choice for other individuals without their consent, which is of course the whole aim of your position.
"You arbitrarily assume that this is factor is possible by linearly consuming more resources per capita. Even if you assume it, there is obviously going to be a limit, and you still have to choose how to spend additional resources."
If a limit to "quality of life" is reached then it does indeed become time to look at expansion, but it's doubtful that will happen (maybe EMs will derive pleasure from each EM owning a planet) and it sure as hell isn't going to happen in Robin's scenarios.
"True, but if you accept this argument, you must either follow it to Benatar's logical antinatalist conclusion"
In EM scoiety I would be an antinatalist (except in emergencies) because reproduction would serve no purpose to the living anymore. Do note that this is not because I think these new lives would have a horrible existence (to illustrate this look at my belief that controlled reproduction should be allowed after a natural disaster that destroys an EM server), it's because those alive today (and alive until the end of the universe if they are EMs) would be giving up a bit of their (potential) quality of life for no good reason (no one's getting hurt: beings that don't exist and will never exist cannot feel anything, so they can't be hurt about not existing either, it should drive you mad to believe otherwise because there will always be an infinite number that you cannot bring into existence). I think you are making it too much about what an unborn being would want instead of what purpose those living today would have for a child.
P.S. as others have pointed out on this blog: being unwilling to commit suicide =/= enjoying life. If I get my arm caught between two large boulders I may would be reluctant to cut off my arm to escape, but that doesn't mean I wouldn't rather be somewhere else than being stuck between those boulders. Similarly it's entirely possible that I wouldn't want to commit suicide when I have some hideous disease while at the same time I would not feel guilty about euthanizing someone else with the same disease if they asked me to (it's not uncommon for people to wish they had the strength to commit suicide).
"Only if they are rent-seekers. Otherwise, if they can pay for themselves, they cause positive economic externalities (or else they wouldn't be able to afford their existence). Or am I missing something?"
Yeah, you're missing the fact that a) Robin admits to the Malthusian crunch and doesn't speak of any test to determine the marginal value of a new EM, b) EM society will be resource starved and will already be so large that new individuals will barely (if at all) speed up technological progress, so rent-seeking and displacement of others will be the only way for new EMs to gather wealth.
"Ems create a Malthusian crunch. In general, additional ems lower the living conditions of other individuals."
Only if they are rent-seekers. Otherwise, if they can pay for themselves, they cause positive economic externalities (or else they wouldn't be able to afford their existence). Or am I missing something?
"A population of 1 trillion EMs living 5-times happier than today's humans could choose to use technological progress to live 50-times happier instead of increasing their number to 10 trillion"
You arbitrarily assume that this is factor is possible by linearly consuming more resources per capita. Even if you assume it, there is obviously going to be a limit, and you still have to choose how to spend additional resources.
"Their minds do not exist, so they won't miss not existing."
True, but if you accept this argument, you must either follow it to Benatar's logical antinatalist conclusion, or else symmetrically accept that they won't object to being brought into existence, which makes your whole criticism moot. Either way, your particular position seems logically untenable.
It seems a good way of measuring the positive value of bringing someone into existence would be to see if others are worse off - which is not the case for economically useful ems who can finance themselves
I'm really beginning to think you miss the point of ems (taken as a thought experiment) and that if you understood it, you wouldn't like the idea much at all. Ems create a Malthusian crunch. In general, additional ems lower the living conditions of other individuals.
...the created individual would be glad about the fact of their creation - which is all but guaranteed if they have basic rationality and reliable suicide rights and methods.
You must be importing your moral values into your concept of rationality. It's very weird to be glad you were created, if you think about it. One might almost think people who don't believe in souls should be incapable of this enthusiasm. Individuals really can't be individuated in any nonarbitrary way before they're born: is it you if one of your father's sperms that's almost identical with the actual sperm is the operative one? Joy at one's own existence doesn't survive rational scrutiny.
[Added. 1 pm] Hedonic Treader: If I can answer you here because I think I've exceeded my quota.
Only if they are rent-seekers. Otherwise, if they can pay for themselves, they cause positive economic externalities (or else they wouldn't be able to afford their existence). Or am I missing something?
As far as I can tell, positive externalities aren't relevant to paying for their existence. Theoretically, their existence must increase the total utility (barring negative externalities). So, their existence doesn't come wholly at the expense of the existing individuals but does come partly at their expense.
"The question is, relative to what? The status quo? Some arbitrary limit defined by an authority? It seems a good way of measuring the positive value of bringing someone into existence would be to see if others are worse off - which is not the case for economically useful ems who can finance themselves"
Being able to finance themselves is not a good measure, it could simply mean the new EM displaces others. If there's a high probability that creating a new batch of EMs will increase total computational resources by more than the current average per capita consumption of computational resources multiplied by the number of new EMs then that would justify creating new EMs. But that's unlikely: natural resources would limit computational resources long before the number of EMs maintaining and designing servers will.
"I am generally skeptical about paternalistic arguments that override such self-determination"
I'm skeptical about even thinking of the self-determination of beings that do not exist yet. Their minds do not exist, so they won't miss not existing. Also, it's not just about the new beings, it's also about the survivors of the previous generation (which could be everyone, in an EM society) that have to live in the future too.
Reproduction itself becomes moot in an EM society: there's no urge anymore because EMs don't die of old age and there are no accidental pregnancies anymore either. Reproduction could be relegated to an emergency protocol in case an EM server is destroyed by a natural disaster. Another major difference is that EMs can't reduce their number significantly without killing, while humans can just have less babies and watch old people die to reduce the number of humans without any killing, therefore EMs have to think twice before increasing their number.
A population of 1 trillion EMs living 5-times happier than today's humans could choose to use technological progress to live 50-times happier instead of increasing their number to 10 trillion (or even 200 trillion: Robin accepts a decrease in quality of life for most individuals). It is my contention that most humans would choose the former option and most EMs would too, unless they adopted a radical new ideology that says increasing the number of beings that get to exist before the end of the universe is a moral goal, that they should feel guilty when they do not multiply (the ideology Robin thinks they will adopt), this must clash with unfettered capitalism (which Robin says they will have as their economic system).
You're making many claims at once, some I agree with and some I don't. One point of contention is your apparently selective antinatalism that applies only to populations of "such numbers that the living will suffer a loss in quality of life".
The question is, relative to what? The status quo? Some arbitrary limit defined by an authority? It seems a good way of measuring the positive value of bringing someone into existence would be to see if others are worse off - which is not the case for economically useful ems who can finance themselves - and if the created individual would be glad about the fact of their creation - which is all but guaranteed if they have basic rationality and reliable suicide rights and methods.
If life is voluntary, and the created individual is not a rent-seeker, how could their creation not be an improvement?
I am generally skeptical about paternalistic arguments that override such self-determination, because I trust the benevolence and rationality of paternalists less than the self-interest and (bounded) rationality of the individuals themselves.
Ironically, aggressive paternalism restricting suicide rights is one of the reasons why coming into existence can actually be quite a severe harm. I just don't see why your position is any better. It is just as authoritarian and non-consensual and doesn't rely on the natural filter of voluntary trade-offs.
I agree that a specific list of em rights is inappropriate at this juncture when we have no idea what rights the ems would want or need.
We can, however, move up a level of abstraction and perhaps agree that ems may be deserving of certain rights. What rights? Animal cruelty laws would be a good starting point. California Penal Code sec. 597(a), for example, generally prohibits causing an animal "needless suffering." I bet we could agree that ems should have the same right when they are capable of suffering. If they suffer from being shut off then, at least prima facie, they would have a right not to be shut off unless there was some compelling justification for doing so.
That makes more sense. I'm not a utilitarian, but if I were I'd be a summation utilitarian. If X is good, it seems logical that 2X is twice as good. And summation utilitarianism avoids any divide by zero problems. Summation utilitarianism also better matches what we'd expect an evolutionary algorithm to produce.
I could have sworn someone was arguing on another thread here that liberals are utilitarian while conservatives are deontologists
But conditional on their being utilitarians, liberals are averaging utilitarians and libertarians are summation utilitiarians. (Perhaps I'm generalizing from too small a number.) Summation utilitarianism blocs with Christian deontology in favoring pronatalism; averaging utilitarianism is neutral on birth.
Bryan Caplan is the only anarchist among the GMU lunch crew. He is also a practicing pro-natalist. I could have sworn someone was arguing on another thread here that liberals are utilitarian while conservatives are deontologists (Hanson is more utilitarian than Caplan). I would say a minority of W.E.I.R.D people advocate utilitarianism, and conservatives are more similar to the modal human. Caplan also believes in "common sense", privileging his own priors for no good reason. This is also unfortunately common. His "common sense" view that ems wouldn't be conscious leads him to disagree with Hanson on that front.
I believe Sailer identifies as a Catholic, though not a particularly religious one and has advocated the use of birth control in some circumstances. He seems to regard the Protestantizing of American Catholics as a good thing.
Explicit anti-natalists are a small minority. The one I first heard of is Chip Smith, the "Hoover Hog", who is basically a libertarian (though more focused on things like free speech than economic policy). Francois Tremblay, who has made up a kind of anti-natalist award, is a former an-cap who now identifies as an anarcho-socialist with disdain for his former fellow-travelers.
"Nope, it's not just about me: more people fighting over the same amount of resources affects everyone (negatively for most people)"
Uh. They earn those resources by adding more value to other people's lives through their own voluntary activity than those resources are worth, unless they are rent-seekers.
Comments like these make it pretty obvious that your primary problem is a simple lack of economic literacy.
I doubt there are many antinatalist democrats (or antinatalist people in general), just a lot of people who do not believe in "go forth and multiply" because they want to preserve the Earth for their older selfs and their moderately numbered descendants.
"Em enthusiasm may signal pronatalist conservatism. Another way Robin engages in very subtle signaling."
Robin has only two children, if he's talking the talk, like you say he is, he doesn't seem to be walking the walk, then again, that's not exactly unheard of in people who signal conservative ideals... I think he's mostly a closeted anarcho-capitalist.
And I think I've reached my quotum for a while.
"I trust you to make that choice for your own life more reliably than any other person, and I don't trust you one bit to make the same choice for other individuals without their consent, which is of course the whole aim of your position."
Nope, it's not just about me: more people fighting over the same amount of resources affects everyone (negatively for most people), so it becomes a public issue and most people would vote my way (if not immediately they will after watching the population grow and the quality of life decrease for a while), barring some major ideological shift.
In short reproduction would be sidelined to an emergency procedure to be used in case an EM server blows up. This single infringement of freedom (which EMs would mind far less than we would since immortal beings do not need children to replace them and carry on their legacy in the future) would prevent the Malthusian hellhole of Robin's scenarios and the general lack of freedoms that comes with it.
The topic of "antinatalism" has entered the discussion, and although it seems at first a red herring, at a subtler level there may be something like this involved in this discussion—only because of a statistical relationship Steve Sailer reported. According to Sailer, liberalism vs. conservativism or being a Democrat versus a Republican correlates .8 with fertility. (I think this applies to district predominance rather than individuals.) Conservative Republicans are more fertile. Sailer implies that a fundamental divide on natalism and antinatalism distinguishes these coalitions.
Although the natalism controversy (if it can be called that) isn't directly relevant here, it may be relevant to the signaling involved. Em enthusiasm may signal pronatalist conservatism. Another way Robin engages in very subtle signaling.
[Added 8:15] IMASBA
I doubt there are many antinatalist democrats (or antinatalist people in general),
Then rather than antinatalist read "less natalist" or perhaps nonnatalist (birth neither good or bad in itself). You imply that rightist natalism comes from religion, "Go forth and multiply." (That's in the Bible, isn't it? :)) I couldn't discover Sailer's take, which I'd find interesting because I don't think he's religious.
Every intellectually serious libertarian is an anarchist. Anarcho-capitalists experience status anxiety in politics because they practice "antinatalism." But their attraction to summative utilitarianism suggests that they may have an interest in signaling their basic conservative inclinations in practical politics. Status anxiety causes increased signaling behavior. They are, after all, part of the Right.
As to walking the walk, I have two words for you: homo hypocritus. But then, let whoever has no mote in his eye throw the first stone (re hypocrisy).
I trust you to make that choice for your own life more reliably than any other person, and I don't trust you one bit to make the same choice for other individuals without their consent, which is of course the whole aim of your position.
"You arbitrarily assume that this is factor is possible by linearly consuming more resources per capita. Even if you assume it, there is obviously going to be a limit, and you still have to choose how to spend additional resources."
If a limit to "quality of life" is reached then it does indeed become time to look at expansion, but it's doubtful that will happen (maybe EMs will derive pleasure from each EM owning a planet) and it sure as hell isn't going to happen in Robin's scenarios.
"True, but if you accept this argument, you must either follow it to Benatar's logical antinatalist conclusion"
In EM scoiety I would be an antinatalist (except in emergencies) because reproduction would serve no purpose to the living anymore. Do note that this is not because I think these new lives would have a horrible existence (to illustrate this look at my belief that controlled reproduction should be allowed after a natural disaster that destroys an EM server), it's because those alive today (and alive until the end of the universe if they are EMs) would be giving up a bit of their (potential) quality of life for no good reason (no one's getting hurt: beings that don't exist and will never exist cannot feel anything, so they can't be hurt about not existing either, it should drive you mad to believe otherwise because there will always be an infinite number that you cannot bring into existence). I think you are making it too much about what an unborn being would want instead of what purpose those living today would have for a child.
P.S. as others have pointed out on this blog: being unwilling to commit suicide =/= enjoying life. If I get my arm caught between two large boulders I may would be reluctant to cut off my arm to escape, but that doesn't mean I wouldn't rather be somewhere else than being stuck between those boulders. Similarly it's entirely possible that I wouldn't want to commit suicide when I have some hideous disease while at the same time I would not feel guilty about euthanizing someone else with the same disease if they asked me to (it's not uncommon for people to wish they had the strength to commit suicide).
"Only if they are rent-seekers. Otherwise, if they can pay for themselves, they cause positive economic externalities (or else they wouldn't be able to afford their existence). Or am I missing something?"
Yeah, you're missing the fact that a) Robin admits to the Malthusian crunch and doesn't speak of any test to determine the marginal value of a new EM, b) EM society will be resource starved and will already be so large that new individuals will barely (if at all) speed up technological progress, so rent-seeking and displacement of others will be the only way for new EMs to gather wealth.
"Ems create a Malthusian crunch. In general, additional ems lower the living conditions of other individuals."
Only if they are rent-seekers. Otherwise, if they can pay for themselves, they cause positive economic externalities (or else they wouldn't be able to afford their existence). Or am I missing something?
"A population of 1 trillion EMs living 5-times happier than today's humans could choose to use technological progress to live 50-times happier instead of increasing their number to 10 trillion"
You arbitrarily assume that this is factor is possible by linearly consuming more resources per capita. Even if you assume it, there is obviously going to be a limit, and you still have to choose how to spend additional resources.
"Their minds do not exist, so they won't miss not existing."
True, but if you accept this argument, you must either follow it to Benatar's logical antinatalist conclusion, or else symmetrically accept that they won't object to being brought into existence, which makes your whole criticism moot. Either way, your particular position seems logically untenable.
It seems a good way of measuring the positive value of bringing someone into existence would be to see if others are worse off - which is not the case for economically useful ems who can finance themselves
I'm really beginning to think you miss the point of ems (taken as a thought experiment) and that if you understood it, you wouldn't like the idea much at all. Ems create a Malthusian crunch. In general, additional ems lower the living conditions of other individuals.
...the created individual would be glad about the fact of their creation - which is all but guaranteed if they have basic rationality and reliable suicide rights and methods.
You must be importing your moral values into your concept of rationality. It's very weird to be glad you were created, if you think about it. One might almost think people who don't believe in souls should be incapable of this enthusiasm. Individuals really can't be individuated in any nonarbitrary way before they're born: is it you if one of your father's sperms that's almost identical with the actual sperm is the operative one? Joy at one's own existence doesn't survive rational scrutiny.
[Added. 1 pm] Hedonic Treader: If I can answer you here because I think I've exceeded my quota.
Only if they are rent-seekers. Otherwise, if they can pay for themselves, they cause positive economic externalities (or else they wouldn't be able to afford their existence). Or am I missing something?
As far as I can tell, positive externalities aren't relevant to paying for their existence. Theoretically, their existence must increase the total utility (barring negative externalities). So, their existence doesn't come wholly at the expense of the existing individuals but does come partly at their expense.
"The question is, relative to what? The status quo? Some arbitrary limit defined by an authority? It seems a good way of measuring the positive value of bringing someone into existence would be to see if others are worse off - which is not the case for economically useful ems who can finance themselves"
Being able to finance themselves is not a good measure, it could simply mean the new EM displaces others. If there's a high probability that creating a new batch of EMs will increase total computational resources by more than the current average per capita consumption of computational resources multiplied by the number of new EMs then that would justify creating new EMs. But that's unlikely: natural resources would limit computational resources long before the number of EMs maintaining and designing servers will.
"I am generally skeptical about paternalistic arguments that override such self-determination"
I'm skeptical about even thinking of the self-determination of beings that do not exist yet. Their minds do not exist, so they won't miss not existing. Also, it's not just about the new beings, it's also about the survivors of the previous generation (which could be everyone, in an EM society) that have to live in the future too.
Reproduction itself becomes moot in an EM society: there's no urge anymore because EMs don't die of old age and there are no accidental pregnancies anymore either. Reproduction could be relegated to an emergency protocol in case an EM server is destroyed by a natural disaster. Another major difference is that EMs can't reduce their number significantly without killing, while humans can just have less babies and watch old people die to reduce the number of humans without any killing, therefore EMs have to think twice before increasing their number.
A population of 1 trillion EMs living 5-times happier than today's humans could choose to use technological progress to live 50-times happier instead of increasing their number to 10 trillion (or even 200 trillion: Robin accepts a decrease in quality of life for most individuals). It is my contention that most humans would choose the former option and most EMs would too, unless they adopted a radical new ideology that says increasing the number of beings that get to exist before the end of the universe is a moral goal, that they should feel guilty when they do not multiply (the ideology Robin thinks they will adopt), this must clash with unfettered capitalism (which Robin says they will have as their economic system).
You're making many claims at once, some I agree with and some I don't. One point of contention is your apparently selective antinatalism that applies only to populations of "such numbers that the living will suffer a loss in quality of life".
The question is, relative to what? The status quo? Some arbitrary limit defined by an authority? It seems a good way of measuring the positive value of bringing someone into existence would be to see if others are worse off - which is not the case for economically useful ems who can finance themselves - and if the created individual would be glad about the fact of their creation - which is all but guaranteed if they have basic rationality and reliable suicide rights and methods.
If life is voluntary, and the created individual is not a rent-seeker, how could their creation not be an improvement?
I am generally skeptical about paternalistic arguments that override such self-determination, because I trust the benevolence and rationality of paternalists less than the self-interest and (bounded) rationality of the individuals themselves.
Ironically, aggressive paternalism restricting suicide rights is one of the reasons why coming into existence can actually be quite a severe harm. I just don't see why your position is any better. It is just as authoritarian and non-consensual and doesn't rely on the natural filter of voluntary trade-offs.