Bryan Caplan argues the public has very poorly informed political beliefs, best described as "irrational," and his main evidence is that they are strong and yet differ greatly and systematically from beliefs of professional economists, after correcting for ideology, income, and other characteristics. Dan Klein and Tyler Cowen complain that, compared to most economists, Bryan’s beliefs unusually far from median economists’ beliefs.
Shakespeare, increasing entropy is an extremely standard well-established physics result. This is not to claim it could not possibly be in error, but surely this puts the burden on you to at least offer an argument why that consensus is mistaken. And the comments of this post is not exactly the right forum for presenting such a dramatic result.
Even if you could get five billion people to agree on something, it could still be weaker than a strong expert opinion.
Five billion strong 'expert' opinions are weaker than a single piece of direct data. It's the nature of opinion.
What makes the experts' judgements valuable is the data underlying them. If the data leads to their conclusions, their judgements are valuable. If not, they're not. Beliefs are - or should be - reflections of the evidence. They are not evidence in themselves.
If the beliefs of people who are slightly more likely to be correct than wrong count as evidence, then I can control what conclusions you reach simply by getting a sufficiently large number of people to reach consensus. Any required amount of 'evidence' can be constructed at will.
I didn't say it couldn't be a really, really tiny amount of evidence. Even if you could get five billion people to agree on something, it could still be weaker than a strong expert opinion. Besides, if I know you're engaging in mass deception, I may decide that most people's opinions actually are unrelated to the truth.
In reality, we recognize that some kinds of evidence are more primary than others, and there's a certain hierarchy at work. Primary evidence trumps any amount of secondary, and secondary trumps any amount of tertiary.
In principle, if someone is even a tiny bit more likely to hold true than false beliefs, their beliefs are evidence.
If the beliefs of people who are slightly more likely to be correct than wrong count as evidence, then I can control what conclusions you reach simply by getting a sufficiently large number of people to reach consensus. Any required amount of 'evidence' can be constructed at will.
In reality, we recognize that some kinds of evidence are more primary than others, and there's a certain hierarchy at work. Primary evidence trumps any amount of secondary, and secondary trumps any amount of tertiary.
Who are you going to believe? The experts? Or your lying eyes?
The condition of the universe after the big bang isindeed a problem for the theory of increasing entropy.Since that early state of high entropy, what we canobserve of the universe has declined in entropy. Thereis no evidence of which I am aware that entropy is notcontinuing to decline. If you have such evidence,please let me know what it is.
Back when Bryan "LuckyGenes" Caplan was all the rage for his ivory tower giggling at the masses of Americans who "are irrational" about economics owing to their silly empathies such as those that would spare their non-productive grandparents the ice-floe, I was one of the few who called him out on it.
I pointed out that Caplan's book had nothing to do with people being misinformed about economics and everything to do with their wanting to eat - even if allowing them to starve WOULD produce really cost-effective fertilizer for the wheat-fields. My cries regarding this emperor's non-existent raiments were considered ludicrous or silly. "Caplan is no ideologue", they said. "He's simply an honest-broker academic!"
Fools.
Caplan writes non-hysterically about being "rational", "factual", non-xenophobic and all sorts of other high-standing qualities and the masses of pseudo-intellectuals trample all over each other in their attempts to jump aboard his "We're Smart!" Express.
Well, some of Caplan's fellow economists have called him on his charade of claiming to represent the views of economists at large and he's come out with a few sentences which may shed some light on the policies that he advocates. They may or may not be YOUR policies, but they're hardly in line with the moral tastes of your average academic, American or human being.
From the jackass's mouth:
I am also well outside the mainstream of American values. Consequences aside, I'm a staunch libertarian. I'm extremely meritocratic. I disagree with the aims, not just the methods, of egalitarianism. I look down on patriotism and piety of every kind. The list goes on.So suppose my book led the world to reject anti-market, anti-foreign, make-work, and pessimistic bias in all their forms, with all their empty promises? How much would policy change as a result? My best guess is that policy would be a little less libertarian than Milton Friedman would have wanted. We'd still have substantial redistribution to relatively poor Americans and the American elderly - much of it funded by surtaxes on guest workers. We'd see educational vouchers, not the separation of school and state (my first choice); and those vouchers might not even be means-tested. In short, we'd have big changes, but I'd still have plenty to complain about.That's me.
Yes, that IS him. That's EXACTLY him.
My original articles on this blog regarding Caplan and his fellow travelers are here. They're worth reading:
The opinion of a large body of people and that of an individual should be treated very differently. Those of a large body of people are unlikely to follow from a consistent logical position. In fact, the rigorous application of logic tends to result in a higher variability in opinion, which will tend to cancel out, compared to a common bias - the Miracle of Aggregation's evil twin operates opposite the desirable direction, stripping out the logic, leaving more bias.
Another angle: it is very unlikely that for some given issue that the experts are wrong and the general population is right because it is unlikely that the general population would have a specific insight that the experts are either unaware of or unable or unwilling to incorporate, while it would be more credible that the experts are wrong and a particular individual is right because of some specific insight.
In a nutshell: disagreement with experts is strong evidence against crowds, but not so much against specific persons.
The question of why the initial conditions of the universe had very low entropy is an acknowledged open problem, if that's what you're talking about. Your intentional vagueness gives me little confidence in the strength of your position.
Yes. You are missing something as blindinglyobvious as the difference in conditions between thebig bang and the present. Easy to miss becauseexperts have been telling you the opposite of whatWilson and Penzias made obvious.
Interesting that you agree with all my points but notwith what I might surmise you think mygeneralization is. (Or did you just not list yourdisagreements?)
Charles Mackay wrote the book "ExtraordinaryPopular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds" Ifmy IQ were as much higher than mine as youraccomplishments lead me to believe yours is, I wouldbe tempted to write "Extraordinary AcademicDelusions and the Madness of Experts." EvenEinstein would have an entry. And, because it hasalways been thus, the book would have many errorsof its own. And all-too-likely a madness or delusionor two.
I am not saying I think experts are always wrong,just often enough and sometimes obviously enoughthat we will all find times when total disagreement istotally justified (even though we won’t always beright – even though some of us will never be right.)
Robin Hanson says: "Shakespeare, increasing entropyis an extremely standard well-established physicsresult."
Robin,As is so often the case, you are right.
Which is why I thought it might be appropriate for adiscussion of disagreements with experts.
John
P.S. Perhaps an appropriate forum would be my ad hochotmail.com e-mail account EntropicConundrums .See you there?
Shakespeare, increasing entropy is an extremely standard well-established physics result. This is not to claim it could not possibly be in error, but surely this puts the burden on you to at least offer an argument why that consensus is mistaken. And the comments of this post is not exactly the right forum for presenting such a dramatic result.
As I asked of Nick Tarleton I ask of you:If you have evidence that the universe isincreasing in disorder, please let us knowwhat the evidence is.
Um... basic thermodynamics? Logic? Hubble's Constant?
Caledonian,
As I asked of Nick Tarleton I ask of you:If you have evidence that the universe isincreasing in disorder, please let us knowwhat the evidence is.
John
every member of the crowd is a specific person.
So?
Even if you could get five billion people to agree on something, it could still be weaker than a strong expert opinion.
Five billion strong 'expert' opinions are weaker than a single piece of direct data. It's the nature of opinion.
What makes the experts' judgements valuable is the data underlying them. If the data leads to their conclusions, their judgements are valuable. If not, they're not. Beliefs are - or should be - reflections of the evidence. They are not evidence in themselves.
Yes, yes, I've read it all before.
If the beliefs of people who are slightly more likely to be correct than wrong count as evidence, then I can control what conclusions you reach simply by getting a sufficiently large number of people to reach consensus. Any required amount of 'evidence' can be constructed at will.
I didn't say it couldn't be a really, really tiny amount of evidence. Even if you could get five billion people to agree on something, it could still be weaker than a strong expert opinion. Besides, if I know you're engaging in mass deception, I may decide that most people's opinions actually are unrelated to the truth.
In reality, we recognize that some kinds of evidence are more primary than others, and there's a certain hierarchy at work. Primary evidence trumps any amount of secondary, and secondary trumps any amount of tertiary.
Read:http://yudkowsky.net/bayes/...http://yudkowsky.net/bayes/...
Um... the universe has been increasing in disorder, which in informal speech is described as an *increase* in entropy, not a decrease.
In principle, if someone is even a tiny bit more likely to hold true than false beliefs, their beliefs are evidence.
If the beliefs of people who are slightly more likely to be correct than wrong count as evidence, then I can control what conclusions you reach simply by getting a sufficiently large number of people to reach consensus. Any required amount of 'evidence' can be constructed at will.
In reality, we recognize that some kinds of evidence are more primary than others, and there's a certain hierarchy at work. Primary evidence trumps any amount of secondary, and secondary trumps any amount of tertiary.
Who are you going to believe? The experts? Or your lying eyes?
Nick Tarleton,
The condition of the universe after the big bang isindeed a problem for the theory of increasing entropy.Since that early state of high entropy, what we canobserve of the universe has declined in entropy. Thereis no evidence of which I am aware that entropy is notcontinuing to decline. If you have such evidence,please let me know what it is.
John
Roy, every member of the crowd is a specific person.
I unpublished an insulting argument-free comment by mnuez.
Yes, Bryan Caplan IS a cold-blooded asshole
Back when Bryan "LuckyGenes" Caplan was all the rage for his ivory tower giggling at the masses of Americans who "are irrational" about economics owing to their silly empathies such as those that would spare their non-productive grandparents the ice-floe, I was one of the few who called him out on it.
I pointed out that Caplan's book had nothing to do with people being misinformed about economics and everything to do with their wanting to eat - even if allowing them to starve WOULD produce really cost-effective fertilizer for the wheat-fields. My cries regarding this emperor's non-existent raiments were considered ludicrous or silly. "Caplan is no ideologue", they said. "He's simply an honest-broker academic!"
Fools.
Caplan writes non-hysterically about being "rational", "factual", non-xenophobic and all sorts of other high-standing qualities and the masses of pseudo-intellectuals trample all over each other in their attempts to jump aboard his "We're Smart!" Express.
Well, some of Caplan's fellow economists have called him on his charade of claiming to represent the views of economists at large and he's come out with a few sentences which may shed some light on the policies that he advocates. They may or may not be YOUR policies, but they're hardly in line with the moral tastes of your average academic, American or human being.
From the jackass's mouth:
I am also well outside the mainstream of American values. Consequences aside, I'm a staunch libertarian. I'm extremely meritocratic. I disagree with the aims, not just the methods, of egalitarianism. I look down on patriotism and piety of every kind. The list goes on.So suppose my book led the world to reject anti-market, anti-foreign, make-work, and pessimistic bias in all their forms, with all their empty promises? How much would policy change as a result? My best guess is that policy would be a little less libertarian than Milton Friedman would have wanted. We'd still have substantial redistribution to relatively poor Americans and the American elderly - much of it funded by surtaxes on guest workers. We'd see educational vouchers, not the separation of school and state (my first choice); and those vouchers might not even be means-tested. In short, we'd have big changes, but I'd still have plenty to complain about.That's me.
Yes, that IS him. That's EXACTLY him.
My original articles on this blog regarding Caplan and his fellow travelers are here. They're worth reading:
The Economist and You
The Conversation Continues
mnuezwww.mnuez.blogspot.com
The opinion of a large body of people and that of an individual should be treated very differently. Those of a large body of people are unlikely to follow from a consistent logical position. In fact, the rigorous application of logic tends to result in a higher variability in opinion, which will tend to cancel out, compared to a common bias - the Miracle of Aggregation's evil twin operates opposite the desirable direction, stripping out the logic, leaving more bias.
Another angle: it is very unlikely that for some given issue that the experts are wrong and the general population is right because it is unlikely that the general population would have a specific insight that the experts are either unaware of or unable or unwilling to incorporate, while it would be more credible that the experts are wrong and a particular individual is right because of some specific insight.
In a nutshell: disagreement with experts is strong evidence against crowds, but not so much against specific persons.
The question of why the initial conditions of the universe had very low entropy is an acknowledged open problem, if that's what you're talking about. Your intentional vagueness gives me little confidence in the strength of your position.
Nick Tarleton,
Yes. You are missing something as blindinglyobvious as the difference in conditions between thebig bang and the present. Easy to miss becauseexperts have been telling you the opposite of whatWilson and Penzias made obvious.
John
Robin,
Interesting that you agree with all my points but notwith what I might surmise you think mygeneralization is. (Or did you just not list yourdisagreements?)
Charles Mackay wrote the book "ExtraordinaryPopular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds" Ifmy IQ were as much higher than mine as youraccomplishments lead me to believe yours is, I wouldbe tempted to write "Extraordinary AcademicDelusions and the Madness of Experts." EvenEinstein would have an entry. And, because it hasalways been thus, the book would have many errorsof its own. And all-too-likely a madness or delusionor two.
I am not saying I think experts are always wrong,just often enough and sometimes obviously enoughthat we will all find times when total disagreement istotally justified (even though we won’t always beright – even though some of us will never be right.)
John