Humans have long used norms to great advantage to coordinate behavior. Each norm requires or prohibits certain behavior in certain situations, and the norm system requires that others who notice norm violations call attention to those violations and coordinate to discourage or punish them.
Plato explicitly endorses a regime with inadequate norm enforcement in Republic. Possibly Robin is thinking more of romantics than idealists, though, as at least the exemplary idealists tend to acknowledge this problem.
I think most are pragmatists, they know enforcement is important and valuable, but also know it is costly and hard, and it is a question of balancing believed desired norms against enforcement costs to get the most bang for the buck. They believe we are all better off if we follow them though some can do better violating them, but that we would all be worse off if no one does, and the costs of extreme enforcement are such that it is the same as them not existing at all. Instead of fixed policy, we have to adapt, strengthening enforcement when cheating costs becomes too great and relaxing it when enforcement costs become too great. Criminals adapt and so must we. The imperfect is not the enemy of the perfect, it is the reality.
You make a good point. Moral persuasion by one's fellow grunts can work. Some new tenants moved into the building where I lived years ago. They were blasting the stereo at all hours. They were always friendly in the elevator, etc. So one day I said to them, "You know, it's really very loud and I doubt that any of your other neighbors appreciate it either." To my surprise, the noise stopped, completely. And they remained as friendly as ever. As did I, of course, if not more so.
But there are alway going to be people who are immune to such suasion. And it seems to me that such suasion is actually facilitated by the idea that there is a Higher Authority who might be appealed to if the distress of a fellow grunt is inadequate.
You're right to observe that the Higher Authority might rule against you, for a variety of reasons, ranging from (1) "I'm sorry, but I think they're right and you're wrong"; through (2) "Look, I just don't have time to deal with minutiae like this; I have bigger fish to fry"; all the way to (3) "He has more power than you do, and though you're right, I'm not going to compromise my chances of advancement by advocating your cause."
Ya pays yer money and takes yer cherce. If you give those in power more ability to punish, that will in fact lead to greater enforcement; but not always in the direction you might prefer. In my example, a Higher Authority (the management agency) might have said, "The way we see it, these people have a right to do whatever they want in their own apartment." The problem is that their norm isn't necessary the norm you would prefer to see enforced.
My own objection was that you used Idealist to mean what I think of as Cynic/Panglossian and vice-versa.
I'm not certain that most people would view it the way I do, but to me it seemed that your definition didn't correspond to, and actually was the opposite of, the common use of the term. I wonder whether you might have picked a term less conditioned by common parlance.
I think Panglossian comes close: one who thinks, "Hey, we got laws and regulations, so what more do we need? Everything is OK."
Or Neumanists: "What, me worry?"
I think most people would consider folks with that view to be cynics of some sort.
Consider the case where I (a low status/power grunt) see grunt #2 violating a norm, and say "hey, stop that." If our boss finds out about the norm violation + my weak attempt to enforce it, which of us is going to get in trouble?If it's them, that is much greater enforcement of the norm than if it's me - regardless of how much power the boss has: where that power is directed matters.
Many of you are reacting to my use of the word "idealist", which is vague and has many associations. I intended to be *defining* the word in this context via the words I gave after my first use.
Echoing Vassar, I can't think of many examples of idealists who think norm enforcement is easy for current norms. One might think of idealists in two categories here, each split into two more.
Category one are idealists whose ideal is aligned with current explicitly endorsed (but perhaps not enforced) norms. They think we should better abide by (some of) those norms, perhaps make those norms stronger. This group usually thinks (as far as I can tell) that norm enforcement is difficult/expensive but necessary/important, we may call them realistic idealists. There is also a small subcategory we might call naive idealists, who do not understand why we cannot simply enforce such norms.
Realistic idealists rarely aid cheaters. The opposite is the case - they advocate for stronger enforcement. A naive idealist might be making the mistake of thinking enforcement is easy or unnecessary, and thus might in effect aid cheaters. But in general, idealists here tend to be helpful. Contrast this with cynics, who essentially advocate for giving up on norms or norm enforcement in practice, as hopeless or not practical.
The other group are idealists who think we should have different norms. We can call one group utopians, who think that their alternate norms would be easy to enforce - they would lead to cheating if they won, but they don't aid current cheaters (example: an actual communist making this mistake.) Then there are those who are hold different ideals but understand enforcement would be hard, which would lead to cheating insofar as people try to cheat any norm, but they would usually want more norm enforcement in their new world, not less (e.g. most advocates for forms of social justice).
In the Moral Mazes case, we see a situation where (as Vassar says) power to enforce norms has effectively fallen fully into the hands of cheaters. A cynic would give up on effective norm enforcement entirely in that situation. An idealist might call for greater enforcement, with varying success - giving those in power more ability to punish would simply make things worse, but other interventions might help.
FWIW, I also find your characterization of idealists strange. I think of idealists as people who find the world bad in some ways but think it can be made better by enforcing the norms they themselves believe in. Examples are socialists, libertarians, and evangelicals and religious reformers of all faiths.
They tend to work hard trying to get their favorite norms established and enforced, usually through attempts to organize mass movements.
I think idealists (like everyone else) tend to overestimate the effectiveness of their own efforts; but I've not heard any of them argue that "it is good if people overestimate the effectiveness of norm enforcement."
Then there are cynics and panglossians. Both believe that the world is as good as it possibly can be. They differ in whether they think that state is good or bad; but that view has no practical distinguishing consequences.
Yes, that is my point. Such moralists aren't merely self-sacrificing, in fact they often expect to gain status, political capital and sometimes material transfers in return for their moralism. Preaching self-sacrifice as a socially mandatory norm is other-sacrifice.
I only support norms that benefit me and the people who've net-benefited me. I don't have a fundamental problem with sacrifice, e.g. I place no value on animal suffering since nonhuman animals lack the intelligence to reciprocate the rights norm and therefore we don't have to give them rights.
I don't recall ever seeing idealists overestimating the effectiveness of norm enforcement. Certainly, there are people who overestimate norm enforcement, but I would expect them to be called 'cowards' or 'suckers' not 'idealists'. They also aid cheaters.
My impression though is that idealists correctly intuit that people feel better when they believe that norms don't need much external enforcement because good norms are somewhat self-enforcing in the long term (e.g. don't eat so much candy) or feel better to obey than to violate (e.g. do the best work you can do, don't just try to get an A).
There are also Moralists, who overestimate norm desirability, and usually also the desirability of punishment. As far as I can tell, they do more harm at almost every frequently observed margin than cheaters. The desirability of punishment is dependent on both how frequently norms are broken and on how frequently and how badly norms tend to be wrong. It also depends on the typical consequences of punishment, which include more obedience to norms in some situations, but more effective coordination to oppose detecting cheaters in other situations.
In the situation described by Moral Mazes more punishment is undesirable. Coalitions of routine cheaters are firmly in charge. By increasing punishment, one increases the power of the most aggressive cheaters to distribute punishment at their discretion. This doesn't work out well.
Agreed that idealists aid cheaters. Also, moderate idealists, it seems to me, help more aggressive cheaters while hurting less aggressive cheaters. Unfortunately, this post seems to me to be moderately idealistic.
Sociopolitical norms, like Confucian China's, are 2200 years old. They're baked into the culture, its language and, almost, its DNA.
They're a weak force at the individual level yet, at the whole society level, they're remarkably effective. I imagine that there's a vast literature on this, but I have not seen much in English.
Of course, many social norms aren't actually in our mutual self-interest. Moralism doesn't just help coordinate against cheaters, it can also demand self-sacrifice for abstract ideals and non-reciprocators that aren't in our mutual self-interest. Those are the norms I would prefer not to be enforced at all. Since people can win moral status games by preaching such self-sacrifice norms, e.g. vegans denouncing meat-eaters as morally inferior, we either need more hypocricy in enforcing those norms, or more effort to win debates against those moralists to denormalize their demands for self-sacrifice. The point being that norm-enforcement is a double-edged sword from the perspective of our mutual self-interest.
Plato explicitly endorses a regime with inadequate norm enforcement in Republic. Possibly Robin is thinking more of romantics than idealists, though, as at least the exemplary idealists tend to acknowledge this problem.
I think most are pragmatists, they know enforcement is important and valuable, but also know it is costly and hard, and it is a question of balancing believed desired norms against enforcement costs to get the most bang for the buck. They believe we are all better off if we follow them though some can do better violating them, but that we would all be worse off if no one does, and the costs of extreme enforcement are such that it is the same as them not existing at all. Instead of fixed policy, we have to adapt, strengthening enforcement when cheating costs becomes too great and relaxing it when enforcement costs become too great. Criminals adapt and so must we. The imperfect is not the enemy of the perfect, it is the reality.
You make a good point. Moral persuasion by one's fellow grunts can work. Some new tenants moved into the building where I lived years ago. They were blasting the stereo at all hours. They were always friendly in the elevator, etc. So one day I said to them, "You know, it's really very loud and I doubt that any of your other neighbors appreciate it either." To my surprise, the noise stopped, completely. And they remained as friendly as ever. As did I, of course, if not more so.
But there are alway going to be people who are immune to such suasion. And it seems to me that such suasion is actually facilitated by the idea that there is a Higher Authority who might be appealed to if the distress of a fellow grunt is inadequate.
You're right to observe that the Higher Authority might rule against you, for a variety of reasons, ranging from (1) "I'm sorry, but I think they're right and you're wrong"; through (2) "Look, I just don't have time to deal with minutiae like this; I have bigger fish to fry"; all the way to (3) "He has more power than you do, and though you're right, I'm not going to compromise my chances of advancement by advocating your cause."
Ya pays yer money and takes yer cherce. If you give those in power more ability to punish, that will in fact lead to greater enforcement; but not always in the direction you might prefer. In my example, a Higher Authority (the management agency) might have said, "The way we see it, these people have a right to do whatever they want in their own apartment." The problem is that their norm isn't necessary the norm you would prefer to see enforced.
Quite true.
My own objection was that you used Idealist to mean what I think of as Cynic/Panglossian and vice-versa.
I'm not certain that most people would view it the way I do, but to me it seemed that your definition didn't correspond to, and actually was the opposite of, the common use of the term. I wonder whether you might have picked a term less conditioned by common parlance.
I think Panglossian comes close: one who thinks, "Hey, we got laws and regulations, so what more do we need? Everything is OK."
Or Neumanists: "What, me worry?"
I think most people would consider folks with that view to be cynics of some sort.
Consider the case where I (a low status/power grunt) see grunt #2 violating a norm, and say "hey, stop that." If our boss finds out about the norm violation + my weak attempt to enforce it, which of us is going to get in trouble?If it's them, that is much greater enforcement of the norm than if it's me - regardless of how much power the boss has: where that power is directed matters.
How is "greater enforcement" different from "giving those in power more ability to punish"? Isn't the latter the only means to the former?
Many of you are reacting to my use of the word "idealist", which is vague and has many associations. I intended to be *defining* the word in this context via the words I gave after my first use.
Echoing Vassar, I can't think of many examples of idealists who think norm enforcement is easy for current norms. One might think of idealists in two categories here, each split into two more.
Category one are idealists whose ideal is aligned with current explicitly endorsed (but perhaps not enforced) norms. They think we should better abide by (some of) those norms, perhaps make those norms stronger. This group usually thinks (as far as I can tell) that norm enforcement is difficult/expensive but necessary/important, we may call them realistic idealists. There is also a small subcategory we might call naive idealists, who do not understand why we cannot simply enforce such norms.
Realistic idealists rarely aid cheaters. The opposite is the case - they advocate for stronger enforcement. A naive idealist might be making the mistake of thinking enforcement is easy or unnecessary, and thus might in effect aid cheaters. But in general, idealists here tend to be helpful. Contrast this with cynics, who essentially advocate for giving up on norms or norm enforcement in practice, as hopeless or not practical.
The other group are idealists who think we should have different norms. We can call one group utopians, who think that their alternate norms would be easy to enforce - they would lead to cheating if they won, but they don't aid current cheaters (example: an actual communist making this mistake.) Then there are those who are hold different ideals but understand enforcement would be hard, which would lead to cheating insofar as people try to cheat any norm, but they would usually want more norm enforcement in their new world, not less (e.g. most advocates for forms of social justice).
In the Moral Mazes case, we see a situation where (as Vassar says) power to enforce norms has effectively fallen fully into the hands of cheaters. A cynic would give up on effective norm enforcement entirely in that situation. An idealist might call for greater enforcement, with varying success - giving those in power more ability to punish would simply make things worse, but other interventions might help.
FWIW, I also find your characterization of idealists strange. I think of idealists as people who find the world bad in some ways but think it can be made better by enforcing the norms they themselves believe in. Examples are socialists, libertarians, and evangelicals and religious reformers of all faiths.
They tend to work hard trying to get their favorite norms established and enforced, usually through attempts to organize mass movements.
I think idealists (like everyone else) tend to overestimate the effectiveness of their own efforts; but I've not heard any of them argue that "it is good if people overestimate the effectiveness of norm enforcement."
Then there are cynics and panglossians. Both believe that the world is as good as it possibly can be. They differ in whether they think that state is good or bad; but that view has no practical distinguishing consequences.
Yes, that is my point. Such moralists aren't merely self-sacrificing, in fact they often expect to gain status, political capital and sometimes material transfers in return for their moralism. Preaching self-sacrifice as a socially mandatory norm is other-sacrifice.
I only support norms that benefit me and the people who've net-benefited me. I don't have a fundamental problem with sacrifice, e.g. I place no value on animal suffering since nonhuman animals lack the intelligence to reciprocate the rights norm and therefore we don't have to give them rights.
I don't recall ever seeing idealists overestimating the effectiveness of norm enforcement. Certainly, there are people who overestimate norm enforcement, but I would expect them to be called 'cowards' or 'suckers' not 'idealists'. They also aid cheaters.
My impression though is that idealists correctly intuit that people feel better when they believe that norms don't need much external enforcement because good norms are somewhat self-enforcing in the long term (e.g. don't eat so much candy) or feel better to obey than to violate (e.g. do the best work you can do, don't just try to get an A).
There are also Moralists, who overestimate norm desirability, and usually also the desirability of punishment. As far as I can tell, they do more harm at almost every frequently observed margin than cheaters. The desirability of punishment is dependent on both how frequently norms are broken and on how frequently and how badly norms tend to be wrong. It also depends on the typical consequences of punishment, which include more obedience to norms in some situations, but more effective coordination to oppose detecting cheaters in other situations.
In the situation described by Moral Mazes more punishment is undesirable. Coalitions of routine cheaters are firmly in charge. By increasing punishment, one increases the power of the most aggressive cheaters to distribute punishment at their discretion. This doesn't work out well.
Agreed that idealists aid cheaters. Also, moderate idealists, it seems to me, help more aggressive cheaters while hurting less aggressive cheaters. Unfortunately, this post seems to me to be moderately idealistic.
Sociopolitical norms, like Confucian China's, are 2200 years old. They're baked into the culture, its language and, almost, its DNA.
They're a weak force at the individual level yet, at the whole society level, they're remarkably effective. I imagine that there's a vast literature on this, but I have not seen much in English.
Has anyone?
I can see both my post and your quote are on norms. However, I'm not seeing a closer connection than that.
The moment you involve other living beings it stops being merely a self-sacrifice and instead becomes a sacrifice.
Of course, many social norms aren't actually in our mutual self-interest. Moralism doesn't just help coordinate against cheaters, it can also demand self-sacrifice for abstract ideals and non-reciprocators that aren't in our mutual self-interest. Those are the norms I would prefer not to be enforced at all. Since people can win moral status games by preaching such self-sacrifice norms, e.g. vegans denouncing meat-eaters as morally inferior, we either need more hypocricy in enforcing those norms, or more effort to win debates against those moralists to denormalize their demands for self-sacrifice. The point being that norm-enforcement is a double-edged sword from the perspective of our mutual self-interest.