On who is who when people are copied, see John Weldon’s excellent short film “To Be.” A while back I saw it on YouTube, but couldn’t find it a few months later; it had violated copyright. So I actually bought a $15 dvd of it from the National Film Board of Canada. But as Nathan Cook
The scene with Tesla implies that "they" would never permit such a profoundly disruptive development to see the light of day.
(Of course, the world of the late 19th century had a throng of different "they"s all maneuvering against each other, so it's hard to see why the Tesla of the film didn't consider pulling up stakes and peddling such a spectacularly militarily useful technology elsewhere.)
The key moment in the film comes when she asks the scientist to go through the device with the doors open.
When she sees the look of shock on the originals' faces in the split-second before the disintegrator fires she realizes that the scientist, while grudgingly willing to admit the device's true nature to her, has not really admitted it to himself.
In delaying the destruction she made him (them) confront the reality of what was happening head-on. By getting the original and copy to see themselves as two different people in the agreed five minutes, she made them appreciate that whoever went back into first booth wouldn't be "going" anywhere afterward.
The key moment in the story comes when she asks the scientist to go through the device with both doors open. When she sees the shock on the originals' faces in the instant before the disintegrator fires, she realizes that even though the scientist is willing to admit the true nature of the device to other people, he's never really admitted it to himself. She realizes that to break the spell she has to delay the disintegration long enough for the original to confront the copy and let the reality to sink in that he isn't actually going to "go" anywhere.
For all his intelligence is coming up with the device, the scientist didn't seem like very clever for not figuring out what was going to happen when he agreed to delay the destruction. :)
When she convinces the scientist to create the copy and delay the destruction of the original, the film doesn't make sense when the two scientists then argue over who is the original and who is the copy.
Although identical at the point of replication, from that point on their histories diverge.
The original will have a memory of walking out of booth 1, and the copy will have a memory of walking out of booth 2, so they will know which one they are.
Since both individuals will have a memory of agreeing to the experiment, the original should agree to return to booth 1 and be annihilated.
I think some would find theological meaning in this movie.
Other than that it was fun and the music was catchy. I think I'll show this to children to freak them out when they watch Star Trek.
The argument reminds me of (I think it was) Heraclitus and his story about never being able to step in the same river twice because the water flows away.
Quantum teleportation relies on communicating classical information to correct the results of measurement -- it really is just as much a "destroy and then (re)create" process as "classical" teleportation would be. (Yes, you can fudge a bit with delayed measurement style effects, and so forth, but it really doesn't change anything). Why does the possibility (or not) of copying change anything about the analysis?
The average poster here is less coherent...or perhaps less entangled :-)More seriously, our normal intuition of identity treats it as unaffected by 8 hours of sleep (as in cyan's example) - which is a much bigger perturbation than losing the details of one's quantum cells.
Hopeless,The specific thing is expression by an expert of what seems to me is the reasonable amount of uncertainty about the natural phenomenon that is "consciousness" and its qualia subcomponents. Not being mystical about it (like the strawmen Hanson and Dennet seem to me to most often engage), and not being cargo-cultish about current neuroanatomical/neuroalgorithmic knowledge.
The concept of reputational votes is a Hansonian, Constant. Two things I'd like to think about Prof. Hanson as distinguishing him from some rather near peers of his, are(1) Not letting politeness/rudeness norms or disputes get in the way of optimizing his local social epistemology, and(2) Not encouraging *shudder* cults of personality or cliqueishness centered around agreeing or aligning with his position in various discussions.
If the delay between the death of the original and the creation of the copy is negative (both existing for some period), would the evolutionarily stable attitude toward the device depend on whether the original had an opportunity to breed during this interval?
The scene with Tesla implies that "they" would never permit such a profoundly disruptive development to see the light of day.
(Of course, the world of the late 19th century had a throng of different "they"s all maneuvering against each other, so it's hard to see why the Tesla of the film didn't consider pulling up stakes and peddling such a spectacularly militarily useful technology elsewhere.)
The key moment in the film comes when she asks the scientist to go through the device with the doors open.
When she sees the look of shock on the originals' faces in the split-second before the disintegrator fires she realizes that the scientist, while grudgingly willing to admit the device's true nature to her, has not really admitted it to himself.
In delaying the destruction she made him (them) confront the reality of what was happening head-on. By getting the original and copy to see themselves as two different people in the agreed five minutes, she made them appreciate that whoever went back into first booth wouldn't be "going" anywhere afterward.
The key moment in the story comes when she asks the scientist to go through the device with both doors open. When she sees the shock on the originals' faces in the instant before the disintegrator fires, she realizes that even though the scientist is willing to admit the true nature of the device to other people, he's never really admitted it to himself. She realizes that to break the spell she has to delay the disintegration long enough for the original to confront the copy and let the reality to sink in that he isn't actually going to "go" anywhere.
The same happens every night when you go to sleep. The person who wakes up in the morning is different by some millions of neurons.
For all his intelligence is coming up with the device, the scientist didn't seem like very clever for not figuring out what was going to happen when he agreed to delay the destruction. :)
When she convinces the scientist to create the copy and delay the destruction of the original, the film doesn't make sense when the two scientists then argue over who is the original and who is the copy.
Although identical at the point of replication, from that point on their histories diverge.
The original will have a memory of walking out of booth 1, and the copy will have a memory of walking out of booth 2, so they will know which one they are.
Since both individuals will have a memory of agreeing to the experiment, the original should agree to return to booth 1 and be annihilated.
I think some would find theological meaning in this movie.
Other than that it was fun and the music was catchy. I think I'll show this to children to freak them out when they watch Star Trek.
The argument reminds me of (I think it was) Heraclitus and his story about never being able to step in the same river twice because the water flows away.
Quantum teleportation relies on communicating classical information to correct the results of measurement -- it really is just as much a "destroy and then (re)create" process as "classical" teleportation would be. (Yes, you can fudge a bit with delayed measurement style effects, and so forth, but it really doesn't change anything). Why does the possibility (or not) of copying change anything about the analysis?
State? Sorry no such thing.
the details of one's quantum state - sorry
The average poster here is less coherent...or perhaps less entangled :-)More seriously, our normal intuition of identity treats it as unaffected by 8 hours of sleep (as in cyan's example) - which is a much bigger perturbation than losing the details of one's quantum cells.
"Hopefully, are you aware of the illusions of simultaneity and other timing effects in conscious experience?"
Nice to hear that there is someone out there, that agrees, that there is no such thing as intent.
Hopeless,The specific thing is expression by an expert of what seems to me is the reasonable amount of uncertainty about the natural phenomenon that is "consciousness" and its qualia subcomponents. Not being mystical about it (like the strawmen Hanson and Dennet seem to me to most often engage), and not being cargo-cultish about current neuroanatomical/neuroalgorithmic knowledge.
The concept of reputational votes is a Hansonian, Constant. Two things I'd like to think about Prof. Hanson as distinguishing him from some rather near peers of his, are(1) Not letting politeness/rudeness norms or disputes get in the way of optimizing his local social epistemology, and(2) Not encouraging *shudder* cults of personality or cliqueishness centered around agreeing or aligning with his position in various discussions.
If the delay between the death of the original and the creation of the copy is negative (both existing for some period), would the evolutionarily stable attitude toward the device depend on whether the original had an opportunity to breed during this interval?
Those are both great illustrations