False false dichotomies
Jed Harris wrote, in one of his otherwise very insightful comments:
(Incidentally, there probably is no viable distinction between cognitive structure and content.)
This statement is true, in that there is probably no distinction that I can write, that Jed can’t come up with a counter-example to. Much as I can’t write a definition of "game" that Wittgenstein couldn’t come up with a counter-example to.
But the statement was used to imply that distinguishing AI architectures by reliance on content vs. learning is nonsensical. If that were so, knowledgeable people would be confused when Eliezer (or Lenat) says Cyc emphasizes content more than other architectures do. They aren’t.
Some more-popular false false dichotomies:
Nature vs. nurture (e.g., genetic or instinctual vs. learned behavior): We’re told that there’s no true distinction between them, since "nurture" can only occur when expected by "nature". I like Paul Bloom’s reply (paraphrasing), "There’s something wrong with a theory of mind that says that a knee reflex and word learning are the same sort of thing."
Race: We’re told that race is a "social construct" because, for any particular genetic criteria you set to determine who is in a race, someone can be found who looks to us like they belong to that race, yet doesn’t satisfy your criteria.
Gender: There are people naturally having characteristics of both sexes; people whose phenotypic gender is different from their genotypic gender; and people who’ve had sex-change operations. Therefore, there is no gender.
You probably knew where I was going with this when you saw the Wittgenstein reference. Every word in our languages breaks down when you apply enough pressure to it. A word encodes a statistical regularity. Applicability in all cases is not required. Forbid us from using words that aren’t precise, and we’d be unable to talk at all.
"Imperfect correlation is OK."
The imperfect correlation of race with geographic ancestry (what the genetic variation actually determines) hurts the ability to use racial groups to predict phenotype.
"Lots of medical conditions are highly correlated with race in the folk-taxonomy phenotype-based concept of race."
True for rare recessive disorders, but frequently over interpreted. These correlations are almost exclusively the result of founder effects/bottlenecking/genetic drift, not selection. Quantitative traits, which are the majority of disease phenotypes, do not correlate well. Preventative medical interventions taken based on race for these conditions tend to be very low risk and are prescribed inefficiently (many treated people needed to see one beneficial outcome), such as diet, exercise, and statins. Race provides little predictive power outside of the extremes.
The difference between race and sex is that exceptions from the male/female dichotomy are rare, genetic abnormalities. While there are clusters of geographic ancestry, the exceptions in the continuum between these clusters are normal and the genetic variation is consistent with random, genetic drift.
"Ernst Mayr, who came up with the commonly used definition of "species" in biology, says race is just as valid a concept."
Absent data, Mayr's opinion is irrelevant regardless of previous contributions or his acknowledged brilliance. Furthermore, he did not have access to the expansive sequence data we have today. I would not presume to guess how these data would affect his opinion.
""Population" is just another word for "race" in genetics. A euphemism, if you will."
I won't. Race is a sloppy term that some equate to population. It does not go in the other direction. Population has explicit meaning. Race is one potential way to define a population. Race is a sub-optimal tool for defining discrete populations and adding efficiency to predictions.
"When discussing non-human species, scientists have no problem using the term "race"."
Personally, I do not know scientists (which puts both of our conclusions somewhere between all scientists and none) who discuss "races" of non-human species. You will hear the term "ecotypes," which implies adaptation to local environmental conditions. Just because scientists use the term does not make it valid.
Ernst Mayr, who came up with the commonly used definition of "species" in biology, says race is just as valid a concept.http://www.gnxp.com/MT2/arc..."Population" is just another word for "race" in genetics. A euphemism, if you will. When discussing non-human species, scientists have no problem using the term "race". The comments thread to this post discuss the two terms and their usefulness.http://www.gnxp.com/blog/20...