From a distance it seems hard to explain a lot of human behavior without presuming that we humans have strong desires to conform to the behaviors of others.
They DO deny that the reason they imitate you is that they want you to like them...
Our difference is that I don't think conformity is based on a concealed desire to be liked. For one thing, under most circumstances x uses conformity to prove that x likes y. Most of all, we like those who like us!
When conformity is for inducing liking it is very open. A gang member wears his colors, a frat rat submits to hazings, not because he likes these things in common with others but to show that he likes those others enough to imitate them, whether he likes those things or not.
They DO deny that the reason they imitate you is that they want you to like them, since that would defeat the purpose. They expect you to like people similar to yourself, and if that is their motive, then they are not similar to you, since you presumably do those things because you like doing them.
Conformity for the sake of being liked isn't "conformity for conformity's sake." People aren't generally prone to deny that they want to be liked, although it has acquired some taint in individual-worshiping cultures and sends a bad single but only in certain selective contexts.
[Added.]Robin could add to his list of rationalizations "I do it because I'll be liked for it" - when the conformity in question wasn't due to the desire to be liked.
Can we usefully compare this to the amount of effort and attention spent on encouraging others to conform to us? Identity-based appeals appear to be explicit.
The reproductive urge is an attempt to propagate genetic information; I imagine the driving heuristics have some influence over cultural information in turn.
An active process of denial is suggested by the fact that when a person does privately fail to conform, he often publicly announces that he privately conforms, that is, he lies about his conformity and non-conformity. E.g. someone will say that he has read some popular book, when he has not.
This suggests a very strong motive for conformity: so that other people will like you.
But there is also a motive to provide a different explanation, rather than saying this is the reason. Because people will presumably like you if you like what they like, while if you say "I am doing this just so you will like me," then you do not like what they like, but you merely like being liked.
The denial is strongly contradicted by the facts when we observe the pattern, but in individual cases (as shown in the discussion in this thread on residential relocation) it's not bizarre. In fact, the only pattern I observe in the rationalizations that Robin surveys is that they are plausible alternatives. (Unlike the syndrome of confabulation, where the explanations are often bizarre.) As with subjects of posthypnotic suggestion who must rationalize carrying out ridiculous acts implanted by the hypnotist, we find the least bizarre explanations we can for conformity. This also contrasts with defensive processes, which often go overboard (e.g. reaction formation). So, it seems like that conformity is largely a process based on suggestion. We really don't know that we are conforming, rather than using an active process of denial.
Robin isn't claiming that conforming as such has no value.
His premises are (1) we do in fact often aim to conform for conforming's sake, and (2) we often deny that we're doing this, even to ourselves.
His point is that this denial is so bizarrely contrary to the facts that there must be some very interesting mental processes behind it.
Your point (that there are often good reasons to conform) only highlights the bizarreness of our denial. Why deny that we're doing something when there are good reasons to do it anyway? This strengthens his case for investigating the processes behind our denial.
Networks of friends and family are priceless assets.
I think that this is the main reason. While not priceless, they are definitely very valuable. Moreover, the worse your material circumstances are, the more valuable these networks become. Certainly they were extremely valuable in our environment of evolutionary adaptedness. So we are probably prone to seeing them as even more valuable than they really are in our own situations.
1. I think of art as moving a little beyond the familiar but not too far else it becomes uncomfortable. This could explain some. 2. I find looking at someone with style of hair too far form norms (like Trump) to be a bit uncomfortable. Could this be because it makes my brain work harder? This also could explain some.
Networks of friends and family are priceless assets. They contribute a great deal to individual happiness. Long-term residence in a specific place builds equity in the form of memory, associations and acquaintances that enriches one's life.Poor people's housing and income may be tied into local welfare programs in such a way that moving, and attempting to reestablish those benefits elsewhere, would be unacceptably difficult.
I often conform solely for the effect on other people, and don't deny it.
For example lately I've been trying to dress better, because I get treated better that way.
I'd prefer to wear my hacker schlub worn-out T-shirts and jeans, but I don't get treated as well when I do that.
My claim is that neither is fundamental to the unnoticed conformism described by Robin.
People do both things, at different times and in different ways.
They DO deny that the reason they imitate you is that they want you to like them...
Our difference is that I don't think conformity is based on a concealed desire to be liked. For one thing, under most circumstances x uses conformity to prove that x likes y. Most of all, we like those who like us!
When conformity is for inducing liking it is very open. A gang member wears his colors, a frat rat submits to hazings, not because he likes these things in common with others but to show that he likes those others enough to imitate them, whether he likes those things or not.
People don't deny that they want to be liked.
They DO deny that the reason they imitate you is that they want you to like them, since that would defeat the purpose. They expect you to like people similar to yourself, and if that is their motive, then they are not similar to you, since you presumably do those things because you like doing them.
Conformity for the sake of being liked isn't "conformity for conformity's sake." People aren't generally prone to deny that they want to be liked, although it has acquired some taint in individual-worshiping cultures and sends a bad single but only in certain selective contexts.
[Added.]Robin could add to his list of rationalizations "I do it because I'll be liked for it" - when the conformity in question wasn't due to the desire to be liked.
Can we usefully compare this to the amount of effort and attention spent on encouraging others to conform to us? Identity-based appeals appear to be explicit.
The reproductive urge is an attempt to propagate genetic information; I imagine the driving heuristics have some influence over cultural information in turn.
An active process of denial is suggested by the fact that when a person does privately fail to conform, he often publicly announces that he privately conforms, that is, he lies about his conformity and non-conformity. E.g. someone will say that he has read some popular book, when he has not.
This suggests a very strong motive for conformity: so that other people will like you.
But there is also a motive to provide a different explanation, rather than saying this is the reason. Because people will presumably like you if you like what they like, while if you say "I am doing this just so you will like me," then you do not like what they like, but you merely like being liked.
this denial is so bizarrely contrary to the facts
The denial is strongly contradicted by the facts when we observe the pattern, but in individual cases (as shown in the discussion in this thread on residential relocation) it's not bizarre. In fact, the only pattern I observe in the rationalizations that Robin surveys is that they are plausible alternatives. (Unlike the syndrome of confabulation, where the explanations are often bizarre.) As with subjects of posthypnotic suggestion who must rationalize carrying out ridiculous acts implanted by the hypnotist, we find the least bizarre explanations we can for conformity. This also contrasts with defensive processes, which often go overboard (e.g. reaction formation). So, it seems like that conformity is largely a process based on suggestion. We really don't know that we are conforming, rather than using an active process of denial.
Robin isn't claiming that conforming as such has no value.
His premises are (1) we do in fact often aim to conform for conforming's sake, and (2) we often deny that we're doing this, even to ourselves.
His point is that this denial is so bizarrely contrary to the facts that there must be some very interesting mental processes behind it.
Your point (that there are often good reasons to conform) only highlights the bizarreness of our denial. Why deny that we're doing something when there are good reasons to do it anyway? This strengthens his case for investigating the processes behind our denial.
Networks of friends and family are priceless assets.
I think that this is the main reason. While not priceless, they are definitely very valuable. Moreover, the worse your material circumstances are, the more valuable these networks become. Certainly they were extremely valuable in our environment of evolutionary adaptedness. So we are probably prone to seeing them as even more valuable than they really are in our own situations.
1. I think of art as moving a little beyond the familiar but not too far else it becomes uncomfortable. This could explain some. 2. I find looking at someone with style of hair too far form norms (like Trump) to be a bit uncomfortable. Could this be because it makes my brain work harder? This also could explain some.
Networks of friends and family are priceless assets. They contribute a great deal to individual happiness. Long-term residence in a specific place builds equity in the form of memory, associations and acquaintances that enriches one's life.Poor people's housing and income may be tied into local welfare programs in such a way that moving, and attempting to reestablish those benefits elsewhere, would be unacceptably difficult.
Yikes, I even read that post of yours.
https://www.overcomingbias....
Laland, Kevin N. 'Darwin's Unfinished Symphony'. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017. Print.
The whole thing, but particularly Chapters 2, Ubiquitous Copying and 3, Why Copy?