My recent exchange with Tyler highlighted a common bias: people presume that policy proposal authors claim high success probabilities. Because I had written sympathetically about futarchy (public policy decision markets) and
I agree as well. It often find myself explaining that I am in favour of trying something when I believe the chance of success is small or, more commonly, scared of some risky situation when the chance of failure is small. It takes a surprising amount of effort to convey this to someone as it tends to be assumed that to be deeply worried about ecophagy or falling of an ill-maintained cliff path you have to think the chance is greater than 1%, rather than that the product of the probability and badness of outcome exceeds the badness of the prevention. I now pre-empt this possibility by phrasing my concern in terms of 'it would be worth putting in a lot of effort to avoid X, even if the chance was 1% and I see no way to justify that it is lower than that'. This works quite well, and even if it doesn't play to the 'arguments are soldiers' game, it is often quite convincing because of its revealed honesty.
More generally, people presume that those who accurately explain policy proposals--cautiously and carefully and with a straight face--believe those policies are optimal. This is in line with Eliezer's "arguments are soldiers" approach to politics.
Robin,I agree completely. It would be a major achievement of overcoming bias if we abandon success-based criteria when presenting policy proposals. The resistance to proposed policy often stems from a remote apprehensiveness to change in general. If we explicitly undervalue success criteria I think we could get more people thinking incisively about the nuances of a potential policy change.
Indeed, I would prefer it if Tyler were just a bit more of an idealist, but the creative capacity thus unleashed may just be too much to handle.
I agree as well. It often find myself explaining that I am in favour of trying something when I believe the chance of success is small or, more commonly, scared of some risky situation when the chance of failure is small. It takes a surprising amount of effort to convey this to someone as it tends to be assumed that to be deeply worried about ecophagy or falling of an ill-maintained cliff path you have to think the chance is greater than 1%, rather than that the product of the probability and badness of outcome exceeds the badness of the prevention. I now pre-empt this possibility by phrasing my concern in terms of 'it would be worth putting in a lot of effort to avoid X, even if the chance was 1% and I see no way to justify that it is lower than that'. This works quite well, and even if it doesn't play to the 'arguments are soldiers' game, it is often quite convincing because of its revealed honesty.
More generally, people presume that those who accurately explain policy proposals--cautiously and carefully and with a straight face--believe those policies are optimal. This is in line with Eliezer's "arguments are soldiers" approach to politics.
Robin,I agree completely. It would be a major achievement of overcoming bias if we abandon success-based criteria when presenting policy proposals. The resistance to proposed policy often stems from a remote apprehensiveness to change in general. If we explicitly undervalue success criteria I think we could get more people thinking incisively about the nuances of a potential policy change.
Indeed, I would prefer it if Tyler were just a bit more of an idealist, but the creative capacity thus unleashed may just be too much to handle.
Sandeep