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Overcoming Bias Commenter's avatar

Yes, that means the existence of a computation is observer-dependent, and, to an observer who cannot harness the computational aspect of the phenomenon, there is no computation.

So if we have a physical system such as a computer that implements a causal structure that is isomorphic (via some mapping) to that of my brain (at some substitution level) over a given period of time (maybe just a couple of seconds), then computationalism says that the activities of this physical system should have resulted in a conscious experience that would be equivalent to my own subjective experience over the period that is simulated. Same computations performed, same conscious experience.

Whether there actually is an external observer who knows the mapping between the two physical systems (e.g. the computer and my brain) would seem to be irrelevant to the question of whether there was a conscious experience associated with the computer's activities, right?

Hans Moravec discusses this in my previous link. Here's another good example. And here's an interesting paper by Tim Maudlin highlighting another related problem with computationalism (takes a while to download). And of course Stephan Wolfram's Principle of Computational Equivalence. And you may have seen the debate between David Chalmers and Mark Bishop on this.

It really kind of looks like a Kantian style antinomy to me. Assuming physicalism/materialism, computationalism seems like the best explanation for conscious experience...BUT, computation is ubiquitous, so how do you avoid having to make arbitrary distinctions about what physical systems implement what computations?

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Overcoming Bias Commenter's avatar

"On reflection, it seems to me quite possible... that some claims are both is and ought...."

Though this is not the same as a claim of knowledge, I should think that, on reflection, Robin would want to explain how such hybrid claims are possible or point to someone who does. The reason this is not 'quite possible' has to do with the structure of the claims themselves: for instance, "I detest non-self-defensive killing" is a statement about my preferences, while "You ought not to murder" is a statement about a moral reality.

As I pointed out earlier, one possible bridge between this gap is promising, since "I promise to return the five dollars you lent me," is a statement of fact and a statement of obligation in the same fell swoop. Perhaps this is what Robin is gesturing towards in his "upon reflection" because, like minds or quale, the obligation is supervenient on some state of affairs (a particular configuration of neurons, a particular configuration of phonemes.)

But I suspect that Robin is actually a naturalist who takes utility- or preference-maximization to be a meta-ethical obligation in itself, which is doesn't really succeed in bridging the is-ought gap but rather ignores it. That's why I inquired.

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