Why do men give women engagement rings? A standard story is that a ring shows commitment; by paying a cost that one would lose if the marriage fails, one shows that one places a high value on the marriage.
Then the question would seem to be whether failure-to-get-married is seen as a bad thing, in the sense that hedging against it would signal risk aversion.
The "bride price" tradition probably fulfilled a similar goal. The money is paid to the parents, so the value to the wife herself is much lower than the original sum, but value isn't destroyed in the long term because of the expected payback from the couple's own daughters a couple of decades later. A gender-symmetrical version of that tradition (to avoid the icky trading-women-like-cattle connotations discussed by earlier posters, as well as to make it more compatible with homosexual couples) would serve the purpose of the betting system you described.
Unlikely to happen though, because the chicken/egg problem is even bigger than the weirdness problem in the betting system - it's only viable if it’s an established tradition, but wouldn’t become established until it’s viable. The most plausible way I can think is if a culture that still has a bride price tradition (China?) moves to a gender-symmetrical version then gains enough soft power that its marriage culture is adopted abroad, but at the moment it looks like that’s going in the opposite direction.
I think that you might be missing the point that having an expensive wedding ring increases the status of both husband and wife, (and women at least stereotypically directly value wearing nice jewelry) and so there is not as much destroyed value in the standard approach as you claim.
Insurance is a risk-averse form of betting, whereas gambling is (at least usually perceived as) risk-loving. Risk-aversion is a large part of responsibility
Sports betting, though, seems to be the most obvious example of a class of bets that people make for entertainment. Someone with more experience betting in less regulated environments like the UK could speak to this better, but I suspect that the sort of wagers which are generally offered by bookmakers relate to public events that the gamblers enjoy following even without the wager.
I guess the question is whether enough people would find negative expectation bets on their future decisions desirable to yield a profitable market for the bookmakers. Without entertainment as a motive, they might need to more explicitly embrace signaling as a reason, which could pose difficulties since signaling often works better from the shadows.
The signal you want isn't just "I want to marry you" but something like "I want to marry you and I'm committed to making it work". Adding weight to the proposal by unilaterally making a down payment on a house or buying the nuptial fund would do both, wouldn't it? I don't see how a value-destroying ring does more.
Right, so I propose that while we're improving traditions we also improve the part where commitment tokens are a one-way street (from the dark times when our farmer ancestors really did trade women like cattle).
One more thought: the token that replaces the ring must be instantly recognizable to everyone as valuabe. If you need a MBA to recognize the value of the token without someone explaining it to you than that token does not work for society. A bet against marrying would work (with the proceeds of a lost bet going to charity or being locked away), buying complicated futures would not work.
You suggest that the couple bet together that they won't break up, to create a cost of breaking up and signal their intention not to. That is not quite the same thing as signaling a strong desire to marry.
The tradition is that men give women engagement rings, not vice versa. I address that tradition. My suggestion can be done symmetrically, as both bride and groom could bet that they won't marry.
1) The ring does signal sacrifice: sure it can be traded back for its value but not while the marriage lasts. It represents a lot of wealth that is purposely locked away at a time when most people are relatively cash-strapped.
2) What's with the over-the-top farmer attitudes about women? Your proposals seem to assume every woman is a predatory golddigger that has to be bought like a piece of cattle. Could the new sacrifial schemes at least be unisex in a time when many women are educated and wealthy themselves?
Then the question would seem to be whether failure-to-get-married is seen as a bad thing, in the sense that hedging against it would signal risk aversion.
The "bride price" tradition probably fulfilled a similar goal. The money is paid to the parents, so the value to the wife herself is much lower than the original sum, but value isn't destroyed in the long term because of the expected payback from the couple's own daughters a couple of decades later. A gender-symmetrical version of that tradition (to avoid the icky trading-women-like-cattle connotations discussed by earlier posters, as well as to make it more compatible with homosexual couples) would serve the purpose of the betting system you described.
Unlikely to happen though, because the chicken/egg problem is even bigger than the weirdness problem in the betting system - it's only viable if it’s an established tradition, but wouldn’t become established until it’s viable. The most plausible way I can think is if a culture that still has a bride price tradition (China?) moves to a gender-symmetrical version then gains enough soft power that its marriage culture is adopted abroad, but at the moment it looks like that’s going in the opposite direction.
I think that you might be missing the point that having an expensive wedding ring increases the status of both husband and wife, (and women at least stereotypically directly value wearing nice jewelry) and so there is not as much destroyed value in the standard approach as you claim.
Insurance is a risk-averse form of betting, whereas gambling is (at least usually perceived as) risk-loving. Risk-aversion is a large part of responsibility
Until recently, just getting married was already a sign of precommitment, because divorce was socially expensive.
Betting so-called is regarded as a bad thing. But buying insurance is technically betting, and insurance is regarded as a signal of responsibility.
Sports betting, though, seems to be the most obvious example of a class of bets that people make for entertainment. Someone with more experience betting in less regulated environments like the UK could speak to this better, but I suspect that the sort of wagers which are generally offered by bookmakers relate to public events that the gamblers enjoy following even without the wager.
I guess the question is whether enough people would find negative expectation bets on their future decisions desirable to yield a profitable market for the bookmakers. Without entertainment as a motive, they might need to more explicitly embrace signaling as a reason, which could pose difficulties since signaling often works better from the shadows.
Perhaps it could be made of gold and inset with a diamond?
The signal you want isn't just "I want to marry you" but something like "I want to marry you and I'm committed to making it work". Adding weight to the proposal by unilaterally making a down payment on a house or buying the nuptial fund would do both, wouldn't it? I don't see how a value-destroying ring does more.
You seem to forget that betting is regarded as a bad thing in most societies. Gambling usually leads to bad outcomes. And women don't bet.
You just don't mix gambling with sacred things such as love. It's bad form.
brooch
Right, so I propose that while we're improving traditions we also improve the part where commitment tokens are a one-way street (from the dark times when our farmer ancestors really did trade women like cattle).
One more thought: the token that replaces the ring must be instantly recognizable to everyone as valuabe. If you need a MBA to recognize the value of the token without someone explaining it to you than that token does not work for society. A bet against marrying would work (with the proceeds of a lost bet going to charity or being locked away), buying complicated futures would not work.
To the extent bets are signals of loyalty, the foundation of prediction markets is undermined.
[Added.] The more far-fetched the belief, the better it functions as a loyalty signal.
You suggest that the couple bet together that they won't break up, to create a cost of breaking up and signal their intention not to. That is not quite the same thing as signaling a strong desire to marry.
The tradition is that men give women engagement rings, not vice versa. I address that tradition. My suggestion can be done symmetrically, as both bride and groom could bet that they won't marry.
1) The ring does signal sacrifice: sure it can be traded back for its value but not while the marriage lasts. It represents a lot of wealth that is purposely locked away at a time when most people are relatively cash-strapped.
2) What's with the over-the-top farmer attitudes about women? Your proposals seem to assume every woman is a predatory golddigger that has to be bought like a piece of cattle. Could the new sacrifial schemes at least be unisex in a time when many women are educated and wealthy themselves?