Two distinct questions here: 1) is Hanson a moralist? and 2) Does Hanson take an unpopular moral position? You say question 2) has biased or even swallowed question 1).
We've defined "moralist" as someone who uses moral arguments (as opposed to factual arguments robust to moral considerations). In the instance Cahokia brought up, Hanson made a moral argument the fulcrum of decision concerning the welfare of "undesirables." I don't understand the stubbornness in conceding he was a moralist in this instance. This seems to have been embarrassing, which I take to show some element of misdirection. I might call Robin a crypto-moralist.
Surely I see the point that Hanson often appears amoral. An amoral moralist? I can almost see why you see this as some kind of leftist demonization. But as with all good crypto anythings, Hanson's moral position is complex and hardly transparent. I would say he is essentially an agnostic on moral realism. But his moralism on undesirables shows how it is an unusual kind of agnosticism, as he expressly invokes moral uncertainty as an argument.
[Edit.] A more precise term than crypto-moralist is 'estoric moralist.'
No, "evil" is your category (if anyone's here), certainly not mine.
What I'm arguing is that to condition the welfare of a set of people on an assessment of their moral value (whether they "should exist") is to be a moralist--and to be one in a very extreme way.
Introducing doubt and uncertainty is, to your opposition, simply a more arcane and subtle way of being the enemy.
It'd be more believable that Hanson is nobody's "moralist" if he were speaking primarily to issues placed upstream that were equally applicable to conservatives and liberals. But since the zeitgeist is with the left, taking an above-it-all stance with the issues of the day places one in the conservative camp.
" The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in January 2012 annual point-in-time count found that 633,782 people across America were homeless." What range of of actions do you mean your "it isn't clear that they should exist" to encompass? What actions are you regarding as acceptable possibilities?
To test it, apply the premise if someone were to utter, "It isn't clear that Robin Hanson should exist." Or to, "it isn't clear that [choose your ethnicity] should exist.
To claim that whether folks should exist is a reasonable consideration in a discussion of their welfare is to take a very extreme ideological (moralistic) position.
"It isn't clear" is exactly a statement of not taking sides. Of course you might insist that your side is so obviously right than anyone who is even unsure if you are right must be evil.
Don't know why the quality of the argument determines whether or not one is a moralist rather than the subject matter or intent behind the argument (one could be an ineffective/effective moralist).
Surely a moralist is one who spends lots of time and words labeling certain behaviors as moral/immoral and urging people to adopt their definitions. Another characteristic would be that moralists are prone to frame issues in good v. evil narratives.
I agree that these arguments address actions about which many people have moral feelings. But I don’t see myself as focused on moral concepts or premises; I see my discussions as focused on other issues.
This is lacking in "legendary candor." Whether you're a moralist or not depends on whether your intent is to change people's ethical beliefs. [Or do you think it morally permissible to try to change people's moral sensibilities while trying to purvey a contrary impression?]
By the way, Robin, do you think it's true that you have changed hundreds: in their moral convictions rather than in the way they argue for them?
Robin: "But people disagree about the weight and even direction that moral considerations push on many of these acts, and I don’t see myself as especially good at or interested taking sides in arguments about such weights and directions."
Yet elsewhere you seem to have very much taken a side about such weights and directions, namely when you declare in the post "Why Not Sell Cities?":
"Actually difficult people don't have to live anywhere. If people are so difficult that the sum of what they can earn plus their assets plus what charity others will give them still isn't enough to get any place to take them, it isn't clear that they should exist."
Illuminating the subtle distinction between loyalty and morality is about the most important thing a moralist could do. And it's very important, since the worst moralizing comes from a lack of understanding about this distinction.
I might well. It was, for instance a ery blatant case if treating people as means, not ends.
Two distinct questions here: 1) is Hanson a moralist? and 2) Does Hanson take an unpopular moral position? You say question 2) has biased or even swallowed question 1).
We've defined "moralist" as someone who uses moral arguments (as opposed to factual arguments robust to moral considerations). In the instance Cahokia brought up, Hanson made a moral argument the fulcrum of decision concerning the welfare of "undesirables." I don't understand the stubbornness in conceding he was a moralist in this instance. This seems to have been embarrassing, which I take to show some element of misdirection. I might call Robin a crypto-moralist.
Surely I see the point that Hanson often appears amoral. An amoral moralist? I can almost see why you see this as some kind of leftist demonization. But as with all good crypto anythings, Hanson's moral position is complex and hardly transparent. I would say he is essentially an agnostic on moral realism. But his moralism on undesirables shows how it is an unusual kind of agnosticism, as he expressly invokes moral uncertainty as an argument.
[Edit.] A more precise term than crypto-moralist is 'estoric moralist.'
That would have to depend on your positions, or track record.
Robin, in the unlikely event that I ever run for office, would you please oppose me?
No, "evil" is your category (if anyone's here), certainly not mine.
What I'm arguing is that to condition the welfare of a set of people on an assessment of their moral value (whether they "should exist") is to be a moralist--and to be one in a very extreme way.
Introducing doubt and uncertainty is, to your opposition, simply a more arcane and subtle way of being the enemy.
It'd be more believable that Hanson is nobody's "moralist" if he were speaking primarily to issues placed upstream that were equally applicable to conservatives and liberals. But since the zeitgeist is with the left, taking an above-it-all stance with the issues of the day places one in the conservative camp.
" The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in January 2012 annual point-in-time count found that 633,782 people across America were homeless." What range of of actions do you mean your "it isn't clear that they should exist" to encompass? What actions are you regarding as acceptable possibilities?
I take you as saying your side is so obviously right that even to be uncertain is to be evil.
I find this response disingenuous.
To test it, apply the premise if someone were to utter, "It isn't clear that Robin Hanson should exist." Or to, "it isn't clear that [choose your ethnicity] should exist.
To claim that whether folks should exist is a reasonable consideration in a discussion of their welfare is to take a very extreme ideological (moralistic) position.
Robin Hanson's morality is not about morality.
I could accept that definition as well. In this post I was following Bryan's lead in how to use the term.
"It isn't clear" is exactly a statement of not taking sides. Of course you might insist that your side is so obviously right than anyone who is even unsure if you are right must be evil.
Don't know why the quality of the argument determines whether or not one is a moralist rather than the subject matter or intent behind the argument (one could be an ineffective/effective moralist).
Surely a moralist is one who spends lots of time and words labeling certain behaviors as moral/immoral and urging people to adopt their definitions. Another characteristic would be that moralists are prone to frame issues in good v. evil narratives.
I agree that these arguments address actions about which many people have moral feelings. But I don’t see myself as focused on moral concepts or premises; I see my discussions as focused on other issues.
This is lacking in "legendary candor." Whether you're a moralist or not depends on whether your intent is to change people's ethical beliefs. [Or do you think it morally permissible to try to change people's moral sensibilities while trying to purvey a contrary impression?]
By the way, Robin, do you think it's true that you have changed hundreds: in their moral convictions rather than in the way they argue for them?
Robin: "But people disagree about the weight and even direction that moral considerations push on many of these acts, and I don’t see myself as especially good at or interested taking sides in arguments about such weights and directions."
Yet elsewhere you seem to have very much taken a side about such weights and directions, namely when you declare in the post "Why Not Sell Cities?":
"Actually difficult people don't have to live anywhere. If people are so difficult that the sum of what they can earn plus their assets plus what charity others will give them still isn't enough to get any place to take them, it isn't clear that they should exist."
Illuminating the subtle distinction between loyalty and morality is about the most important thing a moralist could do. And it's very important, since the worst moralizing comes from a lack of understanding about this distinction.