All Ethics Roads Lead To Ours?
In the latest Philosophical Investigations, Olli Lagerspetz reviews James Sterba’s The Triumph of Practice over Theory in Ethics. Lagerspetz summarizes the book’s thoughtful premise:
There is, I think, some reason for suspicion of the dexterity with which ethical theorists often find rational reasons for conclusions that we would favour anyway on intuitive grounds. The official idea is that theoretical thinking helps us make ethically correct decisions by way of deductive reasoning from a general theory of morality. However, in practice, it seems that the process rather goes in the opposite direction. Certain answers are implicitly treated as foregone conclusions, and philosophers, on the contrary, vindicate their own theories by showing that the expected answers can be derived from them.
Despite seemingly vast differences of principle between leading ethical theories of today’s academia – various professedly Kantian, utilitarian and Aristotelian approaches – their proponents show only a marginal disagreement over matters of substance. Their largely converging practical recommendations reflect the general sensibilities of their own age rather than views actually held by Kant, Mill, or Aristotle. Today, there are no Aristotelian advocates of slavery and no Kantian opponents of female higher education.
People often argue that disagreements about ethics suggest there is no ethical truth. But in some ways this lack of disagreement can seem just as suspicious.
Added: If our specific moral beliefs are better than those of Kant, Mill, or Aristotle, what exactly caused that improvement, if not better abstract ethical theory?
The entities behind Rawls "veil of ignorance" are not people. They are "free-floating wraiths or disembodied somnambulists". Such things do not actually exist, so we cannot know how they would make decisions. Who we are is part of how we think and our ideals that we project on imaginary beings are still going to reflect on our own preferences and beliefs.
Stuart, yes, consistency alone is "feeble" and not just in the case of morality. If I deny particular (inductive) scientific claims, then I can consistently believe that God created the world in seven days and that the human race began with Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden.
If someone were to put forth the claim, "all Jews should be treated as inferior beings," it seems that - if we want to talk to such a person at all - we should ask, "Why could you possibly accept such a claim? Should we treat them this way because they ARE inferior?" Suppose - to avoid the "no wrong facts" criterion - this person says, "No, I'm just saying that's how we should treat them." (I assume this is the direction you were headed.) Here, shouldn't we simply ask again, "And why do you think that?" When we ask this second time, we are NOT asking for evidence of inferiority, so then what are we asking? We could have, equally perhaps, said, "I suppose that means you think that differences in the way we treat people do not need to be supported by, or motivated by, differences in the people themselves."
Surely our anti-Semite could deny this: "Life isn't fair. Why should I be fair?" What can we say in response? We might ask, "Well, what exactly is the alternative?"
"Doing what I prefer to do."
"But what, in this case, makes your preferences special? Or at any rate, how is this not on par with simply acting arbitrarily?"
"It's not arbitrary because this is how I choose to live. This is my 'bedrock.'"
"Well, I just don't see how one could stake their moral conviction on such a claim without having SOMETHING besides mere preference to say in favor of it."
Yes, this imagined conversation involves (on the part of the anti-anti-Semite) a substantive presumption in favor of a "fairness principle." You might ask, "Well, why is the burden of proof on the anti-Semite rather than the other person?" I.e. what is there to say in favor fairness itself (to address your final question)?
I suppose one might appeal to something like John Rawls' "veil of ignorance" where we attempt to select some basic moral (or political) principles without knowing what our social position in the society where these principles will be implemented: not knowing our position makes it impossible for us to go in for principles that would allow for preferential treatment of our own interests, which, of course, we would like. But barring a way to give preference for ourselves, it seems that at least we would like for the rules to be fair - that whomever I turn out to be in this society, my interests get fair consideration.