Why Refuse To Debate

If there were an obvious truth of a particular debate topic, then it’s unlikely that there would be a debate. Also, hardly any real-world opinion is unidimensional, as if standing on a line diametrically opposite its competitor. Thus the space of likely adjusted viewpoints lies mostly closer between the opposing views. Think of it as regression to the mean, central tendency, law of large numbers, even a reflection of the principle of least action, all examples of entropy.

But why would you expect anything different, unless you hold a transparent belief in the efficacy of context-narrowing (as practiced in debate) for finding the truth? Is it the apparent crispness of the decision-making that appeals? Bear in mind that prediction markets exploit quite quite the opposite dynamic, harnessing an increased context selected for its winning, versus selecting from a reduced context in order to win.

To promote progress in the social domain, we don’t need more context-narrowing debates, but rather more context-expanding explorations, where we discover, not “the truer position”, but the more encompassing context containing the smaller “truths” of the competing positions.

I risk being perceived as less than scientific, verging on the postmodernist Far be it from that; I’m trying to convey that science has never dealt in Truth, but only increasing coherence over increasing context, and that is also the direction of increasing good.

How did you get the fit in the top figure? The slope looks approximately right, but the y-axis seems shifted down.

On a continuum from “Where should we eat dinner?” to “Gordian knot” your topics of debate tend toward the latter. On top of that, there is no real incentive to reach consensus in your forums.

In most “real” decisions, problems are simple and consensus is either necessary or preferred. In those cases I’d bet you see trends favoring the initial majority.

I would also take a look at the sample: is it representative of the public or is it representative of the type of people who read sites like OB? I think the second of those groups is way more likely to be composed of people who are able to abandon beliefs in light of new evidence. Given two beliefs with no known objectively correct answer and approximately the same amount of evidence for each, an initial minority should always expect to gain ground in debates among such people.

If Alex is correct, debates will not improve public opinion. It will move opinions toward a 50-50 split regardless of the relative merits of the positions.

Consider how cheap is a binary choice, even with regard to a complex high-dimensional issue. Consider how easy it is to say “you’re either with us or against us” when in the bigger picture it’s clear we have much more in common than not. Consider the tendency toward bifurcation along political lines, right and wrong, good and evil, god and devil…Why do the branches of a tree bifurcate rather than something more complex?

Consider a simple electronic feedback loop, controlling for only a single variable such as voltage. As it becomes “locked”, it will tend toward bipolar symmetrical variation about its set point.

A more complex system, dancing in many dimensions, may be considered not “locked” but adapted, such that its dynamical nature tends to mirror that of its environment. Is it surprising that studies of twins, in regard to traits of adaptation, often show variation correlated roughly 50% nature, 50% environment?

What does this imply for prediction of preferences in general, as we move from the common root of our evolved nature, to the tips of our leaves exploring their adjacent possible?

@Stephen: Yes, you’ve reinforced my point. And to say “an arrow in the direction of the more probably correct answer” rather than “…the more likely correct answer” were it intentional, is the distinction I’ve been trying to impress on our dear Archimedes.

Robin, are the results of the pre-debate votes know to the audience? Your explanation would predict an equalizing effect even if the audience did not know or were mistaken about which view was initially most popular, while Alex’s preferred explanation depends on the audience knowing which position is the “underdog.” (On Alex’s view, the audience should instead switch toward the favorite if they mislead about which is the favorite initially.)

Also, it looks like the source data includes percent undecided. Does your analysis change if you consider these percents? (If the only effect of the debate were to cause undecided people to commit randomly, then that would increase the percentage for the underdog position, but probably should not be interpreted as an increase in support.)

I was confused by the charts at first, too, but I think I’ve figured it out.

Each debate reports the polling results before and after, as percent favoring, percent opposed, and percent undecided. The “contrarian” position is whichever has the smaller percentage supporting it initially, and the “favorite” position is the one with the larger percentage. Because the percent undecided changes before and after, contrarian and favorite positions do not move the same amount or even necessarily the same direction. So we see rather different effects in the two charts.

The red lines are not fits, they are the X=Y lines; if people’s positions did not change at all, all of the points would be on a red line.

One thing I saw (not shown in the charts) is that undecided seems to (at least, almost) always decrease. People feel that they are becoming more certain in their views. That argues against interpretations where people get confused by being exposed to both sides.

It seems plausible that much of the change in position comes from undecided people adopting one of the two sides. That wouldn’t explain all of it but it could explain a lot. Taborek argues that the before-undecided are lying, and were not really undecided. (Maybe they are following a social convention of adopting an unbiased stance before hearing the arguments.) Then you have to assume that these pseudo-undecideds have more moderate views than those who are willing to admit to having made up their minds beforehand.

Visually, the effect looks stronger with the contrarian than the favorite position. That would mean (in this interpretation) that people with the unpopular view are more likely to lie and claim to be undecided beforehand. That could make sense if people are used to hiding unpopular views.

Robin, I second Eliezer’s desire to see a list of topics. If counterintuitive positions tend to be behind at first and ahead at the end, it may be a sign that debates are valuable.

About the idea that it’s easier to steal votes from the other side if they have a large initial lead: shouldn’t the arguments of a position with, for example, 90% support be good enough to convince 9 people for every 1 the other side convinces? If they’re not, why does the position deserve to have 90% support?

Perhaps the solution is to simply debate to audiences that are overwhelmingly composed of the opposition. If the before verdict is unanimous, then conversion can only go one way.

Perhaps it’s better to view debates as providing social evidence in both directions, rather than anything actually persuasive.