This is our monthly place to discuss relevant topics that have not appeared in recent posts.
Doesn’t this just invite trolls?
Thats the idea.
Is there a way to use self-signalling to commit your future self? Are identity and values really just self-signalling? Or is there no such thing as self-signalling?
There is no such thing as the self, so there can be no self-signaling.
The feeling of the “self” is just the output of the resident “this is me” subroutine. Run the “this is me” subroutine in anything and it will self-identify as “self”.
The large computation tasks are all the IO, language, memory. The “this is me” subroutine could likely run on a 286. The IO, language and memory couldn’t and the “this is me” subroutine only gets IO filtered through the non-cognitive IO, language and memory systems, so the “this is me” subroutine thinks it is unique and special. It isn’t, it would feel that way no matter how the other systems were changed.
Gabrielle Giffords still self-identifies as Gabrielle Giffords even though she has changed a lot through having much of her brain destroyed. She doesn’t self-identify as Gabrielle Giffords 2.7. The self-identity module doesn’t work that way. There is no evolved reason for self-identity to have greater fidelity than what is necessary to make the identification “this is me”.
If the notion of “self” had not acquired a heavy coating of mysticism, otherwise intelligent people would never have thought of declaring it illusory.
The “this is me” module is probably just “this is the memories I have access to”. I do consider myself now to be a later version of me 10 years ago, still mostly the same person though.
Faul, if you woke up tomorrow with amnesia, who would you think you were? If you had the slightest ability to think, you would “think” “I am me” because that is all the “this is me” module does.
“There is no such thing as the self”
We are witness.
I think you’re a bit overconfident about your explanation, daedalus2u. I think it’s more accurate to say that understanding the phenomenon of self is a wicked problem, not necessarily easily to reduced to “anything that passes a turing test has a ‘self’ and any concern about theater of consciousness beyond that is mystical”.
Do you know (roughly) where the “this is me” subroutine lives in human brains? Do you have reason to think there is one? What about a “that is you” routine? If it exists, is it proof there is no you?
Humans (and many other organisms) have agency detectors, that is they can detect agency in other organisms. Prey animals need to do this to avoid predators. Social animals need to do this to detect others of their species to cooperate with or compete with. Many of these animals can do this without being able to recognize self as in the mirror test. Relatively few animals can recognize themselves in a mirror. Humans can, some other primates can, elephants, a bird and some sea mammals.
I am pretty sure that agency detection evolved first and self-agency detection evolved later and is just an addition to the agency detection that was already there.
It is probably distributed all over the brain and not localized in one place.
HA, is there some data or evidence you can point to that is inconsistent with what I am saying other than it makes you feel uncomfortable? I am ready to change my conceptualization in the face of data that is inconsistent with it. I think I am only confident in it to the extent that the data and my understanding of the data warrants.
The “I am me” module is simply a feature of the English language, much like the “trout is fish” module. I now am me now, but that is tautological and doesn’t give any new information. I now resemble me five years ago more closely than I resemble Lindsay Lohan, but less closely than I resemble me one year ago (me, in this case, is shorthand for “the entity who posts using the name “Faul_Sname” in online discussions). The idea of self is a useful tool for compression, and the vast majority of the time it is good enough to get the job done.
Faul, that is right. The “I am me” module doesn’t have the fidelity to differentiate different “I’s” and different “me’s”. What ever entity is resident inside your brain is identified as “I” and also as “me”.
If you could transplant the ‘you’ of 5 years ago into your brain today (you actually can’t because there is no “I” independent of the brain that instantiates it), it would still think “I am me”.
To identify itself, the “I am me” module has to do pattern recognition. What pattern does it compare its self perception against in order to do a mapping to see if “I am me”, or “I am someone else”? The only patter it has to use is itself. There is no evolutionary reason for a brain to evolve to use a different pattern for self-identity, and if a different pattern was used, that pattern would require brain resources (neuroanatomy, neural networks, ATP, etc) to instantiate that different pattern. There is no evolved reason to waste resources on a self-identity module with fidelity better than producing a result “I am me”.
You can intellectually appreciate that the “I am me” tautology has to be artifact, but it doesn’t feel that way. The feeling is from the “I am me” module running ‘native’ and what ever substrate it is running ‘native’ in, it will return the “I am me” tautology.
To be able to appreciate how “you” change over time, “you” have to retain the earlier versions to do pattern matching against. To do pattern recognition with the requisite fidelity means you need to keep exact and total copies. That takes exact and total brain computational resources to instantiate. Brains don’t work that way. A copy of former brain states is not kept with the requisite fidelity to instantiate those earlier selves so as to do pattern matching with current self.
In the other thread, Robin talks about saving multiple versions of himself over time so his multiple versions can experience the future too. If he does that, every single one of those ems will “think” that it is the “real” Robin. The “I am me” module doesn’t have the fidelity to do otherwise. If you took a random em, and did a global replace of the “name parameter” with “Robin Hanson”, then that random em would self-identify as Robin Hanson. If every self-reference it has is that it is Robin Hanson, then as far as it is concerned it is Robin Hanson. Never mind that the experiences it has in its memories don’t match the biography in Wikipedia. Its self-identity module will identify it as Robin Hanson and any discrepancies with its Wikipedia biography will be rationalized away as a liberal plot.
You make a large leap. If I found out tomorrow/500 years from now that I was a backup copy, and that another instance of me went on to do the things listed on the Wikipedia page, I would not expect that it was a liberal plot. (I would, however, suspect it was a hallucination, as I am aware of any current way of backing up my brain state). I may be projecting, but I suspect that Robin Hanson would have a similar reaction.
I am fairly sure that I would classify any two instances of “me” to be different so long as they had different memories, and the same when the memories were coherent. As soon as I can no longer read from and write to the memory state of an entity, that entity ceases to be “me”. So I think the “I am me” module is actually a “I can read from and write to memory” module. Then again, this may not reflect the way consciousness feels to you.
You can’t miss the unique fact that you are conscious of your self in a unique way and not at all conscious of any other selves in that same way.
To exerience this directly, but then to assert that there is no such thing is a miracle of putting the model ahead of the reality the model is built to explain.
Cogito ergo sum. Its not an argument, its an observation.
Relatively few animals can recognize themselves in a mirror.
That’s a relatively strong anthropocentric standard.
I’m sure that my dogs think that a self aware entity should be able to recognize the odor of the urine that they left anywhere withing the last several months and marvel at our inability to do so.
JoshINHB, and you know this how? Did your dogs tell you?
Who is using anthropomorphic projection?
Has your further reading of Trivers’ book sparked any noteworthy thoughts or ideas?
Is there a glossary?
Do you think it is possible, in principle, to use genetic engineering to create a vertebrate species that can successfully compete for ecological niches with its wild counterparts without experiencing pain, unpleasantness or distress in any situation? What design principle could be used to accomplish this, if any?
No. There has to be a motivation system for prioritizing activities and by doing so increase the likelihood of survival over non-survival. That motivation system has to have a “neutral” for the normal at rest state, “feel bad” for states which need to be avoided, and “feel good” for states which need to be encouraged.
Organisms that do not have motivation systems to modulate their activities will not have mechanism(s) to apply differential priority to different activities, so there will be no differential priority in their activities. With no differential priority, organisms will be unable to compete with organisms which do have differential priority and can allocate organisms resources efficiently to satisfy differential motivations that prioritize survival over non-survival.
This doesn’t seem right. There are so many useful actions that “feel bad” (stress about the future?) and so many harmful actions that “feel good” (crack cocaine?) that it seems a very bad way to motivate people to maximize survival. We seem to be constantly trying to override our pleasure sensors with our higher cognitive functions that are able to plan ahead and solve for maximum happiness over longer periods.
Why cant we make it so you feel pleasure when things are bad, but even greater pleasure when things are good, so there is still motivation but the whole pleasure scale is shifted towards less pain and greater pleasure?
Thank you for your replies. I think daedalus2u is correct in pointing out that animals need motivation systems to modulate their activities with adaptive differential priorities, and that suffering evolved to cover the aversive aspects of that differential. I also think that Albert Ling is probably correct in assuming that at least some of these functions could be implemented with pleasure differntials. This is also an approach David Pearce has favored in his online manifesto about the abolition of suffering, even though it’s not clear to me this approach can replicate all functions suffering currently has.
But there could be other approaches. For intelligent beings, aversive functions could be covered by the cognitive awareness that future goal fulfillment is contingent upon solving integrity crises successfully. This would require that information about threats and injuries reach the mind’s awareness (such as through intuitive symbols), without causing suffering. If it turns out that abstract awareness isn’t motivating enough, it could be bundled with a dampening of other priorities, such as other emotions, desires or pleasures.
A third approach could be the re-implementation of motivational drives without negative awareness qualia, e.g. pain reflexes without pain awareness, breathing reflexes without suffocation awareness etc. Maybe these approaches can be cleverly combined. It is not clear to me, however, how the ability to learn from mistakes is affected, and how much intelligence is needed as an augmenting factor. I suspect it would be easier to pull off for posthumans than for lions or goats who have to compete in the wild.
Do you think this should be a priority for research? Is this happening?
Albert, if the scale is simply shifted, then what ever is lowest on the scale, whether is is “feel bad” or “feel less pleasure” are equivalent. An organism can only rank its feelings relative to other feelings and that ranking can only be subjective, that is it can only be done in terms of other feelings.
The reason that humans have physiological states that are harmful while feeling good is how humans evolved. This happens to be one of the things I am working on understanding in my research.
Humans (and other organisms) have limited capacity to generate ATP and multiple things that ATP must be used for. Organisms use a “just in time” ATP delivery system, so ATP is always used as fast as it is generated. If there is insufficient ATP, then organisms must either make more or use less, or a combination of both.
Organisms use ATP for essentially everything; for movement by providing the energy for muscles, for synthesis of proteins, for repair of damaged tissues, for reproduction. Pain is a signal that damage is happening and directs the organism to protect itself from the source of the pain. However, there are circumstances where activities that cause damage are desirable, for example when running from a bear where to be caught is certain death. Under such circumstances organisms can enter what is called the “fight or flight” state, where resources (including ATP) are re-allocated to increase chances of survival.
In the “fight or flight” state, organisms are able to run themselves to death. That is, they can run until they have so depleted ATP supplies inside cells that cells are unable to sustain their viability. This is a “feature”. In an evolutionary sense, being caught by a bear and dropping dead from exhaustion are “the same”, an evolutionary fail. It is not that dropping dead from exhaustion is a benefit, but organisms that had the capacity to run themselves until they did drop dead out competed organisms that did not have that capacity, so all extant organisms are descended from ancestors who had that capacity.
Normally, doing metabolic activity until ATP is depleted such that cells necrose is difficult because there is significant pain. This pain is the aversive stimulus to prevent organisms from running themselves to death at a whim. When running from a bear, physiology induces euphoria, what I call the Euphoric Near Death State. That state has to be euphoric to compel organisms to run themselves to death. If that euphoria could be induced easily, organisms would uselessly risk death.
My hypothesis is that drugs like cocaine and amphetamine trigger ENDS and turn off repair pathways. That is where the “extra” energy from stimulants comes from, it isn’t “extra”, it was the energy your body was using for healing, housekeeping, repair of damaged cells, infection control, and so on. That can all be turned off (for short periods of time) which then increases the ATP available to do other things that might be more important (like running from a bear). But when those housekeeping pathways are turned off, damage accumulates. When the damage exceeds a threshold, the compensatory pathways “break” and the degeneration accelerates and terminates in death.
Examples of ENDS are the euphoria of stimulant drugs of abuse, autoerotic asphyxiation, solvent huffing, the runner’s high, PCP and other drug induced rage, roid rage, the berserker state, and the euphoria of drowning and other near death experiences.
This is why feelings are not always a reliable indication of how you are doing.
Albert, if the scale is simply shifted, then what ever is lowest on the scale, whether is is “feel bad” or “feel less pleasure” are equivalent. An organism can only rank its feelings relative to other feelings
That is a much stronger empirical claim than you may think it is. Neuroscience shows that different brain regions handle different aspects of valuation. For instance, pleasure and pain don’t seem to be just activation differentials in the same module but actually relate to distinct regions in the brain. Given this, it seems unlikely that your claim above is true.
Can you have a neutral state which you reliably never go below? I like certain experiences better than others. Do you think if I only experienced the ones above my current “neutral” that I would start disliking good but not great experiences?
If instead of labeling the points on the scale as “feelings”, we map them onto the degree of urgency that the organism needs to compel a certain activity so as to survive.
With this mapping, what we have is a ranking of things the organism needs to do so as to survive. For the most extreme time and survival urgent task, there needs to be the most extreme compulsion to achieve that task ASAP.
Consider the degree of urgency to be analogous to a discount rate. When there is low urgency, the discount rate is low and things can be put off until later. When there is high urgency, the discount rate is higher and things that are currently being done get put off because they have a lower discount rate.
In the limit, when running from a bear, the discount rate becomes infinite. The next few seconds of running from the bear is worth as much as the organisms entire future life. That is the trade-off being made. This is what compels the euphoria of near death metabolic stress. This is why the runner’s high makes you feel as if you can run forever. You can only run until the bear catches you, or until you drop dead from exhaustion. The bear catching you and dropping dead are the same as “forever” and completely equivalent in an evolutionary sense.
I don’t think it is possible to have organisms that will compete successfully with “wild-type” organisms if those organisms do not have the capacity to experience differential compulsions sufficient to motivate actions in the moment (running from a bear) more than actions over years (not running yourself to death).
daedalus2u, I think we can all agree with this, but of course it’s not the answer to the original question. Specifically, you haven’t shown that such a system can’t be implemented without using suffering as a driver. Several potential approaches have been mentioned above.
Do you think if I only experienced the ones above my current “neutral” that I would start disliking good but not great experiences?
Andrew, no, I don’t think so. The relevant question is whether the full adaptive value of below-neutral experiences can be replaced by autonomous reflexes, explicit cognitive reasoning, or gradients of above-neutral experiences.
To avoid confusion, we should also strive toward a better neuroscientific analysis to which information-processes in the brain good vs. bad experiences reduce.
Anonymous, no, it can’t. There are some activities that must be highly rewarded with intense euphoria; activities such as running from a bear.
If an organism is in the neutral default state, what is there to prevent it from transitioning to the euphoric state of near death metabolic stress which it can enter simply by depleting its ATP resources?
There has to be an aversive state between the default neutral state and the euphoric near death metabolic state to prevent useless entry into the euphoric near death state. That aversive state has to have the same degree of aversion as the euphoric state has euphoria. In other words the aversive state has to make life so miserable that suicide seems attractive. That level of aversion is the only thing that can successfully control a degree of euphoria where running yourself to death actually is attractive and highly desirable.
Evolution has minimized the sum of deaths from being caught by the bear, by suicide due to depression and by dropping dead from exhaustion when being chased by a bear. The minimization function has to include some of all three.
Maybe you could anesthetize an organism so it couldn’t feel the adverse state, but then it wouldn’t be able to feel the euphoric state either and it wouldn’t have the differential control necessary to selectively enter either one. If you want to retain conscious control over activities such as running from a bear, then you need to give that consciousness signals that indicate when to enter the “fight or flight” state, what to do in that state and when to leave it.
Suffering isn’t the driver to cause an action, it is the driver to prevent transition into the euphoric near death state.
But why? Why not make the euphoria itself contingent upon there actually being a bear? (metaphorically speaking)
The main reason is because that is how organisms evolved and if you made the euphoria module contingent like that it wouldn’t activate appropriately when it was needed.
A zillion things have to be regulated automatically during that euphoric state, many of them are unconscious and relate to resource allocation to running from the bear. Those resource allocation steps have to occur under a variety of conditions in addition to running from a bear. For example if you have an ischemic stroke, one of the symptoms is sometimes euphoria. The reason is because insufficient brain ATP triggers euphoria in addition to triggering things that reduce ATP consumption. That is the physiology behind autoerotic asphyxiation (which you can die from).
You want to be able to trigger euphoria during a stroke, because you might need to take some action during a stroke that requires euphoria.
It might be possible to make a wholly synthetic organism that didn’t exhibit euphoria except contingently like that, but it would mean redesigning essentially all of physiology including development (and all of the zillion things that get regulated automatically). Such organisms would bear no relationship to organisms that already exist. It is not even clear if it would be possible.
You want to be able to trigger euphoria during a stroke, because you might need to take some action during a stroke that requires euphoria.
daedalus2u, I suspect you confuse correlation with function in some of these examples. Strokes are clearly failure modes, and even if you hallucinated meeting Mel Gibson during a stroke, that wouldn’t imply the hallucination has a function, it could just be a symptom of brain failure. I suspect the same for euphoria from hypoxia, such as in erotic asphyxiation, but I didn’t research this enough to insist on the point.
My central observation from your last post is that your main argument revolves around complexity, i.e. that the system’s redesign would have to be very thorough, and many interdependencies would have to be considered. This may well be true, but as far as I can tell, no one has raised arguments why it can’t be done in principle, just that it would be very difficult. The same is true for other technological goals, such as strong AI, economic fusion reactors, or, retrospectively, getting humans to the moon or sending functional probes to Mars. It’s not a knock-down argument.
I also disagree that the resulting organisms couldn’t bear any resemblence to the existing ones – a lion redesigned like this could still look like a current lion, behave relatively similarly to it, and occuply the same ecological niches under similar ecological laws. A very advanced civilization could create entire ecosystems that are very similar to our natural ones, but contain much less or no suffering. Intelligent beings could redesign themselves in ways that leave them able to survive and compete, without suffering or with much less suffering than humans. As far as I can see, no principle arguments have been raised against such options for humanity in the future, given enough research, motivation and acceptance of failures along the way.
In principle, you might be able to engineer an organism that looked like a lion and had strange non-evolvable properties, like the organisms in the Hitch Hikers guide that were sentient and wanted to be eaten and would voluntarily drop dead so they could be eaten. But there is a pretty high degree of difficulty which we don’t know enough to be able to estimate even within a few orders of magnitude. Is it a few billion person years of experiment and design? Or a few trillion? Or a few quadrillion? Or if complexity doesn’t scale linearly as n but scales as n^2, it may take 10^500 person years of experiment and design. You are talking about something that can’t evolve naturally, and with very specific and unique mental characteristics. It may not even be possible to do.
Remember, behaviors are not a property of a genotype, they are a property of a phenotype, and the phenotype of the brain is generated via neurodevelopment.
If you had the capability of tuning mental states as you are talking, then putting it in a lion suit would be trivial. It wouldn’t be able to reproduce with a real lion because it would have to be different in so many different ways there is no way they could possibly have compatible genome.
A stroke is a failure mode. It is the failure mode after all the stroke-prevention control pathways have failed to prevent a stroke. We don’t know what all of those stroke-prevention pathways are or how they work, what they do and what they don’t do. Eventually virtually everyone has strokes, and strokes that they survive from. Is the occurrence of hallucinations following a big stroke a consequence of stroke-response control pathways that enhances survival and reduced damage for a small stroke?
I had a question for you regarding prediction markets.
You often say that large organizations are less likely to adopt such markets for various non-efficiency reasons. I agree with this. However, what prevents upstart and fairly new orgs from adopting these markets where the benefit from higher efficiency is likely much higher than the costs?
I would imagine that smaller organizations get less benefit from prediction markets because they have fewer participants. The markets are less fluid, and other information-sharing mechanisms are more likely to work.
However, I would expect that they still get some benefit, and so that can’t be a complete explanation.
Yes i agree with your explanation. The only question is why don’t more upstart orgs use prediction markets for whom benefits are MORE likely to outweigh costs. If prediction markets were such a good deal as in their current proposed forms, then surely market competition in many countries of the world might have pushed at least SOME orgs to adopt these techniques. If the time trend of prediction markets adoption is not positive then there might be a problem with the basic concept’s benefits itself.
… be a charity angel.