Financial Status

At a finance conference last year, I learned this: Instead of saving money directly for their own retirement, many workers have their employers save for them. Those employers hire in-house specialists to pick which specialty consulting firms to hire. These consulting firms advise employers on which investment firms to use. And those investment firms pick actual productive enterprises in which to invest. All three of these intermediaries, i.e., employer, consultant, and investor, take a cut for their active management.

Even employees who invest for themselves tend to pick at least one high fee intermediary: an active-management investment firm. Few take the low cost option of just directly investing in a low-overhead index fund, as recommended by academics for a half-century.

I’ve given talks at many active-management investment firms over the years. They pay speakers very well. I’ve noticed that (like management consults) they tend to hire very visibly impressive people. They also give big investors a lot of personal quality time, to create personal relationships. Their top people seem better at making investors like them than at picking investments. One math-focused firm said it didn’t want more investors because investors all demand more face time and influence over investment choices.

Since 1880 the fraction of US GDP paid for financial intermediation has gone from 2% to 8%. And:

The unit cost [relative to asset income] of financial intermediation appears to be as high today as it was around 1900. This is puzzling. Advances in information technology (IT) should lower the physical transaction costs of buying, pooling and holding financial assets. Trading costs have indeed decreased, but trading volumes have increased even more, and active fund management is expensive. … Investors spend 0.67% of asset value trying (in vain on average, by definition) to beat the market. … While mutual funds fees have dropped, high fee alternative asset managers have gained market share. The end result is that asset management unit costs have remained roughly constant. The comparison with retail and wholesale trade is instructive. In these sectors … larger IT investment coincides with lower prices and lower (nominal) GDP shares. In finance, however, exactly the opposite happens. … A potential explanation is oligopolistic competition but … the historical evidence does not seem to support the naive market power explanation, however. (more)

Our standard academic story on finance is that it buys risk-reduction, and perhaps also that we are overconfident in finance judgements. But it isn’t clear we’ve had much net risk reduction, especially to explain a four times spending increase. (In fact, some argue plausibly that those who take more risk don’t actually get higher returns.) On overconfidence, why would it induce such indirection, and why would its effects increase by such a huge factor over time?

Finance seems to me to be another area, like medicine, schools, and many others, where our usual standard stories just don’t work very well at explaining the details. In such cases most economists just gullibly plow ahead trying to force-fit the standard story onto available data, instead of considering substantially different hypotheses. Me, I try to collect as many pieces of related puzzling data as I can, and then ask what simple but different stories might account at once for many of those puzzles.

To me an obvious explanation to consider here is that we like to buy special connections to prestigious advisors. We look good when bonded to others who look good, and we treat investor relations as especially important bonds. We seem to get blamed less for failures via prestigious associates, and yet are credited for most of our success via them. Finally, we just seem to directly like prestigious associations, even when others don’t know of them. And we may also gain from associating with others who share our advisors.

To explain the change in finance over time, I’ll try my usual go-to explanation for long-term changes in the last few centuries: increasing wealth. In particular, social bonds as a luxury that we buy more of when richer. This can explain the big increases we’ve seen in leisure, product variety, medicine, and schooling.

So as we get rich, we spend larger fractions of our time socializing, we pay more for products with identities that can tie us to particular others, we spend more to assure associates that we care their health, and we spend more to visibly connect with prestigious associates. Some of those prestigious associates are at the schools we attend, the places we live, and via the products we buy. Others come via our financial intermediaries.

This hypothesis suggests an ironic reversal: While we usually play up how much we care about associates, and play down our monetary motives, in finance we pretend to make finance choices purely to get money, while in fact we lose money to gain prestigious associates.

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SciCast Contest

SciCast is holding a new contest:

We’ll be offering $16,000 in prizes for conditional forecasts only made from April 23 to May 22.

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Stock Vs. Flow War

When our farmer ancestors warred, they often went about as far as they could to apply all available resources to their war efforts. This included converting plowshares into swords, ships into navies, farmers into soldiers, granaries into soldiers on the move, good will into allies, and cash into foreign purchases. When wars went long and badly, such resources were often quite depleted by the end. Yet warring farmers only rarely went extinct. Why?

The distinction between stock and flow is a basic one in engineering and finance. Stocks allow flows. A granary is a stock, and it can produce a flow of grain to eat, but that flow will end if the stock is not sufficiently replenished with every harvest. A person is a stock, which can produce work every week, but to make that last we need to create and train new people. Many kinds of stocks have limits on the flows they can produce. While you might be able to pull grain from a granary as fast as you like, you can only pull one hour of work from a worker per hour.

Natural limits on the flows that our stocks can produce have in the past limited the destructiveness of war. Even when war burned the crops, knocked down stone buildings, and killed most of the people, farmland usually bounced back in a few years, and human and animal populations could grow back in a few generations. Stones were restacked to make new buildings. The key long-term stocks of tech and culture were preserved, allowing for a quick rebuilding of previous professions, towns, and trade routes.

Future technologies are likely to have weaker limits on the conversion of stocks into flows. When we have more fishing boats we can more quickly deplete the stock of fish. Instead of water wheels that must wait for water to come down a stream, we make dams that give us water when we want. When we tap oil wells instead of killing whales for oil, the rate at which we can extract oil grows with the size and number of our wells. Eventually we may tap the sun itself not just by basking in its sunlight, but by uplifting its material and running more intense fusion reactors.

Our stronger abilities to turn stocks into flows can be great in peacetime, but they are problematic in wartime. Yes, the side with stronger abilities gains an advantage in war, but after a fierce war the stocks will be lower. Thus improving technology is making war more destructive, not just by blowing up more with each bomb, but by allowing more resources to be tapped more quickly to support war efforts.

This is another way of saying what I was trying to say in my last post: improving tech can make war more destructive, increasing the risk of extinction via war. When local nature was a key stock, diminishing returns in extracting resources from nature limited how much we could destroy during total war. In contrast, when resources can be extracted as fast and easy as grain from a granary, war is more likely to take nearly all of the resources.

Future civilization should make resources more accessible, not just to extract more kinds of slow flows, but also to extract fast flows more cheaply. While this will make it easier to flexibly use such stocks in peacetime, it also suggests a faster depletion of stocks during total war. Only the stocks that cannot be depleted, like technology and culture, may remain. And once the sun is available as a rapidly depletable resource, it may not take many total wars to deplete it.

This seems to me our most likely future great filter, and thus extinction risk. War becomes increasingly destructive, erasing stocks that are not fully replenished between wars, and often taking us to the edge of a small fragile population that could be further reduced by other disasters. And if the dominant minds and cultures speed up substantially, as I expect, that might speed up the cycle of war, allowing less time to recover between total wars.

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Beware General Visible Prey

Charles Stross recently on possible future great filters:

So IO9 ran a piece by George Dvorsky on ways we could wreck the solar system. And then Anders Sandberg responded in depth on the subject of existential risks, asking what conceivable threats have big enough spatial reach to threaten an interplanetary or star-faring civilization. … The implication of an [future great filter] is that it doesn’t specifically work against life, it works against interplanetary colonization. … much as Kessler syndrome could effectively block all access to low Earth orbit as a side-effect of carelessly launching too much space junk. Here are some example scenarios: …

Simplistic warfare: … Today’s boringly old-hat chemical rockets, even in the absence of nuclear warheads, are formidably destructive weapons. … War, or other resource conflicts, within a polity capable of rapid interplanetary or even slow interstellar flight, is a horrible prospect.

Irreducible complexity: I take issue with one of Anders’ assumptions, which is that a multi-planet civilization is … not just … distributed, but it will almost by necessity have fairly self-sufficient habitats that could act as seeds for a new civilization if they survive. … I doubt that we could make a self-sufficient habitat that was capable of maintaining its infrastructure and perpetuating and refreshing its human culture with a population any smaller than high-single-digit millions. … Building robust self-sufficient off-world habitats … is vastly more expensive than building an off-world outpost and shipping rations there, as we do with Antarctica. …

Griefers: … All it takes is one civilization of alien ass-hat griefers who send out just one Von Neumann Probe programmed to replicate, build N-D lasers, and zap any planet showing signs of technological civilization, and the result is a galaxy sterile of interplanetary civilizations until the end of the stelliferous era. (more)

These are indeed scenarios of concern. But I find it hard to see how, by themselves, they could add up to a big future filter. Continue reading "Beware General Visible Prey" »

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My Two May Em Talks

You are invited to attend two unusual conferences where I’ll speak in May:

1. INSTED: Agitate! Los Angeles, May 2, 10am-10pm. $25 if you act fast. I talk at time TBD:

The Age Of Em: Envisioning Brain Emulation Societies

Tired of all the wining and boasting on the latest tech & politics trends? See it all shrink to insignificance as we contemplate the next revolution on the scale of the farming and industrial revolutions. The Age of Em will start sometime in the next century; in it, brain emulations could change almost everything.

2. Building The New World Conference, May 28-31, Radford University in Virginia,  $375 for 4 days includes food & room. I talk at 3:30pm May 30 on:

When Men Become Machines: Meaning, Identity, and Ethics at the Advent of a Trans-Human Era and Emulation-Based Singularity.

The three most disruptive transitions in history were the introduction of humans, farming, and industry. Another transition lies ahead: Artificial Intelligence in the form of whole brain emulations – “ems” – sometime in the next century. We will explore the upcoming Trans-Human Era, which will include ems, using a broad synthesis of standard academic consensus, and we will outline a baseline scenario for this “Singularity.” Lastly, we will consider not only the economics of this new world, but also the meaning and identity that human residents will experience during this unprecedented shift.

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Perfect Bits

Did you know that your phone, pad, and laptop are all “computers” wherein all relevant info is stored in “bits”? And did you further know that you can get tools to let you very easily change almost any of those bits? Since you can change most any bits in these devices, you need never tolerate any imperfections in anything that results from those bits. Thus you should never see any disagreeable screen or menu or feature or outcome in any app in any of those systems for more than a short moment. Same for books, music, and movies. After all, as soon as you notice any imperfection, why you’ll open your tool, change the bad bits, and abra cadabra, the system will be perfect again. Right?

In Mind Uploading Will Replace the Need for Religion, “Award-winning #1 Bestseller Philosophy & Sci-Fi Visionary” and Transhumanist Party presidential candidate Zoltan Istvan applies the same penetrating insight to future ems:

Being able to upload our entire minds into a computer is probably just 25-35 years off. … As people begin uploading themselves, they’ll also be hacking and writing improved code for their new digital selves. … This influx of better code will eliminate … stupidity and social evil. …

In the future, we may all have avatars—perfectly uploaded versions of ourselves … [who] will help guide us and not allow us to do dumb or terrible things. … Someone trustworthy will always be in our head, advising us of the best path to take. …

This is why the future will be far better than it is now. In the coming digital world, we may be perfect, or very close to it. Expect a much more utopian society for whatever social structures end up existing in virtual reality and cyberspace. But also expect the real world to radically improve. Expect the drug user to have their addictions corrected or overcome. Expect the domestic abuser to have their violence and drive for power diminished. Expect the mentally depressed to become happy. And finally, expect the need for religion to disappear as a real-life god—our near perfect moral selves—symbiotically commune with us. (more)

Well there’s a few complications. Humans don’t always take advice they are given. And since brains were designed by evolution, we expect their code to be harder to read and usefully change than the device app code written by humans. But surely those are only small bumps on our short 35 year road to utopia. Right?

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Light On Dark Matter

I posted recently on the question of what makes up the “dark matter” intangible assets that today are most of firm assets. Someone pointed me to a 2009 paper of answers:

IntangibleShares

[C.I. = ] Computerized information is largely composed of the NIPA series for business investment in computer software. …

[Scientific R&D] is designed to capture innovative activity built on a scientific base of knowledge. … Non-scientific R&D includes the revenues of the non-scientific commercial R&D industry … the costs of developing new motion picture films and other forms of entertainment, investments in new designs, and a crude estimate of the spending for new product development by financial services and insurance firms. …

[Brand equity] includes spending on strategic planning, spending on redesigning or reconfiguring existing products in existing markets, investments to retain or gain market share, and investments in brand names. Expenditures for advertising are a large part of the investments in brand equity, but … we estimated that only about 60 percent of total advertising expenditures were for ads that had long-lasting effects. …

Investment in firm-specific human and structural resources … includes the costs of employer-provided worker training and an estimate of management time devoted to enhancing the productivity of the firm. … business investments in firm-specific human and structural resources through strategic planning, adaptation, reorganization, and employee-skill building. (more; HT Brandon Pizzola)

According to this paper, more firm-specific resources is the biggest story, but more product development is also important. More software is third in importance.

Added 15Apr: On reflection, this seems to suggest that the main story is our vast increase in product variety. That explains the huge increase in investments in product development and firm-specific resources, relative to more generic development and resources.

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‘About’ Isn’t About You

Imagine you told people:

  1. What looks like the sky above is actually the roof of a cave, and trees hold it up.
  2. The food we eat doesn’t give us nutrition; we get nutrition by rubbing rocks.
  3. The reason we wear clothes isn’t for modesty or protection from weather, but instead to keep cave frogs from jumping on our skin.

Imagine that you offered plausible evidence for these claims. But imagine further that people mostly took your claims as personal accusations, and responded defensively:

“Don’t look at me. I’ve always been a big supporter of trees, I’ve always warned against the dangers of frogs, and I make sure to rub rocks regularly.”

Other than being defensive, however, people showed little interest in these revelations. How would that make you feel?

That is how I feel about typical responses to my saying politics isn’t about policy, medicine isn’t about health, charity isn’t about helping, etc. People usually focus on proving that even if I’m right about others, they are the rare exceptions. They offer specific evidence on their personal behavior to prove that for them politics is about policy, medicine is about health, charity is about helping, etc. But aside from that, they show little interest in what such hypotheses might imply about the world in which they live. (They are, however, often eager to point out that I may have illicit motivations for pointing all this out.)

To which I respond: really, “X is not about Y” is not about you. Yes, your forager ancestors were hyper-sensitive to being singled out by public accusations of norm violations, and in fact much of our reasoning and story abilities may have evolved to help us defend against such accusations, and to make such accusations against others. So yes your instincts naturally push you to react this way.

But I’m talking about ways that we all violate the norms to which we all give lip service. I’m not trying to shame some of us, or even all of us, into trying harder to live up to our professed ideals. I’m focused first and foremost on making sense of our world. If I really believed that the sky might really be the roof of a cave held up by trees, or that we wear clothes to protect against frogs, I wouldn’t focus first on making sure that I was very publicly pro-tree and anti-frog; I’d instead ask what else I must rethink, given such revelations.

Once we better understand the basics of what we are doing in areas like policy, medicine, charity, etc. then we might start to ask if we should be doing more or less of those things, and if invoking norms, and shaming norm violators, will help or hurt on net. But first someone needs to figure out the basics of what we are doing in these areas of life. I implore some of you to join me in this noble quest.

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Party in the Street

Michael Heaney and Fabio Rojas’s new book Party in the Street: The Antiwar Movement and the Democratic Party after 9/11 tries to explain the puzzle of antiwar protests falling greatly after the election of Obama, who mostly continued previous war policies:

In examining war policy positions taken by candidates in the 2004 and 2008 [US presidential] elections, we find that Democratic politicians articulated more fervent antiwar positions than did politicians within the Republican Party, even though there were varying positions among politicians in both parties. Exit poll data reveal that politicians in the Democratic Party benefited during electoral contests from the support of antiwar constituencies. However, when we look at the evolution of actual war policies from the Bush to the Obama administrations, we find more continuity than change. The Obama administration shifted emphasis from Iraq to Afghanistan, but these shifts were still only a slight redirection of the trajectory set forth by the Bush administration. Given Obama’s continuation of many of Bush’s policies, we would have expected the antiwar movement to react with steady or increased levels of protests. Yet, antiwar protests declined during Obama’s presidency, even in the presence of policies that continued war. We argue that, in order to explain this pattern, a new perspective is needed on the relationship between parties and movements. (p.8)

On the surface, this looks like simple hypocrisy: Democratic party elites exploiting false voter beliefs that Democrats are more anti-war than Republicans. Heaney and Rojas are clear that this belief is false:

Our focus is not on why the antiwar movement failed to prevent – or to end – the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We think that the answer to this question is similarly evident: Barriers to policy success for the antiwar movement may have been insurmountable from the start. In general, antiwar movements tend to be less successful in achieving their policy goals than other social movements because they challenge the security interests of state actors and, thus, receive relatively little facilitation from the state. As a result, antiwar movements rarely prevent nations from going to war. (p.7)

But Heaney and Rojas do not phrase their explanation in the language of hypocrisy. They talk instead of identity:

Political actors embrace multiple identities during their participation in politics. When these identities overlap, they have the potential both to amplify party-movement cooperation (when they reinforce one another) and to undercut party-movement cooperation (when they conflict with one another). Thus, the interplay of multiple identities helps to provide an explanation for the dynamics of the party in the street. Drawing upon scholarship in the intersectionality tradition, we hypothesize that partisan identities often trump movement identities during periods of conflict, a tendency that may lead to important identity shifts among mobilized actors. …

Antiwar activists with identities linked to the Democratic Party tended to depart from the antiwar movement earlier than did activists without Democratic identities. Further, … although Democratic Party members generally held an antiwar point of view, their mobilization for the antiwar cause usually assumed a lower priority than mobilization on many other issues, such as health care. … We reach these conclusions after controlling for alternative explanations for individuals’ behavior, such as the possibility that differences in ideology may account for activists’ opposition to war under all circumstances, as opposed to under specific conditions. (p.9)

While this is all plausible, it seems to me rather evasive on the source of the key “reinforcement” and “conflict”. The authors don’t directly say why being anti-war and Democrat reinforce each other with a Republican president, yet are in conflict with Democrat president. Yet if Democrats were actually much more anti-war than Republicans, why is there a conflict between being anti-war and Democrat with a Democrat president? And if voters thought Republicans were no more pro-war than Democrats, why is anti-war reinforced with a Republican president?

When we identify with a party, we tend to be willing to believe its idealistic descriptions of itself, even in the face of consistent and strong evidence to the contrary. We like to think we pick a party because we agree with its positions, but in fact we often change our positions when our party changes its positions, to stay loyal:

At least some members of the mass electorate switch their issue preferences to align with their partisan identification, even when that issue is highly salient to them. … “The fact that partisanship leads to changes in attitudes on issues like abortion, government provision of services, and government help for blacks for many citizens clearly runs counter to the idea that party identification is largely a summary of other evaluations.” …

What does a politician do when she or he is left behind by the party on a key issue? … Politicians are much more likely to deliberately adjust their issue positions to the party’s new stand. … Politicians who elect to leave the group … are met with great scorn by their former colleagues. (pp.77-79)

Added 8p: If they had framed their story more in terms of hypocrisy, they might have asked which media or interest groups tried to tell antiwar protesters the truth before Obama was elected, what reception they received, and why did other big media chose not to tell.

Added 9a: More evidence here that voters change positions in response to changes in which politicians are in power.

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Firms Now 5/6 Dark Matter!

Scott Sumner:

We all know that the capital-intensive businesses of yesteryear like GM and US steel are an increasingly small share of the US economy. But until I saw this post by Justin Fox I had no idea how dramatic the transformation had been since 1975:

intangibles

Wow. I had no idea as well. As someone who teaches graduate industrial organization, I can tell you this is HUGE. And I’ve been pondering it for the week since Scott posted the above.

Let me restate the key fact. The S&P 500 are five hundred big public firms listed on US exchanges. Imagine that you wanted to create a new firm to compete with one of these big established firms. So you wanted to duplicate that firm’s products, employees, buildings, machines, land, trucks, etc. You’d hire away some key employees and copy their business process, at least as much as you could see and were legally allowed to copy.

Forty years ago the cost to copy such a firm was about 5/6 of the total stock price of that firm. So 1/6 of that stock price represented the value of things you couldn’t easily copy, like patents, customer goodwill, employee goodwill, regulator favoritism, and hard to see features of company methods and culture. Today it costs only 1/6 of the stock price to copy all a firm’s visible items and features that you can legally copy. So today the other 5/6 of the stock price represents the value of all those things you can’t copy.

So in forty years we’ve gone from a world where it was easy to see most of what made the biggest public firms valuable, to a world where most of that value is invisible. From 1/6 dark matter to 5/6 dark matter. What can possibly have changed so much in less than four decades? Some possibilities:

Error – Anytime you focus on the most surprising number you’ve seen in a long time, you gotta wonder if you’ve selected for an error. Maybe they’ve really screwed up this calculation.

Selection – Maybe big firms used to own factories, trucks etc., but now they hire smaller and foreign firms that own those things. So if we looked at all the firms we’d see a much smaller change in intangibles. One check: over half of Wilshire 5000 firm value is also intangible.

Methods – Maybe firms previously used simple generic methods that were easy for outsiders to copy, but today firms are full of specialized methods and culture that outsiders can’t copy because insiders don’t even see or understand them very well. Maybe, but forty years ago firm methods sure seemed plenty varied and complex.

Innovation – Maybe firms are today far more innovative, with products and services that embody more special local insights, and that change faster, preventing others from profiting by copying. But this should increase growth rates, which we don’t see. And product cycles don’t seem to be faster. Total US R&D spending hasn’t changed much as a GDP fraction, though private spending is up by less than a factor of two, and public spending is down.

Patents – Maybe innovation isn’t up, but patent law now favors patent holders more, helping incumbents to better keep out competitors. Patents granted per year in US have risen from 77K in 1975 to 326K in 2014. But Patent law isn’t obviously so much more favorable. Some even say it has weakened a lot in the last fifteen years.

Regulation – Maybe regulation favoring incumbents is far stronger today. But 1975 wasn’t exact a low regulation nirvana. Could regulation really have changed so much?

Employees – Maybe employees used to jump easily from firm to firm, but are now stuck at firms because of health benefits, etc. So firms gain from being able to pay stuck employees due to less competition for them. But in fact average and median employee tenure is down since 1975.

Advertising – Maybe more ads have created more customer loyalty. But ad spending hasn’t changed much as fraction of GDP. Could ads really be that much more effective? And if they were, wouldn’t firms be spending more on them?

Brands – Maybe when we are richer we care more about the identity that products project, and so are willing to pay more for brands with favorable images. And maybe it takes a long time to make a new favorable brand image. But does it really take that long? And brand loyalty seems to actually be down.

Monopoly – Maybe product variety has increased so much that firm products are worse substitutes, giving firms more market power. But I’m not aware that any standard measures of market concentration (such as HHI) have increased a lot over this period.

Alas, I don’t see a clear answer here. The effect that we are trying to explain is so big that we’ll need a huge cause to drive it. Yes it might have several causes, but each will then have to be big. So something really big is going on. And whatever it is, it is big enough to drive many other trends that people have been puzzling over.

Added 5p: This graph gives the figure for every year from ’73 to ’07.

Added 8p: This post shows debt/equity of S&P500 firms increasing from ~28% to ~42% from ’75 to ’15 . This can explain only a small part of the increase in intangible assets. Adding debt to tangibles in the numerator and denominator gives intangibles going from 13% in ’75 to 59% in ’15.

Added 8a 6Apr: Tyler Cowen emphasizes that accountants underestimate the market value of ordinary capital like equipment, but he neither gives (nor points to) an estimate of the typical size of that effect.

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