Tag Archives: Status

Status Madness Starves Religion

A big reason why we have the delusions we do: as we get rich, we each increasingly over-estimate our relative social status. … evolution had humans use their absolute income/wealth to judge their relative status. (I’m talking here about overall status in the larger community, not status relative to particular associates …) Yes, this method would work badly in environments where communities varied greatly in average levels of absolute income/wealth. …

This theory predicts that humans came to live much longer after the industrial revolution. … this theory predicts what we have seen: declining rates of violence and conflict, less war, and widening moral circles. … key prediction is: we are more mad for status, as we think we already have a lot of it. … this predicts more school … [as predicted,] fertility has fallen dramatically over the last few centuries … people more eager for news, talk, politics, democracy, government, and paternalistic policies. …

Regarding religion, our seeing ourselves as higher status makes us more expect to be prophets, priests, monks, martyrs, and activists, but less to be the prototypical attendee of religious services, the meek supplicant to whom religion offers comfort and meaning in their hard life. (More)

Centuries ago states took power and property from the church, and then over time participation in religion by ordinary people has greatly declined; I can see this decline directly in my family in in the families of people around me. Across nations (though not much within nations), this decline (and a decline in superstition) has been correlated with rising income, education, and welfare spending. People are mainly religious because parents push it on them, and religious change seems to be concentrated in childhood; once people reach adulthood they mostly retain their prior religion levels.

While many theories have been offered to explain this decline, status madness seems to me a pretty good candidate. People in richer and more educated nations see themselves as higher status. And the higher that people see themselves, the less willing they are to bow down to others. Culture has eliminated most of the ways that people once had to defer and bow to elites around them. We’ve used democracy to get rid of kings, and to see ourselves as partial rulers. And, full of ourselves, we are reluctant to bow down before and worship gods. Even ideal gods.

Some see the key dynamic here as people slowly learning over time the fact that there are no gods. But why should a nation have to get rich itself to learn this fact, if other nations around it have already learned it? Furthermore, this learning theory predicts that opinion change should follow a random walk, not a straight trend. And even today very few people actually understand the relevant evidence well enough to make this judgment.

Furthermore there are actually are gods! Maybe not the gods described in the most popular religions, but gods nonetheless. We should estimate that roughly half of the universe out there right now is filled with advanced creatures who are to us as gods. This part of the universe will be filled with gods within a billion years, and much sooner if we don’t all kill ourselves. And we might be being visited by UFO aliens right now.

Someday most of our descendants will meet creatures who are to them as gods. (Even if those gods are other of our descendants.) At that point I predict that they will no longer be so status mad, and so full of themselves, as to be unwilling to respect those gods. They will bow down to, and even worship, their betters.

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How High Our Elite Tax?

In the ancient world, invading armies were mostly men who, if they won, stayed and took over the top status slots in the new society. After a few generations, the locals would almost completely submit, and see invader descendants as the highest status elite members of “us”.

When invaders had distinctive looks, styles, etc. then those became marks of high status. People would seek such marks for they and their family, and try to associate with those who had such marks. To get people to support their ventures, they’d try to give them the appearance of elite support, via attracting elite members, investors, customers, suppliers, regulators, etc. As any substantial elite opposition could doom their ventures.

These elites would of course charge a price for their support, and such prices would add up to an elite tax on the society. The size of this tax would depend on how many such elites had to be “paid off” in this way to make anything happen, and how well suited were such elites for the roles they took on. In the limit of many available elites who were actually just directly the best people for their roles, this elite tax was zero. But the more that ventures had to pay off elites who were not otherwise the best for their roles, and have people do things in other than the best ways, in order to gain that crucial perception of elite support, the larger the tax.

Societies in history have varied in how they define status, and thus have varied in how much they waste in efforts to achieve status. When war was important, for example, societies that defined status in terms of military accomplishment had in essence a lower tax, and thus a competitive advantage over rivals. Today when innovation is important, then organizations where status is rewarded for promoting innovation can be at a similar advantage.

In academia, we often see similar effects on smaller scales. Particular fields are taken over by a mutual admiration insider’s club, and then everyone in that field must pay tribute to these insiders to get anything done. If you do not sufficiently praise, cite, fund, hire, etc. such insiders, you will be excluded from the field.

So how big a tax does our society pay for the perception of elite support? Much of status in our world is set via graduating from elite schools and being hired for elite jobs, and many say that we have a “meritocracy” in picking applicants to such positions only on the basis of directly relevant abilities. But of course we know this is only partially true.

As I’ve discussed before, in many areas today elites from around the world have merged into a single elite community which share common standards on who is elite and what criteria they use to decide status. As this world elite faces no competition from other worlds, our world is now more vulnerable to drifting status criteria; competition between societies won’t suppress wasteful criteria. For example, if elites everywhere measure status via years of pointless school, then the whole world could just keeping doing too much such school.

One interesting way to try to measure our elite tax is to look at events where the tax rose quickly and dramatically. Sometimes a particular field is low status, with people there paid accordingly, and then suddenly the field rises greatly income and status. At which point high status people enter and take over the highest status positions of that field. Such elite entrants tend to be young and lack experience in that field, and so tend to denigrate the old and experienced there. They push for generic elite practices that may not be the best for this area.

For example, tech used to be nerdy and lower status, and then made a lot of money and rose in status. Top school kids decided to take jobs in tech, especially right after investment banking jobs dried up after the 2008 crash. And so top school kids took over tech, putting a new extra premium on youth and top school degrees. Tech priorities and practices changed, including a lot more interest in woke politics.

Studies that compared the productivity, innovativeness, and social value produced by tech before and after this transition might give us valuable data on our elite tax. Similar studies might be done regarding other suddenly-prestigious areas before and after their status transition. Seems to me an important topic to study.

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We Moderns Are Status-Drunk

Twelve years ago I posted on how our era is a rare unique “dreamtime” of fast growth, wide cultural integration, and delusional beliefs. But I think I missed a big reason why we have the delusions we do: as we get rich, we each increasingly over-estimate our relative social status. Let me explain.

The core idea of evolutionary psychology is that evolution shaped our behaviors to be adaptive in our ancestral environments. That is, we do stuff that gives us more descendants. But because our ancestors only experienced a limited range of environments, we only evolved behavior rules sufficient to induce adaptive behavior in those actual environments. This made our behavior indeterminate in the other new environments which humans have experienced since then. So a re-run of the process of evolution could easily lead to different behaviors in these new environments. That is, human behavior today results not just from adaptation to ancestral environments, but also from the many random ways that evolution happened to encode our behavior in rules.

For example, our ancestors needed to drink water to avoid dehydration, but because in their environments water always had the same combination of water smell and water feel, we could have evolved either to check that stuff is water by its smell, or by its feel. If those two water features always go together, and if both methods are just as easy, then this difference won’t make much difference to behavior. We find water, check that it is water, and drink it. But if later we encountered stuff that had water smell but not water feel, or water feel but not water smell, then these two different ways to detect water might lead to very different behaviors. For example, water-smell humans might drink stuff that smells but doesn’t feel like water, while water-feel humans would not drink such stuff.

In this post, I want to suggest that much of the “modern” human style which has arisen since the industrial revolution results from a particular way that evolution happened to encode human detection of relative status. This has made human history go surprisingly well in some ways, and surprisngly badly in others. Had evolution happened to have coded our status detection machinery differently, these last few centuries might have played out very differently. And perhaps they did, in alien histories. But before we get into that, let us first see how our status detection methods have shaped the modern human style. Continue reading "We Moderns Are Status-Drunk" »

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Would UFO Aliens Be Our Gods?

In ancient societies, leaders and elites gained legitimacy in the minds of the masses via impressive displays of clothes, music, furniture, food, buildings, parades, etc., which made more plausible their claims to actually be a higher class of creatures. Religions also gained legitimacy by claiming to represent even higher classes of creatures, i.e., gods, with which they also associated impressive luxury displays. The masses worshipped and obeyed these leaders and gods, and deferred to their judgment.

One of the main reasons that we less worship and defer to such leaders and gods today is that we know more about them; we see leaders as less clearly superior, and gods as less clearly existing. But we are still the same sort of humans as the ancients, and so are capable of their actions, should we share their beliefs.

Which brings us to an interesting hypothetical that I will now consider: What if the world soon comes to a general consensus that some UFOs actually are aliens? And what if our direct physical relation to these aliens doesn’t change much? That is, they still don’t talk to us, we only see them rarely, and we don’t find their “bases”, their origins, or figure out any of their tech. And what if this situation persists for another century, or for many centuries?

In this postulated scenario, I think the main way that our world changes is this: in our minds, these UFO aliens take over the top of our status hierarchy; we see them as the top dog in our “pack”. And as status is a big deal to we social animals, this ends up being a big deal.

The first obvious implication is that acting or looking alien-like would start to become higher status. Hovering, fast movement and acceleration, bright fuzzy lights, making no sounds, geometric shapes, and smooth shiny surfaces without protuberances. Because that’s just how status works; if aliens are high status, we want to look like them.

Some would fall in status as a result of aliens being top status. The highest would fall, as would those who seemed to have opposed them, such as governments who lied about them and elite academics who dismissed them. We’d also see our familiar human elites and leaders as less in charge of our long term future.

We’d guess that these aliens have some agendas, and so even if they haven’t actually done much yet, they may well intervene in some scenarios. Maybe we’d worry less about killing ourselves, if we think they’d stop that. And if aliens don’t seem worried that our AI experiments might create super-intelligences that suddenly explode to remake the universe, maybe we would worry less about that too.

We would gossip a lot trying to guess alien priorities, priorities we’d be reluctant to visibly resist. We’d more want to adopt their priorities as our priorities, because, again, that is just how status works. Just as people in firms gossip a lot about CEO priorities, and as courtiers of a king gossip a lot about king priorities. They gossip, and also try to pretend that the CEO/king priorities always were their own deepest priorities.

People do seem to believe that they can guess UFO alien motives. In a recent poll, 65.2% of respondents guessed that these aliens main motive for visiting Earth is to “study us as independent example of life evolution.” Which is a pretty high status motive, you have to admit.

No doubt the people who push each priority X would try to also push the view that aliens also prefer X. But we also have some more direct evidence on alien priorities.

First, aliens must be very old and stable, so they less want or experience innovation and change compared to us. Second, they aren’t remaking the universe much around here, or anywhere we can see, yet such remaking would have happened naturally unless they had coordinated strongly to prevent it. Thus they must have a strong “world” government which enforces a policy of preventing mass colonization and remaking of the universe.

They haven’t killed us yet, and they also let us see them, so they can’t feel very threatened by us at our current level. Also, they refuse to talk to us, so they don’t respect us that much, and aren’t that interested in running the details of our world or our lives, or in converting us to their beliefs. In a great many ways, we are just “beneath” them.

Now when humans treat us like this, we are often offended, and expect observers to support our outrage. For example, 81% of respondents said that a small nation should see it an insult if the US refused to respond in any way to their request for a meeting. But only 36.6% of respondents said we should feel insulted if UFO aliens keep refusing to talk to us for another century. (And 52.3% said it would be an insult for a human to treat you like aliens are treating us now, in refusing to talk.)

This all suggests to me that we treat UFO aliens as very high status. You are far more likely to be offended if your sister refused to talk to you, relative to Bill Gates refusing to talk, as you accept that Gates is much higher status than you or your sister. Similarly, even though UFO aliens have come to visit our home, and are showing off their vast abilities, which they must know makes us nervous, most still don’t think we should be offended by their refusing to talk to us. Perhaps because they are as gods to us?

These inferred alien priorities have implications for our behavior. As the aliens have a world government, we’d be more inclined to give substantial powers to a world organization through which we study and deal with them. We’d also be more inclined to limit our physical and tech expansion, as the aliens seem to have also done this. We’d be more willing to slow down our rates of innovation and change, as aliens seem okay with this in their society. And we’d be more okay with just ignoring and refusing to talk to humans we see as beneath us, like the aliens seem to do with us. We’d also be less eager to preach and proselytize, as aliens don’t do that. Finally, if we keep thinking that aliens are mainly here to study us, we’ll be more eager to (from a distance) study other creatures of all sorts.

Of course not everyone would be eager fans of the aliens. Some would resent their ignoring us, and seek to resist their presumed dominance. In fact, being pro- or anti-aliens might become a big new axis of political orientation. Maybe even the main one. For every other existing political axis, we’d ask ourselves which side is more naturally the pro- or anti-alien side. Even racism.

To me this isn’t that pretty a picture overall. But the universe doesn’t consult me before it paints its pictures, and I will first try to see what it has painted, before I think about how I might change it, if that became possible.

Yes, many of these predictions might apply if alien behavior did change after we became convinced of them. But its hard to say more there without knowing more about in what ways their behaviors change. For example, if they acted more hostile we might not see them as top dog in our pack, but as a powerful enemy pack.

Note that this scenario seems to work out well for the aliens, which seems to vindicate their choice to not talk yet also not completely hide. And talking could easily risk their being forced to admit strange repulsive stuff that would really put us off. Maybe their show-not-talk strategy isn’t as crazy and a priori unlikely as many claim.

Added 15Jun: If we come to believe, as I do, that aliens are most likely artificial, having transcended their biological origins, we may then respect artificial things more.

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UFOs and Status

Status seems pretty central to the UFO phenomena.

For example, reports have been filed on well over 100K encounters worldwide so far, but most of the books & movies on the topic focus on the same few cases. These cases are chosen in part for having more witnesses, detail, and physical evidence. But they seem especially chosen for having prestigious witnesses and locations. Seen by police or military workers, especially pilots. At military bases, especially housing nukes. These same books and movies are most eager to interview sympathetic people who are very high status, such as heads of state.

Similarly, many ancient legal systems had formal rules relating status to whose legal testimony to believe. And the social status of witnesses matters greatly today in court, even when there are no explicit rules requiring this.

Apparently most who witness UFOs as part of their job don’t report them, fearing reputation consequences. Because UFO fans are widely seen as very low status, at least among cultural elites. Similarly, organizations like police, militaries, airlines, and airports don’t want to be associated with such events, and so discourage reports by members. Unless some outside monitoring system discourages it, such orgs probably simply destroy such reports when they can.

When high officials have been asked privately why they would be reluctant to publicly admit to UFOs, they consistently say that the public rewards them for projecting ability and knowledge re their topic areas. UFOs require them instead to admit that they don’t know, and that there may be other parties around far more able than they. This effect is larger for police and militaries, compared to other agencies. And it is largest for the United States, at least during the period when it has been nearly the world’s dominant military power.

This all fits with several other militaries around the world releasing their UFO reports, long before the US has considered doing so. And it predicts that coming US release will be minimal, at least compared to the data the US could have and may have been collecting.

As a mildly elite academic, I can directly feel the status hit. If UFOs have an exotic intelligent cause, then we as a species have a lot less freedom than we thought to direct our destiny. And our governments, elites, and academics can do less to protect or inform us.

Yes, we might fund more UFO research, but I honestly don’t see the evidence situation changing that much for the indefinite future. Given how much data we already have, I don’t see more funding changing the overall data situation that much. These aren’t events you can seek out; you have to wait for them. And if there are intelligent exotic UFO causers here, they are clearly not eager to clearly show themselves.

And as long as the data situation remains ambiguous, I expect academic elites to remain adamant in dismissing exotic explanations. They’ll probably divert most funding they get on this topic to other topics they respect more. It will be hard to make much intellectual progress here, and those who do will be consistently slighted by academic elites. Even if society comes to accept UFOs more as a legitimate topic of investigation, elites will make very sure that the people who have so far championed this cause will not get more respect. Instead funding and respect will go to existing elites who deign to touch on the topic, at least from acceptable angles.

Status effects may even help explain some key features of UFO behavior. For example, among humans today, the response to an aggressive physical attack usually depends on how strong is the attacker relative to the defender. (The strengths of both sides’ allies are usually included in this calculation.) When the attacker is much stronger, the usual response is submission. And if they have similar strength, then the defender is likely to react vigorously.

However, if the attacker is far weaker, like a toddler attacking an adult, the usual response is to signal one’s strength by easily deflecting the attack, with little harm to either side. And in the reports I’ve read, this seems to be the usual reaction of UFOs to human attack: easy deflection. Which seems to signal their awareness, intelligence, abilities, and status stance. Maybe they sometimes let us seem them just so they can dis us in this way.

Status effects might even explain their lack of communication. (If they exist, of course.) Often small nations are eager to “enter into talks” with big nations just for the status bump this gives; “they take us seriously, and include us among those who must be consulted”. Conversely, the ultimate status dunk is to refuse to talk to or about someone; you act as if they are as worthy of this as a gnat. Might this explain the otherwise-puzzling lack of direct communication from intelligent exotic causes of UFOs?

A perhaps related and more ominous possible reason for their lack of communication is that they expect this to lead to us asking them some awkward questions. About our history, their expectations about us, their previous behavior toward us, their future plans regarding us, etc. Often the simplest way to avoid having to answer awkward questions is simply refusing to talk. Maybe how they plan to treat us reflects their view of our relative status, and we might not react well to hearing this.

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Subtext Shows Status

When we talk, we say things that are explicit and direct, on the surface of the text, and we also say things that are in hidden and indirect, said in more deniable ways via subtext. Imagine that there was a “flattext” type of talk (or writing) in which subtext was much harder to reliably express and read. Furthermore, imagine that it was easy to tell that a speaker (or writer) was using this type of talk. So that by talking in this way you were verifiably not saying as much subtext.

Yes, it seems very hard to go all the way to infinitely hard here, but flattext could have value without going to that extreme. Some have claimed that the artificial language Lojban is in some ways such a talk type.

So who would use surface text? A Twitter poll finds that respondents expect that on average they’d use flattext about half of the time, so they must expect many reasons to want to deny that they use subtext. Another such poll finds that they on average expect official talk to be required to be flattext. Except they are sharply divided between a ~40% that thinks it would be required >80% of the time, and another ~40% who thinks it would be required <20% of the time.

The obvious big application of flattext is people and organizations who are often accused of saying bad things via subtext. Such as people accusing of illicitly flirting, or sexual harrassing. Or people accused of “dogwhilsting” disliked allegiances. Or firms accused over-promising or under-warning to customers, employees, or investors.

As people are quite willing to accuse for-profit firms of bad subtext, I expect they’d be the most eager users. As would people like myself who are surrounded by hostile observers eager to identify particular texts as showing evil subtext. You might think that judges and officials speaking to the public in their official voice would prefer flattext, as it better matches their usual tone and style which implicitly claims that they are just speaking clearly and simply. But that might be a hypocrisy, and they may reject flattext so that they can continue to say subtext.

Personal servants, and slaves from centuries ago were required to speak in a very limited and stylized manner which greatly limited subtext. They could suffer big bad consequences for ever being accused of a tone of voice or manner that signaled anything less than full respect and deterrence to their masters.

Putting this all together, it seems that the ability to regularly and openly use subtext is a sign of status and privilege. We “put down” for-profit firms in our society by discouraging their use of subtext, and mobs do similarly when they hound enemies using hair-trigger standards ready to accuse them of bad subtext. And once low status people and organizations are cowed into avoiding subtext, then others can complain that they lack humanity, as they don’t show a sense of humor, which is more clear evidence that they are evil.

So I predict that if flattext were actually available, it would be mainly used to low status people and organizations to protect themselves from accusations of illicit subtext. As our enforcement of anti-subtext rules is very selective. Very risk averse government agencies might use it, but not high status politicians.

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Our Default Info System: Status And Gossip

Around 1988-1990, I was working on the idea of “hypertext publishing”, which today we call the web. I was invited to give a talk to a few (<10) academics working on computer based info systems, I think at Xerox PARC. I argued that we then were hampered by our poor systems for finding out what other people had done and said.

One of the audience members said that, via gossip, he had no problem finding out what others were doing in his field. If anything was important, he’d hear about it via gossip, and if someone didn’t have enough status to get people to gossip about his work, it couldn’t be important enough for him to attend to.

Today, a physics academic told me (and a few others) that it isn’t a problem that physicists can’t be persuaded by contrarian arguments published in respectable peer reviewed physics journals, as they won’t read or consider it if it goes against their prior expectations. He said what really matters is your status, not whether you’ve published or where. Gossip about high status people gets their arguments considered even without publication, and no one else’s arguments matter anyway. Low status people can contribute by working out the details of high status people’s arguments.

And from a sociological point of view, of course, they are both correct. In a world that has decided that only arguments from high status people are worthy of considering, each one of them can safely ignore all the others. Even if some low status person somehow forces the world to hear and be persuaded by their argument, the high status people can and will close ranks to ensure that this low status person gains minimal concrete advantages from it, to make sure everyone learns the lesson about going through proper channels.

I presume you can see the social problem here, of insufficient information aggregation and intellectual progress. They can probably see it too, if forced to think on it. But why should they, and even if they saw the problem why should they risk personal prestige to change things, as success just makes it easier for others to compete with them.

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Is Status-Seeking A Context-Neglecting-Value?

The main evolutionary function of sex for humans is obviously procreation. Yet our deep values regarding sex don’t seem to pay that much attention to info we have about if procreation is likely to actually happen in any given sex-related context. Consider our preferences regarding context for pornography, strip clubs, romance novels, and contraception. Oh our sex preferences do attend to cues that robustly correlated with procreation success for our distant ancestors. Such as the status of males and the youthfulness of females. But regarding kinds of context rare among our distant ancestors, our sex preferences seem drawn to the naive appearance of the possibility of successful sex, and neglect the more detailed context info that we have.

This sort of context-neglecting values also seems to happen with media. People seem to act as if the TV actors they watch regularly are actually their friends, and the sports stars they associate with are somehow going to raise their status. They feel they are raising their status by correcting strangers “wrong on the internet”. They also don’t seem to pay that much attention to how the processing of their food might change its nutrition, as long as it doesn’t hurt the taste.

Back in 2010 I posted on a context-neglecting-values theory to explain the demographic transition, i.e., the puzzlingly low fertility that seems to happen as societies get rich. I suggested that women who find that they are rich presume that they are relatively rich, and this have a shot at being “queens”, i.e., at mating with a high status man and producing high status kids. Or a shot at having their kids become kings or queens. This can justify delaying her own fertility to invest in status markers, or justify having fewer kids to let each kid gain more status markers. When entire societies get rich, each person neglects the fact that being absolutely rich doesn’t make you relatively rich. Plausibly among our distant ancestors, societies almost never got very rich for very long, and so this neglect wasn’t much of a problem back then.

Recently I realized that I should consider generalizations of this theory. What if, when societies get rich, we all feel like we have high relative status, and a decent chance to get even more, neglecting the fact that most everyone around us is also richer as well? In this case we’d be primed to take the sort of actions that makes sense for ambitious people with high relative status.

This might explain two big puzzles that I’ve long pondered. The first puzzle is our strong taste for variety in the last few centuries, which doesn’t seem to actually produce that much net value for us. Making new unusual choices can make sense for the high status, if they can use this as a way to show that they are leaders. That is, if they pick or do something different, and lots of people follow their example, they may prove to observers that they are a “thought” leader. And if we all see ourselves as strong leader candidates, we may all be attracted to such strategies.

The other big puzzle I’ve long pondered is our strong taste for paternalism, especially in the last few centuries, which seems to mostly hurt us on average. Instead of showing our high status by showing that others copy us when we do unusual things, we can also show our high status by our visible ability to stop others from doing unusual things. If people hear that we have such power and regularly use it, they have to conclude that we are “somebody.” And so ordinary people lend their support to paternalist policies in the hope that they will be personally credited for it. Much like people seem to think their status will be raised if they associate with celebrities who have never heard of them.

So my new suggestion in this post is that, because in a rich world we all greatly overestimate our relative status, we intuit that it makes sense to try to raise our status either by choosing variety and getting others to copy it, or by showing off our ability to stop others from choosing variety. These both actually make less sense for most of us as ways to gain status, because we aren’t actually high in relative status. But our intuitions don’t notice that.

Why would our preferences neglect context so? The idea is that they are coded in us at very deep levels, at places where our conscious thoughts just can’t change them. Such changes mostly require slower genetic and cultural selection processes.

Should welfare analysis focus on the context-neglecting preferences that we currently express, or on the ones that we would have if we took context more into account. That depends on if you care more about the immediate surface feelings of people today, or longer term outcomes and descendants.

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More on Experts Vs. Elites

When a boss issues a new order, usually the main thing he or she is fighting with is the effects of his (or a prior boss’) previous orders. It can take time to undo their effects. And subordinates who fear that yet newer orders will come down before they can make enough changes might prefer to drag their feet, to see if these current orders will last.

Some responded to my last post on experts versus elites by saying how good it is that elites often overrule experts, as experts get it so wrong so often. As with early in this pandemic. But the experts are less of an autonomous force here, and more just the repository of previous elite instructions. If pandemic experts had it wrong before about masks or travel bans, that is mostly because elites previously pushed them to adopt such policies. For example, our continued ban on challenge trials is due to how med ethics experts have interpreted prior elite instructions. Experts won’t change their mind on this until elites tell them they are allowed to change their minds. In contexts where elites are typically so pushy, it can be hard to tell what experts would decide in their absence.

In economics, it usually feels pretty obvious what the elites want us to say. Not all economists do what they are told, but the major institutions and their elite leaders seem mostly willing to go along, and so what the public mostly hears is economists saying what elites want us to say. When elites change their minds, our major institutions also quickly change their minds.

Now I had been thinking this is all bad news for the new kinds of institutions I want to introduce, as I had been assuming they would be framed as new expert institutions. And yes all this suggests a distrust of formal expert mechanisms that can’t be easily overruled by elite opinion. But maybe I have been too hasty about how new institutions might be framed.

Consider the widespread hostility to “market manipulation”, such as seen in the recent Gamestop stock price episode. Or consider movies like Boiler Room, Glengarry Glen Ross, Wall Street, and Wolf of Wall Street. Typically, financial markets are chock full of “manipulation”, in the sense that most traders are trying to talk and spin to get others to agree with and follow their trades. Sometimes they succeed, and sometimes they fail, but that mostly doesn’t bother people. What bothers people most is when they see clearly low status low prestige people seeming to greatly influence prices, especially in ways that seem unlikely to last. (Elite manipulations tend to last.)

Consider also that elites only rarely complain about errors in speculative market prices, such as stock prices or currency prices. They mainly complain when they think they can find non-elite folks to blame for such prices. Together, these facts suggest to me that most elites may see speculative market prices as something that elites create. They know that there is a lot of money at stake in such markets, and that many big powerful rich elite players play heavily in such markets. So perhaps elites usually accept the verdict of such prices as a verdict of elites!

If this were true, then the prospects for improving our social consensus via improving speculative markets would be far higher than I’d ever hoped! If we could get thick markets trading on many more topics, then elites might well defer to those price estimates in their elite conversations, and push experts to also accept such estimates.

Of course, even if elites would accept a price estimate when it exists, this doesn’t mean most are eager for such any particular price to exist. Rivalrous elites constantly try to undermine each other, including via undermining the organs that rival elites use to express their opinions. If if the prices existed for a while, I predict elites would cave and defer to them, at least until they could kill them.

To signal to all that they are dominated by elites, I do think it important that a lot of money seem be riding on these market prices. Mere prediction tournaments or polls of experts just will not do. Even real money markets with small stakes may not be taken seriously enough.

My proposal for Fire-the-CEO markets seems like it could work here. Though I’ve been waiting for 25 years now for someone to take up this idea.

Added 8Feb: I see now why my usual answer to “what should I read?”, namely “textbooks”, falls on deaf ears. People are looking for elites to read, not experts.

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Experts Versus Elites

Consider a typical firm or other small organization, run via a typical management hierarchy. At the bottom are specialists, who do very particular tasks. At the top are generalists, who supposedly consider it all in the context of a bigger picture. In the middle are people who specialize to some degree, but who also are supposed to consider somewhat bigger pictures.

On any particular issue, people at the bottom can usually claim the most expertise; they know their job best. And when someone at the top has to make a difficult decision, they usually prefer to justify it via reference to recommendations from below. They are just following the advice of their experts, they say. But of course they lie; people at the top often overrule subordinates. And while leaders often like to pretend that they select people for promotion on the basis of doing lower jobs well, that is also often a lie.

Our larger society has a similar structure. We have elites who are far more influential than most of us about what happens in our society. As we saw early in the pandemic, the elites are always visibly chattering among themselves about the topics of the day, and when they form a new opinion, the experts usually quickly cave to agree with them, and try to pretend they agreed all along.

As a book I recently reviewed explains in great detail, elites are selected primarily for their prestige and status, which has many contributions, including money, looks, fame, charm, wit, positions of power, etc. Elites like to pretend they were selected for being experts at something, and they like to pretend their opinions are just reflecting what experts have said (“we believe the science!”). But they often lie; elite opinion often overrules expert opinion, especially on topics with strong moral colors. And elites are selected far more for prestige than expertise.

When an academic wins a Nobel prize, they have achieved a pinnacle of expertise. At which point they often start to wax philosophic, and writing op-eds. They seem to be making a bid to become an elite. Because we all respect and want to associate with elites far more than with experts. Elites far less often lust after becoming experts, because we are often willing to treat elites as if they are experts. For example, when a journalist writes a popular book on science, they are often willing to field science questions when they give a talk on their book. And the rest of us are far more interested in hearing them talk on the subject than the scientists they write about.

Consider talks versus panels at conferences. A talk tends to be done in expert mode, wherein the speaker sticks to topics on which they have acquired expert knowledge. But then on panels, the same people talk freely on most any topic that comes up, even topics where they have little expertise. You might think that audiences would be less interested in hearing such inexpert speculation, but in fact they seem to eat it up. My interpretation: on panels, people pose as elites, and talk in elite mode. Like they might do at a cocktail party. And audiences eagerly gather around panelists, just like they would gather around prestigious folks arguing at a cocktail party about topics on which they have little expertise.

Consider news articles versus columnists. The news articles are written by news experts, in full expert mode. They are clearly more accurate on average than are columns. But columns writers take on an elite mode, where they pontificate on all issues of the day, regardless of how much they know. And readers love that.

Consider boards of directors versus boards of advisors. Advisors are nominally experts, while directors are nominally elites. Directors are far more powerful, are lobbied far more strongly, and are paid a lot more too. Boards of advisors are usually not asked for advise, they are mainly there to add prestige to an organization. But prestige via their expertise, rather than their general eliteness.

Even inside academic worlds, we usually pretend to pick leaders like journal editors, funding program managers, department chairs, etc. based mainly on their expert credentials. But they also lie; raw prestige counts for a lot more than they like to admit.

Finally, consider that recently I went into clear expert mode to release a formal preprint on grabby aliens, which induced almost no (< 10) comments on this blog or Twitter, in contrast to far more comments when arguable-elites discuss it in panelist/elite mode: Scott Aaronson (205), Scott Alexander (108), and Hacker News (110). People are far more interested in talking with elites in elite mode on most topics, than in talking with the clear relevant experts in expert mode.

All of which suggests that my efforts to replace choice via elite association with prediction markets and paying for results face even larger uphill battles than I’ve anticipated.

Added noon: This also helps explain why artists are said to “contribute to important conversations” by making documentaries, etc. that express “emotional truths.” They present themselves as qualifying elites by virtue of their superior art abilities.

See also: More on Experts Vs. Elites

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