Tag Archives: Politics

The Coming Cosmic Control Conflict

We moderns like to join factions associated with ideologies, and many of our most inspiring stories are of great conflicts between ideologically-affiliated factions. We like such stories more when they have more morally-intense ideologies, bigger conflicts in space, time, and social scope, more impressive combatants, and more real and well-defined events.

At a cost in realism, science fiction and fantasy often turn up the other dials, making ideologies extreme, conflicts galaxy-wide, and giving combatants god-like powers. But for realism and definition, we tend to retreat to WWII, which ranks high on moral intensity, but less high on other criteria. Or more recent struggles for group respect. Our true stories of the largest scope, about our vast universe, tend to fail badly; past stories lack conflict or combatants, while future stories lack definition.

Having recently given a lot of thought to grabby aliens and UFOs as aliens, it occurs to me that they can offer great conflict stories of substantial moral intensity, plausible realism and definition, and quite unprecedented size, scope, and combatant impressiveness. Let us consider telling such stories!

The combatants in which we can be most confident are grabby aliens; the fact that we have appeared so early in the universe tells us that they are out there, and three other datums tell us we’ll meet them in roughly a billion years, if we last that long. Grabby civilizations will come into direct conflict with each other at their borders, and will compete more widely to influence the culture of the next hundred billion years. These conflicts rate high on reality, scope, and impressive combatants, but alas it seems hard to guess how such civilizations will differ, and thus to guess the ideologies that might orient their conflicts.

We can have less confidence that aliens are behind some UFOs. But they plausibly exist, and we can say a lot about a big ideological conflict they must have with grabby aliens. We can reasonably guess that UFO aliens have developed many millions of years past our level, are not changing fast now, and have coordinated to prevent any part of them from getting grabby, i.e., from aggressively expanding and filling the universe with their descendants. To achieve this, we can be pretty sure that they created a strong persistent “world” governments. And enforcing their anti-grabby rules on us is the obvious reason for them to be here now coyly showing themselves to us.

Furthermore, even if there are no aliens behind UFOs, we can forsee this same conflict in our future; we are likely to coordinate to try to prevent parts of our civilization from getting grabby. Thus the pro- vs. anti- grabby conflict is plausibly the big future ideological divide, whether or not UFOs are aliens. Let me explain.

For at least a million years, human foragers coordinated within each band to enforce local norms; individual humans were not free to do whatever they wanted. With farming, societies became larger and had more contact with outsiders, but within each society they enforced many norms and laws. And in our world today we actually have pretty strong global coordination enforcing many global norms via local laws. Human organizations have consistently been rising in size and scope, making much stronger global governance a likely outcome over the coming centuries. (It certainly happens in Age of Em.)

As an economist, I see that most people feel strongly that individual freedoms must be constrained by governance, and many seem to regret that we do not have stronger and larger scale governance to deal with our biggest problems. Few favor cutting our scales of governance. Even when governments seem to consistently fail at a task they’ve been assigned, like the unwinnable war on drugs, most are reluctant to give up; instead budgets and powers are continually increased.

Furthermore, I see these laments especially among futurists, who consider longer timescales and bigger problems. For example, many are uncomfortable with “capitalist” competition, which they hope will end soon or at least become globally managed, to prevent capitalist competition between nations. And many are wary of plain old biological competition, even without capitalism. For example, many see a big problem with overpopulation, for which their natural solution is global regulation of fertility. Some imagine that local unconstrained evolution might eliminate consciousness from future agents, or allow the values of our descendants to drift far from our own values, and suggest strong global governance as remedies for these.

In addition, we should expect rates of change due to natural selection to greatly increase with the rise of artificial life, which is likely to dominate our future starting in a few centuries. So whatever problems result from unmanaged natural selection are likely to become much stronger soon, and at a time when we in fact have a pretty strong world government.

If within a few centuries we have a strong world government managing capitalist competition, overpopulation, value drift, and much more, we might come to notice that these and many other governance solutions to pressing problems are threatened by unrestrained interstellar colonization. Independent colonies able to change such solutions locally could allow population explosions and value drift, as well as capitalist competition that beats out home industries. That is, colony independence suggests unmanaged colony competition. In addition, independent colonies would lower the status of those who control the central government.

So authorities would want to either ban such colonization, or to find ways to keep colonies under tight central control. Yet it seems very hard to keep a tight lid on colonies. The huge distances involved make it hard to require central approval for distant decisions, and distant colonists can’t participate as equals in governance without slowing down the whole process dramatically. Worse, allowing just one sustained failure, of some descendants who get grabby, can negate all the other successes. This single failure problem gets worse the more colonies there are, the further apart they spread, and the more advanced technology gets.

Thus if our descendants strongly value the regulations and coordinations that their world government allows, and are unwilling to give them up, then they may be strongly tempted to simply ban interstellar colonization beyond some manageable limits. Which it exactly what it seems that any aliens behind UFOs must have done successfully for millions of years. The exact opposite of the aggressive expansion that, for billions of years, has been and will continue to be chosen by grabby aliens.

Yes, banning internal expansion should put any civilization at a great disadvantage should they ever encounter a grabby one. But that distant possibility in perhaps a billion years may just not carry much weight against more immediate concerns. It might be easier to slip into denial, emphasizing the lack of solid proof that there will ever be any grabby aliens.

And there we have it: the grand cosmic conflict between authorities who use a strong world government to prevent local expansion, and grabby-wannabe rebels seeking a way to slip through this blockage and expand. A conflict with big values at stake, very impressive combatants, that takes places on the greatest scales of space, time, and social range, and which seems likely to be very real. Don’t you want to hear stories about that? Won’t someone write stories about that?

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Who Wants Curated Democracy?

Most democratic systems are pretty simple. To a first approximation, anyone can run for office, any adult citizen can vote, and voters can use all their usual ways to associate and talk to evaluate and coordinate on who to vote for in upcoming elections.

Imagine that some academics instead develop and advocate for a “curated” system of democracy. They research how democratic outcomes vary with the candidates, who votes on which candidates, and who talks to who about which candidates and topics. These academics say that if you put someone who knows this literature well in charge of “curating” democracy, you can get better outcomes.

Assume that these researchers have the usual level of academic competence at doing their research. They study a real phenomena and make real progress, but have the usual academic biases, such as playing usual games of hindering rivals via insider clubs and method fashions. Their results tend to be complex, though news media can sometimes offer deceptively simple summaries of them.

How eager are you to replace your simple democratic system with a voting system curated by an expert credentialed by these academics? That is, to put these curators in charge of who can run for office, who can vote on what, and who can talk to who how about what political topics? They wouldn’t suggest simple rules that we could then debate and choose whether to adopt. No, they’d make many detailed context-dependent choices that they couldn’t well explain to us; we’d just have to trust them.

Most of us wouldn’t trust them, and thus would be wary of such curated democracy. Because democracy is less about having a well-oiled machine and more about having a simple neutral system that we can trust when we don’t together trust any particular people that much to run our system.

This is how I feel about the forecasting systems and contests that are now popular among academics, relative to simple prediction markets. In a simple prediction market, you set up a topic on which to bet cash, and then let any individual or group bet cash there at any time, in any amount, and the current price is your best estimate. Biases are to be fixed by traders profiting from finding and correcting them. Yes, each market has some mechanical details, but those matter less when there is lots of trading, and it usually works okay to let people compete to pick details of the markets they pay to create.

In contrast, in curated prediction contests, the curators pick who participates on which questions, assign them to teams in which they work together, assign them each a weight in a final consensus function that they choose, say how and in what units each is rewarded as a function of their predictions and outcomes, adjust their consensus for various “biases” they see. Curators say that in their studies that this approach gives more accurate predictions.

Which may well be true. Except they don’t do the crucial test where a lot is at stake in the decisions that the markets influence, so much that interested parties try to corrupt the curators themselves. By bribing curators, threatening to get them fired, or just taking over the whole process by which they are trained and selected. The more details that curators control, and the harder to understand their reasons for making adjustments, the more room there’d be for curator corruption.

Institution/system/mechanism design is a very different problem between when (a) you can trust someone to run it, and make discretionary adjustments as needed, and (b) there is no one we can agree to trust, so we need to agree on something simple and clear that will run with few such adjustments. I’m most interested in that second kind of design problem.

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Roemer’s Socialism

Several times before I have posted on trying to figure out what just people mean when they propose “socialism”, and which variations seem how attractive. I just tried this exercise again, this time reading respected Yale economist and political scientist John E. Roemer’s paper What is Socialism Today? Conceptions of a Cooperative Economy, published Dec. 2020 in International Economic Review.

Roemer says “My intention in this article is to retrieve, from the history of the socialist idea, several alternatives to these two socialist varieties” of (1) central planning, which was “toxic” when combined with state ownership and one-party politics in the Soviet Union, and (2) “social democracy” that taxes and redistributes in a familiar world of private firms. He has two proposals for us to consider, explained via math models.

In “Socialism 1”, there is one profit-maxing firm wherein each worker and owner of capital gets paid their marginal product. Capital owners get paid because we need “incentives for citizens to invest their wealth productively. The remainder of firm income goes to firm owners, whom he insists are not being paid for prior entrepreneurial or managerial efforts or investments, not unless the firm was “created by individuals” who did not sell any ownership to others. Yet Roemer is reluctant to expropriate such illegitimate owners because then

We would … lose the monitoring advantages that might accrue to having firms be in part privately owned. And having the state own a large share of firms introduces the issue of political interference in firm decisions.

A linear income tax is instead imposed on everyone, which would result in inefficient work and investment choices if people behaved according to standard game theory, but which they do not because everyone instead follows a cooperative “Kantian optimization” (except that they are price takers due to “bounded rationality.” )

In “Socialism 2”, there are many profit-maxing firms, each of which is entirely owned by its workers and which pays a firm-specific tax set by the state, though he worries that this tax would “discourage innovation on the part of the firm’s workers and investors, who would have no incentive to cut costs to earn above-normal profits”.

In both Socialism 1 & 2 that cooperative “Kantian optimization” behavior ensures the production of public goods and the suppression of public bads such as “employing child labor, polluting, or running assembly lines at a breakneck pace”.

Roemer says that we know such cooperative behavior is possible because the U.S. once taxed the rich more:

In the period 1930−1970, a more cooperative ethos existed in the United States than we experience today: the key evidence is the existence of very high, even confiscatory, taxes on the very rich.

And he suggests we could enforce cooperation via labor unions:

Each must trust that others will optimize in the Kantian manner if he/she does. … [To achieve this,] workers may entrust decisions (such as supplies of labor) to organizations that represent them—unions—which can carry out the Kantian optimization for them.

But Roemer thinks this cooperation requires redistribution, as people won’t cooperate “with others whom they see have much higher incomes”. And it requires the right sort of politicians, as “ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity frustrate” it, and “power-hungry leaders seek to divide their citizenries by emphasizing identity and difference”.

So why don’t we see this cooperation today? We have the wrong “ethos”:

The behavioral ethos of socialism is cooperation. … they are engaged in a cooperative enterprise to transform nature to improve the lives of all. … Capitalism’s behavioral ethos is individualistic: economic activity is characterized as the struggle of each person against all other persons and nature. The ethos may be summarized as one of “going it alone.”

But Roemer is famous for studying, and approving of, political competition. So for some reason he doesn’t think that sort of competition hinders the right ethos. Unless maybe “power-hungry” leaders appear? Are labor unions to stop that somehow?

Here are my reactions:

1) I don’t see how Roemer’s proposal really does much to cut back on economic competition, or how it prevents the bad sort of politicians. Or how even it is “socialism”. Workers still compete within professions and firms, investors compete to pick the best firms, firms compete to max profits, and politicians compete in elections. What exactly is different?

2) I don’t think all the math really adds much to his proposals.

3) I’m not convinced that his “public bads” really fit the definition,

4) I’m pretty convinced in the absence of war, theft, slavery, etc. firm ownership gains really are returns to entrepreneurial or managerial efforts or investments.

5) I agree that humans do often vary in how “cooperative” they feel and act, and that it can be valuable to promote such cooperation, all else equal. But I don’t at all see high taxes on the rich as much evidence of or cause of useful cooperation. Nor do I see the existence of economic competition as reducing cooperation more than does political competition.

6) Most fundamentally, I just don’t see what Roemer is proposing to do to increase our cooperative inclinations. In our competitive world nations, firms, political parties, and other orgs have long competed to promote cooperation internally and among alliances. The world we see is the result of those attempts.

Merely declaring that we now have “socialism” won’t ensure more cooperation, nor will mass redistribution, nor will increased control by governments or labor unions. Those might induce some temporary cooperations, but they also seem to hinder the longer-term search by orgs to find better ways to induce cooperation.

In the end I just don’t see much to Roemer’s proposals beyond “if you agree cooperation is good, then you should do everything I say and then maybe everyone will cooperate.” No thanks.

 

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“If We Win, You Win”

One of the big wins of capitalism is that it creates strong private incentives for some kinds of social change. If someone has an idea for change, they can get investors and employees to work with them, in the hope of rewards if the change earns profits.

Alas, the most fundamental problem with social change in our world is that capitalism doesn’t encourage many other kinds of changes. Yes, under democracy elected politicians can get some weaker rewards for proposing changes. But for anything but small local changes, it isn’t worth a politican’s time to work out change details, explain it to voters, and organize support. That sort of thing is left to social movements and organized interest groups.

While many will deny it, the main promise that movements make to potential recruits is this: “If we win, you win”. Thus we mainly see movements around changes that can credibly make such promises. For example, crypto promises to reward investors with more money, and workers with valued job skills. Academic and technical movements promoting particular tools promise rewards to those who invest in these tools, relative to those who invest in competing tools.

Sometimes a movement has a vague label, and the real message is “As we ‘own’ this label, if our movement grows then we can send rewards to the high status loyalists among us.” Sometimes the movement’s implicit message is simply “We need to replace old folks with young folks like us in positions of influence.”

In entertainment and fashion movements, the reward can just be looking and sounding more knowledgable and “with-it”. For example, if I watch a lot of Game of Thrones, and it is popular, then in conversations I can relate to and say more about what others discuss. If locally sourced foods get popular, then I can seem more with-it when I cook such foods or recommend their restaurants. And if I grow or sell local food, I can gain even more. If I do or don’t wear masks, and then my mask side wins, I can brag that I supported the winning side.

The key point is that there are a lot of good ideas for change, including ideas that most people will admit are good ideas upon examination, where it is hard to organize supporting movements this way. For example, you can make a movement around a new way to teach kids, as you might start a school or be a teacher that uses it, or you might have your kid taught with it. But it is much harder to make a make a movement around the idea that there should just be a lot less school, unless you push a particular alternative to school.

Colleges rate professor teaching via student evaluations, which seems to have zero correlation with how much students learn, even though learning is the main reason given to attend college. But it seems hard to start a moment to fix this. We probably could construct ways to evaluate teacher effectiveness at student learning, but that would take resources away from other things, and would interfere with letting teachers teach any way they like. And a movement to just stop using current evaluations would admit to the public that we don’t care much about teaching quality.

More generally, when the public will mainly listen to people who specialize in X regarding changes in X, it is hard to make a movement to cut back on X. You can have movements to increase investments in X, or change how X is done, but the people who gain from cutting X are not the people listened to much on X.

Note that early on, movements can just promise gains via personal association with prestigious founders. It is later on when movements need to offer other rewards.

Futarchy would solve this, as it could give much stronger rewards for initiating changes. (At least for problems that government can solve.) But what would be gained by those who joined a movement to promote futarchy? The mechanism is simple, so there’s little to gain from investing in learning how to use it. It doesn’t promise to promise the young over the old, or to promote any particular policies for which we could identify the winners. Just making the world, or your nation better, inspires little passion.

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Who Watches Discrimination Watchers?

Two LA area colleges, UCLA and USC, have a famous rivalry. Imagine that local law firms took sides, preferring to hire graduates from one or the other law school. Imagine further that some USC lawyers at a UCLA-favoring firm complained about this, calling it bias, pure and simple; UCLA grads coordinate to prefer other ULCA grads, independent of their qualifications. These USC lawyers demand a quota system, to ensure equitable hiring. If management resists, they plan to go to the media, to get the public mad about this, and then either use legal or norm/mob pressures to get their way.

Firm leaders say instead that UCLA trains better in their type of law, they can find better people by using personal connections, and many of their clients and collaborating specialists (like detectives) are also UCLA grads. Also, there are productivity advantages from having similar kinds of people, trained similarly, working together.

Now both kinds of theories are plausible. There are often productivity advantages from similar people working together, and yet humans also quite consistently, naturally, and even unconsciously coordinate to use relatively arbitrary features to form mutual-admiration societies that promote each other. And disentangling these effects can be quite hard. The UCLA grads involved may themselves not even know why they prefer other UCLA grads. (Random noise is of course also possible.)

What sort of evidence might we collect to decide? We could look at whether UCLA grads talk directly about preferring each other. We might note when they make mean jokes about USC grads, and prefer to socialize with each other. We could experimentally vary the school label for particular applicants, and see if that changes their chances. But even if that does change chances, defenders of the status quo could attribute this to well-calibrated statistical discrimination, as we can’t usually look into the depths of others’ souls.

We could do statistical regressions to predict who gets hired based on which individual features, and also school. But even if those stats found no significant coefficient on school, after controlling for other features, USC grads might claim that the weights used on which desired features count more are biased by what UCLA grads are taught to do and to value, and it isn’t fair if USC grads aren’t taught the same things.

This same sort of story can of course apply to many other features besides schools. Those who hire may prefer candidates who play particular sports, watch particular TV shows, live in particular neighborhoods, and wear particular styles of dress, or have particular work hour preferences. In all such cases, these choices might be due to productivity advantages, or due to arbitrary mutual promoting coordination. And these same processes can also influence who we choose as friends, lovers, and other kinds of associates.

When the purported feature of coordination is rather specific and local, such as school attended or sport preferred, our usual attitude is to allow local associations to “discriminate”, that is, to make choices correlated with such features. We tend to see competition between such associations as sufficient to discipline those who discriminate badly. If a law firm has a hiring strategy that picks worse lawyers, it will suffer naturally as a result; little need for the rest of us to add punishments. And we also balk at the enormous effort that would be required to impose, monitor, and enforce quotas, or other forms of preferential treatment, on a vast number of such features.

But attitudes on preferential treatments may change as (a) choosers face weaker competition and losses from choosing badly, (b) we consider features that are harder to change, (c) wider social scopes all coordinate to prefer the same features together, (d) many features come together as a package preferred across wider social scopes, (e) the choices made look closer to “dominance” relative to “prestige”, and (f) the features involved are strongly correlated with pretty objective and obvious coordinations to mistreat people that we are confident happened in the past, or in current societies of which we disapprove.

Sometimes we are more sympathetic to intervention, that is, to government or social/norm/mob pressure to insist on something closer to preferential treatment to ensure equity. But note: if we believe in a common tendency of humans to coordinate to form self-promoting mutual-admiration societies, and so are tempted to authorize such intervention to suppress this, we must also believe that this same tendency will induce similar group attempts to coordinate to take control over any powers in charge of such intervention. In order to use that power to directly favor themselves.

For example, if a committee is formed at a LA law firm to decide on the details of a USC vs UCLA quota system, a committee full of UCLA grads would probably make different choices than a committee full of USC grads. Thus these groups would vie for control over this committee. And if the problem was that UCLA grads dominate in the firm, wouldn’t they be most likely to win this contest for control?

The key claim might be that while we worry less about many small uncoordinated self-admiration societies, there is in fact a very large social coalition, spread across many associations, and using a large package of features to promote itself. Making it especially able to resist competitive pressures.

But in this case, I have to worry that this coalition seems especially likely to take control of this intervention process, and then use it to favor themselves. So I don’t feel much more confident about the political coalitions and government agencies that would be in charge of choosing preferential treatment regimes, relative to the many smaller organizations which would instead make such decisions in the lack of such intervention.

I’d rather try to increase the strength of competitive pressures on smaller organizations, to break up this larger coalition. For example, if there were one big law firm in LA that most all lawyers worked for, I’d rather try to break this firm up into many smaller law firms. Or imagine most all judges in LA come from UCLA, are in charge of choosing new LA judges, favor UCLA lawyers in the courtroom, and thus induce LA law firms prefer UCLA grads. In this case I’d rather break up this local cabal of judges, by bringing judges into LA from all across the nation or world.

So what I worry most about are centralized choke points controlled by groups responsible mainly to themselves. Groups who take over these choke points can then arbitrarily favor others like themselves for key positions, and punish any of them for favoring anyone else. Central government agencies, academic discipline leaders, professional associations, accreditation bodies, etc. Even if such people claim that their highest priority is global equity, to resist the worst self-promoting coalitions out there, I just find it hard to trust them.

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Managed Competition or Competing Managers?

Competition and cooperation [as] opposites, with vice on one side and virtue on the other … is a false dichotomy … The market-based competition envisioned in economics is disciplined by rules and reputations. … Just as competition is not a shorthand for “anything goes,” the quick and thoughtless inference that cooperation is necessarily virtuous is often unjustified. In many cases, cooperation is a tool for an in-group to take advantage of those outside the group. …

Competition refers to a situation in which people or organizations (such as firms) apply their efforts and talents toward a certain goal, and they receive results based substantially on their performance relative to each other. … Cooperation refers to a situation in which the participants seek out win-win outcomes from working together. (More)

Raw unconstrained competition looks scary; lies, betrayal, predation, starvation, war; so many things can go wrong! Which makes “managed competition” sound so comforting; whew, someone will limit the problems. Someone like a boss, police officer, sports referee, or government regulator.

However, raw unconstrained management also looks scary; that’s tyranny, which can go wrong in so so many ways! Such as via incompetence, exploitation, and rot. And so we can be comforted to hear that managers must compete. For example, when individual managers compete for jobs, firms compete for customers, or politicians compete for votes.

But who will guard the guardians? If we embed competitions within larger systems of managers, and also embed managers within larger systems of competition, won’t they all sit within some maximally-encompassing system, which must then be either competition, management, or some awkward mix of the two? This is the fundamental hard problem of design and governance, from which there is no easy escape. Continue reading "Managed Competition or Competing Managers?" »

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Easy Conspiracy Tests

The most obvious kind of conspiracies to expect in the world are ones between your local organized crime, police, and political powers. These powers should each see each other as rivals to their dominance. So to reduce such threats they should should seek to either weaken each other,  or to ally with each other. There are rumors that such alliances are common around the world, and there is clear data that they have often happened in the past. 

So this is no mere theoretical conspiracy theory, to be dismissed by claiming that too many people would know to keep it a secret. This sort of conspiracy is not only verifiably common, it also has a quite credible threat of punishing those who too publicly expose it.

Given that this seems to usually be a real possibility, what sort of evidence might speak to it? Here are some indicators that, if true about your area, are at least weak evidence against such a local alliance:

  1. You see very little profitable crime in your area, such as gambling, drugs, or prostitution.
  2. You see profitable crime, but also conflicts over its control. E.g., wars over drug-selling territory.
  3. You see profitable crime, and little fighting for its control, but its consumer prices are quite near average costs.
  4. You see profitable crime, and see that those who enter such industries fear only police and competitors, not organized crime.
  5. You see a big conflicts in your area between police and organized crime. 
  6. Police in your area are bounty hunters, who regularly gain bounties from catching each other, and judges are clearly not corrupted.
  7. You do elections in a way that lets organized crime steal elections, yet they are clearly not being stolen.
  8. (what else?)

Now if you don’t see any of these signs in your area, you should estimate a higher than average chance that you have a crime-police-politics conspiracy in your area. And as the base rate is already substantial, your estimate should be even higher than that. 

If people were concerned about such conspiracies, they’d pay to hear from folks who collected and published stats on these indicators. And pay even more for stats that made it easier for skeptical observers to check on how such stats were collected and constructed. And then those with the worse indicators, suggesting local conspiracies, could learn about that fact, and perhaps coordinate to change it. 

So what does it tell you if few seem to care enough to even know if such stats are published?

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Why Abstaining Helps

Misunderstandings that I heard in response to these tweets has encouraged me to try to explain more clearly the logic of why most eligible voters should abstain from voting.

Think of each vote cast between two candidates as being either +1 or -1, so that the positive candidate wins if the sum of all votes cast is positive; the negative candidate wins otherwise. Abstaining is then a vote of 0. (If the vote sum is zero, the election is a tie.)

Assume that there is one binary quality variable that expresses which of the two candidates is “better for the world”, that these two options are equally likely, that each voter gets one binary clue correlated with that quality, and that voters vote simultaneously. What we should want is to increase the chance that the better candidate wins.

While all else equal, each voter may prefer a higher quality candidate, they need not be otherwise indifferent. So if, based on other considerations, they have a strong enough preference for one of the candidates, such “partisan” voters will pick that candidate regardless of their clue. Thus their vote will not embody any info about candidate quality. They are so focused on other considerations that they won’t help make for a more informed election, at least not via their vote. The other “informed” voters care enough about quality that their vote will depend on their quality clue.

Thus the total vote will be the sum of the partisan votes plus the informed votes. So the sum of the partisan votes will set a threshold that the informed votes must overcome to tip the election. For example, if the partisan sum is -10, then the informed votes must sum to at least 10 to tip the election toward the positive candidate. For our purposes here it won’t matter if there is uncertainty over this sum of partisan votes or not; all that matters is that the partisan sum sets the threshold that informed votes must overcome.

Now in general we expect competing candidates to position themselves in political and policy spaces so that on average the partisan threshold is not too far from zero. After all, it is quite unusual for everyone to be very confident that one side will win. So I will from here on assume a zero threshold, though my analysis will be robust to modest deviations from that.

Assume for now that the clues of the informed voters are statistically independent of each other, given candidate quality. Then with many informed voters the sum of informed votes will approach a normal distribution, and the chance that the positive candidate wins is near the integral of this normal distribution above the partisan threshold.

Thus all that matters from each individual voter is the mean and variance of their vote. Any small correlation between a voter’s clue and quality will create a small positive correlation between quality and their mean vote. Thus their vote will move the mean of the informed votes in the right direction. Because of this, many say that the more voters the better, no matter how poorly informed is each one.

However, each informed voters adds to both the mean and the variance of the total vote, as shown in this diagram:

What matters is the “z-score” of the informed vote, i.e., the mean divided by its standard deviation. The chance that the better candidate wins is increasing in this z-score. So if a voter adds proportionally more to the standard deviation than they add to the mean, they make the final vote less likely to pick the better candidate, even if their individual contribution to the mean is positive.

This is why poorly informed voters who vote can hurt elections, and it is why the relevant standard is your information compared to that of the other voters who don’t abstain. If you are an informed voter who wants to increase the chance that the better candidate wins, then you should abstain if you are not sufficiently well informed compared to the others who will vote.

In a previous post I considered the optimal choice of when to abstain in two extreme cases: when all other informed voters also abstain optimally, and when no one else abstains but this one voter. Realistic cases should be somewhere between these extremes.

To model inequality in how informed are various voters, I chose a power law dependence of clue correlation relative to voter rank. If the power is high, then info levels fall very quickly as you move down in voter rank from the most informed voter. If the power is low, then info levels fall more slowly, and voters far down in rank may still have a lot of info.

I found that for a power less than 1/2, and ten thousand informed voters, everyone should vote in both extreme cases. That is, when info is distributed equally enough, it really does help to average everyone’s clues via their votes. But for a power of 3/4, more than half should abstain even if no one else abstains, and only 6 of them should vote if all informed voters abstained optimally. For a power of 1 then 80% should abstain even if no one else does, and only 2 of them should vote if all abstain optimally. For higher powers, it gets worse.

My best guess is that a power of one is a reasonable guess, as this is a very common power and also near the middle of the distribution of observed powers. Thus even if everyone else votes, for the purpose of making the total vote have a better chance of picking the better candidate, you should abstain unless you are especially well informed, relative to the others who actually vote. And the more unequal you estimate the distribution of who is how informed, the more reluctant you should be to vote.

Many have claimed that it hurts to tell people about this analysis, as low informed voters will ignore it, and only better informed voters might follow it. But this analysis gives advice to each and every voter, advice that doesn’t depend on who else adopts it; every added person who follows this advice is a net win. Yes, people can be uncertain about how unequal is the info distribution, and about where they rank in this distribution. But that’s no excuse for not trying to make best estimates and act accordingly.

Note that the above analysis ignored the cost of getting informed and voting, and that people seem to in general be overconfident when they estimate their informedness rank. Both of these considerations should make you more willing to abstain.

In the above I assumed voter clues are independent, but what if they are correlated? For the same means, clue correlation increases the variance of the sum of individual votes. So all else equal voters with correlated clues should be more willing to abstain, compared to other voters.

Yes, I’ve used binary clues throughout, and you might claim that all this analysis completely changes for non-binary clues. Possible, but that would surprise me.

Added 7a: Re the fact that it is possible and desirable to tell if you are poorly informed, I love this saying:

If you’re playing a poker game and you look around the table and can’t tell who the sucker is, it’s you.

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The Socialist Manifesto

As I’ve read criticisms of socialism, I thought I should read some advocates. This seemed promising:

Bhaskar Sunkara, The Socialist Manifesto: The Case for Radical Politics in an Era of Extreme Inequality (April 2019) … What, exactly, is socialism? And what would a socialist system in America look like? The editor of Jacobin magazine, Sunkara shows that socialism, though often seen primarily as an economic system, in fact offers the means to fight all forms of oppression, including racism and sexism. The ultimate goal is not Soviet-style planning, but … to create new democratic institutions in workplaces and communities. A primer on socialism for the 21st century.

I’ve just finished it. Alas, the vast majority of its 288 pages is an “inside baseball” history of socialist movements in history. Who inspired them, ran them, and joined or supported them. How they allied with and fought each other and outsiders, and rarely, what policies they pushed for or how they ran things. Generally, Sunkara’s heros are those who “called for” the most “radical” change, regardless of their actual impact on people or policies.

Amazingly for something called a “manifesto” and “primer”, there’s little effort to argue for why socialism is good; we are supposed to find that obvious. More on that below.

Yes, big failures like Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s China are acknowledged, but blamed on their being insufficiently “democratic”. Sunkara doesn’t discuss why that seems to happen so often, nor how to stop it from happening again. The actual socialist-like government that he seems most willing to embrace is that of Sweden until a few decades ago. But he has little discussion of why Sweden has since moved far away from that, other than to blame it on business media campaigns and bad strategy choices by politicians.

Much is packed into Sunkara “democracy” concept, as he often blames the failure of socialists to gain more influence as due to capitalist influences on votes. Apparently any elections done within capitalism can’t be fully “democratic.” The US today is also said to be “undemocratic” because our system tends to favor having two main parties. Sunkara also says having things decided by local governments is less democratic, as capitalists have more influence at smaller scales. Sometimes merely voting is seen as insufficiently democratic; Sunkara instead prefers the pressure that comes from mobs, especially mobs willing to break the law. I don’t really see a coherent “democracy” concept here, other than that “democracy” is whatever leads to Sunkara’s favored policies.

Socialism is said to be the solution not only to inequality and oppression, but also to racism and global warming:

People can overcome their prejudices in the process of mass struggle over shared interests.

Democratic socialism would do far better at keeping humanity flourishing along with the wider ecology. …Worker-controlled firms don’t have the same ‘grow or die’ imperative as capitalist ones. A more empowered citizenry, too, would be better able to weigh the costs and benefits of new development.

Though Sunkara does call for

avoiding a narrow ‘call-out culture’ along with the kinds of identity politics that, taken to its extreme, will lead us down the path to a hyper-individualized and anti-solidaristic politics. Hyperbole and the politics of personal shaming are a recipe for demoralization, paranoia, and defeat.

So what exactly is “socialism”? It is not the end of competition or inequality. Under socialism, there is still personal private property allocated by competitive markets. Romantic and friend relations are set by competitive markets for association. Competitive labor markets still allocate jobs, which result in differing wages and working conditions. People compete under democracy to see who gets to run firms and the government, and people compete to gain government approval to start and grow firms:

Collectively you and your coworkers now control your company. … You have to pay a tax on its capital assets, in effect renting it from society as a whole. … Everyone [must] participate in management on an equal footing. … [Your firm picks] a representative system of governance. … From the unit supervisor’s perspective, she has the duty to make sure everyone is doing their share. [A lazy worker] goes through a progressive disciplinary process – first comes a warning, with concrete suggestions for improvement, then a suspension with pay, then finally, dismissal with three months of severance. …

There is still market competition, and firms still fail, but the grow-or-die imperative doesn’t apply. … There’s pressure to make sure janitorial and other ‘dirty’ jobs are well compensated. …

Capital goods tax … funds are invested into … national planning projects. What’s left is given to regions on a per capita basis … channels by regional investment banks (public of course) that … apportion … to new or existing firms. Applicants are judged on the basis of profitability, job creation, and other criteria including environmental impact. … These tradeoffs are political decisions. … Since you’re starting the firm, you have some discretion in setting the initial operating agreement. … To attract workers [you decided on] income differentials. … you are rewarded for your invention with a small amount of state prize money, and you do end up earning more as an elected manager.

Sunkara says that you wouldn’t be scared to lose your job as you “can get by on the state’s basic income grant and supplement it by taking a guaranteed public sector job.” No mention is made of savings, so it seems you can’t forgo consumption today to save more for you or your children’s future.

Sunkara offers this as his definition of “socialism”, but he doesn’t do anything to assure us that others agree with his definition. From what I’ve read before on the subject, there’s a lot of disagreement on that question.

I have serious doubts that such a system will work as well as familiar ones for choosing products and methods of production. Why are they better for creating efficiency and growth, or for happiness and meaning? Seems to me people would try a lot less hard to figure out better ways to do things. They’d instead figure out how to pander to and lobby the more ignorant politicized panels that allocate capital. As we’ve seen in “socialist” regimes before.

You probably have such doubts too. Yet Sunkara offers zero arguments to allay our fears. No theory arguments. No systematic data comparing how different systems have worked in practice. Not even a few detailed anecdotes on which we might hang our hopes. Nothing, other than perhaps invoking a faith that more democracy must improve all things.

To anyone tempted in the future to write a “manifesto” for some radical proposal, I suggest: actually argue for it. With theory, data, anecdotes, something. And you’d do best to argue for particular concrete trials to test your proposal. Call for more such trials, but don’t call for everyone everywhere to adopt your proposal in the absence of generally positive results from a series of trials of increasing scale and difficulty.

Given how much experience the world has had with regimes that were called “socialist”, I don’t see how anyone could seriously propose more of it without a review of some data drawn from these experiences. While we do have some such data regarding “democracy” of various forms, that data isn’t especially encouraging. Data on government panels deciding what new production ventures to try, and what old ones to maintain, seems to me even more sparse and less encouraging. But do show us that’s wrong, if you can.

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Yay Parliaments

Voters may like the idea of direct democracy, but as Garett Jones mentions in 10% Less Democracy, most scholars agree that representative democracy produces better outcomes. Similarly, while voters may thrill more to directly choose their top leader, better outcomes come from having voters pick legislators who then pick, and can remove, the top leader.

Here’s Arend Lijphart with some simple theory:

In parliamentary systems, only the legislature is popularly elected and is the clear and legitimate representative of the people, but in presidential systems both president and legislature are popularly elected and are both legitimate representatives of the people—but it is quite possible and even likely that the president and the majority of legislators have divergent political preferences. … There is no democratic principle to resolve such disagreements. … second problem is “rigidity”: presidents are elected for fixed periods of time. … third serious problem is the “winner take all” nature of presidential elections. … The fourth serious drawback of presidentialism is that presidential election campaigns encourage the politics of personality … instead of … competing parties and … programs.

In his new book Why Not Parliamentarism? Tiago Ribeiro Dos Santos collects much evidence favoring that option: Continue reading "Yay Parliaments" »

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