Tag Archives: Law

How Many Judges?

“Wow, that was sure a long slow legal process we just went through to get X punished for Y. Surely many such cases are never punished, because this process is just too hard.”

“I’ve heard that in some places it is much simpler and faster. If you have a complaint, you call over the local police officer, and he or she soon looks into it, and then makes a decision, usually that day. Fast and easy, no need for lawyers, courts, etc. Doesn’t that sound better?”

“No, that sounds terrible! What if that local police is corrupt, or biased, or stupid? Our checks and balances help correct for such problems.”

“Well in our system, after a slow expensive complex process, judges usually make the final decision. So what stops judges from being as corrupt, biased, or stupid as police?”

“Well there are a lot fewer judges than police, so we can focus our attention on a smaller number of them. For example, we can send in people undercover to try to bribe them, and arrest those who accept bribes.”

“But we almost never actually do that with judges. And we could also do that with police.”

“With judges we have an appeals system, where appeals judges fix other judges’ mistakes. And the process is public, so anyone can point to problems.”

“We could do an appeals system with police too – if there’s a complaint, call nearby police to see if they want to come make a quick appeals decision. And that process could be public.”

“We elect judges, or those who appoint them. That holds them accountable to citizens.”

“So why can’t we elect police, or those who appoint them?”

“Judges are more prestigious than police. They are picked for being the lawyers who are most respected by other lawyers.”

“Our actual police are also the most respected among people who apply to police academy.”

“Yeah but overall lawyers are more prestigious than police. They go to college, know big words, make more money.”

“And that makes them less corruptible or biased, and more just?”

“Well elites are more eager to conform, and are better able to conform, so either they will almost all be corrupt and biased or almost none will be.”

“Not sure I feel better about that. And aren’t they better at knowing how to tell when they can get away with things, so that they will be better at finding the loopholes where we are not checking, to be more corrupt and biased there? And doesn’t their conformity better help them coordinate to get away with stuff together?”

“Look, humans have long chosen to be ruled by prestigious elites, its our nature. So it must work somehow. We pick prestigious lawyers to run law, prestigious doctors to run medicine, and prestigious academics to run teaching and research. And those work well, right?”

“Okay, if it is better to be ruled by a smaller group of more prestigious people, making judges better than police, why isn’t it even better to be ruled by one most prestigious of all dictator? Who appoints and fires police or judges as they want?”

“No no, that’s terrible too! That’s too much concentration of power. This dictator could rule with impunity, because even if some of us know of his/her corruption or bias, we’ll be afraid to say so in public. He/she could crush us for our opposition.”

“But can’t judges crush us for opposing them?”

“No, that never happens. When have you ever heard of judges crushing opponents?”

“In a dictatorship, would you actually hear of the dictator crushing opponents?”

“I’m sure I would. And dictators don’t tend to be the most prestigious; they tend to be brutal thugs.”

“But won’t everyone say they are prestigious, out of fear of retaliation? And if it is better to spread out a dictator’s power, among many judges, why isn’t it even better to spread out that power among even more police?”

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Vouching Fights Pandemics

As I’ve pitched vouching as a general solution to both law and medicine, the looming coronavirus pandemic offers a good and challenging concrete test; how well could vouching handle that?

If you recall, under a law vouching system, each person is required to get a voucher who stands ready to cover them for any large legal liability, including fines as punishment for crimes. Under a medical vouching system, each person gets a voucher to pay for all their medical treatments, and also to pay large amounts to a third party when that person becomes disabled, in pain, or dead. Voucher-client contracts can specific physical punishments like torture or jail, co-liability with associates, and limits on freedoms, such as re travel, privacy, or risky behaviors. 

Regarding a looming pandemic, your voucher would know that it must pay for your medical treatment, your lost salary if you stop working, and large fines if you die or get hurt. So it would offer large premium discounts to gain powers to limit your travel and contacts, and to penetrate your privacy enough to see what contagion risks you might incur. And it would have good incentives to make risky medical choices expertly, such as if to try an experimental treatment, or to accept early deliberate exposure. 

When you live with others who you might infect, or who might infect you, you’d probably also be offered premium discounts to let the same voucher cover all of you together. But there would remain key externalities, i.e., risks of infecting or being infected by others who are not covered by the same voucher.

The straightforward legal remedy for such externalities is to let people sue others for infecting them. In the past this remedy has seemed inadequate for two reasons: 

  1. It has often been expensive and hard to learn and prove who infected who, and
  2. Ever since we stopped holding family members liable for each other, and selling debtors into slavery, most folks just can’t pay large legal debts.

The vouching system directly solves (2), as everyone has a voucher who can pay lots. And the key to (1) is ensuring that the right info is collected and saved.

First, consider some new rules that would limit people’s freedoms in some ways. Imagine people were required to keep an RFID tag (or visible QR code) on their person when not at home, and also to save a sample of their spit or skin once a week? Then phones could remember a history of the tags of people near that phone, and lawsuits could subpoena to get surveillance records of possible infection events, and to see if spit/skin samples on nearby dates contain a particular pathogen, and its genetic code if present. We might also adopt a gambled lawsuit system to make it easier to sue for small harms.

Together these changes could make it feasible to, when you discovered you had been infected, sue those who likely infected you. First, your voucher could collaborate with vouchers of others who were infected nearby in space and time, by a pathogen with a similar code. By combining their tag records and local surveillance records, this group of vouchers could collect a set of candidates of who might plausibly have infected you when and where. 

(Yes, collaboration gains from voucher groups might give vouchers more market power, but not too much, as this can work okay even when there are many competing voucher groups.)

You could then sue all these possible infectors via gambled lawsuits. For the winning lawsuits, your voucher could subpoena their split/skin to see if their pathogen codes match the code of the pathogen that infected you. When a match was found, a lawsuit could proceed, unless they settled out of court. Sharing verdict and settlement info with collaborating vouchers could make it easier for them to figure out who to sue.  

Okay, yes, there is the issue of who would agree to keep RFID tags and sufficient spit/skin samples, if this weren’t required by law. I’ve proposed that the amount awarded in a lawsuit be corrected for how the chances of catching someone varies with the freedoms they keep. Such chances would be estimated by prediction markets. The lower the estimated chance of catching a particular harm for a given set of freedoms, then the higher would be the award amount if they are caught. 

So if, given the choice, some people choose not to use RFID tags or keep spit/skin samples, they may be harder to catch, but they would pay more when they do. (Which is part of why most might choose less privacy.) As a result, clients and their vouchers will know that on average they will pay for the full cost of infecting others. Which could be huge amounts if they infect many others with deadly pathogens. Which would push vouchers to work to ensure that their clients take sufficient care to avoid that. 

And that’s my concept. During the early stages of a pandemic, a system of law/med vouchers would have incentives to try the sort of aggressive case tracing that public health professionals now try. And if such professionals existed, they could collaborate with vouchers. Once the pandemic escaped containment, this vouching system would encourage people to isolate themselves to avoid infecting others, and to avoid being infected. Their freedoms of travel and privacy would become more limited, more like the limits that an aggressive government might impose. 

But exceptions would be allowed when other costs loomed larger, just as economic efficiency demands. Compared to a centralized aggressive government, a voucher system could much more easily and flexibly take into account individual differences in inclinations, vulnerability, and preferences. The choice of freedoms would be made more practical and local, and less symbol.

With vouchers and lawsuits for infections working well to get people to internalize the infection externalities, pandemics might be limited and contained at nearly the level that a cost-benefit analysis would suggest. 

Added 07Mar: Early in a pandemic it is easier to trace who infected you, and it would make sense to let you sue someone who infected you not only for the damages you suffered, but also for the damages you had to pay others who you infected. This could create very large incentives to contain pandemics early.

Later in a pandemic people sued might reasonably argue that they should only have to pay for the harm from someone being infected earlier than they would otherwise have been, which might be no harm at all during a period before the peak when medical resources are becoming spread increasingly thin.

Added 10Mar: If later in an infection it becomes too hard to trace who infected who, even with the above reforms, then it might make sense to have more general crime-law-based rules limiting social contact. Vouching can also do well at enforcing such rules.

Added 20Apr: See my more flexible and general approach to requiring that info be collected and saved. Also, if cases are common where you can narrow an infection down to 1 of 5 sources, but can’t prove which one, it makes sense to make them each pay 20% of the damages. This way we don’t need to be >50% confident of each particular infection link.

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Why Big Implicit Deals?

It takes some effort to formally write, review, and sign contracts. And to have courts enforce them. So it makes sense to not bother for deals that are too small, or that are observed and repeated enough for reputation or repeated play incentives to be sufficient. But we have a few big deals in life where these don’t apply, and yet we still don’t tend to write explicit formal contracts, nor allow negotiated exceptions. 

For example, when getting married, joining a religion, joining a profession, or becoming a citizen. We tend to talk about such things as if they were deals, especially when criticizing folks who seem to have reneged. But we aren’t very formal or clear about what exactly one is agreeing to in such cases, and we discourage the negotiation of variations on standard deals. Marriage prenups are frowned on, and often not enforced by courts. Even though people sometimes pray “God, please, if you’ll do this, then I’ll do that,” theologians offer little hope for such deals. And professions and states almost never allow negotiated alterations to their standard deals.

Yes, these can be complex relations, and it is hard for explicit contracts to cover all relevant cases or details. But that is also true for business deals, where we do typically make explicit, if far from complete, contracts. Yes, by forgoing formal contracts we can signal confidence in our shared good will and emotional inclinations to make good on our promises. But that is also true about business deals. 

Yes, implicit deals better support hypocrisy, wherein we pretend to promise things that we probably won’t deliver. But there is much hypocrisy in business too. Yes, by preferring standardized conformist deals, we tend to avoid nonconformists, who on average are more error-prone and less capable. But that is also true in business.

The biggest difference I see between typical business and other deals is that business relations often have a lot more contextual variation that can be usefully addressed via explicit negotiated contract terms. There are so very many kinds of business deals for so many different situations. In contrast, marriages are more alike; the couples I see making explicit marriage contracts are those with unusual tastes or situations. Religions, professions, and states have less need of differing deals for differing members, and they fear some secretly getting better deals than others.

Thus it makes sense that it is mainly in business relations that we usually pay the many real costs to create formal explicit contracts. Thus people who want to disrespect, hurt and tax business can more safely achieve that via adjusting contract law, without risking much harm to these other types of deals, for which they have more respect. 

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Nickname Court

For perhaps a millions years, humans did justice mainly via gossip: the rule was that when you saw a rule violated, you were to tell of it to others, talk together on what to do, and then do it.

Problem was, gossip has long been known to be unreliable. When you hear someone rely an accusation that another person did something terrible, there’s a social “rush to judgment” pressure to immediately agree, to show your disapproval of that terrible thing. Even though you haven’t heard all the relevant evidence, including what that accused person might say in their defense.

Forager bands fixed this vis group discussions. They’d all gather around a campfire, listen listen together to the accusations and any rebuttals, discuss it, and only decide together after everyone had their say. Alas, as social groups got larger this was no longer feasible. So near the dawn of civilization, we invented formal trials: we supported the judgment of a subset of us, who made sure to judge only after hearing all the evidence.

Today we still gossip on a great many topics where there are no formal trials, and on those topics we still suffer big problems with rushes to judgment. So we’d do well to try to find more excuses to make formal trial processes whose judgements we’d be tempted to support.

Note that this isn’t the same as just having some group recommend a judgement. We do that all the time via news editorial boards, expert commissions, interest groups endorsements, etc. The difference is that a formal trial is a public process, airing all relevant evidence, and its judges are not selected to already represent particular sides in familiar debates.

But how? We might declare a new kind of court housing a new kind of trial, but how can we get people to bother to participate as jurors, present evidence as advocates, and to see its ruling as “official” enough to feel pressured to support it?

Here’s my idea: nickname courts. Imagine that people are tempted to use a nickname for a certain person in a particular social context. Such as: the 2nd grade homeroom 3 of public school 117 wants to use the nickname “Stinky Stu” for young member Steward Williams. Perhaps on the basis of recent events wherein young Stu was said to be stinky.

Assume there’s no law against using such a nickname, but that students, parents, and teachers might feel there are relevant social norms against doing something so “rude”. Some of these authorities might even declare their own local rules regulating such nicknames. (Nicknames are going to exist no matter what rules; the best we can do is to better channel that instinct.) I propose that these authorities give substantial deference to a new kind of court, a nickname court.

Someone initiates the process by officially proposing a nickname for a person in a social context, and committing to argue in its favor. That person who is to be given this nickname is notified, and confirms that they will oppose this. Then a “random” jury drawn from this social context is impaneled, which in the example above would be members of this homeroom class. They come together, all present their arguments and evidence, and the jury decides. In the example above, these might all be 2nd grade members of this class, including Stu.

If the jury rules yes, then it becomes more acceptable for members of this community to use this nickname of Stinky Stu for this particular Stu. This ruling may or may not have any legal force, even within the official rules of the school. But people might feel more comfortable knowing that their actions had this “official” support.

If Stu later decided that things had changed enough, he might initiate a new case, arguing that the nickname should no longer apply. Others would be notified, and we’d see if anyone wanted to take the lead to oppose him, starting with whomever initiated that first case. If Stu wins, then it would no longer to be as acceptable to call him Stinky Stu, though it might be okay to call him, “Once-was Stinky Stu”.

This sort of approach could obviously be applied to social media. For example, someone might initiate a case to make it more okay to call Robert Random by the nickname “Racist Rob” on Twitter. As I’ve said before, many of us might prefer a formal process for such labels over the current internet mobs that greatly suffer from rushes to judgment.

I’d bet that kids could really get into nickname courts, and learn a lot about law in the process. And later in life they’d probably think more about how similar processes might apply to other topics. For example, I’d love to have Radical Reform Courts, which evaluate radical proposals for social reform. Today there’s way too much of a rush to judgement, wherein each person who hears of a proposal quickly imagines one potential problem, and then concludes that it can’t work. But I don’t yet know how to make anyone care enough about the ruling of such a court.

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Why Not RFID Tag Humans?

Today, across a wide range of contexts, we consistently have rules that say that if you have a thing out there in the world that can move around and do stuff, you need to give it a visible identifier so that folks near that thing can see that identifier, look it up in a registry, and find out who owns it. That identifier might be a visible tag or ID number, it might be an RFID that responds to radio signals with its ID, or it might be capable of more complex talk protocols. We have such rules for pets, cars, trucks, boats, planes, and most recently have added such rules for drones. Most phones and tablets and other devices that communicate electronically also have such identifiers. And few seem to object to more systematic collection of ID info, such as via tag readers.

The reasoning is simple and robust. When a thing gets lost, identifiers help us get it back to its owner. If a thing might bother or hurt someone around it, we want the owner to know that we can hold them responsible for such effects. Yes, there are costs to creating and maintaining IDs and registries (RFID tags today cost ~$0.15). Also, such IDs can empower those who are hostile to you and your things (including governments) to find them and you, and to hurt you both. But we have consistently seen these costs as worth the benefits, especially as device costs have fallen dramatically over the decades.

But when it comes to your personal body, public opinion seems to quite strongly opposed:

My 14 law&econ undergrads all agreed when I assigned this topic on their final exam today. People oppose requiring identifiers, and as face readers are now on the verge of making a new ID system, many want to legally ensure a right to wear masks to thwart it.

Yet the tradeoffs seem quite similar to me; it is just the scale of the stakes that rise. When we are talking about your body, as opposed to your car, pet, or drone, you can both do more to hurt others, and folks hostile to you might try to do more to you via knowing where you are. But if the ratio of these costs and benefits favor IDs in the other cases, I find it hard to see why that ratio would switch when we get to bodies.

Added 5Mar2020: The number you get from an RFID tag need not directly tell you the public name or location of the person behind it. You might instead need a subpoena to get that from the number.

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Why Not Also Punish False Praise?

I recently read on social media praise for someone I know, someone about whom I know some negative things. I realized that if I posted my negative comments, those would be held to much higher standards than are positive comments. I might be sued for defamation, and many would apply a social norm to me which demands that one defend negative comments with concrete supporting evidence. We don’t have such a norm regarding positive comments.

While the Romans allowed one to sue for damages when someone defamed you even by saying true things, we today only allow that when someone says false negative things, although at common law the burden of proof is on the person accused of defamation to prove their negative claim. The message is: don’t say negative things about others in public if you can’t prove them in court.

Presumably the reason we now allow suits for false defamation is that we see a net social harm there; others are liable to be misled, causing misallocations of resources and relations. In addition, resources may be wasted in back-and-forth defamation battles. But it seems to me that we should also expect similar social harms to result from false positive comments, not just false negative comments. So maybe we should consider having law discourage those as well.

With negative comments it is the defamer who pays the person defamed, even though it is the larger society who in fact suffers the net social harm. The person defamed is just a convenient party we give an incentive to sue. But defamation law would serve a similar social function if we turned it into a bounty, where anyone could sue and collect it. So an obvious option for false positive comments would be to make that into a bounty.

It seems counterproductive to expect the person who is falsely praised to sue someone for doing that. Their incentive can be weak, and if they win they gain twice, from the false claim and from the suit. So my proposal is: let anyone sue re a false positive claim, the first person to succeed gains a bounty amount equal to the court’s estimate of the false gain that resulted. Again put the burden of proof on the person who made the claim. So just as with defamation today, the bounty hunter would have to show some substantial net monetary equivalent gain to the person who was falsely praised, and that could be the amount awarded to that hunter.

Yes, in our world where false praise isn’t punished there’s a lot of it, which isn’t believed so much, and thus each instance causes less harm. But that would also be true if we didn’t allow suing for defamation; a lot more criticism would happen, which would be believed less. If this isn’t a reason to allow defamation, it isn’t a reason not to allow suits against false praise.

Of course, I don’t expect people to leap to implement my proposal. I offer it as a thought experiment, to help us think about *why* we don’t like this, even though its justification seems similarly strong to our usual justification for allowing false defamation lawsuits. Why is false praise seen as so much less harmful than false criticism?

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Rules of Public Evidence?

The United States is perhaps unique among the developed world in that under law, some hate speech is protected. (more)

The United States has a very complicated system of evidentiary rules; for example, John Wigmore’s celebrated treatise on it filled ten volumes. James Bradley Thayer reported in 1898 that even English lawyers were surprised by the complexity of American evidence law. (more)

The main rules of evidence in Sweden are: (i) the principle of free evidence, meaning that there are basically no provisions on what is permitted as evidence as long as it is relevant to the facts to be proven in the case; and (ii) the principle of free evaluation of evidence, meaning that the court evaluates all evidence at its discretion. (more)

On 2 December 1766 Sweden became the first country in the world to have freedom of the press written into the constitution. (more)

Many in the US are proud that the US has weaker limits on speech than do most other nations, especially regarding political speech. However, most in US are not aware that the US also has some of the strongest “rules of evidence” limits on speech in legal courts. These US rules are new; we didn’t have them centuries ago.

Yet the usual arguments used to argue for free political speech can also argue for free court speech, while the usual arguments supporting rules of evidence can also support similar limits on political speech. And the examples of other nations shows that there isn’t a strong world consensus that court limits make more sense than political speech limits. Sweden shows that one can allow free speech in both contexts, while many other nations show that one can also have strong limits in both contexts.

Here are some common rules of evidence limiting trial speech. These are rough guides; the law is quite complex with simple summaries rarely applying exactly.

  • A big clear separation is required between “news” and “editorials”, that is between supporting evidence (most of a trial) and arguments for conclusions (given in closing statements).
  • All witnesses must swear oaths to tell the truth, and are guilty of a crime if they lie.
  • Anyone may be required to testify, except the accused, spouses, docs, therapists, lawyers.
  • One must apply any burdens of proof separately to each element, not just to overall evidence.

All these kinds of evidence are not allowed:

  1. The opinion of a non-expert, unless it is reached unconsciously,
  2. Unauthenticated tangible evidence,
  3. Indirect circumstantial evidence,
  4. Data on similar prior convictions or behavior by the accused,
  5. Hearsay, i.e., what someone heard someone else say,
  6. Simple “naked” statistical evidence, based on relative counts rather than direct observations,
  7. Extrinsic evidence of the contents of a written contract,
  8. Evidence obtained via illegal acts, and
  9. Confessions obtained in an “unreliable” context.

If we wanted, we could eliminate these court rules, and just let everyone say anything relevant that they want in court, as happens now in Sweden.

Or, we might instead apply many of these rules to public political speech. For example, we could require evidence and argument to appear in separate places, we could ban opinions by non-experts, and ban arguments using hearsay or naked statistical evidence. We might even ban irrelevant distracting tangents.

Such rules would require some discretion to enforce, but not much more than judges already use now to apply such rules in courts. Any disputes about excess or misdirected discretion would be judged by those very same legal judges who now make those judgments in courtrooms. And as with most law, minor offenses, which bring small sanctions, may be mostly ignored by both state police and by private suits.

Even in the US, we already apply many limits to business speech. For example, alcohol firms can’t tell the public that most studies find health benefits from modest consumption, anti-discrimination laws limit the kinds of questions one can ask in a job interview, professional licensing limits who you can pay for advice, and some offers are banned by blackmail and wrongful interference with relations rules.

The business world still roughly functions with these rules, as do political worlds in other nations that have strong limits on political speech. And courts could still roughly function without rules of evidence, as happens now in Sweden. These are clearly choices we could make, not clearly forced on us by survival or even wealth considerations.

So what should we choose, more free speech at trials, less free political speech, or a continuation of our inconsistent approach? Here’s a Twitter poll on that:

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The Big Change In Blame

Law is our main system of official blame; it is how we officially blame people for things. So it is a pretty big deal that, over the last few centuries, changes to law have induced big changes in who officially blames who for most things that go wrong. These changes may be having big bad effects.

Long ago most everyone could use law to blame most everyone else. Even though people were poor, the legal process was simple enough for most to use it without needing a lawyer. (Many places actually banned lawyers.) Those found liable could often be sold into slavery to pay their legal debts, and their larger family clans could also be held responsible for their debts. So basically, people blamed people, with families as guarentors.

Over the last few centuries, the legal system has become far more complex and expensive, now requiring people to pay lawyers to sue. But at the same time we’ve made it harder to get people who are found liable to pay. We don’t sell them into slavery or make their families pay, and going bankrupt has become easier and less painful. So when ordinary people suffer a harm and look for someone to sue, their lawyers usually strongly advise that they focus on any deep pockets at all related to their harm.

The law, sympathetic to their plight, has found ways to blame the rich and big firms for most everything that goes wrong. For example, these are all real examples.

  • A rape in an abandoned building is blamed on the building owner.
  • Harassment in a stadium parking lot is blamed on the stadium owner.
  • A student harming another student in an off-campus apartment is blamed on the school.
  • A post-event bad-weather auto-accident is blamed on event host for not cancelling.
  • A harm from using a product bought from a 3rd party is blamed on its manufacturer.

As ordinary people aren’t suing each other much, the government steps in to discipline ordinary folks’ behavior, via regulation and crime law. So, while once people blamed people, law now trains people to blame the rich and big business, and to expect to be blamed by government. So it maybe isn’t so strange that in the recent US Democratic presidential debates, the main parties blamed are the rich and big business. And if ordinary people are seen as doing something wrong (as with guns), regulation or crime law is assumed to be the solution.

When bad things happen in government spaces, like roads, it gets harder to find a rich person or business to blame. So on the roads we have introduced a system of requiring liability insurance, to make sure there’s a big rich business to pay if something goes wrong. As a result, on the road people blame people. That seems a healthier situation to me, and my vouching proposal would try to apply that idea much more widely, to help us return to a world where more often people blame people, rather than people blaming business or government blaming people.

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Who Vouches For You?

A <600 word summary of my crime law proposal:

Who Vouches For You?: A Radical Crime Law Proposal

The legal system used by most ancient societies was simply A-sues-B-for-cash. But in the last few centuries, states added “crime law,” wherein the state investigates, sues, and imprisons “criminals.” These centrally-run one-size-fits-all bureaucratic systems don’t innovate well or adapt well to individual conditions. And even though most of your “constitutional rights” are regarding such systems, they still seem badly broken.

In the ancient world, a stranger who came to town was trusted more if a local “vouched” for them. We still use vouching today in bonded contractors, in open source software, in organized crime, and in requiring most everyone to get an insurer ready to pay if they cause a car accident. I propose requiring everyone to get an insurer to vouch for them regarding any crimes they might commit. If you are found guilty of a crime, your “voucher” pays the state a fine, and then pays to punish you according to your contract with them. This fine in part pays the private bounty-hunter who convinced the court of your guilt. Competing bounty-hunters obey law because they can’t maintain a blue-wall-of-silence.

To lower your voucher premiums, you might agree to (1) prison, torture, or exile, if caught, (2) prior limits on your freedom like curfews, ankle bracelets, and their reading your emails, and (3) co-liability wherein you and your buddies are all punished if any one of you is found guilty. In this system, the state still decides what behaviors are crimes and if any one accusation is true, and it sets fine and bounty levels regarding how hard to discourage and detect each kind of crime. But each person chooses their own “constitutional rights”, and vouchers acquire incentives and opportunity to innovate and adapt, by searching in a large space of ways to discourage crime.

Some key details:

  1. Judges and juries can retain discretion to consider case details when setting guilt or fines.
  2. If fines vary with wealth or income, then the rich don’t get a free pass to commit crimes.
  3. We could subsidize premiums, or offer a public option, to poor ex-cons for which we feel sorry.
  4. Other poor ex-cons might have to work for a while at isolated ships or mining or logging camps.
  5. Not being vouched is punished severely, not via a fine. Need violations to be rare, as with license plates today.
  6. Perhaps each person/building wears visible QR code or pingable RFID of voucher-client ID (VCID).
  7. It is enough to know VCID to charge with crime, no need to physically detain them.
  8. Key criteria for being a voucher is showing that will have enough money to pay fines.
  9. Vouchers are held to contracts for as long as it takes clients to find new vouchers.
  10. Contracts typically worse for clients over time if not renewed, to cover revealed-criminal scenarios.
  11. Contracts typically do not cover pre-existing crimes or plans, for which prior voucher pays.
  12. Clients can switch at will, though co-liability partners must all agree to switch at same time.
  13. First-to-file bounty hunter has right to prosecute first, though is crime to file with little evidence.
  14. Courts would remain skeptical of both sides’ evidence, with evidence faking being a big crime.
  15. Bounty-hunters access to evidence varies with contract-specified client privacy levels.
  16. Market estimates of fines given privacy levels set extra fine factors paid by clients with high levels.
  17. As immigrants & tourists must be vouched, it matters less if immigrants cause more crime.
  18. Parents must get vouchers for kids, so “majority” age could be when kids can afford it on own.
  19. These or related vouchers might pay for costs to assist folks suffering poverty or unemployment.
  20. May want solemn voucher signing ceremony, after passing test shows that understand contract.

Added: See also this talk video.

Added: See also vouching re pandemics.

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Beware Nggwal

Consider the fact that this was a long standing social equilibrium:

During an undetermined time period preceding European contact, a gargantuan, humanoid spirit-God conquered parts of the Sepik region of Papua New Guinea. … Nggwal was the tutelary spirit for a number of Sepik horticulturalist societies, where males of various patriclans were united in elaborate cult systems including initiation grades and ritual secrecy, devoted to following the whims of this commanding entity. …

a way of maintaining the authority of the older men over the women and children; it is a system directed against the women and children, … In some tribes, a woman who accidentally sees the [costumed spirit or the sacred paraphernalia] is killed. … it is often the responsibility of the women to provide for his subsistence … During the [secret] cult’s feasts, it is the senior members who claim the mantle of Nggwal while consuming the pork for themselves. …

During the proper ritual seasons, Ilahita Arapesh men would wear [ritual masks/costumes], and personify various spirits. … move about begging small gifts of food, salt, tobacco or betelnut. They cannot speak, but indicate their wishes with various conventional gestures, …
Despite the playful, Halloween-like aspects of this practice … 10% of the male masks portrayed [violent spirits] , and they were associated with the commission of ritually sanctioned murder. These murders committed by the violent spirits were always attributed to Nggwal.

The costumes of the violent spirits would gain specific insignia after committing each killing, … “Word goes out that Nggwal has “swallowed” another victim; the killer remains technically anonymous, even though most Nggwal members know, or have a strong inkling of, his identity.” … are universally feared, and nothing can vacate a hamlet so quickly as one of these spooks materializing out of the gloom of the surrounding jungle. … Nggwal benefits some people at the expense of others. Individuals of the highest initiation level within the Tambaran cult have increased status for themselves and their respective clans, and they have exclusive access to the pork of the secret feasts that is ostensibly consumed by Nggwal. The women and children are dominated severely by Nggwal and the other Tambaran cult spirits, and the young male initiates must endure severe dysphoric rituals to rise within the cult. (more)

So in these societies, top members of secret societies could, by wearing certain masks, literally get away with murder. These societies weren’t lawless; had these men committed murder without the masks, they would have been prosecuted and punished.

Apparently many societies have had such divisions between an official legal system that was supposed to fairly punish anyone for hurting others, along side less visible but quite real systems whereby some elites could far more easily get away with murder. Has this actually been the usual case in history?

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