Tag Archives: Ems

Why Age of Em Will Happen

In some technology competitions, winners dominate strongly. For example, while gravel may cover a lot of roads if we count by surface area, if we weigh by vehicle miles traveled then asphalt strongly dominates as a road material. Also, while some buildings are cooled via fans and very thick walls, the vast majority of buildings in rich and hot places use air-conditioning. In addition, current versions of software systems also tend to dominate over old older versions. (E.g., Windows 10 over Windows 8.)

However, in many other technology competitions, older technologies remain widely used over long periods. Cities were invented ten thousand years ago, yet today only about half of the population lives in them. Cars, trains, boats, and planes have taken over much transportation, yet we still do plenty of walking. Steel has replaced wood in many structures, yet wood is still widely used. Fur, wool, and cotton aren’t used as often as they once were, but they are still quite common as clothing materials. E-books are now quite popular, but paper books sales are still growing.

Whether or not an old tech still retains wide areas of substantial use depends on the average advantage of the new tech, relative to the variation of that advantage across the environments where these techs are used, and the variation within each tech category. All else equal, the wider the range of environments, and the more diverse is each tech category, the longer that old tech should remain in wide use.

For example, compare the set of techs that start with the letter A (like asphalt) to the set that start with the letter G (like gravel). As these are relatively arbitrary sets that do not “cut nature at its joints”, there is wide diversity within each category, and each set is all applied to a wide range of environments. This makes it quite unlikely that one of these sets will strongly dominate the other.

Note that techs that tend to dominate strongly, like asphalt, air-conditioning, and new software versions, more often appear as a lumpy change, e.g., all at once, rather than via a slow accumulation of many changes. That is, they more often result from one or a few key innovations, and have some simple essential commonality. In contrast, techs that have more internal variety and structure tend more to result from the accumulation of more smaller innovations.

Now consider the competition between humans and computers for mental work. Today human brains earn more than half of world income, far more than the costs of computer hardware and software. But over time, artificial hardware and software have been improving, and slowly commanding larger fractions. Eventually this could become a majority. And a key question is then: how quickly might computers come to dominate overwhelmingly, doing virtually all mental work?

On the one hand, the ranges here are truly enormous. We are talking about all mental work, which covers a very wide of environments. And not only do humans vary widely in abilities and inclinations, but computer systems seem to encompass an even wider range of designs and approaches. And many of these are quite complex systems. These facts together suggest that the older tech of human brains could last quite a long time (relative of course to relevant timescales) after computers came to do the majority of tasks (weighted by income), and that the change over that period could be relatively gradual.

For an analogy, consider the space of all possible non-mental work. While machines have surely been displacing humans for a long time in this area, we still do many important tasks “by hand”, and overall change has been pretty steady for a long time period. This change looked nothing like a single “general” machine taking over all the non-mental tasks all at once.

On the other hand, human minds are today stuck in old bio hardware that isn’t improving much, while artificial computer hardware has long been improving rapidly. Both these states, of hardware being stuck and improving fast, have been relatively uniform within each category and across environments. As a result, this hardware advantage might plausibly overwhelm software variety to make humans quickly lose most everywhere.

However, eventually brain emulations (i.e. “ems”) should be possible, after which artificial software would no longer have a hardware advantage over brain software; they would both have access to the same hardware. (As ems are an all-or-nothing tech that quite closely substitutes for humans and yet can have a huge hardware advantage, ems should displace most all humans over a short period.) At that point, the broad variety of mental task environments, and of approaches to both artificial and em software, suggests that ems many well stay competitive on many job tasks, and that this status might last a long time, with change being gradual.

Note also that as ems should soon become much cheaper than humans, the introduction of ems should initially cause a big reversion, wherein ems take back many of the mental job tasks that humans had recently lost to computers.

In January I posted a theoretical account that adds to this expectation. It explains why we should expect brain software to be a marvel of integration and abstraction, relative to the stronger reliance on modularity that we see in artificial software, a reliance that allows those systems to be smaller and faster built, but also causes them to rot faster. This account suggests that for a long time it would take unrealistically large investments for artificial software to learn to be as good as brain software on the tasks where brains excel.

A contrary view often expressed is that at some point someone will “invent” AGI (= Artificial General Intelligence). Not that society will eventually have broadly capable and thus general systems as a result of the world economy slowly collecting many specific tools and abilities over a long time. But that instead a particular research team somewhere will discover one or a few key insights that allow that team to quickly create a system that can do most all mental tasks much better than all the other systems, both human and artificial, in the world at that moment. This insight might quickly spread to other teams, or it might be hoarded to give this team great relative power.

Yes, under this sort of scenario it becomes more plausible that artificial software will either quickly displace humans on most all jobs, or do the same to ems if they exist at the time. But it is this scenario that I have repeatedly argued is pretty crazy. (Not impossible, but crazy enough that only a small minority should assume or explore it.) While the lumpiness of innovation that we’ve seen so far in computer science has been modest and not out of line with most other research fields, this crazy view postulates an enormously lumpy innovation, far out of line with anything we’ve seen in a long while. We have no good reason to believe that such a thing is at all likely.

If we presume that no one team will ever invent AGI, it becomes far more plausible that there will still be plenty of jobs tasks for ems to do, whenever ems show up. Even if working ems only collect 10% of world income soon after ems appear, the scenario I laid out in my book Age of Em is still pretty relevant. That scenario is actually pretty robust to such variations. As a result of thinking about these considerations, I’m now much more confident that the Age of Em will happen.

In Age of Em, I said:

Conditional on my key assumptions, I expect at least 30 percent of future situations to be usefully informed by my analysis. Unconditionally, I expect at least 5 percent.

I now estimate an unconditional 80% chance of it being a useful guide, and so will happily take bets based on a 50-50 chance estimate. My claim is something like:

Within the first D econ doublings after ems are as cheap as the median human worker, there will be a period where >X% of world income is paid for em work. And during that period Age of Em will be a useful guide to that world.

Note that this analysis suggests that while the arrival of ems might cause a relatively sudden and disruptive transition, the improvement of other artificial software would likely be more gradual. While overall rates of growth and change should increase as a larger fraction of the means of production comes to be made in factories, the risk is low of a sudden AI advance relative to that overall rate of change. Those concerned about risks caused by AI changes can more reasonably wait until we see clearer signs of problems.

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Stephenson’s Em Fantasy

Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash (’92) and Diamond Age (’95) were once some of my favorite science fiction novels. And his Anathem (’08) is the very favorite of a friend. So hearing that his new book Fall; or, Dodge in Hell (’19) is about ems, I had to read it. And given that I’m author of Age of Em and care much for science fiction realism, I had to evaluate this story in those terms. (Other reviews don’t seem to care: 1 2 3 4 5)

Alas, in terms of em realism, this book disappoints. To explain, I’m going to have to give spoilers; you are warned. Continue reading "Stephenson’s Em Fantasy" »

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Progeny Probs: Souls, Ems, Quantum

Consider three kinds of ancestry trees: 1) souls of some odd human mothers, 2) ems and their copies, and 3) splitting quantum worlds. In each kind of tree, agents can ask themselves, “Which future version of me will I become?”

SOULS  First, let’s start with some odd human mothers. A single uber-mother can give rise to a large tree of descendants via the mother relation. Each branch in the tree is a single person. The leaves of this tree are branches that lead to no more branches. In this case, leaves are either men, or they are women who never had children. When a mother looks back on her history, she sees a single chain of branches from the uber-mother root of the tree to her. All of those branches are mothers who had at least one child.

Now here is the odd part: imagine that some mothers see their personal historical chain as describing a singular soul being passed down through the generations. They believe that souls can be transferred but not created, and so that when a mother has more than one child, at most one of those children gets a soul.

Yes, this is an odd perspective to have regarding souls, but bear with me. Such an odd mother might wonder which one of her children will inherit her soul. Her beliefs about the answer to this question, and about other facts about this child, might be expressed in a subjective probability distribution. I will call such a distribution a “progeny prob”.

EMS  Second, let’s consider ems, the subject of my book The Age of Em: Work, Love, and Life when Robots Rule the Earth. Ems don’t yet exist, but they might in the future. Each em is an emulation of a particular human brain, and it acts just like that human would in the same subjective situation, even though it actually runs on an artificial computer. Each em is part of an ancestry tree that starts with a root that resulted from scanning a particular human brain.

This em tree branches when copies are made of individual ems, and the leaves of this tree are copies that are erased. Ems vary in many ways, such as in how much wealth they own, how fast their minds run relative to humans, and how long they live before they end or next split into copies. Split events also differ, such as re how many copies are made, what social role each copy is planned to fill, and which copies get what part of the original’s wealth or friends.

An em who looks toward its next future split, and foresees a resulting set of copies, may ask themselves “Which one of those copies will I be?” Of course they will actually become all of those copies. But as human minds never evolved to anticipate splitting, ems may find it hard to think that way. The fact that ems remember only one chain of branches in the past can lead them to think in terms of continuing on in only one future branch. Em “progeny prob” beliefs about who they will become can also include predictions about life details of that copy, such as wealth or speed. These beliefs can also be conditional on particular plans made for this split, such as which copies plan to take which jobs.

QUANTUM  Third, let’s consider quantum states, as seen from the many worlds perspective. We start with a large system of interest, a system that can include observers like humans and ems. This system begins in some “root” quantum state, and afterward experiences many “decoherence events”, with each such event aligned to a particular key parameter, like the spatial location of a particular atom. Soon after each such decoherence event, the total system state typically becomes closely approximated by a weighted sum of component states. Each component state is associated with a different value of the key parameter. Each subsystem of such a component state, including subsystems that describe the mental states of observers, have states that match this key parameter value. For example, if these observers “measured” the location of an atom, then each observer would have a mental state corresponding to their having observed the same particular location. Continue reading "Progeny Probs: Souls, Ems, Quantum" »

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How Does Brain Code Differ?

The Question

We humans have been writing “code” for many decades now, and as “software eats the world” we will write a lot more. In addition, we can also think of the structures within each human brain as “code”, code that will also shape the future.

Today the code in our heads (and bodies) is stuck there, but eventually we will find ways to move this code to artificial hardware. At which point we can create the world of brain emulations that is the subject of my first book, Age of Em. From that point on, these two categories of code, and their descendant variations, will have near equal access to artificial hardware, and so will compete on relatively equal terms to take on many code roles. System designers will have to choose which kind of code to use to control each particular system.

When designers choose between different types of code, they must ask themselves: which kinds of code are more cost-effective in which kinds of applications? In a competitive future world, the answer to this question may be the main factor that decides the fraction of resources devoted to running human-like minds. So to help us envision such a competitive future, we should also ask: where will different kinds of code work better? (Yes, non-competitive futures may be possible, but harder to arrange than many imagine.)

To think about which kinds of code win where, we need a basic theory that explains their key fundamental differences. You might have thought that much has been written on this, but alas I can’t find much. I do sometimes come across people who think it obvious that human brain code can’t possibly compete well anywhere, though they rarely explain their reasoning much. As this claim isn’t obvious to me, I’ve been trying to think about this key question of which kinds of code wins where. In the following, I’ll outline what I’ve come up with. But I still hope someone will point me to useful analyses that I’ve missed.

In the following, I will first summarize a few simple differences between human brain code and other code, then offer a deeper account of these differences, then suggest an empirical test of this account, and finally consider what these differences suggest for which kinds of code will be more cost-effective where. Continue reading "How Does Brain Code Differ?" »

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Avoiding Blame By Preventing Life

If morality is basically a package of norms, and if norms are systems for making people behave, then each individual’s main moral priority becomes: to avoid blame. While the norm system may be designed to on average produce good outcomes, when that system breaks then each individual has only weak incentives to fix it. They mainly seek to avoid blame according to the current broken system. In this post I’ll discuss an especially disturbing example, via a series of four hypothetical scenarios.

1. First, imagine we had a tech that could turn ordinary humans into productive zombies. Such zombies can still do most jobs effectively, but they no longer have feelings or an inner life, and from the outside they also seem dead inside, lacking passion, humor, and liveliness. Imagine that someone proposed to use this tech on a substantial fraction of the human population. That is, they propose to zombify those who do jobs that others see as boring, routine, and low status, like collecting garbage, cleaning bedpans, or sweeping floors. As in this scenario living people would be turned into dead zombies, this proposal would probably be widely seen as genocide, and soundly rejected.

2. Second, imagine someone else proposes the following variation: when a new child of a parent seems likely enough to grow up to take such a low status job, this zombie tech is applied very early to the fetus. So no non-zombie humans are killed, they are just prevented from existing. Zombie kids are able to learn and eventually learn to do those low status. Thus technically this is not genocide, though it could be seen as the extermination of a class. And many parents would suffer from losing their chance to raise lively humans. Whoever proposed all this is probably considered evil, and their proposal rejected.

3. Third, imagine combining this proposal with another tech that can reliably induce identical twins. This will allow the creation of extra zombie kids. That is, each birth to low status parents is now of identical twins, one of which is an ordinary kid, and the other is a zombie kid. If parent’s don’t want to raise zombie kids, some other organization will take over that task. So now the parents get to have all their usual lively kids, and the world gains a bunch of extra zombie kids who grow up to do low status jobs. Some may support this proposal, but surely many others will find it creepy. I expect that it would be pretty hard to create a political consensus to support this proposal.

While in the first scenario people were killed, and in the second scenario parents were deprived, this third scenario is designed to take away these problems. But this third proposal still has two remaining problems. First, if we have a choice between creating an empty zombie and a living feeling person who finds their life worth living, this second option seems to result in a better world. Which argues against zombies. Second, if zombies seem like monsters, supporters of this proposal might might be blamed for creating monsters. And as the zombies look a lot like humans, many will see you as a bad person if you seem inclined to or capable of treating them badly. It looks bad to be willing to create a lower class, and to treat them like a disrespected lower class, if that lower class looks a lot like humans. So by supporting this third proposal, you risk being blamed.

4. My fourth and last scenario is designed to split apart these two problems with the third scenario, to make you choose which problem you care more about. Imagine that robots are going to take over most all human jobs, but that we have a choice about which kind of robot they are. We could choose human-like robots, who act lively with passion and humor, and who inside have feelings and an inner life. Or we could choose machine-like robots, who are empty inside and also look empty on the outside, without passion, humor, etc.

If you are focused on creating a better world, you’ll probably prefer the human-like robots, as that which choice results in more creatures who find their lives worth living. But if you are focused on avoiding blame, you’ll probably prefer the machine-like robots, as few will blame you for for that choice. In that choice the creatures you create look so little like humans that few will blame you for creating such creatures, or for treating them badly.

I recently ran a 24 hour poll on Twitter about this choice, a poll to which 700 people responded. Of those who make a choice, 77% picked the machine-like robots:

Maybe my Twitter followers are unusual, but I doubt that a majority of a more representative poll would pick the human-like option. Instead, I think most people prefer the option that avoids personal blame, even if it makes for a worse world.

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Today, Ems Seem Unnatural

The main objections to “test tube babies” weren’t about the consequences for mothers or babies, they were about doing something “unnatural”:

Given the number of babies that have now been conceived through IVF — more than 4 million of them at last count — it’s easy to forget how controversial the procedure was during the time when, medically and culturally, it was new. … They weren’t entirely sure how IVF was different from cloning, or from the “ethereal conception” that was artificial insemination. They balked at the notion of “assembly-line fetuses grown in test tubes.” … For many, IVF smacked of a moral overstep — or at least of a potential one. … James Watson publicly decried the procedure, telling a Congressional committee in 1974 that … “All hell will break loose, politically and morally, all over the world.” (more)

Similarly, for most ordinary people, the problem with ems isn’t that the scanning process might kill the original human, or that the em might be an unconscious zombie due to their new hardware not supporting consciousness. In fact, people more averse to death have fewer objections to ems, as they see ems as a way to avoid death. The main objections to ems are just that ems seem “unnatural”:

In four studies (including pilot) with a total of 952 participants, it was shown that biological and cultural cognitive factors help to determine how strongly people condemn mind upload. … Participants read a story about a scientist who successfully transfers his consciousness (uploads his mind) onto a computer. … In the story, the scientist injects himself with nano-machines that enter his brain and substitute his neurons one-by-one. After a neuron has been substituted, the functioning of that neuron is copied (uploaded) on a computer; and after each neuron has been copied/uploaded the nano-machines shut down, and the scientist’s body falls on the ground completely limp. Finally, the scientist wakes up inside the computer.

The following variations made NO difference:

[In Study 1] we modified our original vignette by changing the target of mind upload to be either (1) a computer, (2) an android body, (3) a chimpanzee, or (4) an artificial brain. …

[In Study 2] we changed the story in a manner that the scientist merely ingests the nano-machines in a capsule form. Furthermore, we used a 2 × 2 experimental set-up to investigate whether the body dying on a physical level [heart stops or the brain stops] impacts the condemnation of the scientist’s actions. We also investigated whether giving participants information on how the transformation feels for the scientist once he is in the new platform has an impact on the results.

What did matter:

People who value purity norms and have higher sexual disgust sensitivity are more inclined to condemn mind upload. Furthermore, people who are anxious about death and condemn suicidal acts were more accepting of mind upload. Finally, higher science fiction literacy and/or hobbyism strongly predicted approval of mind upload. Several possible confounding factors were ruled out, including personality, values, individual tendencies towards rationality, and theory of mind capacities. (paper; summary; HT Stefan Schubert)

As with IVF, once ems are commonplace they will probably also come to seem less unnatural; strange never-before-seen possibilities evoke more fear and disgust than common things, unless those common things seem directly problematic.

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Age of Em Paperback

Today is the official U.S. release date for the paperback version of my first book The Age of Em: Work, Love, and Life when Robots Rule the Earth. (U.K. version came out a month ago.) Here is the new preface:

I picked this book topic so it could draw me in, and I would finish. And that worked: I developed an obsession that lasted for years. But once I delivered the “final” version to my publisher on its assigned date, I found that my obsession continued. So I collected a long file of notes on possible additions. And when the time came that a paperback edition was possible, I grabbed my chance. As with the hardback edition, I had many ideas for changes that might make my dense semi-encyclopedia easier for readers to enjoy. But my core obsession again won out: to show that detailed analysis of future scenarios is possible, by showing just how many reasonable conclusions one can draw about this scenario.

Also, as this book did better than I had a right to expect, I wondered: will this be my best book ever? If so, why not make it the best it can be? The result is the book you now hold. It has over 42% more citations, and 18% more words, but it is only a bit easier to read. And now I must wonder: can my obsession stop now, pretty please?

Many are disappointed that I do not more directly declare if I love or hate the em world. But I fear that such a declaration gives an excuse to dismiss all this; critics could say I bias my analysis in order to get my desired value conclusions. I’ve given over 100 talks on this book, and never once has my audience failed to engage value issues. I remain confident that such issues will not be neglected, even if I remain quiet.

These are the only new sections in the paperback: Anthropomorphize, Motivation, Slavery, Foom, After Ems. (I previewed two of them here & here.)  I’ll make these two claims for my book:

  1. There’s at least a 5% chance that my analysis will usefully inform the real future, i.e., that something like brain emulations are actually the first kind of human-level machine intelligence, and my analysis is mostly right on what happens then. If it is worth having twenty books on the future, it is worth having a book with a good analysis of a 5% scenario.
  2. I know of no other analysis of a substantially-different-from-today future scenario that is remotely as thorough as Age of Em. I like to quip, “Age of Em is like science fiction, except there is no plot, no characters, and it all makes sense.” If you often enjoy science fiction but are frustrated that it rarely makes sense on closer examination, then you want more books like Age of Em. The success or not of Age of Em may influence how many future authors try to write such books.
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Like the Ancients, We Have Gods. They’ll Get Greater.

Here’s a common story about gods. Our distant ancestors didn’t understand the world very well, and their minds contained powerful agent detectors. So they came to see agents all around them, such as in trees, clouds, mountains, and rivers. As these natural things vary enormously in size and power, our ancestors had to admit that such agents varied greatly in size and power. The big ones were thus “gods”, and to be feared. While our forager ancestors were fiercely egalitarian, and should thus naturally resent the existence of gods, gods were at least useful in limiting status ambitions of local humans; however big you were, you weren’t as big as gods. All-seeing powerful gods were also useful in enforcing norms; norm violators could expect to be punished by such gods.

However, once farming era war, density, and capital accumulation allowed powerful human rulers, these rulers co-opted gods to enforce their rule. Good gods turned bad. Rulers claimed the support of gods, or claimed to be gods themselves, allowing their decrees to take priority over social norms. However, now that we (mostly) know that there just isn’t a spirit world, and now that we can watch our rulers much more closely, we know that our rulers are mere humans without the support of gods. So we much less tolerate strong rulers, their claims of superiority, or their norm violations. Yay us.

There are some problems with this story, however. Until the Axial revolution of about 3500 years ago, most gods were local to a social group. For our forager ancestors, this made them VERY local, and thus typically small. Such gods cared much more that you show them loyalty than what you believed, and they weren’t very moralizing. Most gods had limited power; few were all-powerful, all-knowing, and immortal. People mostly had enough data to see that their rulers did not have vast personal powers. And finally, rather than reluctantly submitting to gods out of fear, we have long seen people quite eager to worship, praise, and idolize gods, and also their leaders, apparently greatly enjoying the experience.

Here’s a somewhat different story. Long before they became humans, our ancestors deeply craved both personal status, and also personal association with others who have the high status. This is ancient animal behavior. Forager egalitarian norms suppressed these urges, via emphasizing the also ancient envy and resentment of the high status. Foragers came to distinguish dominance, the bad status that forces submission via power, from prestige, the good status that invites you to learn and profit by watching and working with them. As part of their larger pattern of hidden motives, foragers often pretended that they liked leaders for their prestige, even when they really also accepted and even liked their dominance.

Once foragers believed in spirits, they also wanted to associate with high status spirits. Spirits increased the supply of high status others to associate with, which people liked. But foragers also preferred to associated with local spirits, to show local loyalties. With farming, social groups became larger, and status ambitions could also rise. Egalitarian norms were suppressed. So there came a demand for larger gods, encompassing the larger groups.

In this story the fact that ancient gods were spirits who could sometimes violate ordinary physical rules was incidental, not central. The key driving force was a desire to associate with high status others. The ability to violate physical rules did confer status, but it wasn’t a different kind of status than that held by powerful humans. So very powerful humans who claimed to be gods weren’t wrong, in terms of the essential dynamic. People were eager to worship and praise both kinds of gods, for similar reasons.

Thus today even if we don’t believe in spirts, we can still have gods, if we have people who can credibly acquire very high status, via prestige or dominance. High enough to induce not just grudging admiration, but eager and emotionally-unreserved submission and worship. And we do in fact have such people. We have people who are the best in the world at the abilities that the ancients would recognize for status, such as physical strength and coordination, musical or story telling ability, social savvy, and intelligence. And in addition, technology and social complexity offer many new ways to be impressive. We can buy impressive homes, clothes, and plastic surgery, and travel at impressive speeds via impressive vehicles. We can know amazing things about the universe, and about our social world, via science and surveillance.

So we today do in fact have gods, in effect if not in name. (Though actors who play gods on screen can be seen as ancient-style gods.) The resurgence of forager values in the industrial era makes us reluctant to admit it, but a casual review of celebrity culture makes it very clear, I’d say. Yes, we mostly admit that our celebrities don’t have supernatural powers, but that doesn’t much detract from the very high status that they have achieved, or our inclination to worship them.

While it isn’t obviously the most likely scenario, one likely and plausible future scenario that has been worked out in unusual detail is the em scenario, as discussed in my book Age of Em. Ems would acquire many more ways to be individually impressive, acquiring more of the features that made the mythical ancient gods so impressive. Ems could be immortal, occupy many powerful and diverse physical bodies, move around the world at the speed of light, think very very fast, have many copies, and perhaps even somewhat modify their brains to expand each copy’s mental capacity. Automation assistants could expand their abilities even more.

As most ems are copies of the few hundred most productive ems, there are enormous productivity differences among typical ems. By any reasonable measure, status would vary enormously. Some would be gods relative to others. Not just in a vague metaphorical sense, but in a deep gut-grabbing emotional sense. Humans, and ems, will deeply desire to associate with them, via praise, worship and more.

Our ancestors had gods, we have gods, and our descendants will like have even greater more compelling gods. The phenomena of gods is quite far from dead.

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The Uploaded

In this post I again contrast my analysis of future ems in Age of Em with a fictional depictions of ems, and find that science fiction isn’t very realistic, having other priorities. Today’s example: The Uploaded, by Ferrett Steinmetz:

The world is run from the afterlife, by the minds of those uploaded at the point of death. Living is just waiting to die… and maintaining the vast servers which support digital Heaven. For one orphan that just isn’t enough – he wants more for himself and his sister than a life of servitude. Turns out he’s not the only one who wants to change the world.

The story is set 500 years and 14 human generations after a single genius invented ems. While others quickly found ways to copy this tech, his version was overwhelming preferred. (In part due to revelations of “draconian” competitor plans.) So much so that he basically was able to set the rules of this new world, and to set them globally. He became an immortal em, and so still rules the world. His rules, and the basic tech and econ arrangement, have remained stable for those 500 years, during which there seems to have been vastly less tech change and economic growth than we’ve seen in the last 500 years.

His rules are the these: typically when a biological humans dies, one emulation of them is created who is entitled to eternal leisure in luxurious virtual realities. That one em runs at ordinary human speed, no other copies of it are allowed, ems never inhabit android physical bodies, and ems are never created of still living biological humans. By now there are 15 times as many ems as humans, and major decisions are made by vote, which ems always win. Ems vote to divert most resources to their servers, and so biological humans are poor, their world is run down, and diseases are killing them off.

Virtual realities are so engaging that em parents can’t even be bothered to check in on their young children now in orphanages. But a few ems get bored and want to do useful jobs, and they take all the nice desk jobs. Old ems are stuck in their ways and uncreative, preventing change. Biological humans are only needed to do physical jobs, which are boring and soul-crushing. It is illegal for them to do programming. Some ems also spend lots of time watching via surveillance cameras, so biological humans are watched all the time.

Every day every biological human’s brain is scanned and evaluated by a team of ems, and put into one of five status levels. Higher levels are given nicer positions and privileges, while the lowest levels are not allowed to become ems. Biological humans are repeatedly told they need to focus on pleasing their em bosses so they can get into em heaven someday. To say more, I must give spoilers; you are warned. Continue reading "The Uploaded" »

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How Human Are Meditators?

Someday we may be able to create brain emulations (ems), and someday later we may understand them sufficiently to allow substantial modifications to them. Many have expressed concern that competition for efficient em workers might then turn ems into inhuman creatures of little moral worth. This might happen via reductions of brain systems, features, and activities that are distinctly human but that contribute less to work effectiveness. For example Scott Alexander fears loss of moral value due to “a very powerful ability to focus the brain on the task at hand” and ems “neurologically incapable of having their minds drift off while on the job”.

A plausible candidate for em brain reduction to reduce mind drift is the default mode network:

The default mode network is active during passive rest and mind-wandering. Mind-wandering usually involves thinking about others, thinking about one’s self, remembering the past, and envisioning the future.… becomes activated within an order of a fraction of a second after participants finish a task. … deactivate during external goal-oriented tasks such as visual attention or cognitive working memory tasks. … The brain’s energy consumption is increased by less than 5% of its baseline energy consumption while performing a focused mental task. … The default mode network is known to be involved in many seemingly different functions:

It is the neurological basis for the self:

Autobiographical information: Memories of collection of events and facts about one’s self
Self-reference: Referring to traits and descriptions of one’s self
Emotion of one’s self: Reflecting about one’s own emotional state

Thinking about others:

Theory of Mind: Thinking about the thoughts of others and what they might or might not know
Emotions of other: Understanding the emotions of other people and empathizing with their feelings
Moral reasoning: Determining just and unjust result of an action
Social evaluations: Good-bad attitude judgments about social concepts
Social categories: Reflecting on important social characteristics and status of a group

Remembering the past and thinking about the future:

Remembering the past: Recalling events that happened in the past
Imagining the future: Envisioning events that might happen in the future
Episodic memory: Detailed memory related to specific events in time
Story comprehension: Understanding and remembering a narrative

In our book The Elephant in the Brain, we say that key tasks for our distant ancestors were tracking how others saw them, watching for ways others might accuse them of norm violations, and managing stories of their motives and plans to help them defend against such accusations. The difficulty of this task was a big reason humans had such big brains. So it made sense to design our brains to work on such tasks in spare moments. However, if ems could be productive workers even with a reduced capacity for managing their social image, it might make sense to design ems to spend a lot less time and energy ruminating on their image.

Interestingly, many who seek personal insight and spiritual enlightenment try hard to reduce the influence of this key default mode network. Here is Sam Harris from his recent book Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality Without Religion:

Psychologists and neuroscientist now acknowledge that the human mind tends to wander. .. Subjects reported being lost in thought 46.9 percent of the time. .. People are consistently less happy when their minds wander, even when the contents of their thoughts are pleasant. … The wandering mind has been correlated with activity in the … “default mode” or “resting state” network (DMN). .. Activity in the DMN decreases when subjects concentrate on tasks of the sort employed in most neuroimaging experiments.

The DMN has also been linked with our capacity for “self-representation.” … [it] is more engaged when we make such judgements of relevance about ourselves, as opposed to making them about other people. It also tends to be more active when we evaluate a scene from a first person point of view. … Generally speaking, to pay attention outwardly reduces activity in the [DMN], while thinking about oneself increases it. …

Mindfulness and loving-kindness mediation also decrease activity in the DMN – and the effect is most pronounced among experienced meditators. … Expert meditators … judge the intensity of an unpleasant stimulus the same but find it to be less unpleasant. They also show reduced activity in regions associated with anxiety while anticipanting the onsite of pain. … Mindfulness reduces both the unpleasantness and intensity of noxious stimuli. …

There is an enormous difference between being hostage to one’s thoughts and being freely and nonjudgmentally aware of life in the present. To make this shift is to interrupt the process of rumination and reactivity that often keep us so desperately at odds with ourselves and with other people. … Meditation is simply the ability to stop suffering in many of the usual ways, if only for a few moments at a time. … The deepest goal of spirituality is freedom from the illusion of the self. (pp.119-123)

I see a big conflict here. On the one hand, many are concerned that competition could destroy moral value by cutting away distinctively human features of em brains, and the default net seems a prime candidate for cutting. On the other hand, many see meditation as a key to spiritual insight, one of the highest human callings, and a key task in meditation is cutting the influence of the default net. Ems with a reduced default net could more easily focus, be mindful, see the illusion of the self, and feel more at peace and less anxious about their social image. So which is it, do such ems achieve our highest spiritual ideals, or are they empty shells mostly devoid of human value? Can’t be both, right?

By the way, I was reading Harris because he and I will record a podcast Feb 21 in Denver.

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