Search Results for: mobs

MacAskill on Value Lock-In

Will MacAskill has a new book out today, What We Owe The Future, most of which I agree with, even if that doesn’t exactly break new ground. Yes, the future might be very big, and that matters a lot, so we should be willing to do a lot to prevent extinction, collapse, or stagnation. I hope his book induces more careful future analysis, such as I tried in Age of Em. (FYI, MacAskill suggested that book’s title to me.) I also endorse his call for more policy and institutional experimentation. But, as is common in book reviews, I now focus on where I disagree.

Aside from the future being important, MacAskill main concern in his book is “value lock-in”, by which he means a future point in time when the values that control actions stop changing. But he actually mixes up two very different processes by which this result might arise. First, an immortal power with stable values might “take over the world”, and prevent deviations from its dictates. Second, in a stable universe decentralized competition between evolving entities might pick out some most “fit” values to be most common.

MacAskill’s most dramatic predictions are about this first “take over” process. He claims that the next century or so is the most important time in all of human history:

We hold the entire future in our hands. … By choosing wisely, we can be pivotal in putting humanity on the right course. … The values that humanity adopts in the next few centuries might shape the entire trajectory of the future. … Whether the future is government by values that are authoritarian or egalitarian, benevolent or sadistic, exploratory or rigid, might well be determined by what happens this century.

His reason: we will soon create AGI, or ems, who, being immortal, have forever stable values. Some org will likely use AGI to “take over the world”, and freeze in their values forever:

Advanced artificial intelligence could enable those in power to to lock in their values indefinitely. … Since [AGI] software can be copied with high fidelity, an AGI can survive changes in the hardware instantiating it. AGI agents are potentially immortal. These two features of AGI – potentially rapid technological progress and in-principle immortality – combine to make value lock-in a real possibility. …

Using AGI, there are a number of ways that people could extend their values much farther into the future than ever before. First, people may be able to create AGI agents with goals closely assigned with their own which would act on their behalf. … [Second,] the goals of an AGI could be hard-coded: someone could carefully specify what future white want to see and ensure that the AGI aims to achieve it. … Third, people could potentially “upload”. …

International organizations or private actors may be able to leverage AGI to attain a level of power not seen since the days of the East India Company, which in effect ruled large areas of India. …

A single set of values could emerge. …The ruling ideology could in principle persist as long as civilization does. AGI systems could replicate themselves as many times as they wanted, just as easily as we can replicate software today. They would be immortal, freed from the biological process of aging, able to create back-ups of themselves and copy themselves onto new machines. … And there would not longer be competing value systems that could dislodge the status quo. …

Bostrom’s book Superintelligence. The scenario most closely associated with that book is one in which a single AI agent … quickly developing abilities far greater than the abilities of all of humanity combined. … It would therefore be incentivize to take over the world. … Recent work has looked at a broader range of scenarios. The move from subhuman intelligence to super intelligence need not be ultrafast or discontinuous to post a risk. And it need not be a single AI that takes over; it could be many. …

Values could become even more persistent in the future if a single value system were to become global dominant. If so, then the absence of conflict and competition would remove one reason for change in values over time. Conquest is the most dramatic pathway … and it may well be the most likely.

Now mere immortality seems far from sufficient to create either value stability or a takeover. On takeover, immortality is insufficient. Not only is a decentralized world of competing immortals easy to imagine, but in fact until recently individual bacteria, who very much compete, were thought to be immortal.

On values, immortality also seems far from sufficient to induce stable values. Human organizations like firms, clubs, cities, and nations seem to be roughly immortal, and yet their values often greatly change. Individual humans change their values over their lifetimes. Computer software is immortal, and yet its values often change, and it consistently rots. Yes, as I mentioned in my last post, some imagine that AGIs have a special value modularity that can ensure value stability. But we have many good reasons to doubt that scenario.

Thus MacAskill must be positing that a power who somehow manages to maintain stable values takes over and imposes its will everywhere forever. Yet the only scenario he points to that seems remotely up to this task is Bostrom’s foom scenario. MacAskill claims that other scenarios are also relevant, but doesn’t even try to show how they could produce this result. For reasons I’ve given many times before, I’m skeptical of foom-like scenarios.

Furthermore, let me note that even if one power came to dominate Earth’s civilization for a very long time, it would still have to face competition from other grabby aliens in roughly a billion years. If so, forever just isn’t at issue here.

While MacAskill doesn’t endorse any regulations to deal with this stable-AGI-takes-over scenario, he does endorse regulations to deal with the other path to value stability: evolution. He wants civilization to create enough of a central power that it could stop change for a while, and also limit competition between values.

The theory of cultural evolution explains why many moral changes are contingent. … the predominant culture tends to entrench itself. … results in a world increasingly dominated by cultures with traits that encourage and enable entrenchment and thus persistence. …

If we don’t design our institutions to govern this transition well – preserving a plurality of values and the possibility of desirable moral progress. …

A second way for a culture to become more powerful is immigration [into it]. … A third way in which a cultural trait can gain influence is if it gives one group greater ability to survive or thrive in a novel environment. … A final way in which one culture can outcompete another is via population growth. … If the world converged on a single value system, there would be much less pressure on those values to change over time.

We should try to ensure that we have made as much moral progress as possible before any point of lock-in. … As an ideal, we could aim for what we could call the long reflection: a stable state of the world in which we are safe from calamity and can reflect on and debate the nature of the good life, working out what the more flourishing society would be. … It would therefore be worth spending many centuries to ensure that we’ve really figured things out before taking irreversible actions like locking in values or spreading across the stars. …

We would need to keep our options open as much as possible … a reason to prevent smaller-scale lock-ins … would favor political experimentation – increasing cultural and political diversity, if possible. …

That one society has greater fertility than another or exhibits faster economic growth does not imply that society is morally superior. In contrast, the most important mechanisms for improving our moral views are reason, reflection, and empathy, and the persuasion of others based on those mechanisms. … Certain forms of free speech would therefore be crucial to enable better ideas to spread. …

International norms or laws preventing any single country from becoming too populous, just as anti-trust regulation prevents any single company from dominating a market. … The lock-in paradox. We need to lock-in some institutions and ideas in order to prevent a more thorough-going lock-in of values. … If we wish to avoid the lock-in of bad moral views, an entirely laissez-faire approach would not be possible; over time, the forces of cultural evolution would dictate how the future goes, and the ideologies that lead to the greatest military powered that try to eliminate their competition would suppress all others.

I’ve recently described my doubts that expert deliberation has been a large force in value change so far. So I’m skeptical that will be a large force in the future. And the central powers (or global mobs) sufficient to promote a long reflection, or to limit nations competing, seem to risk creating value stability via the central dominance path discussed above. MacAskill doesn’t even consider this kind of risk from his favored regulations.

While competition may produce a value convergence in the long run, my guess is that convergence will happen a lot faster if we empower central orgs or mobs to regulate competition. I think that a great many folks prefer that latter scenario because they believe we know what are the best values, and fear that those values would not win an evolutionary competition. So they want to lock in current values via regs to limit competition and value change.

To his credit, MacAskill is less confident that currently popular values are in fact the best values. And his favored solution of more deliberation probably would’t hurt. I just don’t think he realizes just how dangerous are central powers able to regulate to promote deliberation and limit competition. And he seems way too confident about the chance of anything like foom soon.

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Re An Accused, Tell The Truth

Agnes Callard says we should not fight her cancellation:

Within the mob there is no justice and no argument and no reasoning, no space for inquiry or investigation. The only good move is not to play. … If I am being canceled I want my friends … to stand by, remain silent, and do nothing. If you care about me, let them eat me alive. … The expectation that one’s friends exhibit the “courage” to speak up one one’s behalf, the inclination to see the cancellation as a test of the friendship, which suddenly requires proofs of loyalty — these are the first step on the road to the friend purge.

Here is how it goes: a few of the cancelee’s friends meet the expectation to speak up in support, but those who remain silent — which is most of them — become suspect. New, publicly aligned friends are acquired to take their place. The beleaguered cancelee now feels she sees who her “real friends” are, but in fact she has no friends anymore. All she has are allies. First she turned her friends, and perhaps even her family members, into allies; and then she acquired more allies to fill the ranks of the purged friends. The end result is a united front, but what I would call real friendship has gone missing in the bargain. I do not want any of that. I want friends who feel free to disagree with me both publicly and privately.

If I were accused of a crime, I wouldn’t want my friends to protest outside the courthouse, at least at first; I’d want to give the legal system a chance. But if my associates were called on to testify about me, I’d want them to comply, and to tell the truth as they saw it. Not to say whatever would seem to “support” me, but just to tell the truth.

Humans have only had legal systems for the last ten thousand years or so. For a million years before that, we had mob justice, which worked better than no justice, even if not as well as legal justice. (if you doubt this, see no justice among non-human primates.) Today we still handle some kinds of accusations and punishments via mobs. I’d rather we handled them via law, but given that some accusations are handled by mobs, I’d still want to help mob justice to work as well as possible. Mob justice is in fact possible, and legitimate.

Under mob justice, there is no central authority to subpoena witnesses. So people must instead volunteer their relevant testimony. But such testimony still functions as in legal trials to appropriately influence mob jury verdicts. Thus if I were accused under mob justice (as has in fact happened to me in the past), I’d want my associates to offer testimony relevant to that accusation. Not loyal ally support, but to just tell the relevant truth.

For example, many recent mob justice accusations have been of the form that someone’s statement is a “dog whistle”, purposely done to express nefarious beliefs or allegiances. Thus intent is relevant here, and intent is something on which close associates are often especially qualified to testify. The mob jury can thus reasonably want to hear associates’ take. Given what you know about this person’s views and styles, how plausible is it that their statement was in fact intended to express the alleged beliefs or connections?

We humans are often far more willing to say positive than negative things about associates. But this can work out okay as we commonly infer negative things from the unwillingness to say positive things. For example, when asked for a recommendation re a previous worker, many employers are willing to say express honest positive opinions, but will decline to say anything if their opinion is negative.

I have at times had private contact with people who actually hold views that, at least in a technical sense, might reasonably be labeled as racist or sexist. So if I had to answer the question of whether an expression of theirs might plausibly express such views, my honest answer would have to be yes. But if I had the option, I’d try to instead just say nothing about the subject. But for most of my associates, I’d happily say that such an interpretation is quite implausible, given what I know about them.

In this sort of context, Callard’s request for silence from her friends would hinder mob justice, and make it more likely to go awry against her. The silence of her friends (among which I count myself) would likely, and reasonably, be taken by the mob jury as evidence against her. I get that she is willing to accept this cost, for the cause of preventing the friend purge process that she reasonably detests. But I will hold my friends to a higher standard: don’t just support me unconditionally, but instead tell relevant truths.

If you don’t know anything relevant to the accusation, then yes stay silent. But if you have testimony relevant to the accusations against me, then speak up. Politely, calmly, and with appropriate qualifiers and doubts, but truthfully. Please friends, enemies, and others, in any trial, done at court or before a mob, just tell the relevant truth.

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Hidden Motives In Law

In our book The Elephant in the Brain, Hidden Motives in Everyday Life, Kevin Simler and I first review the reasons to expect humans to often have hidden motives, and then we describe our main hidden motives in each of ten areas of life. In each area, we start with the usual claimed motive, identify puzzles that don’t fit well with that story, and then describe another plausible motive that fits better.

We hoped to inspire others to apply our method to more areas of life, but we have so far largely failed there. So its past time for me to take up that task. And as law & economics is the class I teach most often, that’s a natural first place to start. So what are our motives regarding our official systems for dispute resolution?

Saying the word “justice” doesn’t help much; what does that mean? But the field of law and economics has a standard answer that looks reasonable: economic efficiency. Which in law translates to encouraging cost-benefit-optimal levels of commitment, reliance, care, and activity. And the substantial success of law and economics scholarship suggests that this is in fact an important motive in law. Furthermore, as most everyone can get behind it, this is plausibly our most overt motive regarding law. But we also see many puzzles in law not well explained by this approach. Which suggests to me three other motives.

Back in the forager era, before formal law, disputes were resolved by mobs. That is, the local band talked informally about accusations of norm violations, came to a consensus about what to do, and then implemented that themselves. As this mob justice system has many known failure modes, we probably added law as a partial replacement in order to cut such failures. Thus a plausible secondary motive in law is to try to minimize the common failings of mob justice, and to insulate the legal system from mob influence.

The main failure of mob justice is plausibly a rush to judgment; each person in a gossip network has local incentives to accept the stance of whomever first reports an accusation to them. And the most interested parties are far more likely than average to be the first source of the first report someone hears. In response, law seeks to make legal decision makers independent and disconnected from the disputants and their gossip network, and to make such decision markers listen to all the evidence before making their decision. The rule against hearsay evidence is also plausibly to limit the influence of gossip on trials.

Leaders of the legal system often express concerns about its perceived legitimacy, and this makes sense as a third motive of the legal system. And as the most common threat to such legitimacy is widespread criticism of particular legal decisions, many features of law can be understood as ways to avoid such criticism. For example, criticism is likely cut via having legal personnel, venues, and demeanors be maximally prestigious and deferential to legal authorities.

Also, the more complex are legal language and arguments, the harder it becomes for mobs to question them. The longer the delay before final legal decisions, the less passion will remain to challenge them. Finally, the more expensive is the legal process, the fewer rulings there will be to question. Our most official legal systems differ from all our other less official dispute resolutions systems in all of these ways. They are slower, more expensive, less understandable, and more prestigious.

The last hidden motive that I think I see is that each legal jurisdiction wants to look good to outsiders. So most every jurisdiction has laws against widely disapproved behaviors, such as adultery, prostitution, or drinking alcohol on the street, even though such laws are often quite weakly enforced. Most set high standards of proof and adopt the usual rules constraining what evidence can be presented at trial, even though there’s little evidence that these rules help on net.

Most jurisdictions pretend to enforce all laws equally on everyone, but actually give police differential priorities; some locations, suspects, and victims count a lot more than others. It would be quite feasible, and probably lot more efficient, to use a bounty hunting system to enforce laws, and most locals are well aware of these varying priorities. But that would require admitting such differential priorities to outsiders, via explicit differences in the bounties paid. So most jurisdictions prefer government employees, who can be more hypocritical.

Similarly, our usual form of criminal punishment, nice jail, is less efficient than all the other forms, including mean jail, exile, corporal punishment, and fines. Holding constant how averse a convict is to suffer each punishment, nice jail costs the most. Alas, the world has fallen into an equilibrium where any jurisdiction that allows any punishment other than nice jail is declared to be cruel and unjust. Even giving the convict the choice between such punishments is called unjust. So the strong desire to avoid such accusations pushes most jurisdictions into using the least efficient form of punishment.

In sum, I see four big motives in law: encouraging commitment and care, avoiding failings of mob justice, preserving system legitimacy via avoiding clear decisions, and hindering distant observers from accusing a jurisdiction of injustice, even if most locals are not fooled.

One can of course postulate many more possible motives, including diverting revenue and status to legal authorities, preserving and increasing existing inequalities, giving civil authorities more arbitrary powers, and empowering busybodies to meddle in the lives of others. But it isn’t clear to me that these add much more explanatory power, given the above motives.

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Are Firms Today’s Low Class?

In the ancient world, there were different classes of people, who were treated differently. Some had more freedoms than others, such as to own property, make contracts, start lawsuits, speak in public forums, or travel on their own. On the street, some had to stay silent, to wear distinctive clothing, to give way to others, and to show on demand who vouched for them.

Today we are proud that we make fewer such distinctions among individuals. (Though we do distinguish kids and convicts.) But that may be less because of our liberality, and more because of the rise of large organizations, of which the ancient world had far fewer. Today we require many distinctions between individuals, for-profit firms, non-profit orgs, and government agencies.

For example, we ban many kinds of discrimination by firms that we allow by individuals, and we hold firms to higher standards of truthfulness. We require more public disclosures by them. And many want to further limit their abilities to speak in public debates.

We today are horrified to hear that an unwed mother might have once been required to wear a “Scarlet A” in public to display her status, and are similarly horrified by rumors of a Chinese “social credit” system to weigh many indicators of social approval and disapproval. (Though we seem okay with credit scores, relating only to our dealings with firms.)

But we seem fine with legally requiring firms to disclose Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) scores, which score firms by adding up dozens of particular “do-gooder” indications. A social credit score for firms. So far laws have not yet required us to shun the firms that rate poorly, though many suspect such laws are coming. But such scores today clearly help mobs to coordinate to punish firms, just as Scarlet As do for individuals.

Government agencies, in contrast, often have more privileges than both firms and individuals. For example, US police have “qualified immunity” protecting them from lawsuits. Government, academic and think tank studies are taken at face value, yet firm versions are considered suspect. Non-profits like universities are allowed to collude in ways that firms cannot.

Thus we today still do maintain formal class ladders in custom and law, but more ladders of orgs than of people. Now you might say this is fine, as class ladders are mean to individuals, making them feel bad, but organizations can’t feel bad. But in fact our class ladders of orgs influence how people in those orgs feel.

As individuals today largely gain status via association with orgs, the status of those orgs directly effects the status of individuals. So when we shame or honor an org, we also shame or honor the people associated with it. Formal class ladders continue today.

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To Innovate, Unify or Fragment?

In the world around us, innovation seems to increase with the size of an integrated region of activity. For example, human and computer languages with more users acquire more words and tools at a faster rate. Tech ecosystems, such as those collected around Microsoft, Apple, or Google operating systems, innovate faster when they have more participating suppliers and users. And there is more innovation per capita in larger cities, firms, and economies. (All else equal, of course.)

We have decent theories to explain all this: larger communities try more things, and each trial has more previous things to combine and build on. The obvious implication is that innovation will increase as our world gets larger, more integrated, and adopts more wider-shared standards and tech ecosystems. More unification will induce more innovation.

Simple theory also predicts that species evolve faster when they have larger populations. And this seems to have applied across human history. But if this were generally true across species, then we should expect most biological innovation to happen in the largest species, which would live in the largest most integrated environmental niches. Like big common ocean areas. And most other species to have descended from these big ones.

But in fact, more biological innovation happens where the species are the smallest, which happens where mobility is higher and environments are more fragmented and changing. For example, over the last half billion years, we’ve seen a lot more innovation on land than in the sea, more on the coasts than on the interiors of land or sea, and more closer to rivers. All more mobile and fragmented places. How can that be?

Maybe big things tend to be older, and old things rot. Maybe the simple theory mentioned above focuses on many small innovations, but doesn’t apply as well to the few biggest innovations, that require coordinating many supporting innovations. Or maybe phenomena like sexual selection, as illustrated by the peacock’s tail, show how conformity and related collective traps can bedevil species, as well as larger more unified tech ecosystems. It seems to require selection between species to overcome such traps; individual species can’t fix them on their own.

If so, why hasn’t the human species fallen into such traps yet? Maybe the current fertility decline is evidence of such a trap, or maybe such problems just take a long time to arise. Humans fragmenting into competing cultures may have saved us for a while. Individual cultures do seem to have often fallen into such traps. Relatively isolated empires consistently rise and then fall. So maybe cultural competition is mostly what has saved us from cultures falling into traps.

While one might guess that collective traps are a rare problem for species and cultures, the consistent collapse of human empires and our huge dataset on bio innovation suggest that such problems are in fact quite common. So common that we really need larger scale competition, such as between cultures or species, to weed it out. To innovate, the key to growth, we need to fragment, not unify.

Which seems a big red loud warning sign about our current trend toward an integrated world culture, prey to integrated world collective traps, such as via world mobs. They might take some time to reveal themselves, but then be quite hard to eradicate. This seems to me the most likely future great filter step that we face.

Added 10Jan: There are papers on how to design a population structure to maximize the rate of biological evolution.

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How Group Minds Differ

We humans have remarkable minds, minds more capable in many ways that in any other animal, or any artificial system so far created. Many give a lot of thought to the more capable artificial “super-intelligences” that we will likely create someday. But I’m more interested now in the “super-intelligences” that we already have: group minds.

Today, groups of humans together form larger minds that are in many ways more capable than individual minds. In fact, the human mind evolved mainly to function well in bands of 20-50 foragers, who lived closely for many years. And today the seven billion of us are clumped together in many ways into all sorts of group minds.

Consider a four-way classification:

  1. Natural – The many complex mechanisms we inherit from our forager ancestors enable us to fluidly and effectively manage small tightly-interacting group minds without much formal organization.
  2. Formal – The formal structures of standard organizations (i.e., those with “org charts”) allow much larger group minds for firms, clubs, and governments.
  3. Mobs = Loose informal communities structured mainly by simple gossip and status, sometimes called “mobs”, often form group minds on vast, even global, scales.
  4. Special – Specialized communities like academic disciplines can often form group minds on particular topics using less structure.

A quick web search finds that many embrace the basic concept of group minds, but I found few directly addressing this very basic question: how do group minds tend to differ from individual human minds? The answer to this seems useful in imagining futures where group minds matter even more than today.

In fact, future artificial minds are likely to be created and regulated by group minds, and in their own image, just as the modularity structure of software today usually reflects the organization structure of the group that made it. The main limit to getting better artificial minds later might be in getting better group minds before then.

So, how do group minds differ from individual minds? I can see several ways. One obvious difference is that, while human brains are very parallel computers, when humans reason consciously, we tend to reason sequentially. In contrast, large group minds mostly reason in parallel. This can make it a little harder to find out what they think at any one time.

Another difference is that while human brains are organized according to levels of abstraction, and devote roughly similar resources to different abstraction levels, standard formal organizations devote far fewer resources to higher levels of abstraction. It is hard to tell if mobs also suffer a similar abstract-reasoning deficit.

As mobs lack centralized coordination, it is much harder to have a discussion with a mob, or to persuade a mob to change its mind. It is hard to ask a mob to consider a particular case or argument. And it is especially hard to have a Socratic dialogue with a mob, wherein you ask it questions and try to get it to admit that different answers it has given contradict each other.

As individuals in mobs have weaker incentives regarding accuracy, mobs try less hard to get their beliefs right. Individual in mobs instead have stronger incentives to look good and loyal to other mob members. So mobs are rationally irrational in elections, and we created law to avoid the rush-to-judgment failures of mobs. As a result, mobs more easily get stuck on particular socially-desirable beliefs.

When each person in the mob wants to show their allegiance and wisdom by backing a party line, it is harder for such a mob to give much thought to the possibility that its party line might be wrong. Individual humans, in contrast, are better able to systematically consider how they might be wrong. Such thoughts more often actually induce them to change their minds.

Compared to mobs, standard formal orgs are at least able to have discussions, engage arguments, and consider that they might be wrong. However, as these happen mostly via the support of top org people, and few people are near that top, this conversation capacity is quite limited compared to that of individuals. But at least it is there. However such organizations also suffer from main known problems, such as yes-men and reluctance to pass bad news up the chain.

At the global level one of the big trends over the last few decades is away from the formal org group minds of nations, churches, and firms, and toward the mob group mind of a world-wide elite. Supported by mob-like expert group minds in academia, law, and media. Our world is thus likely to suffer more soon from mob mind inadequacies.

Prediction markets are capable of creating fast-thinking accurate group minds that consider all relevant levels of abstraction. They can even be asked questions, though not as fluidly and easily as can individuals. If only our mob minds didn’t hate them so much.

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On Evolved Values

Biological evolution selects roughly for creatures that do whatever it takes to have more descendants in the long run. When such creatures have brains, those brains are selected for having supporting habits. And to the extent that such brains can be described as having beliefs and values that combine into actions via expected utility theory, then these beliefs and values should be ones which are roughly behaviorally-equivalent to the package of having accurate beliefs, and having values to produce many descendants (relative to rivals). Equivalent at least within the actual environments in which those creatures were selected.

Humans have unusually general brains, with which we can think unusually abstractly about our beliefs and values. But so far, we haven’t actually abstracted our values very far. We instead have a big mess of opaque habits and desires that implicitly define our values for us, in ways that we poorly understand. Even though what evolution has been selecting for in us can in fact be described concisely and effectively in an abstract way.

Which leads to one of the most disturbing theoretical predictions I know: with sufficient further evolution, our descendants are likely to directly and abstractly know that they simply value more descendants. In diverse and varying environments, such a simpler more abstract representation seems likely to be more effective at helping them figure out which actions would best achieve that value. And while I’ve personally long gotten used to the idea that our distant descendants will be weird, to (the admittedly few) others who care about the distant future, this vision must seem pretty disturbing.

Oh there are some subtleties regarding whether all kinds of long-term descendants get the same weight, to what degree such preferences are non-monotonic in time and number of descendants, and whether we care the same about risks that are correlated or not across descendants. But those are details: evolved descendants should more simply and abstractly value more descendants.

This applies whether our descendants are biological or artificial. And it applies regardless of the kind of environments our descendants face, as long as those environments allow for sufficient selection. For example, if our descendants live among big mobs, who punish them for deviations from mob-enforced norms, then our descendants will be selected for pleasing their mobs. But as an instrumental strategy for producing more descendants. If our descendants have a strong democratic world government that enforces rules about who can reproduce how, then they will be selected for gaining influence over that government in order to gain its favors. And for an autocratic government, they’d be selected for gaining its favors.

Nor does this conclusion change greatly if the units of future selection are larger than individual organisms. Even if entire communities or work teams reproduce together as single units, they’d still be selected for valuing reproduction, both of those entire units and of component parts. And if physical units are co-selected with supporting cultural features, those total physical-plus-cultural packages must still tend to favor the reproduction of all parts of those packages.

Many people seem to be confused about cultural selection, thinking that they are favored by selection if any part of their habits or behaviors is now growing due to their actions. But if, for example, your actions are now contributing to a growing use of the color purple in the world, that doesn’t at all mean that you are winning the evolutionary game. If wider use of purple is not in fact substantially favoring the reproduction of the other elements of the package by which you are now promoting purple’s growth, and if those other elements are in fact reproducing less than their rivals, then you are likely losing, not winning, the evolutionary game. Purple will stop growing and likely decline after those other elements sufficiently decline.

Yes of course, you might decide that you don’t care that much to win this evolutionary game, and are instead content to achieve the values that you now have, with the resources that you can now muster. But you must then accept that tendencies like yours will become a declining fraction of future behavior. You are putting less weight on the future compared to others who focus more on reproduction. The future won’t act like you, or be as much influenced by acts like yours.

For example, there are “altruistic” actions that you might take now to help out civilization overall. For example, you might build a useful bridge, or find some useful invention. But if by such actions you hurt the relative long-term reproduction of many or most of the elements that contributed to your actions, then you must know you are reducing the tendency of descendants to do such actions. Ask: is civilization really better off with more such acts today, but fewer such acts in the future?

Yes, we can likely identify some parts of our current packages which are hurting, not helping, our reproduction. Such as genetic diseases. Or destructive cultural elements. It makes sense to dump such parts of our reproduction “teams” when we can identify them. But that fact doesn’t negate the basic story here: we will mainly value reproduction.

The only way out I see is: stop evolution. Stop, or slow to a crawl, the changes that induce selection of features that influence reproduction. This would require a strong civilization-wide government, and it only works until we meet the other grabby aliens. Worse, in an actually changing universe, such stasis seems to me to seriously risk rot. Leading to a slowly rotting civilization, clinging on to its legacy values but declining in influence, at least relative to its potential. This approach doesn’t at all seems worth the cost to me.

But besides that, have a great day.

Added 7p: There many be many possible equilibria, in which case it may be possible to find an equilibrium in which maximizing reproduction also happens to maximize some other desired set of values. But it may be hard to maintain the context that allows that equilibrium over long time periods. And even if so, the equilibrium might itself drift away to support other values.

Added 8Dec: This basic idea expressed 14 years ago.

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The Coming World Ruling Class

When I got my Ph.D. in formal political theory, I learned that the politics of large democratic polities today, such as metropolises, states, and nations, are usually aligned along a single “ideological” dimension. (E.g., “left” vs. “right”.) What exactly that dimension is about, however, has varied greatly across times and places. It seems to more result from a game theoretic equilibrium than from a single underlying dimension of choice; the real policy space remains highly dimensional.

However, it wasn’t until years later than I noticed that this is not usually true for the politics of families, firms, clubs, towns, and small cities. These usually are usually run by a single stable dominant coalition, i.e., a ruling class. As were most ancient societies in history, at least eventually.

This ruling class might sometimes offer their larger community some options to choose between. But mostly this is when the ruling elite can’t decide, or wants to make others feel more involved. Such as who exactly to put at the top most visible positions. Sometimes real fights break out among coalitions within the elite, but these fights tend to be short and behind the scenes.

The same applies to communities with no formal organization. That is, to “mobs”. While in the modern world large mobs tend to split along a main ideological dimension, small mobs tend to be dominated by a main consensus, who roughly agree on what to do and how. Though with time, smaller mobs are more often becoming aligned to larger political ideologies.

This one-dimensional story also does not apply to large ancient areas which encompassed many different polities. These areas look more like a disorganized set of competing interests. So a one dimensional political alignment isn’t a fully general law of politics; it has a domain of applicability.

A few centuries ago, the world was composed of many competing nations, with no overall organization. During the great world wars, and the Cold War, there was an overall binary alignment. Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen a single coalition dominate the world. And over recent decades we have seen policy around the world converge greatly around the opinions of an integrated world elite.

I’m tempted to put this all together into the following integrated theory of a standard progression. Imagine suddenly moving a large random group of diverse strangers to a new isolated area, where they could survive indefinitely. At first their choices would be individual. Then they’d organize into small groups that coordinate together. Then into larger groups.

Eventually many large groups might compete for control of the area, or for the allegiance of the people there. In their bids for control, such groups might emphasize how much they respect the many kinds of diversity represented by people in the area. They don’t intend to repress other groups, they just want to rule for the good of all. As people became more similar, they would bother less with such speeches.

Eventually, these groups would merge and align along a single main dimension, which might be labeled in terms of two main rival groups, or in terms of some ideological axis. For a while, the two sides of this main dimension might find themselves at a stalemate. Or one side might tend to win, but the midpoint of their conflict might be continually redefined to result in two roughly equally sized sides. This main ideological dimension would encompass many issues, but hardly all. It might encompass more issues as the fight for control got fiercer. But the fight should get weaker as outside threats became more salient.

Eventually a single coalition would come to dominate. Especially in a society with many “high grounds” which such a coalition could come to control. This situation might then oscillate between a single ruling elite and a main axis of conflict. But slowly over time, a single coalition would win out more. The members of the ruling elite would come to know each other better, become more similar, and agree more on who should be among their members, and on what are the “serious” policies worth considering. They would focus more on reassuring each other of loyal to their class, and on making sure their kids could join that elite.

A ruling coalition who felt insecure in its power might work harder to seek out and repress any potential dissent. At the extreme, it might create a totalitarian regime that demanded allegiance and conformity in every little area of life. And it might focus more on entrenching itself than on improving society as a whole. As a ruling coalition became more secure, it might more tolerate dissent, and demand less conformity, but also focus on internal conflicts and division of spoils, instead of its society as a whole.

This story seems to roughly describe national, and world, history. My nation is becoming more integrated and similar over time, with actions coordinated at larger scales, national politics coming more to dominate local politics, and national politics coming to color more areas and issues in life. And a single issue axis aligned to a global cultural elite is coming to dominate politics across the world.

It seems plausible that toward the end of the transition between a period of one main ideological dimension, and a period of a single integrated ruling class, the final main political dimension would be aligned for and against that final ruling class. The last ideology question would be: shall we let this ruling class take over?

That is, shall we let this small subset of us define for us who are “serious” candidates for leadership and what are “serious” policy positions worthy of consideration? As such ruling classes now decide in firms, towns, etc. today. A sign of the end would be when one side of the political axis kept putting up candidates for office who were consistently declared “not serious” by the elites who controlled the the main commanding heights of power, such as media, law, universities, regulators, CEOs, etc.

The pro-ruling-class side would be more dominant in places that are more integrated with the overall culture, and less dominate in places that cared more about local issues. Such as in larger cities, compared to towns.

This model suggests that our current era of roughly balanced forces on two sides of one main ideological axis may be temporary. As the world becomes more closely integrated and similar, eventually a single integrated elite culture will dominate the world, entrenching itself in mob opinion and via as many institutions as possible, especially global institutions.

This world ruling class may then focus more on further entrenching itself, and on repressing dissent more than on making the world better. As everyone becomes more similar, conformity pressures will become stronger, as in most small towns today. Plausibly cutting many kinds of innovation. And our entrenched global institutions may then rot. After which our total human civilization might even decline, or commit suicide.

This may take centuries, but that’s really not very long in the grand scheme of things.

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Why Not Extend Formal Social Systems?

Once humans had only informal systems of gossip and norm enforcement, but now we also have formal systems of law. These formal legal systems supposedly have many features designed to overcome problems with prior informal norm systems. For example, with gossip we tend to support the claims of our immediate associates without investigating contrary evidence, but we require formal law judges to instead consider evidence from all sides before making their judgments.

We seem to believe these claims that formal law systems overcome informal system failings, because we are quite reluctant to give up our formal systems. Few of us support dropping our formal law systems, and replacing them with informal gossip and mobs. But if so, why do we still use informal norm systems to deal with so many topics, instead of law?

We often say that we rely on informal norms when formal law systems are too slow or expensive. But when offered specific proposals for ways to drastically reduce the time and expense of formal legal systems, so that they can be used more widely, most people seem quite reluctant to endorse such changes. But if law fixes serious problems with informal norms, and if we could replace such norms with law in more places, why not do so?

What makes this even more puzzling is the fact that centuries ago in the U.S. our formal legal systems were much simpler and lower cost. The law was simpler, most people could go to court without a lawyer, and juries made most decisions. All of which did allow the law to deal with more kinds of conflicts. The scope of law has declined over the last few centuries as we’ve allowed law to get more complex and expensive.

One theory is suggested by the idea of “snitches”. Children punish each other for complaining about each other to parents or teachers; they are supposed to instead rely on informal systems among children. Insiders complaining to outsiders can make any group look bad to outsiders, and thus loyalty to a group can require that one keep one’s complaints inside the group. Thus we may prefer informal systems as ways to show loyalty to our groups.

Just like we’ve added formal systems of conflict resolution to our prior informal systems of gossip and norms, we’ve also added formal systems of abstract conversation to our prior informal talk systems.

For example, in academia we have many norms regarding how we present abstract claims and arguments to each other in books and journal articles, and how we evaluate such things. For most of these norms, we have stories about how they fix problems with informal talk. And few academics would endorse getting rid of all these norms and just reverting entirely to informal talk.

And yet, as new mediums and genres of conversation have appeared over the last few decades, we’ve seen relatively little support for extending the usual academic norms into these new places. I expect many would offer knee-jerk explanations saying that academic norms take too much time and energy to apply to these new places. But that seems to me mostly an excuse; I doubt that they’ve actually thought much about actual time and energy costs.

Regarding both dispute resolution and abstract conversation, it seems that we mostly just want to continue with formal institutions in their current scope of application, but not to apply them more widely, even when that becomes feasible. Perhaps because we prefer to show loyalty to the communities that manage our informal norm systems. But loyalty signaling doesn’t seem a good reason to think this is better for the world, or for our larger societies.

Added 10a: Speculative markets are another area where we don’t want to get rid of the ones we have, but we also don’t want more of them, to aggregate info into consensus on more topics. The cost of creating them has come way down, allowing a lot more of them, that we don’t want.

Property registries is yet another area. The cost of managing them have come way down, yet we don’t have official registries for many more kinds of property than we once did.

Perhaps the simplest theory here is that we’ve lost our taste for social change. Whatever was continues, but nothing new shall be added.

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Subtext Shows Status

When we talk, we say things that are explicit and direct, on the surface of the text, and we also say things that are in hidden and indirect, said in more deniable ways via subtext. Imagine that there was a “flattext” type of talk (or writing) in which subtext was much harder to reliably express and read. Furthermore, imagine that it was easy to tell that a speaker (or writer) was using this type of talk. So that by talking in this way you were verifiably not saying as much subtext.

Yes, it seems very hard to go all the way to infinitely hard here, but flattext could have value without going to that extreme. Some have claimed that the artificial language Lojban is in some ways such a talk type.

So who would use surface text? A Twitter poll finds that respondents expect that on average they’d use flattext about half of the time, so they must expect many reasons to want to deny that they use subtext. Another such poll finds that they on average expect official talk to be required to be flattext. Except they are sharply divided between a ~40% that thinks it would be required >80% of the time, and another ~40% who thinks it would be required <20% of the time.

The obvious big application of flattext is people and organizations who are often accused of saying bad things via subtext. Such as people accusing of illicitly flirting, or sexual harrassing. Or people accused of “dogwhilsting” disliked allegiances. Or firms accused over-promising or under-warning to customers, employees, or investors.

As people are quite willing to accuse for-profit firms of bad subtext, I expect they’d be the most eager users. As would people like myself who are surrounded by hostile observers eager to identify particular texts as showing evil subtext. You might think that judges and officials speaking to the public in their official voice would prefer flattext, as it better matches their usual tone and style which implicitly claims that they are just speaking clearly and simply. But that might be a hypocrisy, and they may reject flattext so that they can continue to say subtext.

Personal servants, and slaves from centuries ago were required to speak in a very limited and stylized manner which greatly limited subtext. They could suffer big bad consequences for ever being accused of a tone of voice or manner that signaled anything less than full respect and deterrence to their masters.

Putting this all together, it seems that the ability to regularly and openly use subtext is a sign of status and privilege. We “put down” for-profit firms in our society by discouraging their use of subtext, and mobs do similarly when they hound enemies using hair-trigger standards ready to accuse them of bad subtext. And once low status people and organizations are cowed into avoiding subtext, then others can complain that they lack humanity, as they don’t show a sense of humor, which is more clear evidence that they are evil.

So I predict that if flattext were actually available, it would be mainly used to low status people and organizations to protect themselves from accusations of illicit subtext. As our enforcement of anti-subtext rules is very selective. Very risk averse government agencies might use it, but not high status politicians.

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