Tag Archives: Psychology

Prefer Ignorant Fans

By Robin Hanson · March 4, 2010 8:40 pm · Comments (25)

Tell pretty women they are smart, and smart women they are pretty. saying

We prefer to be liked, vs. disliked, but we also care about which features others most like about us.  For example, we might prefer to be liked for our sense of humor, rather than our looks.  But it seems to me that we most prefer that people who like us not know why exactly they like us.

It is of course a bad sign about someone’s opinion of you if they can’t think of any positive features of you.  It is also a good sign about their devotion if they sometimes try to make sure you know that you have good features.  But we would be disappointed and even disturbed to learn that someone knew that how much they liked us was captured by a particular known formula referring to objectively measurable features, no matter what those features were.

Someone who knew exactly where you and other folks ranked on their quality scale, and who could easily track how those rankings changed with time will know how much they like you more or less as your features changed.  Even if you are their favorite person at this moment, the odds are that someone else will soon outrank you.

In contrast, consider someone who has had a lot of contact with you, and who knows mainly that they like you, but not why exactly they like you.  This person will have more trouble finding someone else that they like more than you.  In this case you are more of an experience good, that has to be experienced to be evaluated.  If it is expensive to experience other folks enough to know their attractiveness, you have more confidence that you will continue to be one of their favorite people.

(From a conversation with Amanda Budny.)

Tagged as:

Do Larks Repress Owls?

By Robin Hanson · February 21, 2010 9:15 am · Comments (38)

Richard Chappell suggests morning larks treat night owls unfairly:

Scheduling maintenance work on campus housing for 7:45am somehow doesn’t strike the university as grossly inconsiderate, the way that scheduling it for 11pm surely would. … It should be common knowledge that there’s a fair bit of variation in the sleep schedules of graduate students. …. Perhaps [early-risers] think that any grad student who’s still asleep at 8am is just “sleeping in”, the way that they themselves might do on a lazy weekend. … Perhaps the inconsistent treatment is thought to be justified by early-riser moralizing: really (the thought goes), people ought to wake early. Those on later sleep schedules must just be lazy.

Intrigued, I dug:

A higher degree of eveningness in more impulsive subjects. more

Morningness was stable before age 35 and increased afterwards. more

College freshmen who kept night-owl hours had lower GPAs. more

Evening-types are more likely to have higher intelligence scores. more

Late risers tire less quickly. … Those who rise later tend to be both cleverer and richer.  more

Night workers more likely to be evening type and the unemployed less likely to be moderately morning type … Evening types were 2.5 times more likely to report that their general health was only poor or fair. more

Owls had the largest mean income and were more likely to have access to a car. There was also no evidence that larks were superior to those with other sleeping patterns with regard to their cognitive performance or their state of health. more Continue Reading "Do Larks Repress Owls?" »

Tagged as:

Two Anecdotes

By Robin Hanson · January 17, 2010 2:00 pm · Comments (17)
In December 2008, two seemingly unrelated events occurred. The first was the release of Stephen Greenspan’s book, Annals of Gullibility: Why We Get Duped and How to Avoid It. Greenspan, a professor of psychology, … discussed gullibility in fields including finance, academia, and the law. … The second was the exposure of the greatest Ponzi scheme in history, run by Bernard Madoff, which cost its unsuspecting investors in excess of $60 billion. … The irony is that Greenspan, who is bright and well regarded, lost 30 percent of his retirement savings in Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.
…
At conference dealing with spine surgery, a surgeon presented the case of a female patient with a herniated disc in her neck and pain that was caused by a pinched nerve. She had already failed typical conservative treatments such as physical therapy, medication, and waiting it out.
The surgeon asked the [doc] audience to vote on a couple of choices for surgery. The first was the newer anterior approach, where the surgeon removes the entire disc, replaces it with a bone plug, aim fuses the discs. The vast majority of the hands shot up. The second choice was the older posterior approach, where the surgeon removes only the portion of the disc that is compressing the nerve. No fusion is required because the procedure leaves most of the disc intact. Only a few audience members raised their hands.
The speaker then asked the audience, which was almost entirely male, “What if this patient is your wife?” The show of hands was reversed for the same two choices. The main reason is that the amount surgeons are paid for the newer and more complicated procedure is typically several times what they’d receive for the older procedure.

On the impotence of book learning:

In December 2008, two seemingly unrelated events occurred. The first was the release of Stephen Greenspan’s book, Annals of Gullibility: Why We Get Duped and How to Avoid It. Greenspan, a professor of psychology, … discussed gullibility in fields including finance, academia, and the law. … The second was the exposure of the greatest Ponzi scheme in history, run by Bernard Madoff, which cost its unsuspecting investors in excess of $60 billion. … The irony is that Greenspan, who is bright and well regarded, lost 30 percent of his retirement savings in Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.

On distorted doc incentives:

At conference dealing with spine surgery, a surgeon presented the case of a female patient with a herniated disc in her neck and pain that was caused by a pinched nerve. She had already failed typical conservative treatments such as physical therapy, medication, and waiting it out.

The surgeon asked the [doc] audience to vote on a couple of choices for surgery. The first was the newer anterior approach, where the surgeon removes the entire disc, replaces it with a bone plug, aim fuses the discs. The vast majority of the hands shot up. The second choice was the older posterior approach, where the surgeon removes only the portion of the disc that is compressing the nerve. …

The speaker then asked the audience, which was almost entirely male, “What if this patient is your wife?” The show of hands was reversed for the same two choices. The main reason is that the amount surgeons are paid for the newer and more complicated procedure is typically several times what they’d receive for the older procedure.

More here.  I’m actually surprised by this doc story; I’ve heard that docs over-consume med like everyone else.
Tagged as: ,

Status Quo Institution Bias

By Robin Hanson · November 23, 2009 2:25 pm · Comments (25)

New studies show existence and positive purpose biases.  First, we presume that what exists is better that what is not:

People treat the mere existence of something as evidence of its goodness. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that an existing state is evaluated more favorably than an alternative. Study 3 shows that imagining an event increases estimates of its likelihood, which in turn leads to favorable evaluation; the more likely that something will be, the more positively it is evaluated. Study 4 shows that the more a form is described as prevalent, the more aesthetically attractive is that form. … Mere existence leads to assumptions of goodness; the status quo is seen as good, right, attractive, tasty, and desirable.

Second, we presume the universe is designed to achieve broad positive purposes:

Children in first, second, and fourth grades were asked whether rocks are pointy because they are composed of small bits of material or in order to keep animals from sitting on them. The children preferred the teleological explanation. … Recent work suggests that it’s not just children: [researchers] found the same tendency to ascribe purpose to phenomena like rocks, sand, and lakes in uneducated Romany adults. They also tested BU undergraduates who had taken an average of three college science classes. When the undergrads had to respond under time pressure, they were likely to agree with nonscientific statements such as “The sun radiates heat because warmth nurtures life.”

For social institutions, these biases combine into a perfect storm: we assume our social institutions are well designed to achieve laudable broad purposes, rather than being more accidental arrangements where we each achieve private purposes holding constant others’ behavior.

Yes things that we have adapted to our needs are probably better than random other things that could be there instead.  I’d rather keep the current parts in my car than replace them with other random objects.  And yes when institutions have varied from place to place the better ones have probably spread further.

But even so we seem far too eager to believe that our current institutions are so well designed that there is little reason to consider alternatives.  This error is encouraged by the above biases, and by the fact that we can show loyalty to our local culture by believing it has superior institutions.  But be warned: it is nevertheless an error.  (And yes, I’ll tediously argue yet again that prediction markets could help correct this error.)

Tagged as: , ,

Smile Till It Hurts

By Robin Hanson · November 21, 2009 6:00 am · Comments (10)

Kate Tuttle reviews Bright-Sided:

When Barbara Ehrenreich was diagnosed with breast cancer in 2000, the sharp-eyed social critic found herself nearly as discomfited by the “pink ribbon culture” surrounding the disease as by the illness itself. Relentlessly upbeat, cloyingly inspirational, the breast cancer world, as Ehrenreich describes it, is a place where anger, fear and depression — all perfectly reasonable responses to a potentially mortal diagnosis — are frowned upon and the cancer itself is lauded as a great opportunity for spiritual growth. … Why do so many of us seem so willing to discount reality in favor of vague wishes, dreams and secrets? …

Ehrenreich’s examination of the history of positive thinking is a tour de force of well-tempered snark, culminating in a persuasive indictment of the bright-siders as the culprits in our current financial mess. … The author deploys her sharpest tone to eviscerate the business community’s embrace of positive thinking. Offered as a sap to those facing layoffs, used as a spur to better performance by those workers who remain. … “American corporate culture had long since abandoned the dreary rationality of professional management for the emotional thrills of mysticism, charisma, and sudden intuitions.”

We are naturally happy when times are good and sad when times are bad.  Since we prefer to associate with folks having good times, we prefer associates who act happy.  So we tend to be biased to act happier than our hidden info about our circumstances justifies.  Of course when things go really bad we may switched to acting depressed, to realistically assess our prospects, and to perhaps induce more assistance.

But going too far signaling your confidence via happiness can interfere with signaling your intelligence – you might just seem too stupid to notice how bad things are.  Since Ehrenreich has much intelligence to signal, it makes sense for her to show snarkiness instead of happiness.  But it is not clear why business deserves more criticism than any other part of society on this – the clearer harm here seems the meds wasted on faint hopes.

Added 11a:  In case there are any doubts, yes of course the recent panel advice to reduce breast cancer testing is right, and yes this bodes ill for US med spending.

Tagged as:

Evolving Diverse Fragility

By Robin Hanson · November 18, 2009 2:00 pm · Comments (25)

Over the last 50,000 years humans have evolved many fragile features – features that in the wrong situations fail badly, but in the right situations gain greatly.  Apparently, in previous environments the cost of failure was too high to tolerate such fragile features, but our larger denser societies somehow magnify the gains while minimizing the losses, enough to make such features useful.

I’m not entirely clear how this works, but it does suggest even more diverse fragility in our future, and the importance of supporting such diversity.  Some details:

Most of us have genes that make us as hardy as dandelions: able to take root and survive almost anywhere. A few of us, however, are more like the orchid: fragile and fickle, but capable of blooming spectacularly if given greenhouse care. So holds a provocative new theory of genetics, which asserts that the very genes that give us the most trouble as a species, causing behaviors that are self-destructive and antisocial, also underlie humankind’s phenomenal adaptability and evolutionary success. With a bad environment and poor parenting, orchid children can end up depressed, drug-addicted, or in jail—but with the right environment and good parenting, they can grow up to be society’s most creative, successful, and happy people. …

Researchers have identified a dozen-odd gene variants that can increase a person’s susceptibility to depression, anxiety, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, heightened risk-taking, and antisocial, sociopathic, or violent behaviors, and other problems—if, and only if, the person carrying the variant suffers a traumatic or stressful childhood or faces particularly trying experiences later in life.

This vulnerability hypothesis, as we can call it, has already changed our conception of many psychic and behavioral problems. …  Recently, however, an alternate hypothesis has emerged from this one and is turning it inside out. … Yes, this new thinking goes, these bad genes can create dysfunction in unfavorable contexts—but they can also enhance function in favorable contexts. The genetic sensitivities to negative experience that the vulnerability hypothesis has identified, it follows, are just the downside of a bigger phenomenon: a heightened genetic sensitivity to all experience. … Continue Reading "Evolving Diverse Fragility" »

Tagged as: ,

What Status RQ?

By Robin Hanson · November 12, 2009 11:40 am · Comments (43)

The problem with IQ tests is that while they are effective at assessing our deliberative skills, which involve reason and the use of working memory, they are unable to assess our inclination to use them when the situation demands. … “Some people who are intellectually able do not bother to engage very much in analytical thinking and are inclined to rely on their intuitions.” …

A study published last year … found there was no correlation between intelligence and a person’s ability to avoid some common traps of intuitive-thinking. … A survey of members of Mensa (the High IQ Society) in Canada in the mid-1980s found that 44 per cent of them believed in astrology, 51 per cent believed in biorhythms and 56 per cent believed in aliens. … A study of 360 Pittsburgh residents … found that, regardless of differences in intelligence, those who displayed better rational-thinking skills suffered significantly fewer negative events in their lives, such as being in serious credit card debt, having an unplanned pregnancy or being suspended from school. … [Another study] found a similar association among adolescents. Those who scored higher on a test of decision-making competence drank less, took fewer drugs and engaged in less risky behaviour overall. …

A potent criticism … is the lack of a proven test of rational thinking skills that could be used alongside IQ tests. … Stanovich maintains that while developing a universal “rationality-quotient (RQ) test” would require a multimillion-dollar research programme, there is no technical or conceptual reason why it could not be done. … However: unlike with IQ, it would be relatively easy to train people to do well on RQ tests. “They measure the extent to which people are inclined to use what capacity they have,” says Evans. “You could train people to ignore intuition and engage reasoning for the sake of the test, even if this was not their normal inclination.”

More here.  Several million dollars spent trying to develop an RQ test seems money well spent to me.  But even though I’d more want to know someone’s RQ than their IQ, I wonder how much others care.  After all, we admire tall and muscular folks, even if they have little inclination or opportunity to reach high things others cannot, or open jars others cannot.  And we mostly choose academics who show impressive abilities, mostly ignoring how much they contribute to intellectual progress.

How much do potential mates, employers, etc. actually care about your willingness to use your intelligence to discern truth?   Yes, sometimes the truth can help your team win, but at other times speaking inconvenient truths helps your team lose.

Tagged as: ,

Caplan on Exposure Therapy

By Robin Hanson · November 11, 2009 11:10 am · Comments (13)

The idea is to get people to “face their fears.” … “Exposure therapy… involves deliberate and planned exposure to a feared stimulus, or representation of the stimulus, until the intensity of the person’s distress recedes.” … The Handbook [of Exposure Therapies] also reviews clinical evidence on exposure therapy vs. other talk therapies vs. drugs vs. nothing vs. combinations of the above.  …  In almost every case, they conclude that exposure therapy plus X is no better than – and other worse than – exposure therapy alone.  The zero or negative marginal benefit of drugs is awfully Hansonian:

With respect to short-run efficacy, a number of studies suggest that [some drugs] may enhance the effects of exposure-based CBT [cognitive-behavioral therapy].  However, an approximately equal number of clinical trials provide no support for this conclusion, and a meta-analysis of this literature indicates that combined treatment is no more effective than CBT alone. … On the other hand, clinical trials have consistently failed to support an advantage of combined treatment when long-term outcomes are considered.  In fact, the two largest and most well-designed trials of combined treatments provide unambiguous evidence that pharmacotherapy… interferes with the durability of exposure-based CBT.

More here.  Yes, exposure therapy probably does make people feel less stressed about particular fears.  But you can’t know if this is a good thing until you know how stressed people should feel on particular fears.  For fears that are over-blown, exposure therapy seems good, but for under-blown fears, it seems bad.

For example, exposing people to the real deaths of others may well make folks less stressed about, and accepting of, their own future death.  If you think people are not accepting enough of their death, you approve, but if you, like me, wish folks would more “rage against the dying of the light,” you disapprove.

Tagged as:

Beware Far Ethics

By Robin Hanson · October 27, 2009 7:00 pm · Comments (39)

Philosophy triumphs easily over past evils and future evils; but present evils triumph over it. Francois De La Rochefoucauld.
Katja Grace’s translation:  We nobly analyse distant things, and in the present do whatever the hell we want.

If you stopped an articulate person who had just passed a homeless bum, and asked why she did not help, she’d probably explain this isn’t a simple question.  She might mention ethics complexities, but she’d probably focus on the complex social context.  Is the bum mentally ill, sick, stupid, lazy, or faking?  Does the bum have family who should help first, did he arrive recently in this area, and who is best placed to know what he needs?

At my Georgetown lecture last night on our robot future, the smart econ students focused their questions almost entirely on ethics.  They seemed to assume they understood enough about the social situation, and were obsessed with the ethical ways for humans to treat robots, robots to treat humans, etc.  I’ll bet they’d also be quick to condemn Roman centurions’ ethics, also figuring they understood enough about their social situation.  But I think they’d need to learn lots more about either of these worlds before they could begin to offer useful ethics advice.

Some of my young idealistic friends like to talk about figuring out what they could do to most help the world, and might go to Burma to see how the really poor live.  I tell them one has to learn lots of details about a place to figure out how to improve it, and they’d do better to try this on a part of the world they understand better.  But that doesn’t sound nearly as fun as saving the whole world all at once.

Humans overwhelmed by the social complexities of helping a bum nearby think they know enough about societies far away, so that ethics becomes the main concern there.  I see the same thing in discussions of future biotech or nanotech – ethics becomes the main frame, even though we only have the faintest ideas of how future societies might integrate those techs.  Beware the easy confidence of advising worlds far from your knowledge or consequence.

Added 29Oct: The obvious way to help poor folk far away without relying on your poor understanding of their world is to rely on the one thing you know best about their world: it is poor.  Invite them to move to your rich world, to share in its riches.  If your neighbors hinder you, use what you know about them to change that.

Tagged as: , , ,

Hide The Blood Money

By Robin Hanson · October 24, 2009 11:00 pm · Comments (10)

Blood donations are a famous oft-cited case of where we might get less of something of we pay more for it.  Now it seems the problem is just with cash, not with payment; apparently we dislike an appearance of being paid, not payment itself:

We set up … a survey administered to 467 blood donors in an Italian town, and find that donors are not reluctant to receive compensation in general: A substantial share of respondents declared they would stop being donors if paid a small amount of cash, but we do not find such effects when a voucher of the same nominal value is offered instead. The aversion to direct cash payments is particularly marked among women and older respondents, while there are neither gender nor age differences in the response to the voucher.

More here.

Tagged as: , ,