Tag Archives: Psychology

Economists too thoughtful to be kind

A result the media loves to report is that people who study economics are more likely to react like jerks when asked to respond to game theoretic predicaments like the prisoners’ dilemma. Are economists naturally mean? I can’t rule it out, but I always thought a more likely explanation was that they have just thought about these puzzles ahead of time, and simply respond with a memorised ‘correct’ answer, such as the Nash equilibrium. So I was glad to see this paper in Nature finding that anyone who has a while to think about how to react to these situations also becomes more selfish:

Cooperation is central to human social behaviour. However, choosing to cooperate requires individuals to incur a personal cost to benefit others. Here we explore the cognitive basis of cooperative decision-making in humans using a dual-process framework. We ask whether people are predisposed towards selfishness, behaving cooperatively only through active self-control; or whether they are intuitively cooperative, with reflection and prospective reasoning favouring ‘rational’ self-interest. To investigate this issue, we perform ten studies using economic games. We find that across a range of experimental designs, subjects who reach their decisions more quickly are more cooperative. Furthermore, forcing subjects to decide quickly increases contributions, whereas instructing them to reflect and forcing them to decide slowly decreases contributions. Finally, an induction that primes subjects to trust their intuitions increases contributions compared with an induction that promotes greater reflection. To explain these results, we propose that cooperation is intuitive because cooperative heuristics are developed in daily life where cooperation is typically advantageous. We then validate predictions generated by this proposed mechanism. Our results provide convergent evidence that intuition supports cooperation in social dilemmas, and that reflection can undermine these cooperative impulses.

A take-away would be that if you want someone to cooperate with you, you could put them in a situation where they need to make a decision on the spot. And if you want to come across as a naturally nice guy, go with your cooperative instincts and don’t think too much. Greater selfishness should be expected as a downside to letting people go into a detailed ‘near’ mode, where they concretely reflect on strategic choices and the likely outcomes. Calculation makes you calculating.

What about those brave behavioural economists, sent onto the front lines to study human psychology? Maybe they should ask for extra pay to compensate for the risk their work presents to their personalities.

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Morality as though it really mattered

A large share of the public, and even an outright majority of professional philosophers, claim to be ‘moral realists‘. Presumably, if this means anything, it means that there are objective rules out there that any being ought to follow and doing the ‘right thing’ is about more than just doing what you want.

Whatever surveys say, my impression is that almost nobody acts as though they were actually realists. If you really believed that there were objective rules that we should follow, that would make it crucial to work out what those rules actually were. If you failed to pick the right rules, you could spend your life doing things that were worthless, or maybe even evil. And if those are the rules that everyone necessarily ought to be following, nothing could be worse than failing to follow them. If most acts or consequences are not the best, as seems likely, then the chances of you stumbling on the right ones by chance are very low.

Does this imply that you should spend your entire life studying morality? Not exactly. If you became sufficiently confident about what was good, it would then be more valuable to go out and do that thing, rather than continue studying. On the other hand, it does imply a lot more effort than most people put into this question today. The number of ethicists with a public profile could be counted on one hand. Research on ethics, let alone meta-ethics, is largely ignored by the public and considered of ‘academic interest’, if that. To a realist, nothing could be further from the truth. It is impossible to go about forming other life plans confidently until you have worked out what is morally right!

Simple probing using questions well known to philosophers usually reveals a great deal of apparent inconsistency in people’s positions on moral issues. This has been known for thousands of years, but we are scarcely more consistent now than in the past. If we assume that any of the rules we ought to follow will be consistent with one another, this is a disaster and calls for us to down tools until right and wrong can be clarified. In other cases, popular intutive positions simply do not make sense.

A moral realist should also be trying to spread their bets to account for ‘moral uncertainty‘. Even if you think you have the right moral code, there is always the possibility you are mistaken and in fact a different set of rules are correct. Unless you are extremely confident that the rules you consider most likely, this ought to affect your behaviour. This is easily explained through an example which occurred to me recently concerning the debate over the ‘person-affecting view‘ of morality. According to this view, it would only be good to prevent a catastrophe that caused the extinction of humanity because such a catastrophe would affect people alive now, not because it ensures countless future generations never get to live. People who could exist in the future but don’t are not well-defined, and so do not quality for moral consideration. The case for putting enormous resources into ensuring humanity does not collapse is weaker if future people do not count. But how much weaker? Let’s say the number of (post-)humans we expect to live in the future, in the absence of any collapse, is a modest 1 trillion. The real number is probably much larger. If you thought there were just a 10% chance that people who weren’t alive now did in fact deserve moral consideration, that would still mean collapse prevented the existence of 100 billion future people in ‘expected value’ terms. This still dwarfs the importance of the 7 billion people alive today, and makes the case for focussing on such threats many times more compelling than otherwise. Note that incorporating moral uncertainty is unlikely to make someone stop focussing on collapse risk, because the consequences of being wrong in the other direction aren’t so bad.

This demonstrates that a moral realist with some doubt they have picked the right rules will want to a) hedge their bets b) focus disproportionate attention on plausible rules under which their choices have a bigger potential impact on the desirability of outcomes. This is just the same as uncertainty around matters of fact: we take precautions in case our model of how the world works is wrong, especially those errors under which our preferred choice could lead to a relative disaster. Despite this being a natural and important consideration for all moral realists, moral uncertainty is only talked about by a handful of moral philosophers.

Uncertainty about moral issues is scarcely a fringe concern because the quality of available evidence is so poor. Most moral reasoning, when we dig down, relies on nothing more than the competing intuitions of different people. The vast majority of people I know think the moral intuitions of the billions of people who lived in the past on matters such as racism, gender, sex, torture, slavery, the divine right of monarchs, animal cruelty and so on, were totally wrong. Furthermore, intuitive disagreement on moral questions remains vast today. Without a compelling reason to think our intuitions are better than those of others – and I don’t see one – the chances that we have all the right intuitions is frighteningly low.

I would go further and say there is no obvious reason for our moral intuitions to be tethered to what is really right and wrong full stop. It is almost certain that humans came about through the process of evolution. Evolution will give us the ability to sense the physical world in order to be able to respond to it, survive and reproduce. It will also give us good intuitions about mathematics, insofar as that helps us make predictions about the world around us, survive and reproduce. But why should natural selection provide us with instinctive knowledge of objective moral rules? There is no necessary reason for such knowledge to help a creature survive – indeed, most popular moral theories are likely to do the opposite. For this reason our intuitions, even where they agree, are probably uninformative.

I think this shows that most people who profess moral realism are in fact not. This is yet another obvious example of human hypocrisy. Professing objective morality is instrumentally useful for individuals and societies, and our minds can be easily shielded from what this implies. For anyone who actually does want to follow through on a realist position, I can see two options,

  • Hit the books and put more work into doing the right thing.
  • Concede that you have almost no chance of working out what is right and wrong, and could not gain much by trying. Moral skepticism would get you off the hook.

Personally, I would like to think I take doing the right thing seriously, so I am willing to offer a monetary prize of £300 for anyone who can change my mind on a) whether I ought to place a significant probability on moral realism being correct, or b) help me see that I seriously misunderstand what I subjectively value. Such insights would be a bargain!

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Significance and motivation

Over at philosophical disquisitions, John Danaher is discussing Aaron Smuts’ response to Bernard Williams’ argument that immortality would be tedious. Smuts’ thesis, in Danaher’s words, is a familiar one:

Immortality would lead to a general motivational collapse because it would sap all our decisions of significance.

This is interestingly at odds with my observations, which suggests that people are much more motivated to do things that seem unimportant, and have to constantly press themselves to do important things once in a while. Most people have arbitrary energy for reading unimportant online articles, playing computer games, and talking aimlessly. Important articles, serious decisions, and momentous conversations get put off.

Unsurprisingly then, people also seem to take more joy from apparently long-run insignificant events. Actually I thought this was the whole point of such events. For instance people seem to quite like cuddling and lazing in the sun and eating and bathing and watching movies. If one had any capacity to get bored of these things, I predict it would happen within the first century. While significant events also bring joy, they seem to involve a lot more drudgery in preceding build up.

So it seems to me that living forever could only take the pressure off and make people more motivated and happy. Except inasmuch as the argument is faulty in other ways, e.g. impending death is not the only time constraint on activities.

Have I missed something?

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Middle-aged not miserable, just too busy to answer surveys

I have read several times that there is evidence of a U-curve in happiness over an individual’s life. People are happy in their youth, and happy again after retirement, but suffer from a serious malaise in between as they grapple with their finances, careers and family life. Seeing as how I’m about to embark on this part of my life, that isn’t a particularly appealing idea! Today I was glad to find some evidence that the U-curve is just a statistical illusion. Australian economists Paul Frijters and Tony Beatton have analysed large panel data sets from Australia (n>10,000), the UK (n>25,000) and Germany (n>20,000) and produced the following trajectory for happiness as people age:

Happiness is nearly flat from 20 through 50. Frijter’s explanation for the disagreement with the existing literature is that,

previous studies severely underestimated the degree to which miserable people in middle-age were over-represented in these datasets: happy people in middle age are busy and don’t have time to participate in lengthy questionnaires, leading previous studies to erroneously think there was a huge degree of unhappiness in middle-age. When you actually follow people over time, no such ‘middle-age blues pattern’ can be found, at least not in Australia or the UK and only to a mild degree in Germany. … we found that there were severe data problems in Germany, with only quite miserable people in middle-age prepared to partake in the sample and respondents becoming markedly more honest (and miserable) as they answered the happiness questions year after year.

Those of us with active lives need not fear! There are familiar selection problems later in life as well. Unhappy people do not live as long, and may become less able or willing to answer surveys than their healthy and cheerful counterparts. By tracking the same participants for 10 years or more, Frijters claims to have “dealt with both issues,” presumably suing their initial responses to by forecast their missing responses later in life. Some day I should choose carefully where I decide to retire and perhaps return to my homeland: “life in old age is clearly relatively better in Australia than the UK, perchance because of the better weather, more generous public pensions, and more space.”

Another, more depressing, paper on happiness recently caught my attention. Probably due to its early use of twins to investigate the causes of happiness it has landed over 900 citations, despite a limited sample of separated twins. It finds a remarkably high correlation between the happiness of twins who share all of their genes, but very little correlation for twins who share half of their genes:

Happiness or subjective wellbeing was measured on a birth-record based sample of several thousand middle-aged twins using the Well Being (WB) scale of the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ). Neither socioeconomic status (SES), educational attainment, family income, marital status, nor an indicant of religious commitment could account for more than about 3% of the variance in WB. From 44% to 53% of the variance in WB, however, is associated with genetic variation. Based on the retest of smaller samples of twins after intervals of 4.5 and 10 years, we estimate that the heritability of the stable component of subjective wellbeing approaches 80%.

For the 48 DZ [fraternal] pairs, this cross-twin, cross-time correlation for WB was essentially zero (.07) while, for the 79 MZ [identical] pairs, it equaled .40, or 80% of the retest correlation of .50. The MZ data suggest that the stable component of wellbeing (i.e., trait-happiness) is largely determined genetically. The negligible DZ correlation suggests that this stable and heritable component of happiness is an emergenic trait (Lykken, 1982; Lykken, Bouchard, McGue, & Tellegen, 1992), that is, a trait that is determined by a configural rather than an additive function of components. Emergenic traits, although determined in part genetically, do not tend to run in families as do traits that are polygenic-additive.

A similar result was reported in an earlier study of 217 MZ and 114 DZ pairs of middle-aged Minnesota Registry twins, plus 44 MZ and 27 DZ pairs who were separated in infancy and reared apart (Tellegen, et al., 1988). The best estimate of the heritability of WB in that study was .48 (± .08) and, as was true here, a model involving only additive genetic effects did not fit the data.

Myers and Diener suggested that people who enjoy close personal relationships, who become absorbed in their work, and who set themselves achievable goals and move toward them with determination are happier on the whole than people who do not. We agree, but we question the direction of the causal arrow. We know that when people with bipolar mood disored are depressed, they tend to avoid intimate encounters or new experiences and tend to brood upon depressing thoughts rather than concetrating on their work. Then, when their moods swings toward elation, these same people tend to do the things that happy people do. This is undoubtedly a James-Lange feedback effect: Dysfunctional behavior exacerbates depression, whereas the things happy people do enhance their happiness. We argue, however, that the impetus is greater from mood to behavior than in the reverse direction. It may be that trying to be happier is as futile as trying to be taller and therefore is counterproductive. (HT Jim Savage)

My impression – which I would be happy to have corrected – is that later research finds a smaller, but still significant impact of genetics on happiness.

That result brought to mind something John Stuart Mill wrote in his autobiography: “I am now convinced that no great improvements in the lot of mankind are possible until a great change takes place in the fundamental constitution of their modes of thought.” I imagine Mill had education and cultural shifts in mind, and the consistent difference in reported subjective wellbeing between South America and Eastern Europe show culture makes a difference. But if genetics plays such a large and limiting role, the only way to drastically alter our ‘modes of thought’ will require that we learn how to tinker with our minds directly.

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More 2D Values

Back in ’09 I posted on the 2D map of values from the World Values Survey, and how nations are distributed in that 2D space. A related 2D space of values is detailed in this new JPSP paper. Apparently 19 different values fall naturally on a circle:

Here are more detailed descriptions of these values:

  • Self-direction–thought: Freedom to cultivate one’s own ideas and abilities
  • Self-direction–action: Freedom to determine one’s own actions
  • Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and change
  • Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification
  • Achievement: Success according to social standards
  • Power–dominance: Power through exercising control over people
  • Power–resources: Power through control of material and social resources
  • Face: Security and power through maintaining one’s public image and avoiding
  • humiliation
  • Security–personal: Safety in one’s immediate environment
  • Security–societal: Safety and stability in the wider society
  • Tradition: Maintaining and preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions
  • Conformity–rules: Compliance with rules, laws, and formal obligations
  • Conformity–interpersonal: Avoidance of upsetting or harming other people
  • Humility: Recognizing one’s insignificance in the larger scheme of things
  • Benevolence–dependability: Being a reliable and trustworthy member of the ingroup
  • Benevolence–caring: Devotion to the welfare of ingroup members
  • Universalism–concern: Commitment to equality, justice, and protection for all people
  • Universalism–nature: Preservation of the natural environment
  • Universalism–tolerance: Acceptance and understanding of those who are different from oneself

Of course since they are based on surveys, these are probably mostly about values as seen in a far-view.

Added 21Aug: The upper values on the circle are those celebrated more by richer societies like ours, relative to poorer societies like our farmer ancestors. (Foragers were more in the middle.) In older societies, the upper values are also more celebrated by the rich. The left-side more-community-oriented are also more common in the “East,” which I’ve suggested were centrally located places more often conquered by invaders. The more peripheral ”West” tended more to emphasize right-side family and individual values.

Added 24 Aug: Far mode emphasizes the positive over the negative, and the social over the personal. So the upper left area of the circle are the most far values, and the lower right the most near values. This also seems to map onto the (near) things that we actually want, and the (far) things we want others to think that we want.

 

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On the goodness of Beeminder

Beeminder.com improves my life a lot. This is surprising: few things improve my life much, and when they do it’s usually because I’m imagining it. Or because they are things that everyone has known about for ages and I am slow on the uptake (e.g. not moving house three times a year, making a habit of eating breakfast, making habits at all). But Beeminder is new, and it definitely helps.

One measurable instrumental benefit of Beeminder is that I have exercised for half an hour or an hour per day on average since last October. Previously I exercised if I needed to get somewhere or if the fact that exercise is good for people crossed my mind particularly forcibly, or if some even less common events occurred. So this is big. It seems to help a lot for other things too, such as working, but the evidence there is weaker since I used to work pretty often anyway. I’m sorry that  I didn’t keep better track.

Unlike many other improvements to my life, I have some guesses about why this is so useful. But first let me tell you the basic concept of Beeminder.

Take a thing you can measure, such as how many pages you have written. Suppose you measure this every day, and enter the data as points in a graph. Suppose also that the graph contains a ‘road’ stretching up ahead of your data, to days that have not yet happened. Then you could play a game of keeping your new data points above the road. A single day below the road and you lose. It turns out this can be a pretty compelling game. This is basically Beeminder.

There are more details. You can change the steepness of the road, but only for a week in the future. So you can fine-tune the challengingness of a goal, but can’t change it out of laziness unless you are particularly forward thinking about your laziness (in which case you probably won’t sign up for this).

There is a lot of leeway in what indicators you measure, and some I tried didn’t help much. The main things I measure lately are:

  • number of 20 minute blocks of time spent working. They have to be continuous, though a tiny bit of interruption is allowed if someone else causes it
  • time spent exercising weighted by the type of exercise e.g. running = 2x dancing = 2 x walking
  • points accrued for doing tasks on my to-do list. When I think of anything I want to do I put it on the list, whether it’s watching a certain movie or figuring out how to make the to do list system better. Some things stay there permanently, e.g. laundry. I assign each task a number of points, which goes up every Sunday if it’s still on the list. I have to get 15 points per day or I lose.

At first glance, it looks like Beeminder is basically a commitment contract: that it gets its force from promising to take your money if you lose. In my experience this seems very minor. I often forget how much money is riding on goals, and seem to keep the ones with no money on about as well as the others. So at least for me the threat of losing money isn’t what’s going on.

What is going on? I think Beeminder – especially the way I use it – actually does a nice job of combining a bunch of good principles of motivation. Here are some I hypothesize:

Concrete steps

In order to use Beeminder for a goal, you need to be clear on how you will quantify progress toward it. This means being explicit about the parts it is made of. You can’t just intend to read more, you have to intend to read one philosophy paper every day. You can’t just intend to do your taxes, you have to intend to finish one of five forms every week. You can’t just intend to ponder whether you’re doing the right thing with your life, you have to intend to spend twenty minutes per week thinking up alternatives. Making a goal concrete enough to quantify it destroys ugh fields and makes it easier to start. ‘What get’s measured gets done’ – just making a concrete metric salient makes it easier to work toward than a similar vague goal.

Small steps

To Beemind a goal, you need to divide it into many small parts, so you can track progress. ‘Finish making my presentation’ might be explicit enough to measure, but the measure will be zero for a long time, then one. Breaking goals up into small steps has nice side effects. It removes ugh fields, induces near mode, makes success likely at any particular step. In Luke Muehlhauser’s terminology, it increases ‘expectancy’ and allows ‘success spirals’*. Trading long term goals for short term ones also avoids the kind of delay that might make it easy to succumb to procrastination.

Don’t break the chain 

Otherwise known as the Seinfeld hack. This might be the main thing that motivates me to keep my Beeminder goals, in the place of the money. Imagine you are skipping rope. You have made it to 70 skips. It was kind of hard, but you’re not so exhausted that you have to stop. You probably feel more compelled to keep going and make it to 80 than you did when you started. In general, once you have successfully done something a string of times, doing it again seems more desirable. Perhaps this is particular to OCD kinds of people, but a Google search suggests many find it useful.

Beeminder is a nicely flexible implementation of this, because the chain is a bit removed from what you are doing. You only have to maintain an average, so you can work extra one day to slack off the next. This doesn’t seem to undermine the motivational effect.

Hard lines in middle grounds

Firm commitments are naturally made to extremes. This is partly due to principled moral stances, which tend to be both extreme and firm. But that’s not all that’s going on. It’s hard to manage a principle of eating 40% less meat. If people want to eat less meat, they either eat none at all, or however much they feel like pushed down in a vague fashion with some bad feelings. The middle of the meat eating spectrum is too slippery for a hard line – it’s hard to tell how much you eat and annoying to track it. ‘None’ is salient and verifiable. In other realms intermediate lines are required: your diet can’t cut eating to zero. So often diets are more vague; which makes them harder to keep.

Similarly, it’s easy to commit to doing something every day, or every Sunday, or every month. It’s harder to commit to do a thing 2.7 times per week on average, because it’s awkward to track or remember this ‘habit’.

Compromised positions are often more desirable than extremes, and desired frequencies are unlikely to match memorable periods. So it’s a pity that vague commitments are harder to keep than firm ones. Often people don’t make commitments at all, because the readily available firm ones are too extreme. This is a big loss.

Beeminder helps with making firm commitments to intermediate positions. Since you only ever need to notice if the slope of your data isn’t steep enough, any rate is as easy to use as a goal. You can commit to eating 40% less meat, you just have to estimate once what 40% is, then record any meat you eat. I’ve used Beeminder to journal on average five nights per week. This is better than every night or no night, but would otherwise be annoying to track.

A small threat to overcome tiny temptations

While working, there are various moments when it would be easier to stop than to continue, particularly if you mostly feel the costs and benefits available in the next second or so, and if you assume that you could start again shortly (related). It is in these moments that I tend to stop and get a drink, or look out of the window, or open my browser or whatnot.

Counting short blocks of continuous time working pretty much solves this problem for me. The rule is that if you stop at all the whole block doesn’t count. So at any given moment there might be a tiny short term benefit to stopping for a second, but there is a huge cost to it. In my case this seems to remove stopping as an option, in the same way that a hundred dollar price on a menu item removes it as an option without apparent expense of willpower.

I originally thought it would be good to measure the amount of work I got done, rather than time spent doing it. This is because I want to get work done, not waste time on it. But given that I am working, I strongly prefer to do good work, fast. So there’s not much need for an added incentive there. I just need an incentive to begin, and one to not stop when a particular moment makes stopping look tasty. In Luke’s terminology, this kills impulsiveness.

Less stress

The long term threat of failing to write an essay is converted into a short term pleasure of winning each night at Beeminder. I’m not sure why this seems like a pleasure, rather than a threat of losing, but it does to me. Probably because losing at Beeminder isn’t that unpleasant or shameful. And how could getting points or climbing a scale not seem like winning? (This is about value in Luke’s terms).

More accuracy

It’s harder to maintain planning fallacy, overconfidence, or expectation of perfection in the future, in light of detailed quantitative data, and a definite trend line.

Just the difference between ‘I should do that’, and ‘I should do that, so how much time will it take?… About two hours, so I guess it should get 20 points.. that probably won’t be enough to compel me to do it soon, but that’s ok, it’s not urgent’ seems to change the mindset to one more sensitive to reality.

***

In sum, I think Beeminder partly works well because it causes you to think of your goals in small, concrete parts which can easily be achieved. It also makes achieving the parts more satisfying, and strings them into an addictive chain of just the right challengingness. Finally it lends itself to experimentation with a wide range of measures of success, such as measuring time blocks or ‘points’, at arbitrary rates. The value from innovations there is probably substantial. So, averse as I am to giving lifestyle advice, if you’re curious about the psychology of motivation in humans, or if you want to improve your life a lot, you should probably take a look at Beeminder.

*you can also increase expectancy by measuring something like time rather than progress.

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Grace-Hanson Podcast

Robin and I have a new podcast on the subject of play (mp3wav, m4a). Older ones are here.

Don’t be thrown by a bit of silence at the start of the m4a one. We also don’t have the time right now to figure out how to put it in better formats. Sorry about that. If anyone else does, and posts such files, I’ll link to them.

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Good friends can make bad business partners

A new NBER working paper suggests that similar venture capitalists (VCs) are worse at making or managing shared investments:

This paper explores two broad questions on collaboration between individuals. First, we investigate what personal characteristics affect people’s desire to work together. Second, given the influence of these personal characteristics, we analyze whether this attraction enhances or detracts from performance. Addressing these problems in the venture capital syndication setting, we show that venture capitalists exhibit strong detrimental homophily in their co-investment decisions. We find that individual venture capitalists choose to collaborate with other venture capitalists for both ability-based characteristics (e.g., whether both individuals in a dyad obtained a degree from a top university) and affinity-based characteristics (e.g., whether individuals in a pair share the same ethnic background, attended the same school, or worked for the same employer previously). Moreover, frequent collaborators in syndication are those venture capitalists who display a high level of mutual affinity. We find that while collaborating for ability-based characteristics enhances investment performance, collaborating for affinity-based characteristics dramatically reduces the probability of investment success. A variety of tests show that the cost of affinity is not driven by selection into inferior deals; the effect is most likely attributable to poor decision-making by high-affinity syndicates post investment. Taken together, our results suggest that non-ability-based “birds-of-a-feather-flock-together” effects in collaboration can be costly.

Given that homophily rather than heterophily remains the norm, it seems these investors are not learning this lesson, or value working and affiliating with similar peers over maximising profits. All very well for them. But if you have a project that you truly want to succeed, you may be better off doing it with a talented stranger rather than the college mates you clicked with on day one. And if you are letting others invest on your behalf, you should beware of handing your money over to a homogeneous friendship group.

I wonder if this kind of research influences the institutional investors who often fund VCs? If not, it would suggest that even this highly competitive investment market is falling short of its potential to fund and grow promising new companies.

Some research suggests that corporations with more female board members perform better, though the direction of causality is disputed. I doubt females are innately more talented board members, so the causation, if real, could be the result of female ‘outsiders’ generating better management than a clique of natural friends. Shareholders don’t share the benefits of board members enjoying each other’s company, so if they had effective control of  the companies they owned you might expect then to appoint a diverse ‘team of rivals’ to the board to closely scrutinise one another’s ideas.  My impression is that precisely the opposite is the norm.

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Does life flow towards flow?

Robin recently described how human brain ‘uploads’, even if forced to work hard to make ends meet, might nonetheless be happy and satisfied with their lives. Some humans naturally love their work, and if they are the ones who get copied, the happiness of emulations could be very high. Of course in Robin’s Malthusian upload scenario, evolutionary pressures towards high productivity are very strong, and so the mere fact that some people really enjoy work doesn’t mean that they will be the ones who get copied billions of times. The workaholics will only inherit the Earth if they are the best employees money can buy.

The broader question of whether creatures that are good at surviving, producing and then reproducing tend towards joy or misery is a crucial one. It helps answer whether it is altruistic to maintain populations of wild animals into the future, or an act of mercy to shrink their habitats. Even more importantly, it is the key to whether it is extremely kind or extremely cruel for humans to engage in panspermia and spread Malthusian life across the universe as soon as possible.

There is an abundance of evidence all around us in the welfare of humans and other animals that have to strive to survive in the environments they are adapted to, but no consensus on what that evidence shows. It is hard enough to tell whether another human has a quality of life better than no life at all, let alone determine the same for say, an octopus.

One of the few pieces of evidence I find compelling comes from Mihály Csíkszentmihályi research into the experience he calls ‘flow‘. His work suggests that humans are most productive, and also most satisfied, when they are totally absorbed in a clear but challenging task which they are capable of completing. The conditions suggested as being necessary to achieve ‘flow’ are

  1. “One must be involved in an activity with a clear set of goals. This adds direction and structure to the task.
  2. One must have a good balance between the perceived challenges of the task at hand and his or her ownperceived skills. One must have confidence that he or she is capable to do the task at hand.
  3. The task at hand must have clear and immediate feedback. This helps the person negotiate any changing demands and allows him or her to adjust his or her performance to maintain the flow state.”

Most work doesn’t meet these criteria and so ‘flow’ is not all that common, but it is amongst the best states of mind a human can hope for.

Some people are much more inclined to enter flow than others and if Csíkszentmihályi’s book is to be believed, they are ideal employees – highly talented, motivated and suited to their tasks. If this is the case, people predisposed to experience flow would be the most popular minds to copy as emulations and in the immediate term the flow-inspired workaholics would indeed come to dominate the Earth.

Of course, it could turn out that in the long run, once enough time has passed for evolution to shed humanity’s baggage, the creatures that most effectively do the forms of work that exist in the future will find life unpleasant. But our evolved capacity for flow in tasks that we are well suited for gives us a reason to hope that will not be the case. If it turns out that flow is a common experience for traditional hunter-gatherers then that would make me even more optimistic. And more optimistic again if we can find evidence for a similar experience in other species.

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The Smart Are MORE Biased To Think They Are LESS Biased

I seem to know a lot of smart contrarians who think that standard human biases justify their contrarian position. They argue:

Yes, my view on this subject is in contrast to a consensus among academic and other credentialed experts on this subject. But the fact is that human thoughts are subject to many standard biases, and those biases have misled most others to this mistaken consensus position. For example biases A,B, and C would tend to make people think what they do on this subject, even if that view were not true. I, in contrast, have avoided these biases, both because I know about them (see, I can name them), and because I am so much smarter than these other folks. (Have you seen my test scores?) And this is why I can justifiably disagree with an expert consensus on this subject.

Problem is, not only are smart folks not less biased for many biases, if anything smart folks more easily succumb to the bias of thinking that they are less biased than others:

The so-called bias blind spot arises when people report that thinking biases are more prevalent in others than in themselves. … We found that none of these bias blind spots were attenuated by measures of cognitive sophistication such as cognitive ability or thinking dispositions related to bias. If anything, a larger bias blind spot was associated with higher cognitive ability. Additional analyses indicated that being free of the bias blind spot does not help a person avoid the actual classic cognitive biases. …

Most cognitive biases in the heuristics and biases literature are negatively correlated with cognitive sophistication, whether the latter is indexed by development, by cognitive ability, or by thinking dispositions. This was not true for any of the bias blind spots studied here. As opposed to the social emphasis in past work on the bias blind spot, we examined bias blind spots connected to some of the most well-known effects from the heuristics and biases literature: outcome bias, base-rate neglect, framing bias, conjunction fallacy, anchoring bias, and myside bias. We found that none of these bias blind spot effects displayed a negative correlation with measures of cognitive ability (SAT total, CRT) or with measures of thinking dispositions (need for cognition, actively open-minded thinking). If anything, the correlations went in the other direction.

We explored the obvious explanation for the indications of a positive correlation between cognitive ability and the magnitude of the bias blind spot in our data. That explanation is the not unreasonable one that more cognitively sophisticated people might indeed show lower cognitive biases—so that it would be correct for them to view themselves as less biased than their peers. However, … we found very little evidence that these classic biases were attenuated by cognitive ability. More intelligent people were not actually less biased—a finding that would have justified their displaying a larger bias blind spot. …

Thus, the bias blind spot joins a small group of other effects such as myside bias and noncausal base-rate neglect in being unmitigated by increases in intelligence. That cognitive sophistication does not mitigate the bias blind spot is consistent with the idea that the mechanisms that cause the bias are quite fundamental and not easily controlled strategically— that they reflect what is termed Type 1 processing in dual-process theory. (more)

Added 12June: The New Yorker talks about this paper:

The results were quite disturbing. For one thing, self-awareness was not particularly useful: as the scientists note, “people who were aware of their own biases were not better able to overcome them.” … All four of the measures showed positive correlations, “indicating that more cognitively sophisticated participants showed larger bias blind spots.”

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