(No I’m not going to say more about the book now.)
(No I’m not going to say more about the book now.)
Google Alerts has failed me. For years I’d been trusting it to tell me about new news that cites me, and for the last few years it has just not been doing that. So when I happened to go searching for news that mentions me, I found 135 new articles, listed on my press page. I’d probably find more, if I spent a few more hours searching.
Consider for the moment what would have happened if I had put up a blog post about each of those press articles, as they appeared. Even if I didn’t say much beyond a link and a short quote, some of you would have followed that link. And the sum total of those follows across all 135 articles would be far more than the number of you who today are going to go browsing my press page now that you know it has 135 new entries.
Similarly, I now have 2829 scholarly citations of my work, most of which appeared while I was doing this blog, and this blog has had 3640 posts, many of which were written by others when this was a group blog. So I might plausibly have doubled the number of my posts on this blog by putting up a post on each paper that cited one of my papers. Or more reasonably, I might have made one post a month listing such articles.
For both news and academic articles that cite me, I expect readers to pay vastly more attention to them if I announce them soon after they appear than if I give a single link to a set of them a few years later. Yet I don’t think, and I don’t think readers think, that the fundamental interest or importance of these articles declines remotely as fast as reader interest. This is also suggested by the fact that readers follow so many news sources, like blogs, instead of looking at only the ‘best of’ sections of far more sources.
Bottom line, readers show a strong interest in reading and discussing articles soon after they appear, an interest not explained by an increased fundamental importance of recent articles. Instead a plausible hypothesis is that readers care greatly about reading and talking about the same articles that others will read and talk about, at near the time when those others will do that reading and talking. In substantial part, we like news in order to support talking about the news, and not so much because news communicates important information or insights.
You are invited to attend two unusual conferences where I’ll speak in May:
1. INSTED: Agitate! Los Angeles, May 2, 10am-10pm. $25 if you act fast. I talk at time TBD:
The Age Of Em: Envisioning Brain Emulation Societies
Tired of all the wining and boasting on the latest tech & politics trends? See it all shrink to insignificance as we contemplate the next revolution on the scale of the farming and industrial revolutions. The Age of Em will start sometime in the next century; in it, brain emulations could change almost everything. (video)
2. Building The New World Conference, May 28-31, Radford University in Virginia, $375 for 4 days includes food & room. I talk at 3:30pm May 30 on:
When Men Become Machines: Meaning, Identity, and Ethics at the Advent of a Trans-Human Era and Emulation-Based Singularity.
The three most disruptive transitions in history were the introduction of humans, farming, and industry. Another transition lies ahead: Artificial Intelligence in the form of whole brain emulations – “ems” – sometime in the next century. We will explore the upcoming Trans-Human Era, which will include ems, using a broad synthesis of standard academic consensus, and we will outline a baseline scenario for this “Singularity.” Lastly, we will consider not only the economics of this new world, but also the meaning and identity that human residents will experience during this unprecedented shift. (video)
Eighteen months ago I asked here for readers to criticize my Em Econ book draft, then 62K words. (137 of you sent comments – thanks!) Today I announce that Oxford University Press will publish its descendant (now 212K words) in Spring 2016. Tentative title, summary, outline:
The Age Of Em: Work, Love and Life When Robots Rule The Earth
Author Robin Hanson takes an oft-mentioned disruptive future tech, brain emulations, and expertly analyzes its social consequences in unprecedented breadth and detail. His book is intended to prove: we can foresee our social future, not just by projecting trends, but also by analyzing the detailed social consequences of particular disruptive future technologies.
1. Start: Contents, Preface, Introduction, Summary
2. Modes: Precedents, Factors, Dreamtime, Limits
3. Mechanics: Emulations, Opacity, Hardware, Security
4. Scales: Time, Space, Reversing
5. Infrastructure: Climate, Cooling, Buildings
6. Existence: Virtuality, Views, Fakery, Copying, Darkness
7. Farewells: Fragility, Retirement, Death
8. Labor: Wages, Selection, Enough
9. Efficiency: Competition, Eliteness, Spurs, Power
10. Business: Institutions, Growth, Finance, Manufacturing
11. Lifecycle: Careers, Age, Preparation, Training
12. Clumping: Cities, Speeds, Transport
13. Extremes: Software, Inequality, War
14. Groups: Clans, Nepotism, Firms, Teams
15. Conflict: Governance, Law, Innovation
16. Connection: Mating, Signaling, Identity, Ritual
17. Collaboration: Conversation, Synchronization, Coalitions
18. Society: Profanity, Divisions, Culture, Stories
19. Minds: Humans, Unhumans, Intelligence, Psychology
20. Variations: Trends, Alternatives, Transition, Aliens
21. Choices: Evaluation, Policy, Charity, Success
22. Finale: Critics, Conclusion, References, Thanks
23. Appendix: Motivation, Method, Biases
Added Sept2015: The book now has a website.
Imagine that a “musicalist” is someone who makes good and persuasive musical arguments. One might define this broadly, by saying that any act is musical if it influences the physical world so as to change the distribution of sound, as most sound has musical elements. Here anyone who makes good and persuasive arguments that influence physical acts is a good “musicalist.”
Or one might try to define “musicalist” more narrowly, by requiring that the acts argued for have an especially strong effect on the especially musical aspects of the physical world, that musical concepts and premises often be central to the arguments. Far fewer people would be see as good “musicalists” here.
The concept of “moralist” can also be defined broadly or narrowly. Defined broadly, a “moralist” might be anyone who makes good and persuasive arguments about acts for which anyone thinks moral considerations to be relevant. This could be because the acts influence morally-relevant outcomes, or because the acts are encouraged or discouraged by some moral rules.
Defining narrowly, however, one might require that the acts influenced have especially strong moral impacts, and that moral concepts and premises often be central to the arguments. Far fewer people are good “moralists” by this definition.
Bryan Caplan recently praised me as a “moralist”:
Robin … excels as a moralist – in three distinct ways.
Robin often constructs sound original moral arguments. His arguments against cuckoldry and for cryonics are just two that come to mind. Yes, part of his project is to understand why most people are forgiving of cuckoldry and hostile to cryonics. But the punchline is that the standard moral position on these issue is indefensible.
Second, Robin’s moral arguments actually persuade people. I’ve met many of his acolytes in person, and see vastly more online. This doesn’t mean, of course, that Robin’s moral arguments persuade most readers. Any moral philosopher will tell you that changing minds is like pulling teeth. My point is that Robin has probably changed the moral convictions of hundreds. And that’s hundreds more than most moralists have changed.
Third, Robin takes some classical virtues far beyond the point of prudence. Consider his legendary candor.
I accept (and am grateful for) Bryan’s praise relative to a broad interpretation of “moralist.” Yes, I try to create good and persuasive arguments on many topics relevant to actions, and according to many concepts of morality most acts have substantial moral impact. Since moral considerations are so ubiquitous, most anyone who is a good arguer must also be a good moralist.
But what if we define “moralist” narrowly, so that the acts must be unusually potent morally, and the concepts and premises invoked must be explicitly moral ones? In this case, I don’t see that I qualify, since I don’t focus much on especially moral concepts, premises, rules, or consequences.
Bryan gave two examples, and his readers gave two more. Here are quick summaries:
I agree that these arguments address actions about which many people have moral feelings. But I don’t see myself as focused on moral concepts or premises; I see my discussions as focused on other issues.
Yes, most people have moral wants. These aren’t all or even most of what people want, but moral considerations do influence what people (including me) want. Yes, these moral wants are relevant for many acts. But people disagree about the weight and even direction that moral considerations push on many of these acts, and I don’t see myself as especially good at or interested taking sides in arguments about such weights and directions. I instead mostly seek other simple robust considerations to influence beliefs and wants about acts.
Bryan seems to think that my being a good moralist by his lights argues against my “dealism” focus on identifying social policies that can get most everyone more of what they want, instead of taking sides in defined moral battles, wherein opposing sides make conflicting and often uncompromising demands. It seems to me that I in fact do work better by not aligning myself clearly with particular sides of established tug-o-wars, but instead seeking considerations that can appeal broadly to people on both sides of existing conflicts.
Tomorrow I’ll present on prediction markets and disagreement, in Montreal at the NIPS Workshop on Transactional Machine Learning and E-Commerce. A video will be available later.
Ten years ago today the GMU economics department voted to award me tenure. With that vote, I won my academic gamble. I can’t be sure what my odds reasonably were, so I can’t be sure it was a gamble worth taking. And I’m not sure tenure is overall good for the world. But I am sure that I’m very glad that I achieved tenure.
Many spend part of their tenure dividend on leisure. Many spend part on continuing to gain academic prestige as they did before. Many switch to more senior roles in the academic prestige game. And some spend tenure on riskier research agendas, agendas that are foolish for folks seeing tenure.
Though some may disagree, I see myself as primarily in this last category. And since that would not be possible without tenure, I bow in sincere supplication, and thank my colleagues for this treasured honor. THANK YOU for my tenure.
A month ago I mentioned that lots of folks are now saying “this time is different” – we’ll soon see a big increase in jobs lost to automation, even though we’ve heard such warnings every few decades for centuries. Recently Elon Musk joined in:
The risk of something seriously dangerous happening is in the five year timeframe … 10 years at most.
If new software will soon let computers take over many more jobs, that should greatly increase the demand for such software. And it should greatly increase the demand for computer hardware, which is a strong complement to software. So we should see a big increase in the quantity of computer hardware purchased. The US BEA has been tracking the fraction of the US economy devoted to computer and electronics hardware. That fraction was 2.3% in 1997, 1.7% in 2003, and 1.58% in 2008, and 1.56% in 2012. I offer to bet that this number won’t rise above 5% by 2025. And I’ll give 20-1 odds! So far, I have no takers.
The US BLS tracks the US labor share of income, which has fallen from 64% to 58% in the last decade, a clear deviation from prior trends. I don’t think this fall is mainly due to automation, and I think it may continue to fall for those other reasons. Even so, I think this figure rather unlikely to fall below 40% by 2025. So I bet Chris Hallquist at 12-1 odds against this (my $1200 to his $100).
Yes it would be better to bet on software demand directly, and on world stats, not just US stats. But these stats seem hard to find.
Added 3p: US CS/Eng college majors were: 6.5% in ’70, 9.7% in ’80, 9.6% in ’90, 9.4% in ’00, 7.9% in ’10. I’ll give 8-1 odds against > 15% by 2025. US CS majors were: 2.4K in ’70, 15K in ’80, 25K in ’90, 44K in ’00, 59K in ’03, 43K in ’10 (out of 1716K total grads). I’ll give 10-1 against > 200K by 2025.
Added 9Dec: On twitter @harryh accepted my 20-1 bet for $50. And Sam beats my offer:
— Sam (@sflicht) December 10, 2014