Tag Archives: Hypocrisy

A Call To Adventure

I turn 58 soon, and I’m starting to realize that I may not live long enough to finish many of my great life projects. So I want to try to tempt younger folks to continue them. Hence this call to adventure.

One way to create meaning for your life is join a grand project. Or start a new one. A project that is both obviously important, and that might also bring you personal glory, if you were to made a noticeable contribution to it.

Yes, most don’t seek meaning this way. But many of our favorite fictional characters do. If you are one of the few who find grand adventures irresistibly romantic, then this post is for you. I call you to adventure.

Two great adventures actually, in this post. Both seem important, and in the ballpark of doable, at least for the right sort of person.

ADVENTURE ONE: The first adventure is to remake collective decision-making via decision markets (a.k.a. futarchy). Much of the pain and loss in the world results from bad decisions by key organizations, such as firms, clubs, cities, and nations. Some of these bad decisions result because actors with the wrong mix of values hold too much power. But most result from our not aggregating info well; people who could have or did know better were not enticed enough to share what they know. Or others didn’t believe them.

We actually know of a family of simple robust mechanisms that typically do much better at aggregating info. And we have a rough idea of how organizations could use such mechanisms. We even had a large academic literature testing and elaborating these mechanisms, resulting in a big pile of designs, theorems, software, computer simulations, lab tests, and field tests. We don’t need more of these, at least for now.

What we need is concrete evolution within real organizations. Like most good abstract ideas, what this innovation most needs are efforts to work out variations that can fit well in particular existing organization contexts. That is, design and try out variations that can avoid the several practical obstacles that we know about, and help identify more such obstacles to work on.

This adventure less needs intellectuals, and more sharp folks willing to get their hands dirty dealing with the complexities of real organizations, and with enough pull to get real organizations near them to try new and disruptive methods.

Since these mechanisms have great potential in a wide range of organizations, we first need to create versions that are seen to work reliably over a substantial time in concrete contexts where substantial value is at stake. With such a concrete track record, we can then push to get related versions tried in related contexts. Eventually such diffusion could result in better collective decision making worldwide, for many kinds of organizations and decisions.

And you might have been one of the few brave far-sighted heroes who made it happen.

ADVENTURE TWO: The second adventure is to figure out real typical human motives in typical familiar situations. You might think we humans would have figured this out long ago. But as Kevin Simler and I argue in our new book The Elephant in the Brain: Hidden Motives in Everyday Life, we seem to be quite mistaken about our basic motives in many familiar situations.

Kevin and I don’t claim that our usual stated motives aren’t part of the answer, only that they are much less than we like to think. We also don’t claim to have locked down the correct answer in all these situations. We instead offer plausible enough alternatives to suggest that the many puzzles with our usual stories are due to more than random noise. There really are systematic hidden motives behind our behaviors, motives substantially different from the ones we claim.

A good strategy for uncovering real typical human motives is to triangulate the many puzzles in our stated motives across a wide range of areas of human behavior. In each area specialists tend to think that the usual stated motive deserves to be given a strong prior, and they rarely think we’ve acquired enough “extraordinary evidence” to support the “extraordinary claims” that our usual stated motives are wrong. And if you only ever look at evidence in a narrow area, it can be hard to escape this trap.

The solution is expect substantial correlations between our motives in different areas. Look for hidden motive explanations of behaviors that can simultaneously account for puzzles in a wide range of areas, using only a few key assumptions. By insisting on a high ratio of apparently different puzzles explained to new supporting assumptions made, you can keep yourself disciplined enough not to be fooled by randomness.

This strategy is most effective when executed over a lifetime. The more different areas that you understand well enough to see the key puzzles and usual claims, the better you can triangulate their puzzles to find common explanations. And the more areas that you have learned so far, the easier it becomes to learn new areas; areas and methods used to study them tend to have many things in common.

This adventure needs more intellectual heroes. While these heroes may focus for a time on studying particular areas, over the long run their priority is to learn and triangulate many areas. They seek simple coherent accounts that explain diverse areas of human behavior. To figure out what the hell most humans are actually up to most of the time. Which we do not actually know now. And which would enable better policy; today policy reform efforts are often wasted due to mistaken assumptions about actual motives.

Wouldn’t someone who took a lifetime to help work that out be a hero of the highest order?

Come, adventures await. For the few, the brave, the determined, the insightful. Might that be you?

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Hail Humans

Humans developed a uniquely strong and flexible capacity for social norms (see Boehm). Because of this, the praise that humans most crave is an acknowledgment that we are principled. That is, that we (mostly) adhere to the norms of our society, even when doing so is costly. And that includes the norm of calling attention to and punishing norm deviators.

In this post, I want to praise most humans for living up to this standard. This isn’t remotely a trivial accomplishment, and it just doesn’t get enough mention. Again, other animals can’t manage it. And most of us are often sorely tempted to defect.

It is much easier to embrace our society’s norms when we feel that we are winning by those norms, or at least breaking even. In this case we can each justify our norm-supporting sacrifices as the price we each pay to get others to make their sacrifices, to create a functioning society.

But much of our innate programming is tuned to watch for markers of relative status, ways in which some us seem better than others. And by this standard most of us are losers, gaining less than average relative status. (In technical terms, the median of success is well below the mean.)

When we feel like we are losers, so that others are gaining much more from society’s norms than we are, it is easier to doubt if we should continue to personally sacrifice to support those norms. Especially when we suspect that winners tend to win in part because they support some norms less than others do.

I think that in most societies, most losers do in fact suspect most winners of insufficient norm support. And there are some who use that as a justification to excuse their norm deviations. And most losers believe that there are many such deviants, and that such deviants tend to gain as a result of their failures to support norms.

And yet, even when they believe that most winners and many others gain from failing to sufficiently support norms, most losers still pay large personal costs to support most norms most of the time. Yes most everyone deviates sometimes, and yes we often work much harder to create the appearance than the substance of norm support. That is, we often attend more to what looks helpful than what is helpful.

Even so, hail to most humans for supporting their society’s norms enough to make possible society, and civilization. Yes, you might think that some societies have a better set of norms than others. And yes we might lament the lack of enough attention to preserving or inventing good norms.

But still, given that it is the praise that humans most crave to hear, and that they in fact do meet the relevant standard, we should give credit where credit is due. Hail to humans for supporting norms. At least their appearance, for most norms, most of the time.

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Status Hypocrisy

Humans (and some other animals) recognize two kinds of status: good and bad. Good status is “prestige” while bad status is “dominance.” Here is Trump today saying the US wants to be high status in the world, but only via good status:

We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations of the world, but we do so with the understanding that it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first. We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example. We will shine for everyone to follow. (more)

Many animals have a local “pecking order” set by winners of pair-wise physical fights. In some animals, rank is also influenced via prestige elements. For example, babbler birds rise in rank by doing good things for their local group, such as by sharing food and warning against predators. These things count for rank even when gained via violence, such as by fighting other birds for the best places to look out for predators, and by forcing food down the throat of other birds.

Human foragers have strong norms against using or threatening force, and even against bragging about such serious abilities. Hunters may exchange arrows to disguise who deserves credit for good hunts. But foragers are okay with communities having a shared sense of who are better sources of advice, and who are better to emulate and associate with. And it can be okay, in play mode, to brag about play abilities like singing or joking. In The Secret Of Our Success, Joseph Henrich says human cultural evolution was promoted by our tendency to copy behaviors of prestigious people.

Today we tend to say that our leaders have prestige, while their leaders have dominance. That is, their leaders hold power via personal connections and the threat and practice of violence, bribes, sex, gossip, and conformity pressures. Our leaders, instead, mainly just have whatever abilities follow from our deepest respect and admiration regarding their wisdom and efforts on serious topics that matter for us all. Their leaders more seek power, while ours more have leadership thrust upon them. Because of this us/them split, we tend to try to use persuasion on us, but force on them, when seeking to to change behaviors.

You can see this split in typical motives of heroes and villains in fiction, and in how such characters treat their subordinates. It also appears often in war propaganda, such as in accusations about different leadership styles of Trump and Clinton in the US last election.

Firm bosses today tend to be reluctant to give direct orders to subordinates, and prefer a general impression that they have their position mainly because of how much everyone respects their wisdom and effort. Bosses also prefer the impression that their main task is to collect information, apply wisdom, and make good decisions in the firm interest. Subordinates often go along with this story, as they don’t like to publicly accept domination. Employees can just conveniently decide that they respect their boss, and are persuaded by his or her arguments. And firms pay extra for the pretty dynamic bosses to which employees less mind submitting, even if those are worse at making key decisions.

Modern folk often don’t understand how the ancients could have tolerated not having democracy, as we us tell ourselves today that democracy is why we are not dominated by leaders. But while the ancients saw rival nations as under the thumb of tyrants, they themselves had kings whose virtues proved that they deserved their position. And we today look away from evidence that our leaders win elections via illicit means (such as personal connections etc.); our elected leaders are often far from the most prestigious people available. Even if we see most politicians as corrupt, we see our personal politicians as much less so. US residents look away from evidence that the US is not just high status in the world due to its good advice and general helpfulness; the US also uses force, bribes, etc.

Clearly, while there is some fact of the matter about how much a person gains their status via licit or illicit means, there is also a lot of impression management going on. We like to give others the impression that we personally mainly want prestige in ourselves and our associates, and that we only grant others status via the prestige they have earned. But let me suggest that, compared to this ideal, we actually want more dominance in ourselves and our associates than we like to admit, and we submit more often to dominance.

In the following, I’ll offer three lines of evidence for this claim. First consider that we like to copy the consumer purchases of people that we envy, but not of people we admire for being “warm” and socially responsible. I suggest that relative to us, the latter group has prestige while the former has dominance.

Second, consider the fact that when our bosses or presidents retire and leave office, their legitimate prestige should not have diminished much. That is, such people have about the same wisdom and good advice, and they remain as useful a model for copying behavior. Yet others usually show far less interest in associating with such retirees. This suggests that what people really want in associating with bosses is their dominance powers, not their prestigious advice.

For my third line of evidence, consider our differing preferences for short vs. long term mates. We are much more publicly associated with our long term mates, and so we naturally care more about what other people think of them. Their prestige will bleed over onto us. In contrast, short term mating is often done in secret. Thus we should care more about prestige in long term mates, and dominance in short term mates, even if we don’t admit this consciously.

For short term mates, humans seem to mainly care about physical attractiveness. This is in contrast to long term mates and non-sexual short term associates. Women also care about men having a deep voice, and if men are relatively attractive, women like them to show off luxury goods. Women may like creative intelligence in men, but while we can infer overall intelligence quickly and reliably from faces, that just doesn’t much influence how attractive they seem.

While there is a lot of complexity in mating preferences, and we still don’t understand it all, it seems to me that one important component is that for long term mates we more care about prestige features that are good for the group, but for short term mates, we care more about dominance features that are more directly useful to us personally. Physical attractiveness (and a deep voice) shows off capacities for violence and fertility, both of which are useful powers.

Overall intelligence can be good for the group, but for our ancestors it was much less useful to individuals. This may be part of why IQ matters more for national than individual income. We humans may have long known that smarts is good for our groups, and yet made it less of a priority in our selfish choices of associates.

Added 21Jan: The two kinds of status have different kinds of status moves. For example, you look directly at someone prestigious, but avoid looking directly at a dominator.

Added 22Jan: This can help explain why smart & sincere tend to go together.

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Smart Sincere Contrarian Trap

We talk as if we pick our beliefs mainly for accuracy, but in fact we have many social motives for picking beliefs. In particular, we use many kinds of beliefs as group affiliation/conformity signals. Some of us also use a few contrarian beliefs to signal cleverness and independence, but our groups have a limited tolerance for such things.

We can sometimes win socially by joining impressive leaders with the right sort of allies who support new fashions contrary to the main current beliefs. If enough others also join these new beliefs, they can become the new main beliefs of our larger group. At that point, those who continue to oppose them become the contrarians, and those who adopted the new fashions as they were gaining momentum gain more relative to latecomers. (Those who adopt fashions too early also tend to lose.)

As we are embarrassed if we seem to pick beliefs for any reason other than accuracy, this sort of new fashion move works better when supported by good accuracy-oriented reasons for changing to the new beliefs. This produces a weak tendency, all else equal, for group-based beliefs to get more accurate over time. However, many of our beliefs are about what actions are effective at achieving the motives we claim to have. And we are often hypocritical about our motives. Because of this, workable fashion moves need not just good reasons to belief claims about the efficacy of actions for stated motives, but also enough of a correspondence between the outcomes of those actions and our actual motives. Many possible fashion moves are unworkable because we don’t actually want to pursue the motives we proclaim.

Smarter people are better able to identify beliefs better supported by reasons, which all else equal makes those beliefs better candidates for new fashions. So those with enough status to start a new fashion may want to listen to smart people in the habit of looking for such candidates. But reasonably smart people who put in the effort are capable of finding a great many places where there are good reasons for picking a non-status-quo belief. And if they also happen to be sincere, they tend to visibly support many of those contrarian beliefs, even in the absence of supporting fashion movements with a decent chance of success. Which results in such high-effort smart sincere people sending bad group affiliation/conformity signals. So while potential leaders of new fashions want to listen to such people, they don’t want to publicly affiliate with them.

I fell into this smart sincere conformity trap long ago. I’ve studied many different areas, and when I’ve discovered an alternate belief that seems to have better supporting reasons than a usual belief, I have usually not hesitated to publicly embrace it. People have told me that it would have been okay for me to publicly embrace one contrarian belief. I might then have had enough overall status to plausibly lead that as a new fashion. But the problem is that I’ve supported many contrarian beliefs, not all derived from a common core principle. And so I’m not a good candidate to be a leader for any of my groups or contrarian views.

Which flags me as a smart sincere person. Good to listen to behind the scenes to get ideas for possible new fashions, but bad to embrace publicly as a loyal group member. I might gain if my contrarian views eventually became winning new fashions, but my early visible adoption of those views probably discourages others from trying to lead them, as they can less claim to have been first with those views.

If the only people who visibly supported contrarian views were smart sincere people who put in high effort, then such views might become known for high accuracy. This wouldn’t necessarily induce most people to adopt them, but it would help. However, there seem to be enough people who visibly adopt contrarian views for others reasons to sufficiently muddy the waters.

If prediction markets were widely adopted, the visible signals of which beliefs were more accurate would tend to embarrass more people into adopting them. Such people do not relish this prospect, as it would have them send bad group affiliation signals. Smart sincere people might relish the prospect, but there are not enough of them to make a difference, and even the few there are mostly don’t seem to relish it enough to work to get prediction markets adopted. Sincerely holding a belief isn’t quite the same as being willing to work for it.

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Play Blindness

I’ve recently come to see play as a powerful concept for analyzing our behaviors. As I explained recently, play is a very old and robust capacity in many kinds of animals, apparently rediscovered several times.

In non-social play, an animal might play with their body or an object. When they feel safe and satisfied, they carve out a distinct space and time, within which they feel a deep pleasure from just trying out many random ways to interact, all chosen from a relatively safe space of variations. Often animals seek variations wherein they and their play objects reach some sort of interaction equilibrium, as when dribbling a ball. In such equilibria, they can successfully adjust to random interaction variations. Animals may end play abruptly if an non-play threat or opportunity appears.

In social play, an animal again waits until safe and satisfied, and feels pleasure from a large variety of safe behavior within a distinct space and time. The difference is that now they explore behavior that interacts with other animals, seeking equilibria that adjust well to changes in other animals’ behavior. Babies and mothers interact this way, and predators and prey act out variations on chasing and evading. Cats may play with mice before killing them.

These sorts of play can serve many functions, including learning, practice, and innovation. In addition, social play requires social skills of boundary management. That is, animals must develop ways to invite others to play, to indicate the kind of play intended, to assure others when play continues, and to indicate when play has ended. As with grooming, who one plays with becomes a signal of affiliation. Animals can work out their relative status via who tends to “win” inside play games, and communicate other things (such as flirtation) indirectly via play.

As humans have developed more kinds of social behavior, have better ways to communicate, and extend youthful behaviors into our whole lives, we have more ways to play. We can nest some types of play within others, and can create new types of play on the fly. Common features of most human play are some sort of safety prerequisites, a bounded space in which play happens, a feeling of pleasure from being included, a habit of exploring a wide range of options within play, limits on acceptable behavior, and special signals to initiate, continue, and end each play period.

For example, in mild-insult verbal banter play, we must each feel safe enough to focus on the banter, we and our allies are not supposed to threaten or interfere except via the banter, we are supposed to create each new response individually without help, responses are supposed to vary widely instead of repeating predictably, and some types of insults remain off limits. People may get quite emotionally hurt by such banter, but play can only continue while they pretend otherwise.

Another key feature of most human play is that we are supposed to only play for fun, instead of for gains outside of play. So we aren’t supposed to play golf to suck up to the boss, or to join a band to attract dates. Thus we typically suppress awareness of benefits outside of play. Most people find it hard to give coherent explanations of functions of play outside “fun.”

This seems to be one of humanity’s main blind spots regarding our motives. In general we try to explain most of our behaviors using the “highest” plausible motives we can find, and try to avoid violating social norms about appropriate motives. So we can be quite consciously clueless about why we play. That hardly means, however, that play serves no important functions in our lives. Far from it, in fact.

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What Price Kilo-Votes?

Imagine that at every U.S. presidential election, the system randomly picked one random U.S. voter and asked them to pay a fee to become a “kilo-voter.” Come election day, if there is a kilo-voter then the election system officially tosses sixteen fair coins. If all sixteen coins come up heads, the kilo-voter’s vote decides the election. If not, or if there is no kilo-voter, the election is decided as usual via ordinary votes. The kilo-voter only gets to pick between Democrat and Republican nominees, and no one ever learns that they were the kilo-voter that year.

“Kilo voters” are so named because they have about a thousand times a chance of deciding the election as an ordinary voter does. In the 2008 U.S. presidential election the average voter had a one in sixty million chance of deciding who won the election. The chance that sixteen fair coins all come up heads is roughly a thousand times larger than this.

Consider: 1) How much is the typical voter willing to pay to become a kilo-voter? and 2) How much does it cost the typical voter, in time and trouble, to actually vote in a U.S. presidential election? As long as these numbers are both small compared to a voter’s wealth, then for a voter motived primarily by the chance to change the election outcome, these numbers should differ by at least a factor of one thousand.

For example, if it takes you at least a half hour to get to the voting booth and back, and to think beforehand about your vote, and if you make the average U.S. hourly wage of $20, then voting costs you at least $10. In this case you should be willing to pay at least $10,000 to become a super-voter, if you are offered the option. Me, I very much doubt that typical voters would pay $10,000 to become secret kilo-voters.

Yes, the 2008 election influenced the lives of 305 million U.S. residents, and someone who cared enough might pay a lot for a higher chance of deciding such an election. But typical voters would not pay a lot. Which suggests that the chance to decide the election is just not the main reason that they vote. The chance of being decisive actually doesn’t seem to matter remotely as much to typical voting behavior as it should to someone focused on changing outcomes. For example, states where voters have much higher chances of being decisive about the president don’t have much higher voter turnout rates, and turnout is actually lower in local and state elections where the chances of being decisive is higher.

My conclusion: we don’t mainly vote to change the outcome.

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Can’t Stop Lecturing

Imagine a not-beloved grade school teacher who seemed emotionally weak to his students, and was fastidious about where exactly everything was on his desk and in his classroom. If the students moved things around when the teacher wasn’t looking, this teacher would seem disrupted and give long boring lectures against such behavior. This sort of reaction might well encourage students to move things, just to get a rise out of the teacher.

Imagine a daughter who felt overly controlled and under considered by clueless parents, and who was attracted to and tempted to get involved with a particular “bad boy.” Imagine that these parents seemed visibly disturbed by this, and went out of their way to lecture her often about why bad boys are a bad idea, though never actually telling her anything she didn’t think she already knew. In such a case, this daughter might well be more tempted to date this bad boy, just to bother her parents.

Today a big chunk of the U.S. electorate feels neglected by a political establishment that they don’t especially respect, and is tempted to favor political bad boy Donald Trump. The main response of our many establishments, especially over the last few weeks, has been to constantly lecture everyone about how bad an idea this would be. Most of this lecturing, however, doesn’t seem to tell Trump supporters anything they don’t think they already know, and little of it acknowledges reasonable complaints regarding establishment neglect and incompetence.

By analogy with these other cases, the obvious conclusion is that all this tone-deaf sanctimonious lecturing will not actually help reduce interest in Trump, and may instead increase it. But surely an awful lot of our establishments must be smart enough to have figured this out. Yet the tsunami of lectures continues. Why?

A simple interpretation in all of these cases is that people typically care more about making sure they are seen to take a particular moral stance than they care about the net effect of their lectures on behavior. The teacher with misbehaving students cares more about showing everyone he has a valid complaint than he does about reducing misbehavior. The parents of a daughter dating a bad boy care more about showing they took the correct moral stance than they do about whether she actually dates him. And members of the political establishment today care more about making it clear that they oppose Trump than they do about actually preventing him from becoming president.

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Super-Factor Scenario

A man always has two reasons for doing anything: a good reason and the real reason. J. P. Morgan

In economics today, as in many related fields, data analysis is king, and theory takes a back seat, at least as far as status goes. When people celebrate particular exemplary data analyses, they usually point to a use of difficult statistical techniques, or more commonly to some clever idea for how certain data could speak to an important question. They point far less often to what is more often the real limiting factor: access to relevant data, and to resources (such as time and student assistance) to process that data. Organizations with data are far more willing to show them to academics from prestigious institutions.

This is part of a more general pattern: when we give people status, the criteria we claim to use to choose who gets status often differs substantially from our real criteria. Let’s see how that might play out regarding the strong claim I posted on Saturday:

If we put together a huge super-dataset describing many individual people in as many ways as possible, a factor analysis of this dataset may find important new super-factors that span many of these features domains. Such super-factors would be promising candidates to use in a wide range of social research, and social policy. (more)

When someone finally does this data analysis that I’ve proposed, and finds some super-factors, they will be rightly celebrated. But what will they be celebrated for? Their main actual contribution will have been to get some organization to pony up enough resources to look for super-factors. But that’s not the sort of thing for which we like to celebrate intellectuals. So I predict that such people will instead be celebrated for the very idea of looking for super factors, for looking for a certain kind of super-factor, or for a clever computational or statistical technique used in the search.

There isn’t much risk of people finding my post and using that to undercut this celebration. I know of many cases where prestigious academics were celebrated for “insights” that others had expressed beforehand. As long as those others and/or their venues were of sufficiently lower status, academics see no conflict. Should anyone make an issue of it, there are always differing details that can be seized on to explain why the two ideas were really quite different.

If we had prediction markets on such things, and used them as the main way we allocated credit on such claims, well then in that case I might be able to lock in great rewards now, rewards that others couldn’t steal later. But that is one of the reasons we don’t want prediction-market-based rewards. In the end we like most of our hypocrisies, including those involving giving people status for different reasons than we claim.

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Masking Design Competence

Most real organizations have many design problems. This is most explicit in engineering type organizations, but such issues are nearly as common in all organizations. Any organization must make many choices regarding the design and marketing of their product or service, in how it will be financed, sourced, produced, tested, stored, transferred, priced, evaluated, etc.

For most such design problems, most organizations have some standard ideal design criteria. The organization is supposed to search in the space of possible designs for ones expected to do well according to the ideal criteria. And then adopt those better designs. In profit-oriented firms, many key criteria are closely aligned with firm profit.

According to the usual ideal norm in organizations, everything should be arranged to promote good designs according to the ideals. For example, the people who most influence a design choice should be those with the most relevant info and the strongest incentives to get it right. People should be hired and promoted according to their ability to help make good design choices. Designs should be changed when circumstances suggest that the ideal design has changed. And so on.

Real organizations also have complex Machiavellian politics. Coalitions form that promote their members at the expense of rivals. Members are chosen for their loyalty and ability to help the coalition. Coalitions sometimes reform, dropping some factions and adding others. Members must show loyalty to their coalitions by visibly promoting design choices that benefit their coalition, even when that comes at the expense of the organization’s ideal design criteria.

This conflict between design choices that meet ideals and those that help coalitions drives may of the illusions and hypocrisies in organizations. For example, people are often placed in positions of power for reasons other than their superior design competence, such as their info and abilities regarding key decisions. This creates a demand to give those people the illusion of design competence.

For example:

When I started at Lockheed Research in 1985, my mentor was a veteran who explained his secret for getting funding from the other Lockheed divisions:

Find an idea for a project we could do for them, but don’t tell them the idea. Instead break the idea into a few key parts, describe the parts to them, and let them put the parts together into the total idea. They will be much more willing to fund a project that is their idea.

A related strategy is to design a solution but then weaken it to a space of nearby solutions. Tell your manager “I think something in this space should work but I can’t figure out what” and let him reinvent your particular solution point. He then owns the design more, and can claim more credit for design competence.

As another example, as I’ve mentioned before people often pretend to ask people for advice as if they wanted info, but in fact they are seeking allies. In general, boards of advisors are rarely actually asked for their advice; they are mainly chosen to add prestige to an organization.

Meetings in organizations often take the appearance of searching for design proposals and evaluating proposals presented. But in fact proposals have usually been selected beforehand, and the meeting is to create an appearance of support form them, and for the story presented about who deserves credit. If a problem is presented for which a solution isn’t offered, that is probably because they don’t don’t see a solution with which they’d want to be associated, and would rather someone else take on that failure area.

Powerful people can also create the appearance of more design competence than they actually have by pushing vague design philosophies that others can then claim to adhere to without actually greatly constraining their choices. Also, powerful people can claim that complex organizational considerations require them to keep the reasons for their design choices secret. Others can then just assume they must have great design competence regarding such considerations.

It helps to have a culture of assuming that the people with the best credentials in terms of education and prior organization and positional prestige have the most design competence. Since these people happen to the those that are most useful for coalitions to put into positions of power, the conflict between power and apparent design competitions is reduced.

Can readers think of more examples? If so, I’ll add good ones to this post.

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Effective Altruism Complaints

The Boston Review asked eleven people to respond to an essay by Peter Singer on effective altruism, i.e., on using careful analysis to pick acts that do the most good, even when less emotionally satisfying. For example, one might work at a less satisfying job that earns more, so that one can donate more. Response quotes are at the end of this post.

The most common criticisms were these: five people complained that in effective altruism the people helped don’t directly participate in the decision making process, and three people complained that charity efforts targeted directly at people in need distract from efforts to change political outcomes. Taken at face value, these seem odd criticisms, as they seem to apply equally to all charity efforts, and not just to this approach to charity. Yet I doubt these people have published essays complaining about charity in general. So I’m tempted to try to read between the lines, and ask: what is their real issue?

Charity plausibly has a signaling function, at least in part. Charity can let us show others our wealth, our conformity to standard social norms, and our loyalty to particular groups. Charity can also display our reassuring emotional reactions to hearing or seeing others in need or pain. Charity can also let us assert our dominance over and higher status than the people we help, especially if we control their lives a lot in the process. (There are birds who gain status by forcing food down the throats of others who lose status as a result.)

The main complaint above, on including the helped in decisions, seems closely related to showing dominance via charity that controls. But again, how is this problem worse for effective altruism charity, relative to all other charity?

I think the key is the empathy signaling function. People who give because of emotional feelings induced by seeing or hearing those in need are seen as having friendlier and less suspect motives, and people who participate in a political process that includes those they help are also seen as treating them more as equals. In contrast, people with an abstract distant less emotional relation to those in need, whom they help directly as opposed to indirectly via politics, are seen as less having a personal-like relation to those they help, and so are more plausibly trying to dominate them, or to achieve some other less relational purpose.

This interpretation, that the main dislike about effective altruists is their less displaying empathy emotions, is also supported by two other criticisms made of Singer’s essay: two people complained that effective altruism relies too much on numbers and other abstractions, and two people complained that it can be very hard to estimate many numbers.

Imagine someone who said they were in love with you, cared about you, and wanted to live with you to help you, but who didn’t seem very emotionally engaged in this. They instead talked a lot about calculations they’d done on how you two could live your lives together well. You might suspect them of having ulterior motives, such as wanting to gain sex, money, or status from you. Maybe the same sort of thing is going on in charity. We want and expect a certain sort of emotional relation to people who help us, and to people who help the same people we help, and people who say they are trying to help but who won’t join in the usual emotions in the usual way may seem suspect. We’d be more likely to find fault with their approach, and to suspect them of bad ulterior motives.

Those quotes from responses to Singer: Continue reading "Effective Altruism Complaints" »

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