Tag Archives: History

Great Depression

Conventional wisdom tends to treat President Hoover as a clueless advocate of laissez faire who refused to stimulate the economy in the dramatic downturn. Franklin Roosevelt, on the other hand, was the heroic leader who both saved the day and transformed the American economy through his promotion of the New Deal. …

There is little corroboration in the historical record for this simplistic storyline. … Most of what both Presidents did in fiscal policy had little impact on the Depression one way or another. … The consensus view is that FDR’s [main] policy success was the abandonment of the gold standard in 1933.

Though there is still a lively popular debate about the “true” cause of the Great Depression, there is nonetheless a strong expert consensus … The Fed’s focus on curbing speculation in the stock market by restricting lending—as well as its unwillingness to extend liquidity and expand the money supply in the face of a collapsing economy and a wave of bank panics in the early 1930s—deeply aggravated the severity and extent of the downturn.

That is John Nye.  Read and learn.

Ancient Hobbits

It remains one of the greatest human fossil discoveries of all time. The bones of a race of tiny primitive people, who used stone tools to hunt pony-sized elephants and battle huge Komodo dragons, were discovered on the Indonesian island of Flores in 2004. …

According to a growing number of scientists, Homo floresiensis is probably a direct descendant of some of the first apemen to evolve on the African savannah three million years ago. …  It sounds improbable but the basic physical similarity between the two species is striking. … Analysis of Lucy’s skeleton shows it has great similarities with the bones of H. floresiensis, although her species died out millions of years ago while the hobbits hung on in Flores until about 17,000 years ago. …

The crucial point about this interpretation is that it explains why the Flores people had such minuscule proportions. … In research that provides further support for this idea, scientists have recently dated some stone tools on Flores as being around 1.1 million years old, far older than had been previously supposed. … He has now uncovered stone tools on nearby Sulawesi. These could be almost two million years old.

More here.  HT Tyler.

Capital In Conflict

Until a few centuries ago economic growth rates were well below feasible population growth rates.  This gave a “Malthusian” state, as in most animal species, where population was near its max sustainable level.  To learn more about our distant future, which will probably be in such a state, let us learn more about our Malthusian past.  In particular, consider two important clues:

  1. Slack – As measured either by kids per mom or hours of work a day, most recent pre-industrial societies were ~30-70% below their simple Malthusian limit.
  2. Interest – Even after correcting for depreciation and failure-to-pay, for many thousands of years interest rates have been far above population growth rates.

(Data on both clues in Greg Clark’s Farewell to Alms.)

The slack clue can be explained via local cultural norms (i.e., signaling equilibria).  For example, pre-industrial English women married at ~26; those who married earlier had more kids, but at the cost of lower husband quality and threatened kid survival.  In societies with low work hour norms, harder workers faced ridicule and theft.  They attracted worse spouses and couldn’t use all their extra product to feed more kids.

Since social norms varied greatly across societies, however, it is puzzling that competition between neighboring societies didn’t favor societies with norms that put them closer to the Malthusian limit.  When neighboring groups clashed, why didn’t those with norms favoring denser populations tend to win out?

Interest rates appear in prices for renting land, borrowing silver, etc.  Social norm variety also makes high interest rates puzzling.  Local subgroups with a norm of saving capital and reinvesting as much as possible should in principle quickly outgrown groups who instead borrowed, rented, etc.  Soon even a small fraction of the interest on their wealth could paid for many more kids.

We can explain each of these puzzles by assuming that labor and capital have a different value relative to labor in conflicts, relative to more directly making food etc.  However these two explanations are somewhat at odds.

On the slack clue, cultures that limited their fertility and work hours should have had more capital per person.  In conflicts with neighboring cultures, perhaps low capital cultures were more often intimidated or seduced by folks from individually-richer high capital cultures.  Or perhaps such capital was especially useful in warfare.

On the interest clue, subgroups in a society who accumulated more wealth, relative to other groups, would end up with more capital relative to labor than other subgroups.  Other groups would then be tempted to steal that capital.  Perhaps labor is just especially useful in stealing capital, while capital is especially easy to steal relative to labor, especially given very large capital to labor ratios.  Perhaps this Biblical rule was to limit harm from predictable periodic predation:

The Jubilee year … required the compulsory return of all property to its original owners or their heirs, except the houses of laymen within walled cities, in addition to the manumission of all Israelite indentured servants.

Problem is, these two explanations are somewhat at odds – the first assumes that capital is especially strong, relative to labor, in conflicts with neighboring societies, while the second assumes that capital is especially weak, relative to labor, in conflicts within a society.  Can both really be true?

No English Gene Classes

Greg Clark gave a talk here Thursday, and presented data showing that in the long run, England has no social classes!  When English surnames were first created, they marked the status of folks.  The village smith, for example, was called “Smith.”  But by now, those rich and poor surnames are totally mixed – a surname tells you little about someone’s status.  For example, this table describes a sample of once-rich names with especially low rates of mistaken names changes:

surnamehistory2

Clark claims this does not contradict the main thesis of his recent book:

A Farewell to Alms argued that for 800 years at least in pre-industrial England the rich were taking over the society demographically, and replacing the poor.  The evidence above of the dominance of regression to the mean may seem to contradict that argument.  But there is no conflict.  The rich can still have a reproductive advantage within each generation.  It is just that the rich change from generation to generation under the forces of regression to the mean.  But if the argument of A Farewell to Alms is correct then the rich in 1600, or in any generation, should have many more descendants by 1851 than the poor, even though by 1851 they are no longer distinguishable by occupation, income, or wealth. While there was complete regression to the mean in terms of economic status, we do observe that the rich of 1600 left many more descendants than the poor.  … Economic success by a man in 1600 substantially increased his share of their genes in the English gene pool by 1851, as was predicted in A Farewell to Alms.

Substantially increased?  Going from 0.45% to 0.59% of the population is a gain of 31%, but a 31% gain by the rich in six centuries is hardly enough to “take over” England genetically in anything less than tens of thousands of years!  Even if we assume twice this gain from illegitimate kids, clearly Clark’s new work has shown his main book thesis false.

Not Guilty By Reading

[In England] after 1170, … as part of the Compromise of Avranches, Henry … agreed that the secular courts, with few exceptions (high treason being one of them), had no jurisdiction over the clergy. … Defendants demonstrated their clerical status by reading from the Bible. This opened the door to literate lay defendants’ also claiming the benefit of clergy. In 1351 … the benefit of clergy was officially extended to all who could read. …

The Biblical passage traditionally used … [was the first verse of] Psalm 51 [which] …. became known as the neck verse, because knowing it could save one’s neck by transferring one’s case from a secular court, where hanging was a likely sentence, to an ecclesiastical court, … [where] if the defendant swore an oath to his own innocence and found twelve compurgators to swear likewise … he was acquitted. … By the 15th century, most convictions in these courts led to a sentence of penance. …

Henry VII decreed that non-clergymen should be allowed to plead the benefit of clergy only once … [and] were branded on the thumb, and the brand disqualified them from pleading the benefit of clergy in the future. (In 1547, the privilege of claiming benefit of clergy more than once was extended to peers [i.e., Nobleman] of the realm, even illiterate ones.)

In 1512, Henry VIII further restricted the benefit of clergy by making certain offences “unclergyable” offenses; … This restriction was condemned by Pope Leo X … [and led] to Henry VIII splitting the Church of England from the Roman Catholic Church in 1532.  In 1575, a statute of Elizabeth I … the benefit of clergy … it did not nullify the conviction, but rather changed the sentence for first-time offenders from probable hanging to branding and up to a year’s incarceration.

More here.  The English literate classes had quite a conspiracy going to help themselves at the expense of others!  HT Greg Clark.

Added 11a: From stats Clark showed in a talk, it seems most folks people did not invoke this benefit.  This was not a benefit given to all.

Our World In Ape Eyes

While humans have adapted a bit to our modern world, we are mostly forest apes tossed into tech cities and told to deal or die.  So we deal.  But to understand how exactly we deal, it would help to see how our world looks to a forest ape, especially in terms of their cues for conditional behavior.  Let me explain.

The environment of our ape ancestors varied from time to time and place to place.  So our ancestors evolved not just a typical behavior for a typical environment, but they also evolved ways to condition their behavior on environmental changes.  For common types of environments, flagged by cheap noticeable clues, our ancestors should have evolved to notice those cues and then switch to environment-behavior.

So what does our world look like, in terms of the clues that our ancestors might have used to condition their behavior?  We are:

  1. Exposed to an unusually large number of unknown people, with varied customs, as if two tribes had just merged.
  2. Exposed to strange new things, as if just entereing a new region with new terrain, plants, animals, etc.
  3. In a time of great plenty, as if the weather had been favorable lately, or we had just entered a rich unpopulated region.

So what should we have expected our ancestors do in such situations?

  1. When tribes merge, and new coalitions are not yet clear, you should start out being nice to most everyone; tit for tat begins as nice.  You should be interested to learn about many folks, seeking good allies, and be eager to make good first impressions on those you meet.
  2. In a new region with strange terrain, plants, animals, etc., you should be cautious in actions, and eager to hear of news about new things.  You’ll want to affiliate with folks who consistently have news first, and want others to think you are such a person.
  3. In good times, invest in assets that will last until the coming bad times.  Groups may clear a path, explore a cave, send a colony to a new place, or settle old scores.  Individuals may collect body fat, have kids, and collect allies.  To get and keep allies, signal your long-term abilities and loyalties, via feasts, medicine, building homes, and revenge killings.  Perhaps do something dramatic that folks will talk about for years.

So, in summary, to our ancestor’s eyes, compared with their world our should look like a place to be: nicer, fatter, more fertile, more curious about new folks, things, and places, and more eager to signal our long-term abilities and loyalties.

This theoretical analysis gets many things right, though not our reduced fertility.

Neutrality Isn’t Popular

Wikipedia on Thucydides:

Thucydides has been dubbed the father of “scientific history” due to his strict standards of evidence-gathering and analysis in terms of cause and effect without reference to intervention by the gods, … [and] the father of the school of political realism, which views the relations between nations as based on might rather than right.

This famously objective historian was however actually rather partisan:

If Herodotus retains his proper title as the “father of history,” Thucydides, his younger contemporary and author of the “History of the Peloponnesian War,” an elaborate account of that bloody 30-year internecine spat between Athens and Sparta in the 5th century, B.C., might be called the father of all those historians who aspire to comprehend the past coolly, objectively, dispassionately, scientifically and without a brief for any partisan cause. He was the first sociologist. Or so we have blithely tended to believe. …

Contrary to prevailing notions that Thucydides penned his work from a distant, Olympian remove, he was actually a participant — an accomplice, really — in the war he so eloquently and painstakingly depicted; his was a partisan’s point of view. A general high in the Athenian command earlier in the war, he was forced into exile after he lost Amphipolis to the enemy in 422. Years later, he wrote his account to defend his actions and indeed those of his class. Democracy was, he believed, ever prone to dangle before citizens the deceptive promises and baubles of demagogues like Alcibiades, at whose door he placed blame for the Sicilian debacle. And so it was Athenian democracy itself that caused Athens’s eventual defeat, not her more enlightened generals like Nicias and himself. The “History,” according to Kagan, represented as much as anything else Thucydides’ apologia, not a detached rationalist’s tale of simple cause and effect.

Real objectivity is much more a niche than a mass market.  So while one might expect the rare historian to try to be cool and objective, one should be surprised to find that such a historian is very popular.  So one should have been surprised by Thucydides’ popularity, given his supposed objectivity.  Learning that he was in fact quite partisan resolves that puzzle quite nicely.